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Abstract 
The emergence of the human rights paradigm has been the most profound 
development in redefining the relationship between citizens and the state in Canada. 
In the sixties an explosion of new and vibrant social movements rocked Canada, from 
gay liberationism to feminism. Among these social activists was a new generation of 
civil liberties and human rights associations, dedicated to the defence of individual 
freedoms and rights irrespective of individuals' background and beliefs. These 'rights 
associations' emerged in every province in Canada and came to be the dominant 
advocates for individual rights after they eclipsed the work of organized labour with 
the decline of the Jewish Labour Committee in the 1970s. Despite a unity of purpose, 
bitter debates raged within and among rights associations over questions of ideology, 
the validity of state funding, and how to form a national rights association. Many of 
these debates were characteristic ofthe obstacles facing all social movement 
organizations in Canada in the sixties and seventies. This thesis explores the early 
history of the four oldest surviving rights associations in Canada: The British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Ligue des droits de l'homme, The Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, and The Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights 
Association. Among the issues mobilizing these activists in the 1960s and 1970s 
were censorship, drug laws, denominational education, police brutality, the October 
crisis of 1970, and the rights of prisoners, natives and welfare recipients. These four 
11 
case studies provide insights into both the development of a uniquely twentieth 
century social movement and several controversial public debates during this period, 
and demonstrate the power, and the limitations, of human rights activism. 
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Introduction 
Two events, separated by time and geography, symbolize the central themes of 
this dissertation. In 1946 a royal commission was instituted by the federal 
government to investigate allegations by Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cypher clerk 
defecting from the Soviet Union, of a spy ring operating in Canada. In October 1970 
the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) kidnapped James Cross, the British High 
Commission's senior Trade Commissioner in Montreal, and Pierre Laporte, a Quebec 
cabinet minister, in an effort to promote Quebec independence. These are the only 
two moments in Canadian history when wartime powers, under the War Measures 
Act, were employed during peacetime to suppress a perceived threat to the state. 
Habeas corpus was suspended, people were arrested and interrogated by the police 
without access to legal counsel, and reputations were sullied as a result of the stigma 
attached to being associated with an act of treason. A less appreciated consequence of 
these events was their impact in stimulating the creation of organizations dedicated to 
the defence of individual freedoms. Since the 1930s, with a short period of inactivity 
in the late 1950s, an amalgam of organizations have existed across the country with 
the express purpose of defending the rights of all Canadians irrespective of any 
distinctions such as race or political belief. The espionage commission and the 
October crisis were met with profound opposition from rights activists, and led to the 
formation of new rights associations across the country. 
Since the sixties a host of new social movements have emerged. William K. 
Carroll, a sociologist specializing in Canadian social movements, has characterized 
the 1960s and 1970s as "the climax of a period of social movement activism in 
Canada."1 One manifestation of these movements were social movement 
organizations: groups dedicated to realizing the goals of a particular movement. Gay 
men in Vancouver and Toronto met in their homes to form the country's first gay 
rights groups; women came together in their basements or community centres to 
develop a program of action to raise awareness of such issues as abortion and equal 
pay; students congregated outside classrooms in universities to organize campus 
demonstrations to demand a say in the governance of the university; and in 
Vancouver, men and women concerned about the impact of nuclear testing on the 
environment united to form what would become one of the most recognized advocacy 
groups in the world. These patterns were repeated time and time again in the homes, 
offices, and street comers of cities and towns in Canada, bringing together people 
concerned about children, prisoners, welfare recipients, lesbians, natives and a host of 
other constituents and issues. Social movement activism defined the sixties and 
seventies. 
Many of these activists clothed their demands in the language of human rights. 
These activists, and the beliefs they promulgated, constituted a veritable human rights 
movement in which they all shared a common desire for liberty and equality. One 
manifestation of the human rights movement, virtually absent from the historical 
2 
record, was the rise of 'rights associations.' Rights associations, in the context of this 
study, are narrowly defined. Laurie S. Wiseberg and Burns H. Weston offer a useful 
definition for understanding the distinction between rights associations and other 
social movement organizations employing human rights discourse: 
[A rights association is] a voluntary organization which is independent 
of both government and all groups which seek direct political power, 
and that does not itself seek such power .... [A rights association] 
monitors government behavior and tries to hold the government 
accountable to human rights standards .... What distinguishes a [rights 
association] from other political actors is that the latter, typically, seek 
to protect the rights of their members or constituents only; a [rights 
association] seeks to secure the rights for all members of society .... On 
the whole, [rights associations] are not mass-based organizations"2 
These 'rights associations' distinguished themselves within the human rights 
movement in that they did not serve any specific constituency, they were non-partisan, 
and they were self-identified 'civil liberties' or 'human rights' associations.3 Prior to 
the sixties, there had only been a sprinkling of such organizations across Canada, 
barely a dozen organizations active at one point in time. However, by the 1980s, 
more than forty rights associations had emerged across the country since 1962. The 
history of these 'rights associations' is the subject of this work. 
The following dissertation charts the history of the human rights movement in 
Canada as embodied in a network of associations created in the sixties and seventies. 
Rights associations offer us a window into how people have sought to define and 
apply ideas about human rights. Movements are defined by the beliefs they 
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propagate, but they are composed of the people who articulate and shape, sometimes 
imperfectly, those beliefs. Although rights associations do not constitute the human 
rights movement, to isolate them from the movement is to deny the very purpose for 
which these organizations existed. A history of rights associations is a history of a 
small but integral manifestation of the human rights movement. 
Canadian historians have only recently begun to probe the evolution of the 
rights paradigm through the eyes of social activists. Ross Lambertson (Repression 
and Resistance, 2004) and Christopher MacLennan (Toward the Charter, 2003) have 
written about the early history of the human rights movement. Similar work by 
Carmela Patrias, Ruth Frager and James Walker on Jewish activists and racial 
minorities; George Egerton on the impact of religious doctrine on human rights 
discourse; and William Schab as on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
evidence of increasing interest among historians in this field of study.4 With the 
exception of Lucie Laurin's 1985 history of the Ligue des droits et libertes in 
Montreal, however, this literature fails to address the development of rights 
associations since the sixties.5 Some of the key human rights issues discussed in this 
work include denominational education, police brutality, censorship, and the October 
CriSIS. 
An important assumption informing this work is that there are two identifiable 
'generations' of civil liberties and human rights activists in Canada. The first 
generation had its roots in the 1930s and peaked in the 1940s; the second generation 
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emerged in the sixties and continues to be active today. Within the international 
literature on human rights the term 'generations' is often used to explain changing 
ideas about rights, such as references to a generation of civil and political rights 
followed by a generation of social and economic rights. Generations, in the context 
of this study, however, is not a reference to new ideas about rights but to the activists 
themselves. The rights associations of the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by the 
baby boomers. Walter Thompson was fresh out of law school in 1972 when he joined 
the Nova Scotia Civil Liberties Association (and became president a few years later) 
and Norman Whalen, a founding member and future president of the Newfoundland-
Labrador Human Rights Association, was on the cusp of finishing his articling 
position in St. John's when he became involved in the association. None of the 
individuals who attempted to form a national rights association in the 1940s was 
present in the 1970s when a national federation of rights associations was born in 
Montreal. 
As the following work will demonstrate, the two generations were 
characterized by different dynamics. Each generation of activists operated within a 
different historical context. The expansion of the welfare state, concerns over the use 
of illegal narcotics among middle class youth, the Quiet Revolution and other 
developments shaped the activism of the second generation of rights associations. 
Building upon the successes of their predecessors, these rights associations engaged 
with a host of new human rights issues. 
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The second generation of rights associations began with the creation ofthe 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in 1962. Since this dissertation is 
primarily concerned with social movement organizations, this work is organized in 
such a way as to highlight the perspectives of the four groups under study as opposed 
to providing a comprehensive analysis of every human rights issue of the period. The 
research conducted for this project touched on more than two-dozen rights 
associations, including at least one group in every province. Some of the empirical 
work on these other organizations is presented in the appendix. However, in order to 
provide a focussed, intensive discussion of individual associations over an extended 
period of time, four rights associations have been carefully selected as case studies. 
The four case studies are geographically distinct, they are divided equally between the 
two major ideological camps of rights associations (human rights and civil liberties), 
they include associations from both small and large urban centres, and one 
francophone association was included. Although only four groups are discussed in 
detail, many of the conclusions reached in this work can be applied to other rights 
associations. 
Chapter one briefly surveys some ideas about the nature of human rights, 
including conceptual distinctions between civil liberties and human rights. Chapter 
two reviews the theoretical underpinnings of this work, with a particular focus on 
social movement theory and the nature of human rights activism. Part II begins with 
chapter three, a brief survey of the first generation of rights associations in Canada, 
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from the 1930s to the 1950s. Since the case studies in this work are presented as one 
manifestation of a larger social movement, chapter four will endeavour to chart the 
'rights revolution' of the twentieth century, although such a monumental task can 
only receive a cursory examination in this context. Chapters five to seven of this 
dissertation establish the necessary historical context for understanding the emergence 
of rights associations in the sixties: a brief examination of the October crisis, possibly 
the most important human rights issue of the period (chapter five); a review of various 
failed attempts to form a national rights association (chapter six); and an introduction 
to the role of state funding in supporting rights associations (chapter seven). Chapters 
eight through eleven (Part III) embody most of the empirical work in this study. Each 
chapter presents the early history of the four oldest and most active rights associations 
in Canada, and the chapters are organized chronologically from the point of each 
group's inception: the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (Vancouver, 
1962), Ligue des droits de l'homme (Montreal, 1963), the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (Toronto, 1964), and the Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights 
Association (St. John's, 1968). 
Many of the issues dealt with in this work are specific to the history of rights 
associations, but they are also a manifestation of other developments in Canada. In 
the latter half of the twentieth century, new human rights issues caught the 
imagination of Canadians and the positions adopted by rights associations, as well as 
the ideological divisions among them, were partly a manifestation of these new 
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developments. In addition to exploring the history of the sixties and seventies from 
the perspective of human rights activists, the organizational concerns facing rights 
associations were consistent with the experience of many middle class social 
movement organizations of this period. The history of the four rights associations in 
this work challenges the assumption that state funding, at a time when government 
funding for social movement organizations reached unprecedented levels, necessarily 
limits or constrains social activism.6 Similarly, new communications technology, 
cheaper air travel and an expanding pool of individuals becoming involved in social 
movement organizations created new opportunities for organizing at the national 
level. One of the key issues dealt with in this work is the inability of rights 
associations to form an inclusive national association and, while this failure is 
primarily rooted in factors specific to these groups, it is also a testament to the 
obstacles facing all social movement organizations seeking to form a national 
association in a physically immense, regionally diverse, and culturally divided nation. 
Many of these topics are addressed in the theoretical literature on social movements 
and human rights, particularly by sociologists in the United States and Europe, but 
what is lacking is an intensive, long-term empirical study ofthe activities of social 
movement organizations that only an historical study can offer. 
Historians have paid little attention to the history of social movement 
organizations in Canada except for political associations, and few scholars have 
attempted to chart an entire network of organizations dedicated to the same cause. 
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Historical work on the rights paradigm often focuses on the state and the role of state 
actors in promoting and defending human rights. The history of these four 
organizations offers a glimpse into how non-state actors have articulated, promoted 
and struggled with varying notions of rights. A study of human rights at this 
particular juncture is propitious; as Maxine Molyneux and Siar Lazar have recently 
noted, the "focus on security issues following the attacks of 11 September 2001 has 
set the human rights agenda back, causing some to wonder if the ascendancy ofthe 
human rights agenda is over."7 A history of human rights activism can act as a useful 
reminder of the need for constant vigilance against unnecessary and violent attacks on 
fundamental freedoms, as well as the limits of this type of advocacy. 
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Part 1: Social Movements and the Age of Rights 
Chapter One: 
What are Human Rights?8 
One of the first explorations into the history of human rights in Canada was 
penned in 1966 by Walter Tarnopolsky in a work titled The Canadian Bill of Rights. 
From the outset he made it clear that he used the terms 'civil liberties' and 'human 
rights' interchangeably.9 Among rights associations, however, there were important 
distinctions between human rights and civil liberties associations. A key theme 
throughout this work is to identify and understand this ideological divide. As a result, 
it would be useful to develop a tentative framework for explaining how and why 
rights associations adopted these ideological labels. 
Civil Rights, Political Rights, and Social, Economic and Cultural Rights10 
Any attempt to define separate categories of rights is a risky endeavour. A 
great deal of the literature dealing with human rights depends on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the two covenants, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as reference points for 
distinguishing between differing categories of rights. Yet, the right to self-
determination in the ICCPR (1.1) requires some recognition ofthe economic, social 
and cultural rights in the ICESCR; the right to family is enshrined in both the ICCPR 
(23.2) and the ICESCR (23.2); and, the right to join a union in the ICCPR (10.1) is 
also entrenched in the ICESCR (8.1). Is an economic right to be defined, as 
Tarnopolsky suggested in 1966, as the right to own and not be deprived of property, 
or is it a right to social security, as C.B. Macpherson suggested twenty years later? 
Categorizing rights is thus an artificial exercise at best. It is true that, as the 
following study will demonstrate, rights associations did not always share the same 
priorities, and this can be partially explained by these ideological distinctions. Yet, as 
with any social movement organization with a high turnover rate, the priorities and 
positions of rights associations continually shifted and were never pre-determined. 
As a result, this exercise should only be undertaken with the understanding that these 
boundaries "can obviously be blurred and quite arbitrary." 11 
C.B. Macpherson offers a useful standard for categorizing rights: "The civil 
rights are chiefly rights against the state, that is, claims for individual freedoms which 
the state cannot invade. The political rights are rights to a voice in control of the 
state. The economic and social rights are claims for benefits to be guaranteed by the 
state, both by legislation and by positive promotion of services and income 
supplements."12 Using this framework, civil rights are herein understood as property 
rights and the rule of law. These rights include freedom of contract and the right to 
property (and to not be deprived of property without compensation), to withhold one's 
labour and to join a trade union. Civil rights also encompass basic legal rights such as 
11 

Social, economic and cultural rights are difficult to enforce because the nature 
and scope of such rights are often defined by the current government. Nonetheless, in 
principle social rights are equally legitimate human rights. 16 As Peter Bailey asks, "is 
not the sight of a starving beggar in a street in Sri Lanka, or of an exploited migrant 
worker in an Australian heavy industry workshop, or of an unhealthy pregnant woman 
unable to obtain decent medical care, or of an uneducated and illiterate refugee 
attempting to find work in a country of resettlement, not equally an affront to basic 
rights?" 17 
Negative versus Positive Rights 
If we hope to understand the nuances behind differing forms of rights 
activism, it is critical to go beyond simply identifying various types of rights. An 
interesting theme in the history of rights associations in Canada has been the decision 
by many human rights organizations to embrace economic, social and cultural rights 
while civil liberties associations have generally avoided this type of advocacy. One 
way of explaining this distinction is to distinguish between negative and positive 
rights. When civil liberties activists argue that people must be free from restraint in 
carrying out their desires (e.g., freedom from restrictions on personal behaviour), they 
are articulating a conception of liberty based on negative rights. In his ground-
breaking essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," Isaiah Berlin suggested that if"I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; 
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and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be 
described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved."18 Negative freedom is 
essentially the absence of restraint. 
Berlin was a fierce opponent of positive freedom, although primarily when 
interpreted as imposing the majority's will on individuals. Alternatively, many 
contemporary liberals understand positive freedom as ensuring individuals' capacity 
to formulate their desires, values and goals. A robust definition of positive freedom 
would characterize liberty as the freedom to act and to make claims against the state: 
the right to provisions of basic goods or the right to equal access to employment. 
Jerome Bickenback offers a useful way of understanding the differences between 
negative and positive freedom in his discussion on disability rights: 
Rules, regulations, laws, and other forms of coercion, manipulation, 
and threat are all limitations upon one's negative freedom- some 
justified, some not. These are familiar restrictions. Lack of training, 
accommodation of needs, or realistic opportunities are also 
restrictions; they are limitations upon one's positive freedom, one's 
capacity to exercise one's freedom to do or become what one wishes. 
Both kinds of freedom open the door to options and choices, but only 
positive freedom captures the actual capability to achieve or bring 
about what one chooses. Since the importance of negative freedom 
presumes one's abilities to do or become something, if one so chooses, 
the value of negative freedom must be derivative from positive 
freedom. 19 
Under Bickenback's construction of positive freedom, social and economic 
rights (positive rights) are critical in ensuring individual freedom. Maurice Cranston, 
among others, has argued that positive freedoms are not true human rights because 
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they require support from the state, and it is unreasonable and costly to characterize 
the provision of aid as a right. Such a formulation is problematic. Civil and political 
rights are principally defended though expensive legal systems and often require the 
state to act in a positive manner to ensure their protection. Social and economic rights 
are no less enforceable. We have the ability to provide all Canadians with a minimum 
of food and housing, but we choose not to because of political resistance to extensive 
redistribution and structural change. Even Berlin, a staunch opponent of positive 
freedom, acknowledged that "to offer political rights, or safeguards against 
intervention by the state, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased 
is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can 
understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom. "20 
Another possible way of explaining the ideological differences among rights 
activists is to characterize some as libertarians and others as egalitarians. In theory, 
libertarians believe in liberty and egalitarians believe in equality. A libertarian 
embraces negative freedom: freedom exists in the absence of coercion.21 In contrast, 
an egalitarian believes in positive freedom: freedom is derived not only from the lack 
of an intentionally created obstacle, but is also violated by unintended obstacles, such 
as being born in a poor family. Therefore, egalitarians claim that the poor in capitalist 
societies are unfree, or less free than the rich, and libertarians claim that the poor are 
equally as free as the rich. 22 
15 
Both terms are highly problematic in this context. Right wing libertarians 
embrace extreme notions of self-ownership and reject any kind of redistribution of 
wealth; in contrast, left wing libertarians support the division of resources equally 
among all individuals and, in some cases, oppose inherited wealth. Egalitarians are 
also commonly "criticized for wanting to eliminate differences between people, 
thereby creating a bland and homogenous society devoid of just those individual 
differences that are responsible for social progress. 'm As the case studies will 
demonstrate, no rights association in Canada could be honestly characterized as 
libertarian or egalitarian based on these definitions. 
As labels, libertarianism and egalitarianism are therefore inappropriate. As 
descriptive terms, however, they can be useful in explaining the emergence of 
contrasting objectives between civil liberties (libertarian) and human rights 
(egalitarian) associations. Egalitarian activists favour positive rights and advocate for 
economic, social and cultural rights (but not to the detriment of other rights). A 
libertarian approach, by contrast, is characterized by a concern for equality of 
opportunity and protecting individuals' negative rights. Of course, while these terms 
make for a useful analytical exercise, in practice the lines among rights associations 
have often been blurred. Civil liberties activists have not universally denied the 
importance of economic or social rights, and human rights activists have often 
defended free speech. Nonetheless, the dichotomy between negative and positive 
rights partially explains why human rights associations have, unlike civil liberties 
16 
associations, considered the elderly's need for inexpensive drugs, or access to low-
income housing for the poor, as rights. 
But the issue goes further than simply prioritizing certain rights over others. 
Why have civil liberties groups tolerated hate speech as an exercise of free speech 
whereas human rights associations demand that hate speech be censored? These 
divisions can be understood as a debate between libertarian (negative) and egalitarian 
(positive) approaches to rights advocacy. A libertarian approach would lead someone 
to oppose any abuse of an individual liberty; hate speech would be tolerable only 
because the alternative would be a violation of the individual's liberty to speak 
freely. 24 The same approach informs opposition to laws that restrict drug use or 
consensual and private sexual relationships (including gay sex). Egalitarians also 
oppose state regulation of private sexual relationships, but argue that equality can 
only be achieved through positive state action. In theory, minorities can not 
participate equally in society if they are victims ofhate propaganda or live in fear of 
becoming targets of violence promoted by hate mongers. The difference between 
libertarian and egalitarian approaches to rights advocacy represents an important 
ideological dispute over the nature and function of human rights.25 
A Conceptual Distinction: Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
In the early 1970s a federation of rights associations was formed: the Canadian 
Federation of Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations. Clearly, at the level of 
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self-identification, rights activists defined themselves in ideological terms and, as we 
shall see, these distinctions also reflected differences in the nature of their activism. 
The terms civil liberties and human rights have been used in many contexts to 
distinguish between ideas about rights. In Australia, for instance, Beth Gaze and 
Melinda Jones have suggested that the "concept of human rights is encapsulated in 
the claim for positive liberty; the concept of civil liberties is usually thought of as 
involving only negative liberty."26 Not only is the term 'civil liberties' associated in 
some contexts with negative freedom and 'human rights' with positive freedom, but 
by extension civil liberties are associated with civil and political rights while human 
rights are associated with economic, social and cultural rights.27 Human rights, 
however, are not separate from civil liberties. Conceptually, human rights are an 
expansion of traditional notions of civil and political rights to broader ideas about 
freedom and equality.28 Therefore, in the following study, 'human rights' is used 
broadly to refer to all forms of rights discourse whereas 'civil liberties' is narrowly 
applied. 
Human rights is a highly malleable term. Such ideological distinctions are a 
useful tool for explaining the nature of rights advocacy, but should not be mistaken 
for an unbending ideological predisposition among rights associations. Ideology did 
not predetermine the activities of rights associations. There have always been 
individuals within human rights organizations who opposed censorship of 
pornography and individuals among civil liberties groups who support legislation 
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banning hate speech. Still, although these distinctions are problematic as labels, they 
serve a useful analytical function in helping understand the relationship among rights 
associations and why they divided over certain issues. Attempting to sort out this 
conceptual minefield through a study of the practices of social movement 
organizations is an important goal of this study. 
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Chapter Two: 
Social Movement Organizations and Human Rights Activism 
The Fundamentals of Human Rights Activism 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon 
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; 
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and 
women; when it dies, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.29 
Speaking before crowds of people in New York's Central Park in 1945, 
American jurist Learned Hand's famous words continue to resonate today. Although 
the history of the human rights paradigm is intimately tied to the evolution of the 
modern state, scholars have too often adopted a top-down approach, examining the 
evolution of human rights from the point of view of state actors and the courts. Only 
recently has work emerged on the role of non-state actors in framing rights discourse 
but, even outside Canada, scholars have yet to vigorously pursue studies linking 
human rights to social movement activism. As Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman 
have noted, there "are relatively few comparative studies of either social movements 
or rights, and, to the best of our knowledge, no such study of the relationship between 
them over time."30 Neil Stammers has also pointed out that, in the United States, "the 
ways in which social movements construct and deploy rights discourses have rarely 
been considered to be of analytical import. "31 In their study of Latin American non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), Maxine Molyneux and Sian Lazar lament how 
little we know "about the ways in which [non-governmental organizations] have 
worked with rights, and less about the specific regional or local understandings about 
rights that inform project design and implementation."32 Despite the expansive 
literature on human rights organizations, only a limited number of studies discuss the 
impact of rights discourse in shaping social activism.33 
The following study is based on two fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of human rights activism. First, the idea of human rights as it has evolved in 
the twentieth century is intimately linked with the state. Human rights activism is 
primarily, but not exclusively, focussed on the state; activists seek to protect 
individuals against state abuse of human rights or to mobilize the state to protect 
human rights. When four black freshmen from the North Carolina Agricultural and 
Technical College in Greensboro sat down at a whites-only lunch counter at 
Woolworths demanding to be served, their goal was to pressure a private business to 
change its policies. Obviously, such activism was not directly state-oriented. Yet, 
when restaurant owners agreed to serve blacks or when neighbourhoods removed 
restrictive covenants, they were not conferring rights upon others. A voluntary act by 
private individuals is not a recognition of a right. Thus, the second assumption, 
which derives from the former, is that human rights are only tangibly realized through 
state laws or regulations. Individuals and groups can make rights-claims and such 
claims have a powerful moral force, but they are not rights until recognized by the 
state. Therefore, human rights activists will eventually seek out the state to have their 
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rights-claims recognized.34 As Thomas Hobbes once remarked, "rights without the 
sword are but mere words."35 
These assumptions have informed a great deal of the literature on human 
rights activism. In their study of human rights organizations in Latin America, 
Molyneux and Shahra Razavi premise their work on the belief that "the central 
instrument for the protection of rights has been, and must remain, the state. "36 
According to Canadian political scientists Alan Cairns and Cynthia William, rights 
discourse draws activists towards the state: "the state becomes the major instrument 
to facilitate or block changes .... Drawing on the rhetoric of rights, citizen groups seek 
to employ the state for their own advancement."37 As Miriam Smith observes in her 
study of the gay rights movement in Canada, "rights talk assumes that changing or 
strengthening the law is in itself a means to [achieve] social change and that legal 
changes are thus the proper goal of political struggle and organizing. Rights talk thus 
defines social and political change as legal change."38 Martha Minow incorporates 
the same assumption about rights and the state in her own work on the disability 
rights movement in the United States: "Rights thus critically articulate relationships 
between individuals and the state; they represent the rules governing when the state 
will affirm an individual's liberty to act or fail to act, and when the state will listen to 
a person's objections about another's conduct."39 For human rights activists, the state 
includes both the government as well as the courts which enforce and define rights 
through their interpretation of the law. In essence, as James Walker posits in his book 
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on human rights and the Supreme Court of Canada, "rights are what the law says they 
Human rights thus encourage social activists to think of social change as legal 
change. This approach is potentially problematic. As Minow has suggested, the 
rhetoric of rights "underscores the power of the established order to respond or 
withhold response to the individual's claim .... [R]ights rhetoric can and should be 
exposed for its tendency to hide the exercise of state authority."41 In Minow's study 
of the disabled in the United States, she reveals how 'difference' is applied in social 
relationships in the way people apply pre-existing notions of the disabled, notions 
which are laden with cultural meanings. She perceives knowledge-constructed 
difference as the root of inequality. By labelling people like the disabled we create 
insurmountable barriers for them to participate equally in society. Difference is 
accepted as natural and immutable. In reality, difference is constructed because we 
apply socially constructed ideas of a 'norm' in our everyday lives and, in doing so, 
exclude all those who do not fit within this conception. Notions of human rights 
obscure these knowledge-power relationships by offering the veneer of formal 
equality when, in reality, treating everyone equally blinds us to the social handicaps 
caused by labelling. 
Minow is not alone in raising concerns about the implications of human rights 
activism. In Canada, several scholars who study the impact of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms have become alarmed at the impact of human rights activists using the 
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courts to promote social change. In their recent work, The Charter Revolution and 
the Court Party, Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton raise the spectre of an elite of 
lawyers and NGOs guiding and dominating the jurisprudence and priorities of the 
Charter and using the courts to undermine the political process. A 'Court Party' 
composed ofNGOs and the legal establishment have subverted the democratic 
political process by promoting the adjudication of important social issues through an 
unelectedjudiciary. These organizations, dominated by an educated middle class 
elite, exploit the courts as a forum to promote their interests and impose their ideas 
on public policy without having to lobby governments and mobilize public opinion. 
Through the funding of private volunteer associations and the Court Challenges 
Program (federal government funding available for Charter cases), the state supports 
what Knopff and Morton consider to be a profoundly anti-democratic practice.42 One 
of the main organizations identified by the authors is the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association. 43 
Fears about the implications of human rights activism are shared across the 
political spectrum. From the Left, Miriam Smith has pointed out that, in the case of 
the gay rights movement, rights discourse combined with Charter litigation weakened 
its grass roots base. Identity formation in the 1970s was sacrificed for equality 
seeking in the 1980s. Although the movement had always employed rights discourse, 
it initially used litigation and advocacy to mobilize at the grass roots level whereas 
Charter litigation made legal reform, not mobilization, the central goal of the 
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movement. Instead of liberating gays from social repression, rights discourse avails 
itself to a middle-class educated elite who can benefit from legal reforms and human 
rights charters. Charter litigation also absorbs an increasingly large portion of a social 
movement's (and NGOs) resources.44 But this is not solely a post-Charter 
phenomenon. As Tom Warner notes in his history of the gay movement before the 
Charter, gay rights activism, notably various campaigns to have sexual orientation 
included in human rights codes, had a dampening effect on the movement by 
redirected resources towards litigation and away from grass roots mobilizing.45 
Warner also distinguishes between gay rights and gay liberation, and argues that only 
the latter encourages identity formation whereas the former is a conservative force 
which only seeks formal legal equality for homosexuals instead of demanding 
substantive equality (e.g., challenging heterosexuality as the 'norm'). 
Certain Canadian legal theorists argue that the courts are a poor forum for 
seeking social change. Drawing on the theories of Ronald Dworkin, Michael Mandel 
distinguishes between matters of principle and policy, with the judiciary limiting itself 
to deciding the former while the latter remains the exclusive jurisdiction of 
politicians. More often than not, the judiciary will couch its decisions in matters of 
principle when striking down legislation (particularly in the post-Charter era) and in 
matters of policy when deferring to legislatures. This is critical because the unelected 
judiciary lacks democratic legitimacy. Yet this approach is inherently problematic 
because decisions based on abstract reasoning (principle) are unable to consider the 
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social costs of the issue at hand. Thus Sunday closing laws are considered within the 
realm of freedom of religion as opposed to the interests of workers or the economy. 
In terms of achieving social progress, this presents a serious obstacle. Policy issues 
(which are goal-oriented) generally consider broader notions of general welfare 
whereas principle-based arguments (which are rights-oriented) are more conducive to 
individual interests. As a result, broad social policies designed to satisfy collective 
needs are threatened by a judiciary using abstract principles to trump public policy.46 
The judiciary are in no position to combat economic and social inequalities because, 
in basing their decisions on principle, they often avoid dealing with systemic factors 
promoting inequality.47 "So it is only by ignoring the ugly facts of concrete power 
that judges can do their job at all."48 As a result of the innate conservativism of 
judicial politics,49 Mandel laments the shift among socially progressive activists, from 
peace activists to the women's movement, in seeking out the courts to achieve social 
change. 
Scholars of international human rights activism have reached similar 
conclusions. Gary Teeple has recently forwarded a vigorous attack on human rights 
as an ideology which is incapable of confronting systemic inequalities. He shares 
Smith and Warner's distress with human rights activists sacrificing grass-roots 
mobilization and adopting rights-based strategies. Using Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch as case studies, Teeple concludes that they "absorb, moreover, 
the energies of individuals, groups, sectors, and classes that might otherwise have 
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presented a challenge to state policies; and they dampen a possible critical awareness 
about the link between the problems they are supposedly addressing and the nature of 
the economic and political system itself."50 In their comparison of southern (third 
world) and northern NGOs, Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco, and George A. Lopez point 
out that the "international human rights movement relies heavily on what are called 
"insider" tactics, or activities that demand some formal access to political institutions 
and that typically require more resources (e.g., skills, money) than do "outsider" 
tactics, such as public demonstrations and boycotts. This pattern is not terribly 
surprising, given that the human rights movement generally seeks to strengthen legal 
institutions for the increased protection of human rights."51 
Only a few historians have considered the impact of human rights activism on 
social movements. One example, recently forwarded by Nelson Lichtenstein, 
examined the effect of human rights activism on the labour movement in the United 
States. According to Lichtenstein, the rights revolution of the sixties had "a 
powerfully corrosive impact on the legitimacy and integrity of the union idea."52 
Unions were displaced by a state-run human rights apparatus, in the form of agencies 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Commission, which encouraged workers 
to seek out individual, as opposed to collective, solutions. But occupational safety 
regulations are not self-enforcing and require the input of individual workers in order 
to deal with problems as they arise in the workplace; without unions to protect 
employees or to monitor the workplace, grievances often go unnoticed. In addition, 
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the new human rights apparatus promotes excessive dependance on professional and 
governmental expertise: "[R]egulation takes disputes out of the hands of those 
directly involved, furthers the influence of administrative professionals, sets up these 
experts as the target of everyone's resentment, and ends by increasing litigiousness 
and undermining government legitimacy. Taken to its logical conclusion, rights 
consciousness absolves individuals of the consequences of their own grievances."53 
Finally, rights discourse has "proven increasingly incapable of grappling with the 
structural crisis, both economic and social, that confronts American society .... [A] 
rights-based approach to the democratization of the workplace fails to confront capital 
with demands that cannot be defined as a judicially protected mandate."54 
Clearly, there is a strong basis for raising concerns about the implications of 
human rights activism. Human rights activism can propagate elitism (in that it 
discourages mass mobilization) and encourages individuals to work through state 
institutions to advance their interests. But recognizing the drawbacks of human rights 
activism does not vitiate its potential to promote progressive social change. Canadian 
historians such as James Walker have argued that the courts can, at times, be a forum 
for systemic social change through the construction of new cultural codes. Even a 
negative decision by a court is fruitful if the court becomes a forum for challenging, 
or at least questioning, common sense notions of, for instance, racial hierarchies or 
gender roles. 
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Many of those who have mounted sustained criticisms of human rights 
activism are not prepared to reject it outright. Minow, for instance, calls on the courts 
and other state bodies to try and see through the eyes of the disabled to avoid labels. 
She attempts to rescue rights from the very critique she has proffered. Rights rhetoric 
is useful because it has the potential to constrain those with power by those who do 
not, by exposing and challenging hierarchies of power. "Legal vocabulary, including 
that of rights, can be invested with meaning that challenges power and recover 
submerged or suppressed experiences. Once constructed and officially embraced, 
normative language can become loosened from its past uses and turned around to 
limit its authors, if only through their own shame or courageous self-restraint."55 
Minow hopes to exploit the ambiguous nature of rights discourse to promote the 
interests of those without power by forcing those with power to acknowledge certain 
rights. 
Miriam Smith also believes in the potential of rights discourse to empower 
oppressed minorities. People outside the hegemonic classes can politicize their 
grievances and gain recognition from mainstream members of society by making their 
demands in the language of rights. This has proven to be, according to Smith, an 
effective tool for mobilizing activists within the gay community. 56 Similarly, 
Lichtenstein, who fears the continued dominance of rights consciousness in its current 
form, acknowledges that "it's a good thing that Burger King and so many other 
companies have put that [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] 
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nondiscrimination declaration at the top of their employment applications. But 
collective action, institution building, and rights consciousness are not mutually 
exclusive, and we need to quickly redress the balance if the American system of work 
rights is not to devolve into an ineffective formalism."57 Lichtenstein raises a critical 
point: human rights activism has a vast potential for challenging inequality and 
exploitation, but should not be employed to the detriment of other, complementary, 
forms of collective action. 
The optimism which often accompanies attacks on human rights activism is 
best exemplified by Teeple, whose scathing critique of human rights activism goes 
beyond most concerns articulated by other scholars. Although Teeple derides the 
work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, he accepts that "if human 
rights organizations worked to advance human rights as social rights, instead of 
focusing almost exclusively on certain political and civil rights, they would as a 
matter of course raise questions about the intrinsic social and economic inequalities of 
the system, about how and why these inequalities can only continue to grow, and 
about the relation between liberal democracy and class property."58 
As Teeple suggests, the primary obstacle to effective human rights activism 
may be the adoption of a minimalist approach to human rights. Stammers has 
advanced a similar position and calls for a more expansive conception of human 
rights to deal with economic inequalities: "A concept of human rights that requires 
economic actors to respect human rights would legitimize action against actors who 
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do not do so and create a general challenge to the legitimacy of the unconstrained 
exercise of economic power in the private realm. "59 In other words, human rights 
defined as basic civil and political rights offer, at best, only formal equality and, at 
worst, the illusion of freedom and equality.60 
Social Movements and Social Movement Organizations 
What is a social movement? The theoretical literature on social movements is, 
to say the least, vast. Classical social movement theories, most notably those by Max 
Weber, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, characterized social movements as collective 
behaviour emerging from a breakdown in society during periods of structural change 
(e.g., industrialization). Social movements were often seen as deviant behaviour or, to 
borrow from Durkheim, as expressions of anomie. More recently, scholars of social 
movements have premised their work on the recognition that social movements are 
normal (non-deviant) social behaviour. Social movements are a typical and healthy 
part of any society. There are several major schools of thought on the function and 
nature of social movements, but one theory in particular, Resource Mobilization 
Theory, provides a framework for the study of social movement organizations.61 A 
key subject in the sociological literature arising from the Resource Mobilization 
Theory school is the study of the formal organizations as "carriers of social 
movements. "62 
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According to Mayer Zald and John D. McCarthy, two leaders in the field of 
Resource Mobilization Theory, a social movement is defined as "a set of opinions and 
beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the 
social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society .... A social movement 
organization [SMO] is a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals 
with the preferences of a social movement ... and attempts to implement these 
goals."63 
Instead of attributing the remarkable rise in social movement activity in the 
1960s and 1970s to a confluence of specific issues (e.g., Vietnam war, civil rights, 
women's liberation), Zald and McCarthy focus on structural changes during a 
particular historical period to explain social movement mobilization. American 
society, as well as Canadian society, was increasingly wealthy by the sixties and the 
middle class was expanding. As many social movement theorists have noted, 
affluence creates discretionary income which can be provided to social movement 
causes. Educational attainment and economic success also led larger numbers of 
people from the middle class to participate in voluntary associations and political 
activities. While the working class may have had as much leisure time as the middle 
class, the latter enjoyed greater discretionary income which allowed them to 
participate more in social movements (i.e., through dues instead of direct 
participation).64 SMOs during this period could also access further resources through 
foundations and churches which, since the sixties, have provided more funding for 
32 
social movements than ever before. Government grants to SMOs increased in the 
sixties (this issue is discussed in chapter seven) and the bureaucratic requirement for 
consulting community groups provided opportunities for movement activity. Zald 
and McCarthy's study also highlights increasing activity in the private sector in 
support for social movements, from lawyers providing their services for free to 
corporations offering grants to SMOs.65 Finally, new technologies allowed the media 
to have a disproportionate impact in the formation of SMOs and to encourage 
individuals to support social movements. Television brought riots in Alabama and 
police violence in Georgia to the homes of millions of Americans whose support for a 
movement no longer depended on personal experience and immediate situational 
context.66 Thus, the expansion of social movement activity during this period was a 
result of structural changes which allowed SMOs to thrive. 
Often referred to as the 'entrepreneurial model', Zald and McCarthy provide a 
framework for examining social movements as manifested in professional 
organizations. SMOs are composed of various classes of participants, from adherents 
who embrace the goals of the movement to constituents who also provide resources. 
Professional SMOs draw most of their resources from a membership base they have 
limited contact with and are composed of a professional staff whose central objective 
is to ensure the group's survival. Media campaigns, mass mailings and other 
activities allow groups to mobilize support and encourage adherents to become 
constituents. Activities such as these will inevitably lead to competition among 
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SMOs for a finite amount of resources. The lack of face to face interaction with 
adherents or constituents requires SMOs to place a priority on public education 
campaigns, or tools such as the media and mass mailings, to spread their message.67 
As the case studies will demonstrate, professionals (lawyers, doctors, social 
workers, journalists and professors) played a central role in leading the second 
generation of rights associations. One of the reasons for the preponderance of 
professionals in SMOs is the power of experts in contemporary debates on issues such 
as abortion or human rights. It is a feature of contemporary movements that they 
depend on expert opinion. Analysing the interplay of causes, costs, consequences, 
and options requires extensive knowledge of esoteric subjects, unavailable to even 
relatively well-educated laymen. In modern societies experts play a role in defining 
facts and issues for many movements, from tax redistribution to the impact of 
pornography on individual behaviour."68 
SMOs have become the institutional forum for mobilizing resources, 
including labour or money, and expressing grievances arising from a social 
movement. An SMO is not, in itself, a movement, but an SMO and the movement's 
grass roots adherents form an important dynamic. Jo Freeman explains the 
importance of studying SMOs to understand social movements: 
A social movement has one or more core organizations in a penumbra 
of people who engage in spontaneous supportive behavior which the 
core organizations can often mobilize but less often control. When 
there is spontaneous behavior with only embryonic organization, there 
may be a premovement phenomena awaiting the right conditions to 
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become a movement, but there is no movement per se .... An 
organization that can mobilize only its own members, and whose 
members mobilize only when urged to action by their organization, is 
lacking a key characteristic of movements. Regardless of whether 
structure or spontaneity comes first, of ifthey appear simultaneously, 
the important point is that both must exist.69 
Rights associations are presented in this work as social movement 
organizations which have emerged from the human rights movement (as discussed in 
chapters three and four). By the end of the 1970s, more than forty rights associations 
had been independently formed across the country. These groups, which no ties to 
other rights associations, were linked only by the ideas and beliefs born of the human 
rights movement. 70 
SMOs, like traditional interest groups, generally pursue their interests against 
the state. There are some exceptions. As Zald and McCarthy note, SMOs "include in 
some degree radical and clandestine terrorist groups, retreatist sects that revalue the 
world, reform-oriented political action groups, and interest groups aimed at changing 
a law or policy to benefit its members."71 Becki Ross has produced a detailed history 
ofthe Lesbian Organization of Toronto, an organization in the 1970s composed 
mainly of "small friendship circles of largely young, white, middle-class lesbian 
feminists [which] set out to create social and support-oriented settings wherein they 
could explore the precious opportunity to come out and invent themselves anew.'m 
The purpose of LOOT was to provide lesbians with a visible presence in the 
community and challenge dominant heterosexual cultural mores. Nonetheless, with 
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the exception of rare organizations such as LOOT, most SMOs either directly or 
indirectly engage with the state. 
To be sure, SMOs consider policy or legislative change a victory, but activism 
takes a myriad of forms and not all SMOs will use litigation or lobbying to achieve 
social change. SMOs employ a variety of strategies and tactics to get their message 
across to the public and, at times, promoting tolerance or understanding is more 
valuable than legislative success. Bill Ratner and William K. Carroll have compared 
three different SMOs in Vancouver to demonstrate how each of the three groups 
employed radically different tactics and strategies. End Legislated Poverty, an 
umbrella organization for anti-poverty groups, attempts to empower the poor and 
bring light to their plight through a variety of tactics including rallies, picketing, 
boycotts, letter-writing campaigns, leafleting, producing media (e.g., newsletters), 
street-theatre and social events. British Columbia's Coalition of People with 
Disabilities condemns the marginalization of disabled people and employs lobby 
group tactics to get its message across to the public and policy makers, including the 
development of position-papers and briefs. In an attempt to undermine the normative 
assumptions attached to disabled/abled, the disability group avoids affirming a 
distinctive disabled identity, which stands in marked contrast to the objectives of The 
Centre. The Centre is a service-oriented organization which provides a physical space 
for promoting gay/lesbian/bi/transsexual identity. Activists encourage activities 
which promote a common identity in order to empower sexual minorities and raise 
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their self-respect in a society where many face discrimination and marginalization. 
The types of services which are available at The Centre include peer counseling, a 
library, a speakers bureau, a legal clinic, youth and coming-out groups, and a state-
funded health clinic offering human immunodeficiency virus and sexually transmitted 
diseases tests. 73 
A key feature of social movement activism, encouraged and organized by 
SMOs, is direct action. Environmentalists, for instance, have spiked trees or chained 
themselves to trees to protest clear-cut logging and "create dramatic media footage 
that can be used to promote the values of the movement." Instead of"conforming to 
the ideal type description of social movement political behaviour, many movements 
may follow a dual strategy of influencing the state and society. Environmental groups 
may lobby government while engaging in activities that are designed to influence 
public opinion and to change social attitudes."74 
A critical aspect of social movement activity, therefore, is grass roots 
mobilization and a willingness to employ direct action in conjunction with traditional 
interest group tactics. SMOs, which are central to mobilizing the resources and 
adherents of a social movement, are an important part of this process. As Naomi 
Black has pointed out in her analysis of the Voice of Women in the 1960s and 1970s, 
SMOs employ a mix of strategies. Some of the Voice of Women's tactics included 
anti-nuclear vigils, protest marches, international conferences, knitting clothes for 
children in North Vietnam and boycotting war toys. Several of these activities were 
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designed to promote a culture of pacifism or help victims of war, while others were 
directly oriented towards the state; at one point, the group sought to pressure the 
Canadian government to oppose nuclear testing by presenting officials with thousands 
of baby teeth to demonstrate the impact of the fallout from nuclear testing.75 The 
success of the Voice of Women relied, not on its ability to develop a small core group 
of professional experts working the system, but a host of strategies of which a key 
factor was mobilizing and engaging with large numbers of people. Warren 
Magnusson has identified similar strategies with other social movement 
organizations; the Raging Grannies (peace activists), for instance, focused less on the 
state and more on promoting their political and cultural sensibilities to others.76 
Social movement organizations are thus not predisposed to working directly 
through political and legal institutions, even if their objective is legislative change.77 
In fact, several social movement scholars have questioned the inevitability of SMOs 
adopting conservative (e.g., litigation or lobbying) tactics. In their study of SMOs in 
the United States, Roberta Ash Gamer and Mayer Zald have concluded that SMOs 
employ both radical and conservative tactics, and the direction taken by an individual 
SMO depends on internal and external developments. Similar conclusions have been 
reached by Stephen W. Beach, Joseph R. Gusfield and William A. Gamson to name a 
few. 78 In his study oftenants associations in New York, David P. Gillespie 
demonstrates how the decision to avoid using radical tactics (e.g., mass rent strikes) in 
favour of conservative tactics (e.g., litigation and bargaining with individual 
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landlords) was the result of a conscious decision by activists of the feasibility of 
radical tactics in a particular situation.79 
In the case of rights associations, there is no reason, by virtue of being an 
SMO, that they should automatically embrace conservative tactics and avoid grass 
roots mobilization. As noted in the introduction, the only criteria for an SMO to be 
identified as a 'rights association' is if it is a self-identified civil liberties or human 
rights association, is non-partisan, and is not linked to a specific constituency or 
another issue (e.g., environmental rights). However, as the case studies will 
demonstrate, rights associations have rarely embraced the dual strategies utilized by 
other SMOs during this period and have seldom employed mass mobilization tactics 
or direction action strategies. The reason for this strategy lies as much in the nature of 
their advocacy (human rights) as in their organizational form. 
Organized Labour in the Age of Protest 
A small, but important theme in this work is the relationship between 
organized labour and rights associations. Until the seventies, organized labour played 
a leading role in the human rights movement and in working alongside rights 
associations. One of the goals of this work is to help explain how and why labour's 
relationship with rights associations changed dramatically by the seventies. 
Although there is a great deal of debate on the impact of 'fordism' or the 
'post-war settlement,' most historians agree that, following World War Two, 
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organized labour entered into a consensus with capital and the state by shedding its 
transformative agenda in favour of stability and working through a state regulated 
system of grievance mediation. Under fordism, class conflict was restrained and 
working class organizations became large bureaucratic associations which 
discouraged militancy.80 In other words, unions were more concerned with wages and 
job security than undermining capitalism. 81 
F ordism may have restrained working class radicalism, but it was also 
conducive to working class mobilization because it concentrated workers in mass 
industries and provided discretionary income that could be directed towards 
movement activities. By the seventies organized labour was increasingly 
institutionalized (i.e., less dependent on grass-roots mobilization) and, combined with 
the failure of socialist movements in Europe and disillusionment with marxism, many 
students of social movements no longer perceived the working class as the vanguard 
for social change.82 For many, labour was no longer able to adopt a broad based 
transformative agenda and "in its current bureaucratic guise, labour is no longer 
capable of mounting more than symbolic opposition to an agenda it no longer 
controls, and on behalf of social actors it cannot presume to speak for."83 Labour 
remains an essentially 'old' social movement replaced by the activism of 
postmaterialist groups advocating a gender, race, ethnic, peace, ecology and anti-
nuclear agenda among others.84 These 'new' social movements "embrace a politics of 
everyday life that prioritizes changes in lifestyle and values in the defence of civil 
40 
society."85 While some scholars have suggested that working class activism has 
become marginalized in light of these new social movements, others argue that labour 
can adapt by incorporating the needs of these postmaterialist groups to labour's 
agenda. The degree to which organized labour has been able to act as an agent for 
social change beyond workplace-specific issues during and since the fordist era 
remains an important historical question. 86 
In her study of SMOs representing racial minorities in Toronto, Daiva 
Stasiulis found that organized labour had no significant presence among social 
activists. In the case of West Indian associations, she noted the "virtual absence of 
contacts with trade unions or other working class organizations. Except for the 
emergent, locally-based anti-racist organizations in the working class neighbourhoods 
of Riverdale and Parkdale there has been few instances of cooperation between the 
black community and working class in pursuit of anti-racist goals."87 This trend is 
consistent with the experience of rights associations since the sixties. Although 
organized labour played a crucial role in the human rights movement after World War 
Two, particularly through its support for the Jewish Labour Committee (discussed in 
chapter three), it is clear that by the seventies organizations such as the Canadian 
Labour Congress deferred to rights associations in taking the lead on key human 
rights initiatives. 
In many of the debates on human rights and new social movements, historians 
have made only a marginal contribution. At the same time, despite all the claims 
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about the potential radicalism ofSMOs and the role ofthe state in human rights 
activism, surprisingly few people have conducted in-depth empirical studies on SMOs 
over an extended period. Many of the claims forwarded by Zald and McCarthy, for 
instance, are hypotheses based on limited data. A few scholars have attempted to fill 
this void, but Canadian historians have rarely exploited the available source material 
to enter these debates. Instead of judging SMOs on short term goals or individual 
campaigns, an historical study of multiple rights associations over a twenty year 
period can provide a far more detailed analysis of at least one manifestation of human 
rights activism in Canada. While this study does deal with some sociological 
questions, it remains primarily a work of history focused on a unique historical 
phenomena: the unprecedented proliferation of civil liberties and human rights 
associations in a period of heightened social movement activity. 
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Part II: Canada's Human Rights Movement 
Chapter Three: 
The First Generation of Rights Associations 
Repression and Resistance: The First Civil Liberties Associations 
Communists, political radicals and trade unions were the targets ofthe most 
extreme forms of government repression in twentieth century Canada. Stimulated in 
part by the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent geo-political 
developments, the spread of communism concerned Canadian political leaders and 
their fears had a trickle down effect. In 1933 Constable Joseph Zappa of the Montreal 
police force shot an unarmed Pole, Nick Zynchuck, in the back during an eviction 
proceeding in Montreal. When asked to account for his actions Zappa shrugged his 
shoulders and replied 'He's a Communist'. 88 The Canadian state was an active 
participant in the persecution of communism at home. Suspicion about the threat of 
communism "had always been characteristic of the Canadian governmental and 
administrative elites."89 With its rejection of capitalism and private property, and 
dedication to the overthrow of the state, communism represented a fundamental 
challenge to the existing power structure. A tendency to link socialism and unionism 
resulted in the inclusion of organized labour in various regulations and pieces of 
legislation directed at repression of communism during the inter-war period. Much of 
the "violence directed at unions ... stemmed from a fear that every strike was in fact a 
miniature socialist revolution or an anarchist plot."90 
Section 97 of the criminal code was one of the earliest and most direct means 
employed by the federal government to suppress communism. It was added to the 
Criminal Code in the wake of the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919. The sheer size 
and range of the general strike had demonstrated the power and potential of organized 
labour and the Left in post-World War One (WWI) Canada. Essential services were 
stopped, newspapers closed down, police went on strike and a Central Strike 
Committee effectively took control of the city. Thirty-five thousand workers were on 
strike in Winnipeg alone, with thousands more in sympathy strikes across the nation. 
Section 97 was designed to forestall any similar action in the future by disposing of 
radical union leaders and foreign agitators. It was complemented by an amendment to 
the Immigration Act in the same year, which allowed officials to deport any alien or 
Canadian citizen not born in Canada for advocating the overthrow of the government 
by force. 
The enabling legislation to amend the Criminal Code was rushed through 
Parliament between 25 June and 5 July 1919.91 Inspired by the American Espionage 
Act (no comparable English statutes existed), Section 97 created a penalty of up to 
twenty years in prison for being a member or officer of an unlawful association 
(defined as a group seeking governmental or economic change through force or 
violence), and it encompassed anyone wearing a badge or button indicating 
membership or paying dues to such a group.92 Individuals were presumed members if 
they attended meetings of an illegal organization, spoke publicly on its behalf, or 
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distributed its literature. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was 
empowered to seize, without warrant, all property belonging or suspected of 
belonging to an illegal organization, and any owner of a hall who provided premises 
to such a group could be imprisoned for up to five years with a fine of up to $5000. 
Frank Scott, writing in 1932, considered that the "permanent restriction on the right of 
association, freedom of discussion, printing and distribution of literature, and fear of 
severity of punishment, is unequaled in the history of Canada and probably any 
British country for centuries past."93 
Section 97 of the criminal code was used throughout the 1920s and 1930s by 
the police to harass the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), break up meetings, 
disperse audiences, raid offices, confiscate literature and detain activists.94 Three 
prosecutions were brought under Section 97, the most notable being the trial of eight 
leaders of the CPC in 1931. The party had gone public in 1924 but the federal 
government had chosen to wait seven years to enforce Section 97 against the leaders 
of the CPC.95 At trial, they were found guilty and given five year sentences. On 
appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the lower court's decision and found 
the provisions of Section 97 sufficiently broad to include the CPC as an unlawful 
association. 96 
Another group targeted by the Toronto police was the Canadian Labour 
Defense League (CLDL). Founded in 1925 in Toronto, the CLDL was arguably the 
CPC's most effective front organization. The central aim of the CLDL was the 
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protection of strikers from prosecution. By 1927 fifty-two groups were associated 
with the CLDL, with a combined membership exceeding 3000 people. The CLDL 
achieved prominence during the worst years of the depression by "promoting 
communist policies, agitating on behalf of the CPC and defending in courts over six 
thousand individuals who had ventured astray of the law because of their militant 
labour activities."97 It was also dedicated to removing Section 97 from the Criminal 
Code and the recent amendment to the Immigration Act. 98 
The CLDL became moribund in the late 1930s and the federal government 
formally banned the organization in 1940 in the midst of attempts to revive the group 
during the war. Soon after the ban, A.E. Smith, founder and president of the CLDL, 
created the National Council for Democratic Rights in 1941 to lobby against the 
wartime ban on the CPC. Instead of defending the rights of all Canadians, however, 
the efforts of the CLDL and its successor were limited to "workers and those on the 
political left ... did not pretend to follow the dictum of making no distinctions about 
whose liberties [it] defended."99 
There were two attempts in the 1930s to form a more inclusive rights 
association dedicated solely to the preservation of civil liberties irrespective of the 
individual's background. The Canadian Civil Liberties Protective Association was an 
attempt by members of the League for Social Reconstruction, a think tank of leftist 
intellectuals with ties to the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), to form 
a group in the style of the American Civil Liberties Union in 1933. Frank Scott was 
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part of another initiative in 1934 with the creation of the Emergency Committee for 
the Protection of Civil Liberties, formed in response to a law in Quebec requiring 
individuals to receive permission to distribute circulars on city streets. 100 Neither 
group lasted for more than a few years. 
The Padlock Act and Canadian Civil Liberties Union 
Mackenzie King's decision to revoke Section 97 ofthe Criminal Code in 1936 
following an election promise had a domino effect destined to have a deep impact in 
stimulating Canada's first generation of rights associations. Soon after the 
elimination of Section 97, the CPC began distributing leaflets in Quebec to the ire of 
the Premier and Attorney General, Maurice Duplessis. Deeply anti-communist, 
Duplessis quickly acted to fill the void created by the revocation of Section 97 by 
passing An Act to Protect the Province Against Communist Propaganda ( a.k.a. 
Padlock Act) in 1937. 101 This statute made it illegal to print or publish any 
newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, circular or document propagating communism or 
bolshevism and to house any organization propagating these views. The Attorney 
General was empowered, upon receiving satisfactory proof of these activities, to order 
the closing of the house where the activities were taking place for up to one year. 
Section fourteen of the legislation further allowed the Attorney General to confiscate 
and destroy any document banned under the Act. 102 Since the Act did not define 
bolshevism or communism, leaving this up to the discretion of the Attorney General, 
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the Act was used against various left wing political dissidents including the CCF and 
trade unions. 103 Years later, during the proceedings of the 1950 Senate Special 
Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, members of the Jewish and 
Ukrainian communities would claim to have also fallen victim to the Padlock Act. 104 
From the reaction to the Padlock Act we see the stirrings of Canada's first 
rights associations. The previously mentioned Emergency Committee for Civil 
Liberties in Montreal was replaced in 193 7 with the Montreal branch of the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Union (CCLU). A collection of autonomous organizations across 
Canada, the CCLU soon had branches in Toronto and Ottawa, stimulated in large part 
in opposition to the Padlock Act. Additional groups were formed in Winnipeg and 
Ottawa in 1938-9. Unlike the CLDL, the CCLU was "a non-political organization, 
the object ofwhich is to maintain throughout Canada the rights of free speech, free 
press, free assembly, and other liberties, and to take all such action as seems advisable 
in furtherance of their subject."105 These branches of the CCLU represented the first 
attempts to construct rights associations characterised by Larry Hannant as focussed 
on "political rights considered universal within liberal democratic societies: freedom 
of speech, association, and worship, the right to a fair and impartial trial, and equality 
before the law, among others."106 They were dedicated to the protection of rights 
irrespective of background or belief system and did not favour the CLDL's working 
class politics; the ideal was to incorporate people from varying ideological camps. 
Montreal's CCLU quickly garnered support from the Student Christian Movement, 
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Fellowship of Reconciliation, League for Social Reconstruction, CCF, Montreal 
Presbytery of the United Church and local trade unions in their call for disallowance 
of the Padlock Act. 107 Within a few years the Montreal branch had recruited 1000 
members. 108 
A concerted effort to convince the federal government to use its power of 
disallowance on the Padlock Act was initiated in Toronto in 1938 with a delegation to 
Ottawa of groups representing 100 000 Canadians. Their call was refused by the 
Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, the cabinet's leading political figure from 
Quebec. Several attempts by the Montreal CCLU to challenge the legislation in court 
failed, and it was not until 1956 that a decision ofthe Supreme Court of Canada found 
the legislation ultra vires and rendered it inoperative. 
World War II 
With the onset of another world war in 193 9 a new host of human rights issues 
came to the fore. According to historian Ramsay Cook, the Defence of Canada 
Regulations "represented the most serious restrictions upon the civil liberties of 
Canadians since Confederation."109 An entire apparatus designed to protect national 
security was expanding under the context of war time powers. "It was an atmosphere 
in which real debate about the fundamental issues at stake was widely seen as 
threatening the national consensus, and dissent from that consensus was often 
interpreted as disloyalty to the country. People who questioned the emergent 
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orthodoxy sometimes fell under police surveillance, lost their government jobs, were 
purged from their trade unions, or became subject to deportation proceedings."110 In 
the rush to protect the nation from various threats identified by the popular media, 
RCMP and political leaders, minorities and controversial groups became easy targets. 
The Liberal government of World War Two was far more repressive than the 
Conservative government had been in World War One. King and his cabinet were 
responsible for censoring 325 newspapers and periodicals in the first years ofthe war 
(compared to a total of 184 under Borden). Wartime propaganda was promoted 
through the National Film Board and the Wartime Information Board. More than 
thirty political, social, religious and ethnic organizations were banned and internment 
camps housed approximately 2 4 23 Canadians during the war. 111 Habeas corpus and 
many of the rights designed to protect citizens from arbitrary state action were 
suspended. One of the most notable legacies of the war was the forcible relocation of 
22 000 men, women and children of Japanese descent from the Pacific coast to the 
interior. Under "wartime powers, these citizens were forcibly relocated to camps in 
the interior, had their property confiscated, and were seriously threatened with mass 
deportation to Japan (including Canadian-born among them) at war's end. All of this 
was done without proof of a single case of espionage or sabotage by a Japanese 
Canadian."112 
Civil liberties groups generally avoided the internment issue and focussed 
their energies on the Defence of Canada Regulations. In Vancouver, a branch of the 
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CCLU devoted its efforts to defending a bookstore owner from prosecution for selling 
subversive material of a communistic nature. 113 The Toronto CCLU, renamed the 
Civil Liberties Association of Toronto (CLAT) in 1940, organised a massive rally of 
5000 people on 17 July 1942 with Arthur Roebuck, a Liberal senator, and Arthur 
Garfield Hays of the American Civil Liberties Union addressing the crowd. Among 
the central demands raised at the rally: lifting the ban on the CPC. A second rally, on 
10 February 1943, called for the restoration of the Ukranian Labour Farmer Temple 
Association, another victim of the DOCR orders. 114 Wartime regulations had become 
a rallying point for individuals determined to ensure the protection of fundamental 
freedoms. 
The War at Home: Civil Liberties and the Left 
The CLA T' s willingness to defend the rights of association for communists 
was tempered by its members unwillingness to work with communists in their own 
organization. B .K. Sand well and the liberal moderates in the CLAT fought off an 
attempt by communists to take control of the group in 1942, leading to deep divisions 
within the organization. 
Divisions within the Left were bitter, and the refusal of many social democrats 
to work with communists compounded the same refusal of prominent liberals like 
Sandwell to be seen cooperating with communists. Before and during the war, 
defending communists was a central theme in the activity of associations like the 
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CLDL/National Council for Democratic Rights or the Toronto group in opposition to 
Section 97, the Padlock Act and the ban in World War Two. But the defence of 
communists was not undertaken without some difficulties. Communists dominated 
the CCLUs in Montreal and Vancouver, and were active in the Toronto group. 115 
However, the Ottawa CCLU, formed with the support of David Lewis of the CCF, 
was disbanded in 193 9 out of concern communists were gaining too much control of 
the organization. Winnipeg's CCLU barely lasted a year and the newly constituted 
Civil Liberties Association of Winnipeg in 1939 refused to allow communists to join. 
An attempt to form a national civil liberties association initiated by the Montreal 
CCLU in 1941 failed when other groups refused to work with known communists. 116 
Many of those loyal to the CCF considered "themselves as honest defenders of 
civil liberties who were generally appalled by the prosecution of the communists, [but 
they were] nevertheless deeply suspicious of all communist activity .... Officially the 
founding fathers of the CCF decided to have nothing to do with the CPC or any of its 
front organizations such as the CLDL."117 The CPC's relationship with the labour 
movement altered radically in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1930 the CPC established the 
Workers Unity League as an umbrella organization for unions rivaling the more 
moderate Trades and Labour Council. Within five years the League was disbanded 
and communists were helping establish another rival to the Trades and Labour 
Council: the Congress of Industrial Organisations. In contrast to the Trades and 
Labour Council's trade-based unions, the Congress oflndustrial Organisations 
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organized industrial unions. However, in 1940 the Congress of Industrial 
Organisations merged with the All-Canadian Congress of Labour to form the 
Canadian Congress of Labour with resolutions condemning fascism, nazism and 
communism. The Canadian Congress of Labour soon endorsed the CCF as the main 
political arm of labour. Meanwhile, the CPC had called for a united front with the 
CCF in the late 1930s, a move rejected by the CCF and followed by "intercine 
warfare inside the trade unions and the central labor bodies. It was the confrontation 
of two inflexible strategies, with the trade unions as the battleground."118 The 
ideological divisions within organized labour and the political Left were to have a 
profound impact on these budding rights associations, preventing cooperation among 
the Left in the defence of individual rights. 
'A Farce of Citizenship': Japanese Canadians and the Espionage Commission 
Only three rights groups emerged from the war intact: the CLAT, Civil 
Liberties Association of Winnipeg (CLAW) and the Vancouver branch of the CCLU. 
Two incidents at the close of the war were to have a major impact on rights 
associations and lead to a peak of human rights activism in the late 1940s. The first 
was the scandal surrounding the deportation of Japanese Canadians. Asians had a 
long history of discrimination in British Columbia. All manner of policies from 
immigration restrictions, head taxes, restrictions on work and trade, to denial of the 
franchise were part of the oriental experience in British Columbia from the 1800s to 
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the Second World War. In a culmination of decades of discrimination, 22,000 
Japanese were expelled from the west coast in 1942.119 
To compound the frustrations felt by Japanese-Canadians during the war, on 
15 December 1945 the cabinet passed orders-in-council PC7355, PC7356 and 
PC7357 to repatriate 10 347 Japanese Canadians back to Japan. Three quarters of 
them were Canadian citizens, half born in Canada. These orders were based on 
voluntary agreements by individuals, encouraged by the government, to repatriate in 
1944; when the orders were finally passed in 1945, thousands applied for 
cancellation. 
All three ofthe surviving civil liberties groups from the war, the CLAW, 
CLAT and Vancouver CCLU openly opposed the orders. Arthur Lower and members 
of the CLAW sent letters to Members of Parliament and a brief to the Prime Minister 
opposing the orders, while the Vancouver CCLU denounced the orders in 1946 after 
having failed to speak out against the expulsion in 1942.120 The CLAT joined a 
coalition of groups formed in 1945 (Cooperative Committee for Japanese Canadians) 
opposed to the deportation orders which brought together groups of Japanese, unions, 
women and social gospel advocates. They brought a case all the way to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in London in a failed attempt to have the orders ruled 
illegal. 121 Individuals noted for speaking out against state abuse of rights also raised 
objections. In a letter sent to fifty-five newspapers on 4 January 1946 (published in 
eleven papers), Frank Scott vigorously condemned the deportation of Canadian 
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citizens on no basis except their racial origins. The orders made "a farce of 
citizenship. We are all immigrants in Canada, except the Indians and Eskimos, and 
no citizens's right can be greater than that of the least protected group. Every 
Canadian is attacked in his fundamental civil liberties by this policy. To find it 
sponsored by a government bearing the name Liberal and not objected to by a 
vigorous public protest, warns us how far our standards have sunk during these past 
years."122 
If the deportations raised the ire of civil libertarians across the country, the 
espionage commission of 1946 facilitated the mobilization of rights associations in a 
way no other issue had done before. Igor Gouzenko's defection on 5 September 1945 
has been referred to by many authors as the instigating event of the Cold War. Hiding 
classified documents under his coat as he exited the embassy, Gouzenko provided the 
federal government with evidence of a Russian spy ring operating in Canada. After 
weeks of interrogating Gouzenko and maintaining complete secrecy about the 
defection, the cabinet passed a top secret order-in-council (PC6444) empowering the 
Minister of Justice under the War Measures Act to investigate Gouzenko's 
allegations. 123 Unbeknownst to Canadians, the government had just suspended 
several of their basic rights two months after the end of hostilities in August 1945. 
PC6444 allowed the Minister of Justice to suspend habeas corpus by detaining 
suspects indefinitely without access to lawyers or family. 124 
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The defection became public on 4 February 1946 when a popular American 
talk show host, Drew Pearson, claimed to have evidence of a Russian defector in 
Canada. Realizing there was little he could do to keep the defection hidden, King 
gathered his cabinet together the next day to pass order-in-council PC411 creating a 
Royal Commission to investigate Gouzenko's claims. Ten days later, following on 
the heels of thirteen raids by RCMP officers against suspected spies early in the 
morning (including one raid on the wrong person's apartment), King announced to the 
world that his government was investigating allegations of espionage. 125 The decision 
to use a Royal Commission was a conscious attempt to avoid the pitfalls of procedural 
protections in the judicial system. In a top-secret memo to the Prime Minister on 5 
December 1945, E.K. Williams, president ofthe Canadian Bar Association, warned 
that "criminal proceedings at this stage are not advisable. No prosecution with the 
evidence now available could succeed." 126 A strict police investigation followed by a 
trial would likely fail to convict most of the suspects. Williams favoured a Royal 
Commission as "it need not be bound by the ordinary rules of evidence if it considers 
it desirable to disregard them. It need not permit counsel to appear for those to be 
interrogated by or before it." 127 
The proceedings of the 1946 espionage commission rank with the 1970 arrests 
during the FLQ crisis as the most extensive abuse of individual rights in Canadian 
history in peacetime. When the federal government passed an order in council in 1945 
under the War Measures Act to aid the investigation of a royal commission, an 
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investigation which continued long after the war had ended, the government 
effectively suspended the fundamental rights (such as habeas corpus) of every 
Canadian. The individuals who were arrested were held incommunicado in the 
Rackliffe Barracks in Ottawa, without access to lawyers or family, some for up to five 
weeks. Each was placed in a cell under suicide watch, with an RCMP guard in the 
cell at all times. The cell was small, 9' by 8', with a window opening three feet wide 
and a 100 watt lightbulb shining twenty-four hours a day. They were interrogated 
several times in secret by RCMP officers and encouraged by their cell-mates to 
cooperate with the commissioners, two Supreme Court of Canada justices, Robert 
Taschereau and Roy Lindsay Kellock. When they were finally brought before the 
commission where the proceedings were held in camera and with a stenographer 
present, suspects were questioned about their political beliefs, links to communist 
reading groups, feelings about the USSR, and their recent activities. Suspects were 
threatened with contempt of court and six months in jail ifthey did not testify before 
the commission. Some were repeatedly interrogated after refusing to speak without 
access to a lawyer, a right reserved to the commissioners under the Public Inquiries 
Act. 128 After a failed hunger strike, one of the detainees, David Shugar, wrote a letter 
to Minister of Justice Louis St. Laurent on 9 March 1946, claiming that "if I am to 
judge by the treatment accorded to me yesterday afternoon before your Royal 
Commission, I can only come to the conclusion that, as a Canadian citizen, I have 
been completely stripped of all my rights before the law."129 
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If the government had limited itself to a secret inquiry, the backlash would 
have been much less severe. The decision to prosecute the suspects using the 
commission's transcripts represented for many an attempt by the state to circumvent 
the judicial system. By refusing access to lawyers, the suspects (none of whom were 
themselves lawyers) did not think to request the protection of the Canada Evidence 
Act. 130 Under this legislation, witnesses may ask judges to provide them with 
immunity from self-incrimination before they testify (the clause is designed to ensure 
the veracity of witness testimony). Taschereau and Kellock refused to inform 
witnesses of the Act and its protections, thus opening the door for future prosecutions 
against the suspected spies. 131 
Defending 'Spies' and 'Commies': Rights Associations Take Action 
Civil libertarians reacted strongly to the dangerous precedent set by the 
espionage commission. Three new groups emerged in 1946. With the demise ofthe 
communist-led Montreal CCLU during the war, an opening existed for the rise of the 
Montreal Civil Liberties Association (MCLA). 132 This new body was composed 
primarily of social democrats, including Frank Scott, who were opposed to the 
deportations and PC6444. An attempt to form a cooperative organization among the 
Left was initiated in Ottawa with the birth of the Ottawa Civil Liberties Association 
(OCLA). Harry Southam, editor of the Ottawa Citizen, was the OCLA's honorary 
president, and the founding meeting was attended by such luminaries as Arthur 
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Roebuck, John Diefenbaker, M. J. Coldwell and Cairine Wilson. According to Ross 
Lambertson, the OCLA was "one of the last attempts to create a civil liberties 
organization which spanned the increasing ideological gulf between the far left and 
those further to the right."133 
A third association was spawned in Toronto, but this one represented an 
extreme expression of the divisions within the Left. The Emergency Committee for 
Civil Rights (ECCR) was led by a splinter group of communists frustrated at the 
dominance of liberals like Sand well in the CLA T. 134 The creation of the ECCR did 
not forstall total cooperation between rival groups. An exploratory conference to 
discuss current issues from the Padlock Act to federal censorship regulations took 
place in Toronto on 28 November 1946 with the Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto 
groups. 135 A civil liberties rally was later held in Toronto with the support of both 
groups with Senator Roebuck and Leslie Roberts ofthe MCLAin attendance. 136 
These instances appear to have been uncommon examples of cooperation between 
communists and social democrats/liberals in rights associations. In 1946, a second 
attempt (following the Montreal CCLU's efforts in 1941) in Ottawa to form a national 
civil liberties association failed and has been characterized by Frank Clarke as a 
"rancourous affair."137 C.S. Jackson of the ECCR called for a broad based 
organization to include organized labour while J.P. Erichsen-Brown of the OCLA 
rejected the idea of a communist being a legitimate civil libertarian. The conference 
broke down and no consensus was reached. 
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Both the Vancouver CCLU and the MCLA were relatively silent in 1946 
regarding the espionage commission, with the latter limiting itself to an advertisement 
in the Montreal Star condemning PC6444 but not the commission. Scott and other 
social democrats' dislike of communists and worries of being seen defending accused 
communist spies likely dampened their enthusiasm. The CLAT refused to join the 
debate, believing it "would not serve the interests of our Association to hold any sort 
of public meeting or demonstration until more facts are known and the trials in the 
courts are over."138 This did not stop the president of the CLAT (Sandwell) from 
vigorously denouncing the commission in Saturday Night, which he edited. 139 
The OCLA and the ECCR, and to a lesser degree the CLAW, entered the fray 
with a passion. They sent letters to politicians, published advertisements in 
newspapers, produced reports through detailed research, and distributed literature. 
Advertisements financed by the ECCR appeared in the Toronto Daily Star, one ofthe 
country's largest newspapers, on 15 June and 29 June 1946. Motions passed by the 
Ottawa and Winnipeg groups denounced the use of war time powers in peacetime and 
the circumvention of the judicial process, and were forwarded to the Minister of 
Justice. They also hoped to convince the Minister to stop distributing the report 
because it contained accusations of guilt against individuals already acquitted in 
court. 140 As Sandwell attacked the commission in Saturday Night, Arthur Lower of 
the CLAW expressed similar concerns in the pages ofthe Winnipeg Free Press. 
Several groups also had their correspondence read before Parliament where the CCF 
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and Conservative Party were hammering the Liberals over the commission. 141 Within 
a few weeks the ECCR had accumulated $9000 and had an office with a paid 
secretary from which it mailed 15 000 pieces of literature including a regular 
Bulletin. 142 
Thanks to the efforts of the OCLA and the ECCR, extensive research was 
conducted on the conditions in Rackliffe Barracks and the treatment of individuals by 
the commission, as well as the implications for each person of being accused of being 
a communist spy. Both groups produced detailed reports on the espionage 
commission and the spy trials soon after the submission of the commission's final 
report. 143 Their work was based on dozens of interviews with lawyers, the accused 
and their spouses, politicians and journalists. Accounts ofRCMP officers tearing up 
letters from family members and suggestions of psychological abuse were recounted 
in the reports. Implications for the upcoming trials were also noted by describing 
public perceptions of the 'spies' and 'commies' as if suspects had already been found 
guilty, when in fact many were later acquitted. For some, the experience resulted in 
prison terms while others found their reputations tarnished or lost employment. Israel 
Halperin, a math professor at Queen's University, would have been dismissed had it 
not been for the intervention of Chancellor Charles Dunning before the Board of 
Trustees who feared embarrassment to the university should Halperin be dismissed 
despite being acquitted in court. 144 Another acquitted suspect, David Shugar, lost his 
position with the Department ofNational Health and Welfare. 
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Two central themes emerge from the events of 1945-6. First, the debates in 
Parliament, the media, the Canadian Bar Association (which debated the issue 
extensively in its 1946 annual meeting) and the creation of three new rights 
associations represented a high point in activism by rights associations. Issues of 
individual rights and the role of the state in protecting them became a significant 
question of public debate, stimulated in large part by the espionage commission, 
arguably more so than any single event during the war. However, it was at this stage 
that social democrats and liberals increasingly came to dominate rights associations 
and communists were marginalised. The Vancouver CCLU, MCLA, CLAW, and 
CLAT were all led and dominated by social democrats or liberals, and the ECCR 
(renamed the Civil Rights Union in 1947) was the only communist-inspired 
association. Attempts to bridge these ideological gaps in the OCLA failed, and its 
president's refusal to work with communists at the 1946 meeting in Ottawa 
represented the domination of non-communists in the OCLA. The refusal of leaders 
in the OCLA, CLAW and MCLA to work with communists, the ascendency of 
Garnett Sedgewick and social democrats to the leadership ofthe Vancouver CCLU 
and the split in the CLAT had effectively sidelined communists within rights 
associations. Politically, communists were reeling from the ban on the CPC during 
the war, and the creation of the Labour Progressive Party to replace the CPC had little 
success. Most labour votes went to the CCF in the 1945 election, with the Labour 
Progressive Party attracting fewer than 110 000 votes. The latter was further 
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tarnished by the espionage commission and the conviction of the party's only elected 
MP (Fred Rose). Rights associations of the immediate post-war period had 
undergone a significant ideological shift from the days of the CLDL and CCLU. 
Secondly, the philosophy of Parliamentary supremacy was the central obstacle 
facing rights associations during this period. Louis St. Laurent and J.L. Ilsley (who 
replaced St. Laurent as Minister of Justice in late 1946) used the language of 
Parliamentary supremacy to justify the government's actions in the wake of 
Gouzenko' s defection. 145 A crisis justified the use of extreme measures and, in the 
tradition of Diceyan law, Parliament should not be bound by any rules other than 
those in the constitution or Parliamentary procedure. In court, judges refused to 
accept defence counsel objections to the use of the commission's transcripts. One of 
the earliest rulings, set by James McRuer of the Ontario High Court, concluded that it 
was not "at all clear that this court has, in these proceedings, any jurisdiction to 
review the conduct of the commission or to decide that a commission acting with 
apparent lawful jurisdiction has at any time by its conduct deprived itself of 
jurisdiction."146 Judicial decisions in the spy trials reflected a clear deference to 
Parliament and the inability of the courts to act as a forum for the defence of 
individual rights when facing the will of the state. 147 
Public opinion also seemed to reflect a deference to legislative authority when 
the question of preserving individual rights was raised. A poll by the Toronto Star 
following the espionage commission determined that 93 percent of respondents had 
63 
heard about the Gouzenko Affair and 61 percent approved of the government's 
tactics. 148 Another Gallup poll taken in 1949 asked respondents if they believed in 
complete freedom of speech allowing people to say anything at any time about 
government and the country. Of the 2019 respondents, 36.2 percent said no and 
another 15 percent had no opinion or had a qualified answer. 149 Four years later, 
public opinion continued to favour limits on free speech, in this case for communists, 
where 62 percent of respondents favoured limiting the speech of communists and only 
26 percent considered it a fundamental democratic right. 150 
Forever Divided: The Association for Civil Liberties and the League for 
Democratic Rights 
By the 1950s most of the rights associations that had emerged in the 1930s 
and 1940s were largely inactive or defunct. The Vancouver CCLU, CLAW, OCLA 
and MCLA had quickly dissolved. The Association for Civil Liberties had been 
formed out of members from the CLAT eager to create a national civil liberties 
association headquartered in Toronto. Among the leadership were Toronto lawyers 
Irving Himel and Andrew Brewin (future New Democratic Party MP), as well as 
Sandwell and Charles Millard of the United Steelworkers of America. They 
expended most of their energies combating restrictive covenants, censorship and 
police powers while agitating for provincial Fair Employment Practices legislation 
and a bill of rights. 151 Sand well, Himel and Brewin were also responsible for creating 
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the Committee for a Bill of Rights in 1946 as an adjunct to the CLAT. Their 
committee presented the Minister of Justice with a petition of 200 'respectable' 
members of the community from across the country calling for a bill of rights in 1946, 
and in 1951 organized a delegation to Prime Minister St. Laurent representing 200 
people and 50 organizations. 152 
One of the requirements for membership in the Association for Civil Liberties 
was not having membership in any other civil liberties association, a measure 
designed to exclude communists. The League for Democratic Rights was formed in 
1950 out of a union of the Civil Rights Union of Toronto (formerly ECCR), the 
newly-formed Montreal Civil Liberties Union and a group in Timmins. As was the 
case with the Association for Civil Liberties, the League for Democratic Rights was 
an attempt to form a national rights association, but one inclusive of communists. 
The League for Democratic Rights claimed twenty-four affiliates across the country 
and received funds from each affiliate and various unions. It was concerned with 
defeating the Padlock Act and pressuring the federal government to enact a bill of 
rights. 153 
Divisions among civil liberties associations were a reflection of the impact of 
the Cold War in the 1950s. According to Bryan Palmer, the "Communist and social 
democratic rivalries of the 1940s exhibited a vehemence seldom witnessed in 
Canadian labour," and labour "entered the 1950s largely purged of Communist 
influence."154 In-fighting with communists had reached a fevered pitch by the 1950s 
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within the ranks of organized labour. Caught up in the fervour of the Cold War, the 
Canadian Congress of Labour effectively vetted its communist-led unions and 
established clear directives against allowing communists to lead unions or the 
[Canadian Congress ofLabour]."155 In the Trades and Labour Council, the purging of 
communists was manifest in the expulsion and undermining of the Canadian 
Seaman's Union in 1949 and the development of a system ofblock voting allowing 
control of the organization to shift to a small group of anti-communist leaders. 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation: Introducing the Jewish Labour Committee 
Neither the Association for Civil Liberties nor the League for Democratic 
Rights were highly effective on their own in accomplishing their goals in the 1950s. 
Whether a symptom of Cold War politics or their choice of issues, it was the 
Association for Civil Liberties and its ability to ally with other organizations which 
was the more effective of the two groups. A key issue for the Association for Civil 
Liberties during this period was anti-discrimination legislation, most notably Fair 
Employment and Fair Accommodations Practices Acts. A minority Conservative 
government in Ontario had passed legislation in 1944 prohibiting discrimination in 
signs or publications. 156 With no enforcement mechanism and given the limited scope 
of the law, it achieved little in undermining discrimination. 
A movement, in which Jews played a central role, emerged in the 1950s to 
lobby the Ontario government to pass anti-discrimination legislation. As Carmela 
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Patrias and Ruth A. Frager have demonstrated, many Jews were particularly well 
placed to combat discrimination. Jewish lawyers and academics conducted human 
rights research and acted as spokespersons for various campaigns, while Jewish 
workers within the labour movement and the political Left represented a large and 
outspoken ethnic minority in organizations such as the CCF. Jews were able to draw 
upon an extensive network of Jewish organizations, from community groups to 
unions, which formed a "province-wide communication network unparalleled by any 
other minority group."157 Possibly the most important organization in this network 
was the Jewish Labour Committee (JLC). 
Few other organizations in Canadian history can claim to have had such a 
critical impact in battling discrimination across the country. The network of human 
rights committees established by the JLC were extremely active locally in using the 
press and various pressure tactics to discourage acts of discrimination. The history of 
the JLC also offers a useful introduction to the important role played by organized 
labour in the human rights movement. 
Formed in 1936, the JLC and the Joint Public Relations Committee (formed in 
1938) of the Canadian Jewish Congress were front runners in the push for anti-
discrimination legislation in Ontario. Kalmen Kaplansky, a polish-born Jew who was 
a member of the International Typographical Workers' Union, was the JLC's 
executive director for combating racial discrimination in the labour movement and 
was instrumental in the formation of the Joint Labour Committees to Combat Racial 
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Discrimination in Toronto, Windsor, Montreal, Vancouver and Winnipeg. The Joint 
Public Relations Committee and the JLC, initially competitors, joined forces in 1947 
under the Joint Advisory Committee on Labour Relations with equal funding and 
executive members from the Joint Public Relations Committee and the JLC, and with 
Kaplansky as its leader. Each of the labour committees held an annual Race Institute 
conference, a conference promoting tolerance among workers in unions, and 
distributed pamphlets and networked with various other bodies like the Canadian 
Association for Adult Education. 158 
Both the Trades and Labour Council and the Canadian Congress of Labour 
provided funding and support to Kaplansky' s network. Labour's participation in the 
Joint Advisory Committee on Labour Relations represented a significant shift in its 
attitudes towards racial minorities. For most of the first half of the twentieth century, 
labour was a strong proponent of closed borders, and considered immigrants and 
racial/ethnic minorities, most notably the Chinese in British Columbia, who earned 
significantly lower wages than caucasians, as potential strikebreakers and a threat to 
the power of organized labour. 159 Changes within the labour force and the realization 
that racism was a significant obstacle to working class unity had a profound impact on 
the labour movement. Well over 2 million immigrants entered the country between 
1946 and 1961 and a significant percentage of the growing labour force was new 
Canadians. Post-war prosperity also led to higher wage levels among immigrants 
who began to swell the ranks of organized labour. 160 Through its support for the JLC, 
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labour had come full circle and was now one of the most vocal advocates for 
tolerance and fair practices in the country. 
As early as 1946, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) had committed itself to 
pursuing the creation of Fair Employment Practices legislation in Ontario and the 
Joint Public Relations Committee had played a role in the passing ofthe Racial 
Discrimination Act of 1944. Cooperation between the Association for Civil Liberties 
and the labour committees in Toronto was essential to the anti-discrimination 
legislation campaign. Combined, the civil liberties group was the lead organization 
with prominent members like Sandwell, Brewin, Charles Millard and Rabbi Abraham 
Feinberg who had access to members in government, while the Kaplansky network 
provided the funds and resources for public opinion polls, research, publications and 
sending delegations to Toronto. As a purely voluntary organization consisting of a 
small number of elite members, the association lacked the resources of organized 
labour. The Association for Civil Liberties could provide the Kaplansky network 
with a group of middle class, non-communist advocates of racial equality with access 
to Canada's political elite. In early 1949, the Association for Civil Liberties and 
Toronto labour committee formed a Committee on Group Relations to lobby 
government for a Fair Employment Practices Act, as well as a ban on restrictive 
covenants and the removal of licences from those who refused services to 
minorities. 161 
69 
A large delegation with support from the CJC and consisting of associations 
representing various minorities, churches, youth groups and labour groups formed a 
delegation to Ontario Premier Leslie Frost on 7 July 1949, with Irving Himel 
presenting the brief. Another visit to Queen's Park in January 1950, this time 
consisting of several hundred people and 105 organizations, called upon the 
government to pass anti-discrimination legislation. Frost acquiesced, and in 1950 
amended the Labour Relations Act to withhold legal protections from collective 
agreements discriminating on the basis of race or creed, and soon after introduced a 
bill which prohibited the enforcement of restrictive covenants. Within a year, Frost 
had also introduced and passed the country's first Fair Employment Practices 
legislation and another piece of legislation dealing with equal pay for women, the 
Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act. 162 A Fair Accommodation Practices Act 
was later introduced in 1954.163 These were significant milestones in the history of 
the human rights movement in Canada and Ontario's initial steps into the field of 
human rights legislation had a snowball effect. Within five years of Ontario's 
ground-breaking Fair Employment Practices legislation, similar laws were enacted in 
five other provinces and several provinces also followed Ontario's lead in passing 
legislation to ban discrimination in accommodations. 164 
In 1960, rights activists achieved a partial victory with the passing of a federal 
Bill of Rights. An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was introduced in Parliament by John Diefenbaker, Prime 
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Minister and leader ofthe Conservative Party, and became law on 10 August 1960. 
For Frank Scott and members ofthe human rights community, the bill was a 
disappointment. During the proceedings of the Special Committee of the House of 
Commons on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Frank Scott, Irving Himel 
and other advocacy groups from the Canadian Jewish Congress to the Canadian 
Labour Congress all favoured a constitutional amendment. 165 As a federal statute, the 
Bill of Rights could be overridden by any future Parliament and was not binding on 
the provinces. Nonetheless, although it was eventually passed as a simple statute, it 
had the potential to act as an educative tool to emphasize the importance of tolerance 
and equal rights. Section two of the legislation further purported to ensure that "every 
law of Canada shall ... be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or 
infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the 
rights of freedoms herein recognized and declared."166 The initiative now shifted to 
the courts and whether they would enforce laws in conflict with the new Canadian 
Bill of Rights. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Rights Revolution 
In the 1950s the small town of Dresden, Ontario was one of the "most racially 
segregated communities in Canada."167 Blacks, who constituted about twenty percent 
of the population in Dresden, were banned from most white churches and refused 
service by white merchants. For several years Dresden was the focal point for human 
rights activists who sought tangible evidence of the need for effective anti-
discrimination legislation. One of the more notorious violators of Ontario's weak 
anti-discrimination legislation in the 1950s was Morley McKay, a restaurant owner 
who refused to serve blacks. When the Jewish Labour Committee sent black 
volunteers to test the law, McKay would either openly refuse them service or quickly 
close the restaurant when they approached from down the street. At one point, one of 
the volunteers was "seriously concerned that he might be attacked by the restaurant 
owner, who was wielding a large meat cleaver and appeared to be having trouble 
controlling his notorious temper."168 
Dresden was symbolic of a broader phenomena at this time. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the state did not hesitate to circumvent individual rights when it was 
deemed necessary, whether it was the need to prosecute a war or suppress 
communism. It was also clear that communists or religious minorities were not the 
only ones who did not enjoy the same rights as everyone else. The deportation of 
Japanese-Canadians in 1946 was the ultimate symbolic example ofthe limits of 
Canada's rights culture. Immigration policies were explicitly racist until1962 and 
restrictive covenants (restrictions on the ethnic, racial or religious mix in a 
neighbourhood) were common in the first half of the twentieth century. During 
World War Two, Canada was among the world's least hospitable destinations for 
Jewish refugees, allowing barely 5000 to enter during the course of the war. Blacks 
and other many other minorities who sought to enlist were rejected by recruiting 
centres. Women did not get the vote in Quebec until 1940, and several minority 
groups, including aboriginals, were denied the provincial and federal franchise until 
well after the war. Without the franchise, individuals could not hold public office or 
serve on a jury. Minorities were regularly denied licenses to operate a business. 
Unions fought for the basic right to be recognized as the bargaining agent for their 
members. Anti-semitism, segregation amongst blacks and whites in Nova Scotia and 
Southern Ontario schools, limited economic opportunities for women, and widespread 
discrimination amongst native peoples was a basic reality of life in Canada. By the 
1940s it "was clear that Canadian courts regarded racial discrimination as neither 
immoral nor illegal, and apart from a tenuous claim to breach of contract in special 
circumstances, the victim of discrimination could obtain no redress, no matter how 
flagrant the discriminatory act."169 
Many historians have identified a 'paradigm shift' which occurred around the 
Second World War. Horrified by the implications of the Holocaust and the abuses 
committed by a state on its own citizens, it became increasingly difficult to claim that 
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discrimination was simply a manifestation of aberrant individual behaviour. People 
began to seek broader solutions. By the 1980s the relationship between individuals 
and the state had fundamentally altered, and the role of the state in regards to private 
relationships within civil society had also evolved. Canadians, irrespective of their 
ideas or physical characteristics, became increasingly assertive rights-bearing citizens. 
In 194 7 Parliament repealed the Chinese Immigration Act, which had virtually banned 
Chinese immigration, and enfranchised East Indians and Chinese. By 1949 all legal 
restrictions on Japanese Canadians had been removed. And this was just the 
beginning. The post-war welfare state established certain basic social rights for all 
Canadians, from free health care to accessible education. Privacy Acts were passed in 
most jurisdictions by the 1980s; they protected individuals from such actions as 
unnecessary police wiretaps or insurance companies disclosing information on their 
clients. Linguistic rights were given added protection with the passage of the Official 
Languages Act in 1969. Children were recognized as having their own rights as well. 
Quebec's Youth Protection Act of 1977 guaranteed youths the right to be consulted 
when changing foster care and to consult a lawyer before judicial proceedings, while 
the Ontario Child Welfare Act of 1978 protected the privacy of adopted children. 
Restrictions on women serving on juries were removed by the 1980s as were 
requirements for women to leave the civil service after they were married (this 
requirement remained on the statute books in Newfoundland until the 1980s). Mental 
patients also became rights-bearing citizens; in some jurisdictions, they were included 
74 
in minimum wage laws and greater restrictions were placed on forcible confinement. 
The first major land-claims treaty was signed in 1975 between the Quebec 
government and the James Bay Cree to develop hydro-power, and several revisions to 
the Indian Act placed First Nations on more equal footing with other Canadians, 
including allowing female aboriginals to retain their native status after marrying a 
male who was not aboriginal. Prisoners were granted the vote in Quebec in 1979. 
Changing attitudes, the expanding role of the state, new laws, activists 
employing rights discourse: all of these developments were part of a human rights 
movement which swept across the country. This 'rights revolution' not only 
represented an important shift in the relationship between citizens and the state, but 
within civil society as well. 
Developments in Canada reflected similar international phenomena. By the 
late 1940s there "was a new concept dawning in international thought, of 'human 
rights' as a distinct entity with universal applicability. Canadian policy had not 
recognized this concept early in the War, but through its participation in United 
Nations (UN) declarations Canada was accepting the international intention to 
promote fundamental rights." 170 The Charter of the United Nations, for instance, 
stated the organization's intention "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small." 171 The UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR went much further 
than the Charter. 172 The first two documents not only asserted basic civil and political 
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rights, but the UDHR and the ICESCR characterized leisure time, education, fair 
wages and working hours as basic rights. Individuals, and not just states, were now 
the subject of international law. As Marc Bossuyt notes, it is "fair to state that 
nothing came even close to an international system of protection of human rights 
before the founding of the United Nations."173 
Although Canadian activists and policy makers drew upon the international 
discourse of human rights, the human rights movement pre-dated international 
developments. 174 Organizations dedicated solely to the defence of civil liberties 
appeared as early as the 1930s. Anti-discrimination legislation appeared in Canada 
long before the international community enforced similar rights; the two covenants 
did not come into force until the 1970s and many countries were slow to ratify various 
human rights treaties, most notably the United States, which did not ratify the 
covenant on civil and political rights until1994. Covenants on the rights of women 
(1979) and children (1989) were slow to emerge from the United Nations, and 
Canadians had already recognized these rights in legislation. Nonetheless, although 
the Canadian government voted in favour of the UDHR in 1948, few of the 
Declaration's principles could be found in Canadian law in the 1940s. It would take 
another generation, and intensive efforts by human rights activists, before these 
principles were reflected in the social and legal order. 
The rights revolution in Canada has had profound political, legal, social and 
cultural ramifications. It would be impossible to delineate every manifestation of the 
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human rights movement in Canada. Instead, the following chapter builds upon the 
discussion in chapter three by highlighting key developments within the human rights 
movement since the sixties. The issues identified below, notably the role of the state, 
the legal order, rights activism and new cultural codes, are designed to provide the 
necessary historical context for understanding the emergence of rights associations in 
the sixties. These developments helped to constitute the human rights movement of 
which rights associations were an integral part. 
The Politics of Rights: Parliamentary Supremacy and the Bill of Rights 
Movement 
As with any revolution, the rights revolution deeply affected political 
discourse in Canada. In 1922 Prime Minister Mackenzie King expressed concern 
with Anglo-Saxons becoming 'debased' if lower races were allowed to mingle freely 
in Canada; twenty-five years later King suggested that "the people of Canada do not 
wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the 
character of our population."175 Within a couple of generations after the war, 
however, such views were virtually eliminated from political debate. 
The rights revolution entailed an important change in the role of the state in 
Canada; governments became central to the protection and enforcement of the new 
rights regime. In 1867, however, the founding fathers had rejected a bill of rights and 
the only real limits on governments were their jurisdiction of powers as defined by the 
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constitution. 176 Of all the manifestations of the rights revolution in Canada's political 
culture, no issue more clearly demonstrates the transformative power of rights 
discourse than the bill of rights movement and its impact on Parliamentary supremacy 
as a core principle of Canadian political culture. 
At the close of the war in 1945, Alistair Stewart, recently elected member of 
the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), presented before Parliament the 
first resolution to create a Canadian Bill of Rights. His resolution called for a "bill of 
rights protecting minority rights, civil and religious liberties, freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly; establishing equal treatment before the law of all citizens, 
irrespective of race, nationality or religious or political beliefs; and providing the 
necessary democratic powers to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms." 177 
Since its foundation in 1933 with the Regina Manifesto, the CCF had called for 
amendments to the constitution to protect racial and religious minorities, and to offer 
greater protection for freedom of speech and of association. Only a year before 
Stewart introduced his motion, the civil liberties sub committee of the Canadian Bar 
Association had recommended entrenching certain rights in the constitution. 178 
Stewart's motion, with no support from the ruling Liberals, was more 
symbolic than realistic, as was a similar attempt by John Diefenbaker to introduce a 
bill of rights into the proposed Citizenship Act in 1946. Diefenbaker, a leading figure 
within the Conservative Party, talked about the possibility of a Bill of Rights during 
the debates surrounding the espionage commission, and would continue to support 
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legislation for protecting individual rights until he led the passage of the Bill of Rights 
in 1960. His proposed 'Bill of Rights' in 1946 incorporated freedoms of religion, 
speech and assembly, limited the suspension of habeas corpus to Parliament (as 
opposed to a cabinet order-in-council), and prohibited government tribunals from 
circumventing due process. 179 
Opponents of a bill of rights appealed to notions of Parliamentary supremacy. 
Parliament was held to be the defender of personal freedoms, as enshrined in the 1689 
Bill of Rights. As defined by A.V. Dicey, the "principle ofParliamentary sovereignty 
means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under 
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, 
that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."180 
Appeals to parliamentary supremacy were often invoked by power-holders 
concerned with any proposed limits on their ability to legislate. The Liberals had 
ruled almost continually since 1921, with brief interludes of Conservative rule under 
Arthur Meighen (1926) and R.B. Bennett (1930-5). During World War Two the 
executive governed by order-in-council and the ruling party became increasingly 
comfortable with exercising power. For the CCF and Conservatives like Diefenbaker, 
a bill of rights was an attractive solution to the potential abuses arising from the 
exercise of executive power. During the debates over the espionage commission, the 
Liberals decided that the best defence against accusations by Conservatives and the 
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CCF of state abuse of individual rights was an appeal to the tradition of Parliamentary 
supremacy. In defending the actions of his government in suspending habeas corpus 
and other civil liberties in 1946, Minister of Justice J.L. Ilsley claimed that "those 
principles resulting from Magna Carta, from the Petition of Rights, the Bill of 
Settlement and Habeas Corpus Act, are great and glorious privileges; but they are 
privileges which can be and which unfortunately sometimes have to be interfered with 
by the actions of Parliament or actions under the authority ofParliament." 181 A bill of 
rights intended to limit Parliamentary supremacy, in Ilsley's view, threatened to 
Americanize the Canadian political system.182 
Support for legislating rights in some form of bill of rights was already 
growing in Canada. Alberta attempted to pass its own Bill of Rights in 1946 but it 
was struck down in the courts, whereas Saskatchewan successfully implemented its 
Bill of Rights in 194 7. 183 The Canadian Congress of Labour began advocating for a 
national bill of rights as early as 194 7 and the Trades and Labour Congress followed 
suit in 1948. 184 For civil liberties organizations, there was no denying their desire for 
a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights. At a December 1946 conference in 
Toronto to discuss common strategies, civil liberties groups from Ottawa, Montreal 
and Toronto all expressed their support for a constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights. 185 
Yet, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being negotiated in 
1948, Canada was one of the few countries initially opposed to the Declaration. 
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Prime Minister Mackenzie King was concerned that the Declaration could be used 
against the government to pressure it to support unwanted reforms or to criticize 
public policy. Pressure from the Americans and distress at the thought of voting 
alongside the Soviet block and South Africa forced Canada to support the initiative. 186 
Nevertheless, a year after the UDHR was signed by Canada, Ilsley reasserted his 
opposition to entrenching human rights in the constitution because it would place 
limits on Parliamentary supremacy. Placing rights in the constitution represented a 
"radical departure from principles which have heretofore applied." Deputy Minister 
of Justice, F.P. Varcoe, suggested before a committee of the House and Senate that it 
would be a 'retrograde step' to deny Parliament the powers of sovereignty. 187 Varcoe 
believed that the "parliamentary system, the essential characteristic of which is that 
Parliament is sovereign, and in the provinces the legislatures, if you impose a bill of 
rights on the legislature to that extent, you are diminishing its sovereignty."188 
In the wake of the espionage commission scandal and developments in the 
United Nations, the Liberals decided to institute a series of Parliamentary committees 
to consider the possibility of creating a bill of rights. In 1947 and 1948,joint 
committees of the House of Commons and Senate conducted investigations and asked 
provincial and federal Attomies-Generals, as well as deans of law schools, if the 
federal government could pass a bill of rights. A 1950 senate committee carried out 
public hearings on the potential content and viability of a bill of rights. 
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The Liberals had little interest in a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights 
which would permit judicial review as a means to limit executive and parliamentary 
power. After more than twenty years of continuous rule and the imposition of 
extensive economic and social controls during the war, the Liberals had little reason 
to welcome a bill of rights. In presenting his motion to institute the first committee in 
1947, Ian Mackenzie (Minister ofVeteran Affairs), contended that "many ofthe 
rights and privileges which we prize highly we do not owe to specific statutes. Rather 
we owe them to the absence of laws which would prohibit them. In my view, it is 
much more important that we should think and talk about freedom than that we 
should pass legislation in regard to it."189 Neither the 1947 nor the 1948 committee 
accomplished much. Only a select few were allowed to present before the committee 
in 1947.190 J.L. Ilsley, who had earlier defended the government's actions during the 
espionage commission, and Senator L.M. Gouin from Quebec chaired the committee. 
Neither was predisposed towards a bill of rights. The former was opposed to judicial 
limits on Parliament and the latter favoured provincial rights, and it was Diefenbaker 
who pushed for a second meeting of the committee and a survey of law schools and 
attorneys general to consider the potential for a Canadian bill of rights. 191 In the end, 
only the Attorney General from Saskatchewan suggested that the federal government 
had the power to legislate to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
rest warned Parliament that it would represent an encroachment on provincial 
powers. 192 
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By far the most productive of the three investigations during this period was 
the 1950 Special Senate Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It 
was led by Arthur Roebuck, a Liberal senator from Toronto, who held the distinction 
ofbeing one of the most outspoken Liberals in favour of a bill of rights in Canada. 
Representations from across Canada were invited to present individual and group 
opinions before the committee, an option unavailable in the previous joint 
committees. The presentations offer an insight into how non-state actors viewed a 
potential of a bill of rights. A variety of groups encompassing organized labour, 
rights associations and various interest groups from the Canadian Jewish Congress to 
the Canadian Association for Adult Education made representations. 193 Everyone 
called on the government to introduce a bill of rights, most believing it should be in 
the constitution. In describing the types of rights appropriate to the constitution, there 
was an unspoken consensus in favour of civil and political rights, and not economic 
and social rights. Speaking for the Association for Civil Liberties, Irving Himel 
sympathized with those who "approve of these economic and social rights in 
principle, and favour them as objectives to be attained .... [I]t must be admitted that 
they are rights which can only be properly dealt with by specific and detailed 
legislation and not, as have been the case with the civil and political human rights, as 
part of the fundamental law of the land."194 Presentations by the Department of 
External Affairs did not consider economic and social rights as "statements of the 
rights of the individual against the State itself, but descriptive of the responsibility of 
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Government and Parliament for social welfare and economic prosperity. It is widely 
recognized that the right to work and the right to social security cannot be much 
advanced by simply declaring them in a general instrument on human rights."195 
Organized labour was itself divided on the question of economic and social 
rights. Eugene Forsey, speaking for the 350 000 workers of the Canadian Congress of 
Labour, believed that the jurisdictional divisions between federal and provincial 
governments prohibited the inclusion of the right to work in the constitution. Most 
importantly, it considered a bill of rights as being solely capable of entrenching 
negative rights, and the rights to work or education required positive action by the 
state, best left to federal and provincial economic policy. 196 In contrast, the Trades 
and Labour Congress called on the entrenchment of economic rights in the 
constitution and considered it a constitutional right for the unemployed to expect 
work be created for them, although they were vague on precisely whose responsibility 
it was to create such work. 197 
Roebuck must have been disappointed with the results of the commission he 
had instituted. 198 The committee recommended passing a declaration of human rights, 
but only after an amending formula had been agreed upon by the provinces and the 
federal government, a central issue in the upcoming Dominion-Provincial conference. 
In a letter to Irving Himel in June 1950, Roebuck emphasized the divisions between 
the English and French speaking members of the committee, with the latter hesitant to 
support any derogation of provincial powers suggested in a bill of rights. 199 French 
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Canadian MPs' opposition to a bill of rights had denied Roebuck the opportunity to 
present to the Senate a confident recommendation for a constitutionally entrenched 
bill of rights. No doubt Mackenzie King's earlier hesitancy to support the UDHR out 
of concern for offending provincial rights had some basis in fact. Any attempt by the 
federal government to claim jurisdiction on the defence of individual rights could be 
seen as an attempt to derogate powers from the provinces and would raise opposition 
from Quebec MPs. 
Despite entrenched opposition, there was clearly some significant and growing 
support for some kind of bill of rights for Canada. The call for a bill of rights was an 
important step in acknowledging the compatibility of entrenched rights with the 
Canadian political system. It represented a meaningful alteration in political debate in 
the context of the evolving welfare state where government was increasingly 
responsible for ensuring social and economic equality. By 1960, as the Diefenbaker 
Conservative government prepared to enact its own bill of rights, the notion of 
Parliamentary supremacy was waning. Although not stated outright by the Minister 
of Justice, Davie Fulton, it was clear from his testimony that his government was 
willing and interested in entrenching rights in the constitution. Fulton did not appeal 
to Parliamentary supremacy in his argument against a constitutional entrenchment, 
but instead focussed on the legal obstacles to amending the BNA Act. Specifically, 
he was concerned, as the Roebuck commission had been in 1950, with the lack of an 
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amending formula and the implications of having Britain amend the constitution for 
Canada. 
At the same time, the position of the Liberal party had begun to change. 
During the debate over Diefenbaker' s proposed Bill of Rights in 1960, Lester B. 
Pearson, leading the Liberals, was quick to distance the party from the actions of the 
King government in 1946: "I wish to say for myself and for those associated with me 
in this House that we do not believe that certain of those actions were really 
necessary, or that they should be repeated in any similar situation in the future."200 
Liberal conventions in 1948 and 1959 took no position on a Bill ofRights.201 
Nonetheless, in focussing his attack against Diefenbaker's proposed bill for not 
consulting the provinces and losing the opportunity to develop a bill binding on the 
provinces and possibly as a constitutional amendment, Pearson's speech signalled an 
important departure from the late 1940s when most Liberals opposed outright any bill 
of rights. Parliamentary supremacy was slowly losing its influence among the ranks 
of the Liberals, a fact Pearson acknowledged: 
the record over the years is certainly not perfect. However, I think it 
has in the past justified this approach and adherence to these principles 
which are grounded in the sovereignty of a free and democratic 
parliament. In this bill we are departing from the British tradition. 
New circumstances, new difficulties and new pressures may justify 
some such departure, but they will not justify the limited, confused and 
uncertain departure embodied in this bill.202 
These early political debates on the rights of Canadians reflected a minimalist 
view of individual rights. Federal and provincial legislation did not go far beyond 
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traditional British freedoms of press, assembly, speech, association and religion as 
well as due process and property rights.203 Classical liberal values dominated the 
politico-legal order ofthe country. Statesmen favoured respect for private property, 
trial by jury, rule of law, freedom of contract and minimal government interference in 
their basic freedoms. These were the type of rights enshrined in Magna Carta (1215), 
the Petition of Right (1628), Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the Bill of Rights (1689) and 
the Act of Settlement (1700-1 ). Responsible government was combined with a 
respect for British Parliamentary institutions and the primacy of these institutions. 
Even the socialist CCF approached rights from a minimalist perspective. As 
discussed above, the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, passed by Tommy Douglas and the 
CCF in 1947, was limited to the five freedoms and anti-discrimination provisions. In 
1955 M.J. Coldwell proposed a motion in Parliament to have the federal government 
take the initiative in entrenching human rights in the constitution. It dealt with the 
five freedoms: equality under the law, privacy and prohibiting excessive bail and the 
suspension of habeas corpus.204 The CCF was unique in its unwavering dedication to 
a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, but had yet to adopt a broader human 
rights perspective to incorporate social, economic and cultural rights when it came to 
the constitution. 
Under the leadership of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the Liberals' position on a bill 
of rights continued to evolve. Trudeau's campaign to lead the Liberals in patriating 
the constitution and entrenching a Charter of Rights and Freedoms began in 1968 
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with his first official speech on constitutional rights as Minister of Justice. In a 
speech before a conference of Federal-Provincial First Ministers in the year of the 
anniversary of the UDHR, Trudeau called for a constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights to "identify clearly the various rights to be protected, and remove them 
henceforth from governmental interference .... The basic human values of all 
Canadians- political, legal, egalitarian, linguistic- would in this way be guaranteed 
throughout Canada in a way that the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, or any number of 
provincial bills of rights, is incapable of providing. "205 
A joint committee ofthe House of Commons and the Senate was established 
in 1970 to consider patriating the Canadian constitution and, among other issues, 
discuss the possibility of a bill of rights. The committee recommended entrenching a 
bill of rights in the constitution along the same lines as the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
With the exception of adding anti-discrimination articles and protections for language 
rights, the substance of the rights favoured by the committee was effectively the same 
as those demanded in 1950: freedoms of speech, religion, association, assembly and 
press alongside protections for private property and against arbitrary arrest. 
Parliamentary supremacy was rejected as an obstacle to entrenching rights in the 
constitution. In its final report, the committee admitted that their recommendation 
would limit legislative sovereignty, but 
parliamentary sovereignty is no more sacrosanct a principle than is the 
respect for human liberty which is reflected in a Bill of Rights. 
Legislative sovereignty is already limited legally by the distribution of 
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powers under a federal system and, some would say, by natural law or 
by the common law Bill ofRights. The kind of additional limit on it 
which would be imposed by a constitutional Bill of Rights is not an 
absolute one, for a Bill of Rights constitutes rather a healthy tension 
point between two principles of fundamental value, establishing the 
kind of equilibrium among the competing interests of majority rule and 
minority rights which is in our view of the essence of democracy.206 
The increasing assertiveness of French Canadians in the 1960s, as manifested 
in the election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976 and the subsequent referendum on 
sovereignty-association in 1980, played a key role in introducing a new issue in the 
bill of rights debate: language rights. Federalists had pledged constitutional reform 
during the referendum campaign, a promise which eventually led to the patriation of 
the constitution and the Charter. For federalists, the Charter was a powerful weapon 
to be used for promoting national unity, most notably through its provisions for 
language rights. Language rights were added to the arsenal of traditional civil and 
political rights during this period. As Stewart and Diefenbaker had done twenty years 
earlier, in 1967 Trudeau paid homage to the basic freedoms in a speech before the 
Canadian Bar Association referring to "the familiar basic rights- freedom of belief and 
expression, freedom of association, the right to a fair trial and to fair legal procedures 
generally. We would also expect a guarantee against discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion, sex, ethnic or national origin. These are the rights commonly protected 
by bills of rights." However, unlike Stewart and Diefenbaker, he further argued that a 
"constitutional change recognizing broader rights with respect to the two official 
languages would add a new meaning to Confederation."207 Language rights, 
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according to the future Prime Minister, were as fundamental and basic human rights 
as speech or religion. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms ushered in a new era and was, in many 
ways, the ultimate manifestation of the rights revolution in Canada. A preference for 
civil and political rights was evident in the Charter's various articles, with protections 
for the five freedoms and due process rights. Mobility rights, democratic rights 
dealing with the political system (e.g., voting), and denominational education rights 
were all entrenched in the constitution. An equality clause was inserted alongside 
language rights. Recognition of minority rights was a major step from the traditional 
political discourse on rights as civil liberties. Nonetheless, the Charter was 
principally concerned with negative rights and avoided many of the provisions 
contained in such documents as the UDHR or the ICESCR. These newly entrenched 
rights were also vulnerable to an override clause and a limitation clause which 
allowed the judiciary to permit state abuse of fundamental freedoms if the 
government could demonstrate that its actions were 'justified in a free and democratic 
society.' 
The Charter was not the end of the rights revolution, but it was undoubtedly a 
critically symbolic achievement. First, economic, social and cultural rights were not 
absent from political debates about human rights, but negative rights and civil 
liberties dominated these discussions. Second, if one accepts Miriam Smith's 
contention that human rights activists conceive of social change as legal change, then 
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no development in Canadian history better exemplifies the dominance of rights 
discourse than entrenching a bill of rights in the constitution. Human rights do exist 
outside the law and exert a powerful moral force in Canada, but they are most clearly 
manifested in the law; any study of the rights revolution must appreciate how the law 
and law makers have articulated notions of rights in a particular social and historical 
context. 
The Human Rights State: Human Rights and the Law 
The rights revolution went far beyond constitutional debates. Up until the war 
there was little legal recognition for the rights of minorities. But between the end of 
the war and culminating in 1982, a massive human rights program was initiated by 
federal and provincial governments in Canada creating a veritable 'human rights 
state.' The human rights state was an institutional infrastructure designed to protect 
human rights through various state institutions. 
Anti-discrimination legislation was the most visible pillar of the state's human 
rights program. Ontario's 1944 Racial Discrimination Act banned discriminatory 
signs or publications in an effort to prohibit the use of 'Whites Only' or 'No Jews or 
Dogs' signs.208 Saskatchewan's 1947 Bill ofRights also prohibited discrimination 
with respect to accommodation, education and employment.209 Neither Act provided 
an enforcement mechanism and proved weak instruments for protecting citizens 
against discrimination. According to Walter Tarnopolsky in 1982, there was 
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a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to convict, probably based 
upon a feeling that a discriminatory act is not really in the nature of a 
criminal act. Without extensive publicity and promotion, many people 
are unaware of the fact that such human rights legislation exists. 
Members of minority groups who have known discrimination in the 
past tend to be somewhat sceptical as to whether the legislation is 
anything more than a sop to the conscience of the majority. Finally, 
the sanction in the form of a fine does not really help the person 
discriminated against in obtaining a job or home or service in a 
restaurant.210 
As anti-discrimination legislation evolved, it would increasingly form an 
integral part of the emerging human rights state. Throughout the 1950s several 
provinces passed legislation banning discrimination in employment and 
accommodation (see chapter three), albeit with weak enforcement mechanisms. The 
1960 federal Bill of Rights was another important pillar of the human rights state. It 
was an acknowledgment that all Canadians, irrespective of the province they lived in, 
enjoyed certain basic freedoms, although its value would prove to be primarily 
symbolic. The Bill of Rights was a dismal failure and led Frank Scott to state in 1964 
that "that pretentious piece of legislation has proven as ineffective as many of us 
predicted. "211 
The Bill of Rights suffered a painful reception at the hands of the judiciary. 
Judges were simply unwilling to employ the Bill of Rights in the face of a tradition of 
Parliamentary supremacy. In Robertson and Rosetanni v The Queen (1963), the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the federal government's Lord's Day Act banning 
the operation of a business (in this case, a bowling alley) on a Sunday. The Court 
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rejected arguments that the Act violated freedom of religion under the Bill of Rights. 
According to Ronald Ritchie's majority decision, the Bill of Rights enshrined existing 
rights when it was passed in 1960 and did not create any new rights; since freedom of 
religion existed when the Lord's Day Act was in operation before 1960, the Bill of 
Rights did not create any new rights making the law inoperative. In effect, the Bill of 
Rights did not open up new territory. 212 The main obstacle facing the Bill of Rights 
was the lack of a clear clause specifically stating that all1aws violating its provisions 
would be rendered inoperative. In fact, by 1969 the court had not once used the Bill 
of Rights to assert an individual's civil liberties. 
Suddenly, in 1970, rights advocates found themselves with an unexpected 
victory. For ten years the Supreme Court had refused to assert the Bill of Rights in 
any meaningful way although the court had been confronted with only a handful of 
Bill of Rights cases by 1970 (between 1960 and 1982, the court only heard 34 cases 
dealing with the Bill of Rights). In the case of The Queen v Drybones, the court 
found section 94(b) of the Indian Act in direct violation of section 1 (b), equality under 
the law, of the Bill of Rights. In a potentially precedent-setting decision, the court 
ruled section 94(b) of the Indian Act inoperative. Joseph Drybones had been found 
guilty by a Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories (affirmed by the Appeals 
Court) of being drunk off a reserve, was fined $10 and held for three days in custody. 
According to Ritchie's majority decision, section 1(b) meant "at least that no 
individual or group of individuals is to be treated more harshly than another under 
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that law, and I am therefore of opinion that an individual is denied equality before the 
law if it is made an offence punishable at law, on account of his race, for him to do 
something which his fellow Canadians are free to do without having committed any 
offence or having been made subject to any penalty."213 Ritchie's decision led the 
majority of the court in a ruling which may have been influenced by the federal 
government's controversial1969 white paper seeking to eliminate Indian status and 
place natives on more equal footing with other Canadians. It was a major victory for 
rights advocates in placing the rights of the individual as enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights above federal legislation. 
The precedent, however, proved to be short lived. In 1974 the court 
effectively reversed itself in Attorney General of Canada v Lavell. Jeanette Lavell 
was an Indian woman challenging section 12( 1 )(b) of the Indian Act requiring native 
women to surrender their status upon marrying a non-Indian. Since the same rule did 
not apply to Indian men, Lavell used the same argument as Drybones: she claimed 
that the regulation violated her right to equality under the law. This time, however, 
the court's decision was much different. The problem with interpreting the Lavell 
case is that, as one author has suggested, the majority of the decision is "devoted to 
setting up shibboleths and then elaborately and repeatedly striking them down. 
Excessively broad declarations are made, sometimes far beyond the requirements of 
the case, and then dismissed or reinterpreted without concise and sufficiently detailed 
analysis."214 As an example of exaggerations made in the case, Ritchie (once again 
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writing for the majority) suggested that to accept Lavell's claim would be to 
invalidate the federal government's ability to designate special treatment for native 
people and thus render it impotent in carrying out its responsibilities under the 
constitution.215 Ritchie distinguished between the two cases by pointing out how 
Dry bones dealt with penal law instead of civil law (although there is no reason to 
believe the Bill of Rights was meant to apply more strictly to penal law) and dealt 
with an off-reserve Indian being treated differently from a non-Indian. In effect, the 
judgement meant that Indian women could be discriminated against so long as all 
Indian women were discriminated against equally.216 
Subsequent attempts in the 1970s to use the Bill ofRights' equality under the 
law clause to render legislation inoperative were equally unsuccessful. In Brownridge 
v the Queen, Curr v The Queen and Duke v The Queen, individuals accused of drunk 
driving claimed a violation of their right to counsel and their due process rights while 
questioning the legality ofbreathalyzer tests.217 Another case, Smythe v The Queen, 
impugned the Receiver General's discretion to prosecute under the Revenue Act as a 
violation of equality under the law. 218 Each case failed. By 1982 it was clear that 
only an amendment to the constitution would transform the court into a more 
effective agent for combating rights violations rooted in statute.219 
While the court remained unimaginative in its approach to human rights issues 
in the 1960s, several provincial governments were involved in implementing a novel 
method for making governments more accountable. Another pillar of the human 
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rights state was the ombudsman. The role of the ombudsman was to "generate 
complaints against government administration, to use its extensive powers of 
investigation in performing a post-decision administrative audit, to form judgements 
that criticize or vindicate administrators, and to report publicly its findings and 
recommendations but not to change administrative decisions."22° Canada's first 
ombudsman appeared in Alberta in 1967, followed by New Brunswick (1968), 
Quebec (1968) and Manitoba (1969). Ombudsmen were available in every 
jurisdiction by the end of the 1970s except in Prince Edward Island and the federal 
government.221 While ombudsmen had no direct link to human rights codes, they 
clearly played a role in defending individuals from the state by establishing machinery 
in which citizens could pursue claims against the government. This process included 
complaints not falling under the jurisdiction of human rights codes, such as the case 
of a civil servant abusing their power. 
In addition to the ombudsmen, Canada's two largest provinces initiated major 
investigations to revise their laws in the 1960s to better conform with current 
standards ofhuman rights. On 21 May 1964 Ontario established the Royal 
Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights chaired by former Chief Justice of the High 
Court, James McRuer. Its mandate was to provide a comprehensive review of all the 
laws in Ontario and to "recommend such changes in the law, procedures and 
processes as in the opinion of the commission are necessary and desirable to 
safeguard the fundamental and basic rights, liberties and freedoms of the individual 
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from infringement by the State or any other body."222 For the next seven years the 
McRuer commission examined hundreds of Ontario statutes, received thousands of 
submissions and heard hundreds of witnesses. All told, the commission's reports 
contained 2281 pages and 976 recommendations. As McRuer's biographer has 
suggested, "nothing quite like McRuer' s inquiry into civil rights had been seen before 
in Canada. In a sense, it became a great work of constitutional reform- an attempt to 
give meaning, within the laws and legal procedures of the province, both to the civil 
rights acquired through the common-law tradition and to the other 'inalienable rights' 
that Canadians enjoyed."223 
While McRuer was preparing his first report, another major commission was 
announced by the Quebec government on 24 January 1967 led by lawyer and former 
Minister of Municipal Affairs, Yves Prevost.224 The Commission of Enquiry into the 
Administration of Justice on Criminal and Penal Matters in Quebec was to inquire 
into the application of criminal and penal law in Quebec. 225 Prevost's report was even 
larger and more extensive than the McRuer report, containing 5 volumes (some as 
long as 1500 pages) with more than a dozen sub-volumes and appendices prepared 
between 1968-9. It represented the most comprehensive analysis of Quebec penal law 
ever conducted by the provincial government. 
It would be impossible to come close to summarizing the hundreds of 
recommendations and analyses presented in these two voluminous reports. Each 
investigation dealt with the particular needs of the province. For instance, McRuer 
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called for an ombudsman (which Quebec already had) while Prevost insisted on 
establishing a system oflegal aid (which Ontario already had). One of the key issues 
was the question of a Bill of Rights. Prevost recommended a comprehensive Charter 
of Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights while McRuer, guided by principles of 
traditional British justice and democracy, was more hesitant to recommend a Bill of 
Rights for Ontario but did favour legislation similar to the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights. 
Despite these differences, the reports shared similar concerns on the operation of 
juvenile and family courts, coroner's inquests, the provision of bail for poor people, 
providing compensation to victims of crimes, and making the judicial system more 
efficient in processing appeals. Both resulted in the implementation of widespread 
reforms. 
While McRuer and Prevost were busy transforming the statute books of the 
two provinces where two-thirds of the Canadian population resided, human rights 
legislation was undergoing a significant transformation. The Fair Employment 
Practices and Fair Accommodation Practices laws noted in the previous chapter were 
consolidated into human rights codes, beginning with Ontario in 1962 and ending 
with the federal government in 1977.226 Human rights codes were far more expansive 
than earlier pieces of legislation; they dealt with discrimination in employment, 
services and housing and expanded to ban discrimination on grounds such as political 
opinion. The codes provided enforcement mechanisms through human rights 
commissions which could hear cases and impose fines or require a service to be 
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rendered or employment provided. Most of the commissions were also active in 
educational campaigns promoting equality and awareness of anti-discrimination 
regulations. Until2002, when British Columbia became the first province to disband 
its human rights commission, these commissions remained a mainstay of the state's 
human rights program in every jurisdiction across Canada. 
Human rights commissions were at the forefront of challenging traditional 
ideas about human rights. Early human rights legislation and litigation was concerned 
primarily with direct discrimination. Individuals were prosecuted for refusing 
employment to Jews or denying blacks entry into restaurants. By the seventies, there 
was a recognition of systemic discrimination based on the belief that practices which 
were considered neutral could, in fact, be discriminatory. A policy by the British 
Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons forcing newly licensed non-Canadian 
doctors to practice for a limited time in remote areas of the province was challenged 
in Human Rights Commission v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia (1976).227 British Columbia's Human Rights Commission found against 
the College because its policy unreasonably discriminated against non-Canadians for 
reasons not relevant to working as a doctor. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed. A 
year later, in Singh v Security and Investigations Services Ltd (1977), the Supreme 
Court was faced with an appeal to a ruling of the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission.228 The Commission had considered the case of a Sikh security guard 
who was required to shave and wear a safety helmet as part of his job requirements. 
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There was no direct attempt at discrimination against Sikhs, it was a generic 
requirement for all employees, but in the opinion of the Commission the requirement 
unfairly discriminated against Singh who could not follow the job requirement 
without violating his religious beliefs. Once again, the Supreme Court of Canada 
found in favour of the minority group. Such an expansive approach to dealing with 
discrimination heralded a more positive role for the state in the field of human rights. 
Instead of simply prohibiting the offensive activity of individuals, human rights codes 
could be used to recognize the historical inequalities of minority groups and the social 
and economic conditions in which inequality was rooted. 
Another facet of the human rights state was law reform commissions. Law 
Reform Commissions were responsible for conducting extensive research and study 
into provincial and federal laws in their respective jurisdictions and, as was the case 
with the McRuer and Prevost commissions, offered recommendations to improve the 
law in ways which could better respect individual rights. The central function of the 
commissions was as follows: "a search by the Commission for those values which the 
law should uphold; the effective communication to others ofthe results ofthis search; 
and general persuasion of the need for rational change and the achievement of reform 
by practical results."229 Ontario began the trend by appointing a Law Reform 
Commission under McRuer in 1964 at the same time it appointed the Royal 
Commission Inquiry on Civil Rights, and by the end of the 1970s most of the 
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provinces had similar institutions (the federal Law Reform Commission was created 
in 1971). 
There were several other minor developments which contributed to the 
infrastructure of the human rights state. A Conference on Human Rights Ministers 
was held for the first time in British Columba in 1974. Closed to the press, the 
conference assembled mostly labour ministers to discuss their views on human rights 
legislation. The only decision to emerge from the conference was to encourage the 
expansion of the Canadian Statutory Association of Human Rights Associations into a 
truly national coordinating committee for human rights commissions.230 This 
Association, another important development in the 1970s, had been formed a few 
years earlier as a forum for organizing annual conferences of human rights 
commissioners to exchange ideas and provide training exercises for human rights 
officers. 
An Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights emerged from the 
conference of human rights ministers. The committee was designed to organize task 
forces within the federal government to study human rights issues while working to 
maintain an open dialogue between various human rights ministers and 
commissions.231 When the provinces and federal government established a 
Continuing Federal-Provincial Committee of Officials Responsible for Human Rights 
as part of the negotiations over entrenching rights in the constitution, the 
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Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights provided the administrative 
framework to foster communication among human rights ministers. 
With the introduction ofthe Charter in 1982 the deficiencies ofthe Bill of 
Rights were overcome and the human rights state was fully entrenched. Numerous 
other pieces of legislation, royal commissions and bureaucratic structures were 
created to promote the state's human rights program. The rights revolution thus 
entailed a significant transformation in the law from the pre-World War Two period 
when "the violation of civil liberties in Canada did not seem to be of serious 
concern. "232 
Strategies for Change: Human Rights Activism 
The impact ofthe rights revolution was felt outside the realm of policy-
making and the courts. During a period of widespread social movement activism, a 
myriad of new social movements promoted alternative lifestyles and challenged 
conventional mores. One manifestation of these movements were social movement 
organizations. Unlike the rights associations which are the focus of this work, 
however, these organizations served a particular constituency and were involved in 
more than simply rights advocacy; many ethnic organizations, for instance, organized 
cultural events and provided direct services to their members. These organizations 
represented a 'human rights community,' a collection of activists and organizations 
employing human rights discourse. Political lobbying and legal reform was only one 
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form of activism. True equality for gays or women, for example, could not be 
achieved simply by adding new sections to human rights codes; education programs, 
women's centres, gay pride parades, civil disobedience and a multitude of other forms 
of activism forced Canadians to confront new ideas about equality. Social movement 
activists were an integral a part of the rights revolution. 
Drugs, free love, long hair, flashy clothes, rock and roll, and a host of other 
challenges to conformity defined the sixties. By1965 half the population in North 
America was under 25 years old. Fifty thousand people attended the Toronto rock 
festival in 1968, and the following year hundreds ofthousands poured into 
Woodstock in upstate New York. With music came drugs, both equally at the heart 
ofthe counter-culture ofthe sixties. LSD, made illegal in Canada in the 1960s, and 
cannabis were the drugs of choice for most youth seeking to rebel. Fearful of the 
implications of mass drug use, the state stepped up its attack on illegal narcotics. 
Between 1960 and 1970, drug charges laid in Canada jumped from 516 to 8 596. And 
if rock and roll mixed with drugs was a threat to traditional middle class social 
standards, the sexual revolution of the sixties was an even greater threat to the basic 
moral standards epitomized in the 1950s. "By the time the first baby-boomers 
reached university ... sexuality was fully depicted in both literature and movies in 
ways that would have been completely unacceptable only a decade earlier."233 
Intertwined with this counterculture was the student movement and the rise of 
the New Left. Within ten years the student movement peaked and declined. The 
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Combined University Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a symbol of the New Left 
in the sixties, was university-centered, encouraged direct protest and considered 
political parties ineffectual. It launched a journal in 1961, Our Generation Against 
Nuclear War, and organized Peace Houses in various cities where people could gather 
for discussion, organize mass mailings, lead debates and promote antipathy to nuclear 
weapons. 234 In 1964 the Combined University Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
transformed into SUP A (Student Union for Peace Action), an "explicitly ... New Left 
organization, influenced by the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] and firm in 
its belief in direct action, non-violence, and participatory democracy."235 Focused 
primarily on the university campus, SUP A was dedicated to working with 
disadvantaged communities, protesting the Vietnam war and consciousness raising. It 
was "the single most important New Left organization in Canada."236 
In direct competition with SUP A was the Company of Young Canadians. 
Created by an Act of Parliament in 1965, the Company of Young Canadians was a 
federal government sponsored youth organization modeled on the American Peace 
Corps and designed to channel the energies of the youth movement into positive 
community-based programs. It did consulting work, research and sent teams of 
youths across the country to support poverty-stricken areas and promote community 
development. As the activities ofthe Company of Young Canadians expanded, 
SUP A itself began to decline. It was no coincidence that the rise of one saw the 
decline ofthe other; after SUP A's government funding dried up in 1965, the 
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Company of Young Canadians began to absorb its activists and leaders, undermining 
SUP A's core support.237 The last SUP A conference took place in Goderich in 1967 
and the Company of Young Canadians was soon at the mercy of government 
cutbacks. After 1973 the number of student protests on campuses declined 
precipitously and the Company of Young Canadians was effectively defunct by the 
late 1970s.238 
In the midst of an expanding student movement, the women's movement 
experienced its own resurgence. By the 1960s increasingly larger numbers ofwomen 
were joining the workforce and receiving a university education. On campuses 
women became active in SUPA and in 1967 met separately as a women's caucus. 
Branches of the Voice of Women, formed in 1960, began campaigning for the 
legalization of the Pill as early as 1962, a position the country's largest women's 
organization, the National Council of Women, was slow to accept. Thanks to the 
efforts of the Canadian Federation of University Women and supported by other 
feminist organizations across Canada, a Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
was formed by Prime Minister Pearson in 1967. The contradictions between the 
promise of education and the reality of the labour market, as well as changing 
attitudes towards sexuality and the family, contributed to the revitalization and 
radicalization of the women's movement. The Royal Commission on the Status of 
Women was a watershed for the women's movement and a symbol of second wave 
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feminism, a critical juncture characterized by Naomi Black as the "first success of the 
second wave of Canadian feminism."239 
When the Royal Commission on the Status of Women published its report in 
1970 it provided a rallying point for women and led to the formation of a new 
national federation of women's organizations. Those feminists who had been central 
in lobbying the government to create the commission formed the National Ad Hoc 
Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) in 1971. The NAC's primary 
mandate was to ensure the implementation of the commission's recommendations. 
By 1972 the NAC represented more than 42 associations.240 
Following the formation ofNAC the "women's movement expanded 
enormously both in the numbers of women's organizations it included and in the 
range of issues .... [T]he number of women's organizations and services started up in 
the 1970s is staggering."241 British Columbia's feminists claimed two established 
women's groups in 1969; by 1974 they could boast more than a hundred. There were 
at least 39 women's centres across Canada by 1979. National conferences were held 
by lesbians in 1973 in Toronto and by rape crisis centres in 1975. International 
Women's Year, proclaimed by the United Nations for 1975, contributed to the 
continued mobilization of women into various organizations and activities. The 
expansion of women's rights groups created a veritable mosaic of organizations.242 
Crisis centres were a form of grass roots organizing concerned less with political 
lobbying than with providing a direct service to women. There was also a radical 
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wing to the women's movement. The Lesbian Organization of Toronto was formed 
in the early 1970s and, as with many other radical women's groups, rejected any 
working relationship with men on the basis that such relationships were inherently 
unequal.243 
One of the most difficult issues the women's movement had to grapple with 
was the place of lesbians. Many lesbians formed separate organizations, including the 
Lesbian Organization ofT oronto or Lesbian Organization of Ottawa Now, and 
accused groups such as NAC of not giving enough attention to their needs.244 The 
proliferation of gay and lesbian groups is another example of a social movement 
dramatically coming to life in the 1960s and 1970s. The first and most successful gay 
group organized in Canada was the Association for Social Knowledge in 1964 in 
Vancouver. An organization materialized in Toronto in 1969 at the time the 
Association for Social Knowledge was becoming defunct; the University of Toronto 
Homophile Association was established on 24 October 1969 with the goal of 
educating the community about homosexuality and combating discrimination. 245 
These early attempts to organize homosexuals were short-lived and focused primarily 
on either educating the public about homosexuality or providing a secure social 
atmosphere for gays and lesbians. 
As one historian has suggested, the "1970s are hailed as the decade of gay 
rights in North America."246 Several small gay liberation groups appeared in 
Canada's larger cities in the early 1970s, groups such as the Front de liberation 
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homosexual in Montreal in reaction to the closure of gay bars under the War 
Measures Act. Gay liberationists challenged established moral codes (e.g., 
heterosexuality) by living an alternative lifestyle and articulating a new set of values. 
During this same period, gay rights activists called for legal protections for gays and 
lesbians, including the Gay Alliance Towards Equality in Vancouver and Toronto; a 
journal, The Body Politic, also emerged in Toronto.247 These organizations were at 
the forefront of the gay rights movement. According to Tom Warner, human rights 
legislation "provided the political and legal frameworks within which an agenda for 
social change could be promoted. Advocating that sexual orientation become a 
prohibited ground of discrimination in such laws was a strategy that could be 
embraced by gays and lesbians in large urban centres and smaller communities .... 
[H]uman rights advocacy was a focused strategy, but one that could be supported by 
both conservatives [ assimilationists] and militants. "248 While there are no statistics on 
the number of gay organizations formed in the 1970s, there is no doubt the number 
was quite substantial. Even a national organization wao;; formed, the National Gay 
Rights Coalition, in 1975.249 
Aboriginals were also highly active in forming social movement 
organizations. Between 1960 and 1969 four national aboriginal associations and 
thirty-three separate provincial organizations were born.250 Many of these groups 
were pioneers in organizing aboriginals beyond the local level for the first time. In 
Nova Scotia, for instance, the Union ofNova Scotia Indians (1969) was Nova 
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Scotia's first province-wide aboriginal association. At the national level, one of the 
most influential aboriginal organizations was the National Indian Council of Canada 
(1961) which disbanded when the National Indian Brotherhood was formed in 1968. 
The National Indian Brotherhood was the first national aboriginal organization run by 
and for aboriginals.251 Indian Friendship Centres multiplied across the country thanks 
to substantial financial support from the federal government's Secretary of State. 252 
As David Long notes, a significant aspect of this revived aboriginal activism was "the 
expansion of the term 'aboriginal rights,' which by 1981 had been revised from its 
original focus on land rights to include the rights to self-governrnent."253 Human 
rights activism, however, was only one part of a broad-based social movement, often 
referred to as the 'Red Power' movement, which called for a fundamental re-
alignment of aboriginals' relationship with the dominant group through an aggressive 
assertion of aboriginal identity: "They were able to both nurture and capitalize on 
their spiritual-cultural identity as a 'people' as movement supporters identified with 
the exclusiveness of the member groups' characteristics. In effect, the movement 
emerged and grew as Natives learned together to cultivate their 'Indianness. "'254 
However, Long also suggests that by the mid-1970s "the idealistic radicalism that had 
blossomed in the 1960s and early 1970s had begun to wane."255 In its place was an 
increasingly bureaucratic movement dominated by hierarchical organizations 
employing traditional interest group tactics. 
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Ethnic minorities also mobilized in unprecedented numbers. Several 
Associations for the Advancement of Coloured People were formed in the late 1950s 
and 1960s in several provinces, including Nova Scotia, British Columbia, New 
Brunswick and Alberta?56 These black rights organizations employed similar tactics 
as the NAC, Gay Alliance Towards Equality or National Indian Brotherhood; 
primarily political lobbying, educational programs within the black and non-black 
community, and providing some services to their members.257 Some of the more 
active of the new groups representing African-Canadians included the Black United 
Front in Nova Scotia, Urban Alliance on Race Relation (Toronto) and the National 
Black Coalition. The Black United Front, formed in 1969 at a meeting of 700 mostly 
young black militants, is a good example of the increasing assertiveness of African-
Canadians.258 Black United Front activists rejected the assumption that discrimination 
was a result of individual acts, and located the problem in systemic obstacles to black 
equality. They sought to promote a collective sense of identity, develop programs to 
enhance the economic and political power of black people, and improve their self-
image. These organizations provided African-Canadians with a stronger voice on the 
local and national stage than they ever had before. Empowering black people was at 
the heart of their activism.259 
By the mid-1980s, the Secretary of State was providing funding to 3500 
separate organizations across the country, and this does not even account for those 
organizations which were not receiving government grants?60 Prisoners' rights 
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groups became increasingly vocal and well organized; the Quebec Prisoners' Rights 
Committee was one of the most prominent and radical prisoners' rights advocates in 
the country with a mandate to seek the abolition of all prisons.261 Greenpeace was 
founded in Vancouver in 1971. Children's rights, animal rights, advocates for peace 
and official language groups are just a few other examples of the many social 
movement organizations active across Canada during this period. 
Human rights discourse pervaded throughout these social movements, but not 
all social movement organizations could be characterized as human rights advocates. 
Important distinctions divided many of these organizations and movements. Gay 
reformers sought amendments to human rights statutes while liberationists called for 
more fundamental change such as eliminating the age of consent. At times, 
liberationist militancy on such issues as pornography and the age of consent "grated 
on assimilationist, equality-seeking advocates, who saw them as impediments to 
securing legislative reform."262 Liberal feminists, who played a key role in pushing 
for an equality clause in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and dominated the NAC, 
placed their faith in the liberal-democratic system and demanded equality of 
opportunity for women, whereas radical feminists turned "towards the creation of 
social and political alternatives to the existing society."263 One manifestation of these 
alternatives were physical spaces for women, such as women's centres, which were 
focused on "providing space for women, and on trying to figure out how to organize a 
world that would reflect women's needs and experiences."264 A book published in 
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1971 entitled Women Unite!, the first Canadian book to explore the women's 
liberation movement, emphasized the distinction between rights-based activism of the 
NAC and the liberationism of some grass-roots women's organizations: 
Although the broad basis of both is the improvement of the quality of 
life for women in Canada, the philosophy of the women's rights 
groups is that civil liberty and equality can be achieved within the 
present system, while the underlying belief of women's liberation is 
that oppression can be overcome only through radical and fundamental 
change in the structure of our society. 265 
Several activists have also, in retrospect, criticized rights-based reformers. As 
Tom Warner notes in the case of gay rights groups, "pursing human rights 
amendments would lead ultimately to the dominance of conservative voices and 
assimilation with heterosexuals on their terms, rather than the liberation sought by 
more radical proponents."266 
The massive expansion of social movement organizations was partly a 
manifestation of the new rights paradigm. Previously marginalized and powerless 
members of Canadian society were employing rights discourse to make claims for 
equality and fair treatment. Social movement activism and the human rights state 
were equally important manifestations of the rights revolution. But for activists who 
adopted a liberationist approach, while the rights revolution promised a new era of 
equality, it was not without its limitations. 
Canada's Rights Culture 
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The bill of rights movement, law reform and social movements offer only a 
glimpse into the profound impact of the rights paradigm on Canadian society. One 
could easily point out additional political debates, other social movements or legal 
reforms as examples of how human rights have come to play an important role in the 
lives of Canadians in the twentieth century. Fundamentally, however, the rights 
revolution was about new ideas. As James Walker notes in his study of four key 
Supreme Court of Canada cases on racial discrimination, law defines rights "and the 
law on this point changed dramatically."267 Legal change is part of a dialectical 
process which results in the evolution of new cultural codes. "When change in the 
law occurred, it was not because a reforming judge decided to break with tradition, 
but when the social dynamic within which the law existed underwent a shift .... [T]he 
initiative for reform was taken first by members of the public who perceived a need 
for change, usually individuals from the affected minority .... Reform was 
accommodated only when common sense grew to accept it."268 Human rights are 
intimately linked with changes in the law, yet at the same time they are informed by 
cultural context of the community they serve. For instance, as Walker notes in his 
first case study, in 1914 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a Saskatchewan statute 
banning white women from working for Chinese men. The entire issue was reduced 
to a debate over the right of Chinese men to hire white women; no one raised the 
issue of a woman's right to choose her own employment. In the case of a Jewish man 
challenging a restrictive covenant in 1951 which barred Jews from owning property in 
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a Toronto neighbourhood, "the Court allowed the respondents' argument- that racial 
discrimination was both morally and legally acceptable- to pass without contradiction, 
and declined to confirm the appellants' assertion that racial distinctions were contrary 
to public policy."269 By the 1980s racial and religious discrimination would not only 
be considered illegal, but morally reprehensible. 
Human rights are a powerful force, not simply because they have the force of 
law, but because the source of human rights lies not in the law but in human morality. 
"Rights-based social change is distinguished by the prior entitlement of the right-
holder, with the special force this gives to his claims, and by the fact that the right-
holder uses his right to remove the barriers to its enjoyment. Systematically 
unenforced rights position the right-holder to mount a particularly powerful attack on 
the institutions that deny him rights.'mo A society with a strong rights culture thus 
provides the context for individuals to make rights claims even though, at the time, 
they are not recognized by the state. 
As Michael Ignatieff notes, a unique rights culture has evolved in Canada. 
"First, on moral questions such as abortion, capital punishment, and gay rights, our 
legal codes are notably liberal, secular, and pro-choice .... Second, our culture is social 
democratic in its approach to rights to welfare and public assistance .... The third 
distinguishing feature of our rights culture, of course, is our particular emphasis on 
group rights."271 This 'rights culture' has found expression in many forums, and not 
only the courts. The power of rights discourse is based on its ability to empower 
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marginalized and powerless people in the community. They may be denied legal 
recourse for their claims, but rights discourse provides them with a legitimate forum 
in which to advance their claims in ways that are not easily ignored. Such was the 
case with the battle for sexual equality for gays and lesbians. "Rights equality 
changes moral culture because groups demand recognition. As they do so, they force 
sexual majorities beyond toleration towards acceptance and approval. ... So on 
questions of sexual morality, the impact of the rights revolutions has been to diminish 
the power of the heterosexual majority to define what is normal and normative in 
personal life. "272 
Canadians have come to view themselves as rights-bearing citizens, and this 
has had a profound impact on the relationship between the state and civil society. As 
with Ignatieff, Cynthia Williams suggests that Canada's rights culture has shifted 
towards egalitarian and cultural rights from the traditional focus on negative rights. 
According to Williams, the "preoccupation with procedural equality in the 1950s 
centred on equality before the law .... During the 1960s and later, however, popular 
equality claims turned to more substantive concerns, and a new focus on equality of 
opportunity included the demand that citizens be guaranteed equal benefits from 
society."273 Sections on language rights, multiculturalism, and aboriginals in the 
Charter are only one manifestation of this new paradigm. By the 1980s, Canadians 
increasingly considered access to education and health care as rights. In many ways, 
the pillars of the welfare state, from employment insurance to workers compensation, 
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were as much a manifestation of Canada's rights culture as the right to vote and equal 
pay. "The welfare state is built upon an expanded definition of citizenship captured 
in the concept of social rights."274 
The legal, political, social and cultural manifestations of the rights revolution 
discussed above were thus part of a fundamental shift in Canadian society. As 
Stammers suggests, the "use of rights discourse seeks to create an outlook which 
challenges dominant ideas of 'common sense' and could be said to be seeking to be 
counter-hegemonic in respect of such power.'m5 Ideas about racial hierarchies and 
parliamentary supremacy were discarded, and new conceptions of the role of the state 
and the law emerged. "The global human rights 'paradigm shift' ... represented at 
least a shift in sensibility in Canada: public protests against discriminatory businesses, 
the campaigns against Japanese Canadians' deportation and to repeal the Chinese 
immigration laws, support for Asian enfranchisement, passage of municipal by-laws 
and fair practices legislation, all represented the development of a new perception 
among majority Canadians about what was right and fair."276 
A veritable rights revolution had occurred in Canada. 
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Chapter Five: 
The October Crisis 
In October 1970, the nation held its collective breath as events in Quebec 
unfolded. The October crisis, initiated by the kidnappings of James Cross and Pierre 
Laporte by the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), was one of the most stunning 
events ofthe period, and the subject of intense discussion in the media as well as 
academic and political circles for decades. For the second and only other time in 
Canadian history, twenty-four years after the espionage commission, the powers of 
the War Measures Act were employed to suspend Canadians' fundamental civil 
liberties in peacetime. The imposition of the War Measures Act on 16 October 1970 
remains the most important rights issue of the period under study and is the one 
constant theme throughout the four case studies. As a result, it will be useful to 
briefly review the crisis from a human rights perspective. 
FLQ activities date back to as early as 1961 with graffiti and other forms of 
vandalism calling for an independent Quebec, with the first bombs exploding in an 
army barracks on 7 March 1963. The Quiet Revolution was in full swing at this 
stage, beginning with the election of Jean Lesage and the Liberals in 1960. Lesage's 
victory ended the sixteen year rule of the Union Nationale, following the death of 
Maurice Duplessis and his lieutenant, Jean-Paul Sauve, in 1959. Between 1960 and 
1966 (when they were defeated by the Union Nationale under Daniel Johnson) the 
Lesage Liberals played a major role in the transformation of Quebec into a secular, 
technocratic, modern society. Hydro-electricity was nationalized and placed under the 
control of Hydro Quebec where franco phones dominated what would soon become 
the provinces's largest employer; capital investment funds were created to support 
francophone businesses and a pension plan was instituted; the education system was 
secularized and a health insurance system was inaugurated in 1961 (universal health 
care was adopted in 1970). The state service sector expanded exponentially, with the 
number ofhospital employees alone rising from 50 000 to 100 000 between 1960 and 
1966.277 
Alongside the transformations initiated by the Quiet Revolution was the rise 
of the modern separatist movement. The Rassemblent pour l'independance nationale 
was a centre-left party founded in September 1960 and was followed by another party, 
the right-wing Ralliement national, founded in 1964. In the 1966 election, the two 
parties garnered about 10 percent ofthe popular vote. A year later, Rene Levesque 
abandoned the Quebec Liberal Party and formed the Mouvement souverainete-
association. He succeeded in uniting his organization with the Ralliement national to 
form the Parti quebecois (Rassemblent was dissolved and many of its members joined 
the Parti quebecois) and captured 24 percent ofthe popular vote in the 1970 election 
which saw the Liberals return to power under Robert Bourassa.278 
The first FLQ bombs in 1963 coincided with the entry ofthe Rassemblent 
pour l'independance nationale into Quebec politics. Soon, bombs detonated at a 
federal tax building, Canadian National Railway station and rail tracks at Lemieux. 
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Other bombings and acts of vandalism occurred across the province throughout 1963, 
including twenty-four sticks of dynamite failing to explode at a broadcast tower of 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on Mont Royal and the toppling of the statue of 
General Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham. All of these incidents were linked with the 
FLQ. Wilfrid O'Neil, a night watchman, became the first victim of the FLQ, killed 
during a bomb attack on a Canadian forces recruiting centre in Montreal in April 
1963. 
In 1966 Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, the ideological leaders of the 
FLQ, were arrested and charged with a variety of offences from murder to bombings. 
During Valliere's trial which began on 26 February 1968, he released a soon to be 
widely circulated book, Negres blanc d'Amerique (White Niggers of America) on 
March 15. It became a best seller in Canada and internationally. The book, 
borrowing the imagery of the black civil rights movement through the word 'niggers' 
to symbolize the repression and second class status offrancophones ("to be a 'nigger' 
in America is to be not a man but someone's slave"279), was a call to arms. In his 
opening chapter, he noted how "the liberation struggle launched by the American 
blacks nevertheless arouses growing interest among the French Canadian population, 
for the workers of Quebec are aware of their conditions as niggers, exploited men, 
second-class citizens. "280 Vallieres saw the FLQ as the vanguard of a revolutionary 
movement comparable to movements in Algeria and Cuba that would lead not only to 
the creation of a Quebec state, but a socialist society. As with these other movements, 
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the FLQ sought systemic change and, while it promoted the interests of the working 
class, it accused the labour movement of becoming coopted by the state.281 
The rise of a terrorist organization deeply influenced by socialist principles 
was in part a manifestation of broader developments within the Left in Quebec. 
Throughout the 1960s organized labour in Quebec broke away from its links with the 
conservative Catholic church and shifted dramatically to the Left. As John T. Saywell 
notes, the sixties was a period of "radicalization of the trade unions [and] the adoption 
of starkly socialistic manifestos based on a marxist analysis of the roots of Quebec's 
ills by the union leadership."282 In the 1960s and 1970s organized labour in Quebec 
was coming into its own. Through the unionization of public sector workers, 
organized labour expanded considerably, representing approximately 40 percent of 
workers in the 1960s compared with 30 percent a decade earlier. While the major 
unions in Quebec became increasingly secularized the nationalist-oriented 
Confederation des syndicats nationaux expanded exponentially from 90 000 members 
in 1957 to 250 000 by 1974.283 A new labour code was introduced in 1964 which 
extended the right to strike to professionals and agricultural workers, later expanding 
to include hospital workers, teachers and public servants. Quebec became the first 
province in Canada to permit its public sector workers to unionize. 
In 1977 political scientists Michael Ornstein and H. Michael Stevenson 
suggested that "in Quebec, nationalism is associated with social democratic positions 
on class issues; its supporters are more likely to favour controls on foreign 
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investment, support the labour movement, and sympathize with social welfare 
initiatives."284 William D. Coleman argues in his exhaustive analysis of the 
independence movement in Quebec that the movement was intimately linked with the 
political Left: "The class character of the struggle constrains the independence 
movement to be anti-capitalist. Because of the strong presence of the workers' 
movement in the independence coalition, this anti-capitalism has been expressed in 
the terminology of the left and not of the right."285 The existence of the Ralliement 
national is evidence that the Left never monopolized the independence movement in 
Quebec, but what is significant in this context is the perception in some quarters that 
Quebec nationalism, particularly the more radical manifestations of the movement, 
was a movement ofthe Left. Certainly, the RCMP and Montreal police believed 
there was a link between the Left and the separatist movement and, as Jeff Salot, 
Jean-Franc;ois Cardin and others have noted, the RCMP began to equate separatism 
with the threat to national security posed by communists.286 As a result, authorities 
directed many of their raids, searches and arrests against members of Left, notably the 
Rassemblent pour l'independance nationale in the early 1960s, taking membership 
lists and other documents.287 
FLQ bombings continued amidst these developments. On 19 February 1969, 
the most spectacular bombing by the FLQ took placed at the Montreal Stock 
Exchange where 20 people were injured (there were no deaths because the FLQ sent a 
warning in advance). The attack was initiated by one of the most violent cells ofthe 
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FLQ network, that of Pierre-Paul Geoffrey. He was soon arrested on 4 March 1969 
and pleaded guilty to all the actions of his cell. Judge Andre Fabien, presiding over 
Geoffrey's trial, handed down the most severe sentence in the history of the British 
Commonwealth: 124 life sentences.288 
By the time James Cross was abducted in 1970, the province of Quebec had 
been the locus of extreme forms of violence and social unrest for almost a decade. 
Cross was abducted on 5 October 1970 by the Liberation cell; it demanded the FLQ 
manifesto be read on Radio Canada, the release of23 political prisoners in jail for 
various crimes linked with the FLQ, $500 000 in gold bullion and safe passage to 
either Cuba or Algeria. On 8 October the FLQ manifesto was read on the air by Radio 
Canada, having been already made public by the private radio station CKAC the night 
before. This act engendered some sympathy for the FLQ among the people of Quebec 
by appealing to a collective sense of frustration towards economic troubles and 
Quebec's minority status in North America.289 Police acted quickly as one of the 
largest manhunts in Canada began. Between 7 and 10 October, police carried out 
nearly 1000 raids and searches, and arrested, questioned then released about 50 
people. Within a few days, on 10 October, Minister of Justice for Quebec, Jerome 
Choquette, announced at a press conference the government's willingness to provide 
the kidnappers with safe conduct to a foreign country, but refused to give in to any of 
their remaining demands. In response, on the same day, an independent cell with no 
contact with the Liberation cell proceeded to kidnap Pierre Laporte. 
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Kidnapping Pierre Laporte was a symbolic act for the socialist FLQ, given his 
position as Deputy Prime Minister and Minster of Labour in the Quebec government. 
The kidnappings heightened tensions to new levels- it gave the impression the FLQ 
was well organized and capable of coordinated action. Bourassa responded to the 
capture of his friend and colleague by calling for negotiations with the FLQ. On 12 
October he released Robert Lemieux, a lawyer famous for his defence of various 
felquists (one ofthe first individuals arrested following Cross' kidnapping), to 
negotiate on behalf of the kidnappers. On the same day, as tensions continued to rise, 
500 soldiers arrived in Ottawa to protect politicians and diplomats. 
Within twenty-four hours Lemieux had given up on the negotiations and 
called for a new mandate from the FLQ.290 Meanwhile, as the lawyers negotiated and 
the government vacillated in the hopes of gaining more time, police continued their 
search for the two kidnapped men. Bourassa was adamant in his refusal to give in to 
the terrorists' demands of releasing prisoners and providing money. Military 
reinforcements continued to pour into Quebec, with six thousand troops stationed in 
Montreal by 15 October 1970.291 Finally, a crisis point was reached by 16 October, at 
which point Bourassa and Jean Drapeau (Mayor of Montreal) sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau declaring their belief that an apprehended insurrection 
was at hand and calling on the federal government to intervene.292 For the first time 
in 24 years, the War Measures Act was adopted by order in council. The next day 
Pierre Laporte was found in the trunk of a car, murdered by the FLQ. 
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Subsequent events are detailed elsewhere, and involve a great deal of work on 
the part of the police in tracking down Laporte's killers and Cross' kidnappers. 293 
Cross was eventually released on 3 December and his abductors, who would return to 
Quebec more than ten years later, were flown to Cuba.294 The army remained in 
Quebec until29 December. What is significant within the context of this analysis is 
the reaction to the imposition of the War Measures Act. The War Measures Act had 
an instant impact on police activity and political debate in Quebec. Two hundred and 
eighty-eight people were arrested in the first night, and eventually 438 were detained 
under the War Measures Act and police conducted 3068 searches without warrants. 
As had been the case in most police raids dealing with separatism or FLQ violence, 
raids and arrests were directed against nationalists and the political Left in general.295 
The statistics on those arrested during this period is a testament to the overeagerness 
of the police in employing emergency powers, as had been the case in 1946. Those 
arrested spent an average of a week in jail or up to 21 days (legal limit) without 
charge; a large majority, almost 90 percent, were eventually released without ever 
being charged. Those who were charged with a crime spent an average of two and a 
half months in jail before being released on bail; 95 percent ofthem were either 
acquitted or had the charges withdrawn. Only 20 people were ever found guilty of a 
crime arising out of the October crisis of 1970?96 
The use of the War Measures Act quickly came to dominate most of the 
debate on the October crisis, notably in the media. Early on police were searching 
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and seizing media stories, limiting what could be made available to the public.297 
Editors were divided on how to deal with the situation. Most of the English language 
papers supported the government, but within Quebec there were a variety of 
reactions.298 L 'Action encouraged the populace to rally behind the government; Le 
Nouvelliste counseled the government to give in absolutely; and, Le Devoir called for 
continued negotiations until the hostage was released.299 While editors for La Presse 
and Le Solei! cautiously supported the use of the War Measures Act, Claude Ryan of 
Le Devoir was a constant advocate against the hard line taken by both governments.300 
Initially organized labour in Quebec adopted a moderate stance, calling on 
both governments to negotiate with the kidnappers.301 But all this changed 
dramatically with the imposition of the War Measures Act. A unified stance between 
all three major union federations in the province was soon organized and they became 
one of the most outspoken critics of the federal and provincial government. With 
twenty-four hours the unions issued a statement denouncing the use of emergency 
legislation and accusing Bourassa of giving in to pressure from Ottawa. More than 
500 delegates attended a mass meeting on 21 October to formulate labour's position 
on the crisis. From having adopted a fairly moderate position, labour now made clear 
its complete opposition to the state's tactics. Quebec labour called on Bourassa to lift 
the emergency measures and attacked the state for denying prisoners bail.302 For a 
movement ridden with internal conflicts and tension over union-raiding, the unity of 
1970-1 was a significant moment of inter-union cooperation. 
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On university campuses and throughout Montreal, students also reacted 
strongly to the imposition of the War Measures Act. Even before the imposition of 
the War Measures Act, students were making their voices heard. A demonstration at 
the Paul-Sauve centre in Montreal organized by Front d'action politique on 15 
October soon turned into a pro-FLQ rally of 3000 people, many of whom were 
students from the University of Montreal who were denied a permit to rally on their 
own campus.303 Student papers at McGill and University of Montreal also expressed 
their support for the FLQ during the crisis.304 A newly opened university in 1969, 
l'Universite du Quebec a Montreal, proved to be the most radical campus. Suspecting 
it ofharboring an FLQ cell led by historian Robert Comeau, the RCMP planted 
informers on the campus to investigate the possibility that the Comeau cell was 
responsible for drafting the FLQ manifesto the previous June and stealing 450 sticks 
of dynamite. When the crisis hit, a rally of 800 students paralyzed the campus on 15 
October. An action committee was formed with a three point plan to support the FLQ 
as students occupied the rector's office and other buildings overnight. In response, 
concerned administers closed down the university in the face of militant student 
activism.305 
The imposition of the War Measures Act simply aggravated the situation, 
although in a limited fashion. Three hundred students demonstrated in front of the 
McGill Arts building against the War Measures Act on 16 October.306 In Toronto, the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association organized a meeting attended by hundreds of 
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students to challenge the arrest of two University of Toronto students for raising a 
make-shift flag. It was not long before the police began to exercise their new powers 
outside of Quebec. An American draft-dodger, suspected ofbeing an active supporter 
of the FLQ, was arrested in Toronto on 20 October and released hours later. Seven 
members of the Vancouver Liberation Front, a fringe group sympathetic to the aims 
of the FLQ, were arrested and detained for distributing copies of the FLQ manifesto 
in Vancouver; they were released several hours later after the police had confiscated 
all the flyers. 307 
Police also confiscated hundreds of copies of student newspapers at the 
University of Guelph for publishing the FLQ manifesto and a professor in Vancouver 
was dismissed for reading the manifesto in public. In Winnipeg, a university library 
was forced to temporarily close down after raising a pro-Quebec independence sign.308 
A woman in Ottawa had her home raided by the Quebec Provincial Police under the 
authority of the War Measures Act because she had been photographed in a 
demonstration protesting the imposition of the Act. 309 Civil liberties groups were also 
formed at the instigation of professors at McGill and University of Montreal to 
challenge the use of emergency powers, with a thousand students and teachers 
attending a teach-in organized by the latter on 27 October.310 
As was the case during the espionage commission, the October crisis was also 
an issue at the annual meeting of the Canadian Bar Association. Members of the 
country's leading law association expressed concern for those detained under the War 
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Measures Act and questioned the legitimacy of preventative detention. There were 
several parallels with the espionage commission of thirty years earlier. Critics of the 
federal government pointed to the practice of holding individuals without charge, 
incommunicado and without access to a lawyer. 311 However, as was the case in 1946, 
the Canadian Bar Association deferred the matter and refused to condemn the 
government. The debate, dominated by members opposed to calling the government 
to task, focused on the need to provide special powers to the state during an 
emergency and opposed the repeal of the War Measures Act. In the end, in contrast to 
student groups and organized labour, the Canadian Bar Association effectively 
condoned the state's actions by its silence.312 
The Canadian Bar Association's refusal to challenge the imposition of the 
War Measures Act reflected an overall deference within English Canada to the federal 
government's actions. Any concerns in government about a negative public reaction 
against the use of war time powers was assuaged, however, by consistent public 
opinion polls reaffirming the public's support of the federal government. A poll 
conducted by CTV's popular news program W5 found only 10 percent of Canadians 
outside Quebec and 13 percent inside the province opposing the use of war time 
powers.313 A Gallup Poll funded by La Presse on 14 December 1970 concluded that 
87 percent of Canadians supported Trudeau's actions.314 On the first anniversary of 
the October crisis in 1971, another poll conducted by Adgomb Research found that 
Canadians predominantly supported the use of the War Measures Act: 75 percent 
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agreed with the government's decision to use the controversial piece oflegislation 
and 72 percent favoured using the army again in future situations.315 Dozens of other 
polls conducted by various other agencies found similar results: Canadians 
overwhelmingly supported the use of the Act in the suppression of terrorism. 
Whether or not the federal government was justified in imposing the War 
Measures Act goes to the heart of the debate surrounding the October crisis of 1970. 
By proclaiming the Act, the rights of all Canadians, not simply those in Quebec, were 
temporarily suspended. For rights activists in particular, such action could only be 
justified under the most exceptional circumstances. As will be seen in the chapters 
ahead, rights activists believed that the state ultimately failed to prove the need for 
such drastic action. No convincing evidence was ever produced by the federal or 
provincial government to demonstrate that Bourassa's government was in any real 
threat of being toppled. In effect, the existing powers under the criminal code for 
search, seizure and arrest coupled with the broad provisions for sedition and 
conspiracy were seen by many as sufficient for dealing with the terrorist activities of 
the FLQ and the kidnappings. 
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Chapter Six: 
A National Rights Association 
The October crisis highlighted, among other things, the need for a national 
rights association in Canada to coordinate the efforts of existing associations. Dozens 
of rights associations were emerging across the country with few ties to each other. 
Meanwhile, in the context of a massive expansion of social movement activity in the 
1960s and 1970s, various movements coalesced into national organizations, from the 
National Action Committee on the Status of Women to the Assembly ofFirst 
Nations. Amidst this surge of social movement activism were several attempts to 
form a national rights association. 
One of the more curious aspects of the history of rights associations is the 
failure to form a national association. Our examination of the second generation of 
rights associations, therefore, begins at the national level. Two other organizations, 
the Jewish Labour Committee and the Canadian Bar Association, are discussed as 
well. True, neither organization is a genuine rights association. Not only did the 
Canadian Bar Association, a professional organization for lawyers, represent a 
specific constituency, but it could hardly claim to be a self-identified 'civil liberties' 
or 'human rights' organization. Human rights was just one of the many issues dealt 
with by the Bar Association, and its tactics and strategies were influenced by a myriad 
of other priorities. In contrast, the JLC was unquestionably a human rights 
organization first and foremost. Still, the JLC' s close ties to organized labour can not 
be ignored. Support for the JLC came primarily from working class organizations, 
and its mandate was undeniably influenced by the priorities of organized labour. 
Rights associations offer a unique insight into human rights activism because they 
were autonomous and their sole mandate was the defence of human rights. The JLC, 
its tactics, strategies and priorities influenced by working class organizations and an 
almost exclusive mandate to focus on anti-discrimination, was no rights association. 
For this and many other reasons, when rights associations across Canada attempted to 
form a national group, no one thought to call either the Bar Association or the JLC to 
sign up. Yet their willingness to advocate on behalf of all individuals and to establish 
a national network of human rights committees merits the inclusion of the JLC and 
the Bar Association in this study, and their failure reflects similar problems which 
faced rights associations in their attempts to form their own national association. 
The National Committee for Human Rights 
Organized labour continued to play a prominent role at the national level in 
the sixties and championed the earliest efforts to form a national human rights 
organization since the demise of the Association for Civil Liberties and the League 
for Democratic Rights. Combined with the efforts of the Jewish Labour Committee, 
which had become integral to labour's human rights activities since the 1950s, 
labour's efforts represented the most well organized and prolific human rights 
program by the 1960s. 
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When the Trades and Labour Council and the Canadian Congress of Labour 
merged in 1957, each had its own human rights committees with mandates to 
undermine racial discrimination in the labour movement.316 A new National 
Committee for Human Rights (NCHR) was formed at the time of the merger and the 
Jewish Labour Committee's Canadian Labour Reports, which highlighted the human 
rights work of organized labour, became the Human Rights Review in 1960. The 
NCHR's mandate was to focus on the "elimination of racial and religious 
discrimination in all areas of Canadian society and the promotion of equality of 
opportunity in employment, housing, and public accommodation for all residents of 
Canada."317 The NCHR worked with local and regional human rights committees in 
the labour councils and federations to campaign for anti-discrimination legislation, 
education, research, publicity, the investigation of cases of discrimination and work 
with government and non-governmental organizations to promote tolerance and fair 
practices. By 1957 seven municipal labour councils with human rights committees 
were located in Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia.318 
Provincial labour federations in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec 
also had their own human rights committees. The role of the NCHR was to 
coordinate the activities of these various labour committees and advise the Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC) executive on how best to lobby the federal government. 
Most of the NCHR's work in the 1960s involved funding local labour 
committees. Through the CLC it was also able to secure an amendment to the 
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National Housing Act to prohibit government contracts to companies which 
discriminated in their employment practices.319 In 1968, when the country was 
celebrating International Year for Human Rights, in its most ambitious project the 
CLC funded a newly graduated social worker, Pat Kerwin, to work in Kenora, 
Ontario, one of the poorest regions of Canada surrounded by native reserves, to 
educate and train natives to be their own advocates. The project was successful in 
implementing several local projects, from securing welfare benefits for individuals to 
building ice rinks with government funding. 320 
The Kenora project was a unique initiative for the CLC organized specifically 
for International Year for Human Rights, and was not replicated despite its apparent 
success. After 1968, the CLC became increasingly less active within the human 
rights movement. As the leader of the labour movement in Canada, the CLC 
continued to play a significant role in the lobbying for rights-related issues in general. 
The CLC was one of the few organizations outside Quebec to oppose the use of the 
War Measures Act in 1970, and it continued to lobby on issues including abortion, 
capital punishment, wiretapping, RCMP activities and the federal Human Rights Act. 
But the NCHR was unquestionably playing a diminished role. The Human Rights 
Review had been discontinued and by 1977 the CLC no longer provided grants to the 
local and provincial labour committees. While its advisory role to the CLC executive 
on human rights issues continued, and remains today, the new Department of Social 
Action and Community Affairs (created in 1970) took over responsibility for a variety 
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of human rights issues, notably Indian affairs.321 By the late 1970s a separate 
women's bureau had been created, taking even more responsibility away from the 
NCHR. Whereas the labour movement had been one of the most vocal advocates of 
an entrenched bill of rights in the 1940s and 1950s, it was absent from the special 
joint committees on the constitution in 1970 and 1981 when hundreds of other groups 
presented. With the exception of a few organizations, most notably the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association (see chapter ten), the CLC had virtually no relationship 
with any rights association. 322 
The Jewish Labour Committee 
The decline of the NCHR was linked with the parallel disintegration of the 
JLC. Since the JLC had combined the human rights work of the CLC and the 
Canadian Jewish Congress in the 1950s to combat discrimination, the activities of 
labour and the JLC were intimately connected. Such was the success of the JLC by 
1960 that Frank Scott was led to state he knew "of no single body in the whole of 
Canada doing as much continuous and consistent work for civilliberties."323 At the 
heart of the JLC's human rights program was the work of various labour committees 
to combat racial intolerance funded through the JLC by individual unions, the 
Canadian Jewish Congress and the CLC. Another noted civil liberties lawyer in the 
1960s claimed that "every major effort to get civil rights legislation, most of the 
leading cases and surveys, have been organized and initiated by one of our labour 
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committees for human rights."324 The JLC administered labour's entire human rights 
program; reports of the NCHR were simply verbatim reports oflocal JLC committees. 
With operations in five urban areas by 1959 (Vancouver, Winnipeg, Windsor, 
Toronto and Montreal) the JLC had a large network of rights associations. For most 
of the 1960s the JLC-CJC alliance remained a powerful force in the slowly evolving 
human rights movement and was the closest manifestation in the country to a national 
rights association. 
JLC activists were involved in some of the most comprehensive anti-
discrimination campaigns in Canada. In Montreal, the United Council for Human 
Rights (the JLC's local labour committee) badgered the provincial government 
continually to pass a provincial bill of rights. In 1962, Alan Borovoy, the head of the 
JLC's operations in Ontario, was dispatched to Halifax where he helped form a new 
JLC committee to fight for fair compensation for the impoverished black residents of 
Africville who were being forcibly relocated by the municipal government. The 
JLC' s program of action in the 1960s included "dispatching staff to certain areas to 
help create an indigenous organization among the impoverished racial minority and to 
develop with them a program of social action related to the problems as they see 
them."325 Africville represented one ofthe most blatant examples of racial 
segregation in Canada and, alongside the JLC's work in organizing natives 
(particularly in Ontario), the initiative was consistent with the group's desire to help 
empower minorities to fight discrimination and defend their interests. The most active 
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committee in the country was the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights. In 
his time with the Ontario committee Borovoy resolved dozens of cases of 
discrimination across the province, and organized a large number of surveys to 
highlight cases of discrimination. 
By the early 1970s the work of organized labour and the JLC was eclipsed by 
a burgeoning number of rights associations following the creation of new groups 
surrounding International Year for Human Rights and the maturing of rights 
associations created in the early 1960s. None ofthe labour committees were active 
after 1972 and, although the JLC national committee was revived in the late 1970s, it 
was a shadow of its former self. The JLC was effectively moribund by the mid-1970s 
and the NCHR, whose main activity was consulting the CLC executive and 
supporting the JLC, followed the latter into obscurity. 
If there is any single event linked with the decline of the JLC, it would be the 
decision of Alan Borovoy to quit as director in 1968 and join the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association (CCLA). It was a symbolic switch given the increasing 
dominance of rights associations such as the CCLA in the field of rights activism 
which was slowly eclipsing the work of the JLC. Borovoy had agreed to take over 
leadership of the JLC in 1967 and the inability to replace him at the local level was a 
sign of the deterioration of the JLC. While there seemed to be a large collection of 
labour committees dealing with human rights issues, this was in large part an illusion. 
At one point, Borovoy was the Associate Director of the NCHR, the Director of the 
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JLC, and the staff person for the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights 
(OLCHR) and the human rights committees of the Ontario Federation of Labour and 
the Toronto and District Labour Council. These five different committees were in 
effect all doing the same work out of one office in Toronto led by a single individual 
who would don whatever 'hat' was most appropriate to the situation.326 Within a 
year, however, Borovoy left the JLC to become the General Counsel of the CCLA.327 
Borovoy's predecessor as Director of the JLC, David Orlikow, a member of 
Parliament for the New Democratic Party, agreed to return and take temporary control 
of the JLC. It was readily apparent that Orlikow could not devote much time to the 
JLC and for years he struggled to find a suitable replacement. Not only had the JLC 
lost its most dynamic activist in Borovoy, but the NCHR had also begun conducting 
its own human rights activities and stopped working with the JLC.328 
Demographic factors and changing attitudes towards minorities further 
contributed to the fall of the JLC. Whereas the Jewish working class had been a 
major force in establishing the JLC and the Joint Public Relations Committee in the 
1940s, it was a declining constituency by the seventies.329 James Walker has also 
recently suggested that the nature of the 'problem' the JLC was designed to combat 
had changed. The JLC had been created to deal with discrimination derived from 
pathologically prejudiced individuals (thus necessitating anti-discrimination 
legislation to ban such behaviour), but by the seventies discrimination was 
increasingly characterized as 'institutional racism' or 'systemic racism.' 330 As a 
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result, a new set of strategies and organizations were needed to deal with more 
systemic forms of discrimination. 
But perhaps the most convincing explanation for the decline of the JLC was 
simply that it had accomplished many of its goals. While few would argue racism 
was absent by the seventies, it was clearly on the decline. Anti-discrimination 
legislation had been passed in every province and would soon be implemented at the 
federal level; most of the provinces had active human rights commissions, several 
with full time staff. For more than twenty years the labour committees of the JLC had 
been combating discrimination in major urban areas, and it could be fairly said that at 
the time of its demise, racism in employment, services and housing was at an historic 
low. 
The Canadian Bar Association 
Another organization with the potential to play a significant role in the human 
rights movement at the national level was the Canadian Bar Association. In theory, 
the Canadian Bar Association had established a formidable structure to place itself at 
the forefront ofthe human rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. As the 
preeminent lawyers' association in the country, it had access to the legal skills for 
examining statutes and making recommendations for change. Since having 
established a permanent civil liberties committee in 1946, the Canadian Bar 
Association encouraged the formation of civil liberties committees in all of its 
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provincial sections. With a national committee coordinating the work of provincial 
sub-committees, supported by the resources of the national network, the association 
was in an excellent position to take a stand on human rights issues, influence public 
opinion and lobby governments. But throughout the 1960s the Canadian Bar 
Association civil liberties sub-committee and its provincial counterparts failed to live 
up to their potential. According to the chairman of the national committee in 1967, 
the section "during the last year has been, as usual, active in one or two provinces, 
mildly active in one or two others, and totally inactive in all of the others."331 Two 
years later the chairman continued to lament the failure of the committee to attract 
enough supporters to become a viable advocate and blamed the association for not 
taking enough interest in human rights issues: 
The problem of maintaining the Civil Liberties Sub-section are 
aggravated by the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the work of the 
Section in a number of provinces .... The lack of interest reflected in 
the last half of the current year is symptomatic of the feeling which 
prevails among those persons normally active in the affairs of the Civil 
Liberties Section- that their wishes and points of view cannot 
effectively be expressed through the medium of the Association. I 
share this view. 332 
The Canadian Bar Association was not unaware of the key human rights 
issues ofthe period. There were several heated debates on abortion (1966 and 1971) 
and capital punishment (1971 ), and on a variety of other issues such as wiretapping, 
writs of assistance, youth rights and the October crisis. At times, as in the case of 
writs of assistance, the association lobbied to have the legislation amended.333 These 
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efforts were most often conducted through the Canadian Bar Association executive 
and the national network of civil liberties committees was not involved. In 1970 the 
national civil liberties committee was totally inactive. It finally began work again in 
1972 only to spend the next ten years as a minor committee in the Canadian Bar 
Association, conducting research and passing resolutions at annual meetings. In 
many provinces, such as Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, 
the civil liberties section attracted few members and was rarely active, sometimes 
going years without a meeting. 334 Although the association would eventually play a 
prominent role during the debates on entrenching rights in the constitution, it never 
lived up to its potential as a national rights association.335 
Toronto's Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
Alongside the failure of the Canadian Bar Association and organized labour to 
form a network of human rights committees, rights associations also endeavoured, 
and also failed, to form a national rights association. The first attempt to form an 
autonomous national organization exclusively designed to defend the rights of all 
individuals with no links to a specific constituency was in 1964 with the creation of 
the CCLA. There was initially nothing national about the organization beyond its 
name. Its precursor, the Association for Civil Liberties, had also envisioned itself 
evolving into a national organization but had failed to develop beyond Toronto and 
had focussed most of its efforts in securing anti-discrimination legislation in the 
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Ontario. Throughout most of its early history the CCLA remained a purely Toronto-
based organization concerned with local issues until it was able to secure a major 
grant from the Ford Foundation in 1969 which allowed the CCLA to expand outside 
of Toronto by helping fund groups willing to affiliate with the Toronto group. As the 
CCLA expanded and grew richer from various large donations and membership dues, 
it attempted to form permanent chapters across the country to establish itself as 
Canada's national rights association. Many of these chapters, however, had a short 
life span or chose to disaffiliate and operate independently.336 By 1982 the CCLA 
remained a Toronto-based organization with only a couple of active chapters. The 
history of the CCLA as a national organization is discussed in detail in chapter ten. 
The Canadian Human Rights Foundation 
Before the CCLA had managed to secure its Ford Foundation grant, another 
organization with the potential to act as a national rights association emerged in 1967 
in the form of a Canadian Human Rights Foundation. Unlike the CCLA, this was not 
an advocacy group but instead a national charitable organization conducting education 
and research programs for promoting human rights issues. The foundation received 
grants predominantly from government sources including the Secretary of State and 
the Canada Council, as well as federal and provincial departments of Justice. Its 
membership included such distinguished personalities as John Humphrey (drafted the 
UDHR), Justice Antonio Lamer (future justice of the Supreme Court of Canada), 
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Professor Paul A. Crepeau (head of the Office for the Revision of the Civil Code of 
Quebec) and Therese Casgrain (future senator and well known women's rights 
activist).337 However, the foundation was never designed to be a popular association 
with a broad membership. It was a fellowship of elites raising money to promote 
human rights issues. According to the minutes of its founding meeting, the "purpose 
of the Foundation is to advance the course of Human Rights by helping to finance the 
work of organizations and activities in this field. It would not, however, take any 
stand on particular issues but would restrict itself to channeling moneys to appropriate 
agencies."338 At no time could the Foundation honestly claim to be a national rights 
association. 
Two years later came another attempt to form a national rights association. As 
early as August 1968 Kalmen Kaplansky, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Canadian Commission on International Year for Human Rights, was talking about 
using the anniversary celebrations as a forum for creating a national rights 
association.339 Only one motion materialized from the December conference in 
Ottawa which represented the culmination of a year's work across the country 
promoting human rights for the anniversary of the UDHR. The motion called for the 
formation of a Canadian Council on Human Rights to act as a national rights 
association made up of interested individuals and voluntary agencies. Within a few 
months, Kaplansky brought together many of the executive members of the Canadian 
Commission for the International Year for Human Rights to act as the planning and 
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organizing committee for the Council. Funding left over from the Secretary of State 
grant for the International Year for Human Rights (over $17 000) was transferred to 
the Council and an office was established with administrative support through the 
Canadian Welfare Council. 
The Canadian Council on Human Rights was particularly concerned with lack 
of funding. A grant of $19 500 from the Secretary of State was followed by a 
cessation of state funding and the Council was unable to procure funding from any 
additional sources. During its one year of existence, the major accomplishment of the 
Council was to fund a report produced by Maurice Miron surveying rights 
associations across the country. Miron's goal was to consult with potential members 
on the feasibility of a national human rights organization, their willingness to 
participate in such an organization and to consider means of financing such a group. 
Based on his findings, Miron recommended that the Secretary of State provide the 
Canadian Council on Human Rights with a $47 500 grant to set up a national rights 
association to employ a national director as well as five regional directors. 340 Nothing 
came of the report and the Council, devoid of government funding, became inactive 
and officially folded in 1970. 
The Canadian Federation of Civil Liberties and Human Rights Association 
(Federation) 
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As was the case with the espionage commission, an important event of 
national proportions helped mobilize rights associations across the country and this, in 
turn, led to another attempt to form a national rights association. One of the long term 
implications of the October crisis and the use of the War Measures Act in 1970 was 
the creation ofthe Canadian Federation of Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
Associations ('the Federation'). It was designed as a federation of civil liberties and 
human rights groups, each having an equal vote and voice within the organization, 
paying minimal membership fees and funded by the Secretary of State. The idea 
behind the creation of the Federation emerged from the imposition of the War 
Measures Act. A collection of rights associations from Montreal, Toronto, St. John's, 
Edmonton, Windsor, Fredericton and Vancouver had coordinated their efforts in 1970 
to publicly oppose the imposition of the War Measures Act and lobby the federal 
government to rescind the emergency powers as soon as possible.341 On 18 February 
1971 rights groups in Ottawa, Newfoundland and British Columbia sent a letter 
endorsed by ten other rights associations across the country to Quebec's Minister of 
Justice, Jerome Choquette, asking the government of Quebec to compensate 
individuals arrested under the War Measures Act.342 These initial efforts prompted 
the leaders of established rights associations to consider the formation of some type of 
national umbrella organization to provide a unified national voice. 
During the October crisis an information network of rights associations was 
formed under the banner of the Union of Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
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Associations, officially established on 30 October 1970. It had the support of groups 
in Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax, Fredericton, Ottawa, Edmonton and Windsor. The 
Union published a regular newsletter, and focused its energies on applying for a grant 
from the Secretary of State to hold a national conference of rights associations. At 
this stage the Union was not an advocacy group, but an association facilitating the 
exchange of ideas, communication and development of national positions on public 
issues.343 
There were several attempts to bring rights associations together into a formal 
organization throughout 1970 and 1971 but each failed. At a meeting in Toronto to 
conclude its research for the Ford Foundation, the CCLA proposed that groups from 
Vancouver, Winnipeg and Halifax form a national group headed by the CCLA general 
counsel, centred in Toronto and funded by individual membership fees. Its proposal 
was soundly rejected because it was felt such an organization would be easily 
dominated by the CCLA. 344 Don Whiteside, who worked for the Secretary of State 
and was a member of the National Capital Region Civil Liberties Association, and 
Eamon Park of the CCLA, divided bitterly over the question of government funding. 
Park was adamantly opposed to any kind of government funding whereas Whiteside 
was equally adamant about the need for small rights associations to seek out 
government grants.345 The rift represented the basic divide between the CCLA and 
most of the remaining rights associations in Canada and would play a key role in 
145 
preventing the formation of a national rights association that included the largest 
association in the country. 
Another attempt at founding a national organization was made in 1972 at a 
conference of rights associations in Winnipeg. Unfortunately, the same problems 
arose. In this case, not only was government funding an issue, but the question of 
control and representation in the Federation was debated. The CCLA, by far the 
largest rights association in the country, refused to join the Federation unless its 
constitution included a ban on state funding and members were given voting rights 
equal to the size of their membership. When no compromise could be reached, 
sixteen organizations formed a national organization based on principles of equal 
representation by group, not membership. On 27 June 1972 the Canadian Federation 
of Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations was officially formed at a meeting 
in Montreal, the first truly national rights association in Canadian history, with 
representation from every province. The central aim of the organization was to liaise 
between rights associations and consider national policies in the field of rights. 346 The 
CCLA, with its desire to ignore regional distinctions through a single national voice, 
would not accept such an arrangement and boycotted the new organization.347 
Representation and funding were the core issues separating rights associations. 
The question of government funding was fundamentally an ideological division based 
on the relationship of rights groups to the state and had replaced the divisions between 
social democrats and communists which had prevented the formation of a national 
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rights association in the 1940s. A final distinction between the CCLA and the 
Federation was the relationship between the parent organization and its affiliates. All 
the organizations affiliated with the CCLA enjoyed a great deal of independence and 
minimal interference with their internal affairs, with the exception that any position 
taken on a national issue (e.g., abortion) had to be approved by the CCLA Board of 
Direction. In contrast, the Federation's constitution specifically stated that each 
member retained "complete integrity and independence in regard to its existing 
Constitutional arrangements, policy statements, programme priorities, finances and 
membership."348 
Over the next ten years the Federation provided as much support to its 
affiliates as was fiscally possible, writing letters of support and working with the 
media to offer national credibility to a local group's campaigns. It dealt with a variety 
of issues from the federal Privacy Act to opposing the deportation ofHaitians in 1975 
who faced poverty and persecution back home.349 In general, however, it was a weak 
advocacy group and its major contribution was to network among rights associations. 
Nonetheless, it played a critical role in the deliberations of the Special Joint 
Committee on the Constitution in1981 in which the Federation, represented by 
members from three separate associations, presented a comprehensive brief. Among 
the Federation's recommendations were revisions to section ten dealing with legal 
rights upon arrest. These amendments were accepted verbatim in the final draft of the 
Charter. Its brief also expressed concerns regarding section seven, which originally 
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read, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the procedures established by 
law." By qualifying the deprivation of rights as being in accordance with the law, the 
Federation argued that any government could pass a law allowing officials to ignore 
these basic freedoms. Instead, as was accepted in the final draft of the Charter, the 
Federation's brief recommended the section be modified to include the following 
wording: " ... except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. "350 The 
success enjoyed by the Federation before the joint committee was evidence of the 
ability of a collection of rights associations to cooperate effectively to accomplish a 
specific objective at the national level. 
Despite its victory before the Parliamentary committee, by 1982 the 
Federation had failed to achieve anywhere near the same public profile as the better 
known CCLA. The CCLA's brief received the most attention in the committee's 
draft report (in the final report reference to specific groups was omitted). In addition, 
when the Minister of Justice, Jean Chretien, introduced his suggested revisions to the 
government's proposal for a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the CCLA, not the 
Federation, was credited with inspiring many of the changes to the proposal.351 
Whiteside acknowledged in his presidential reports his frustration with the national 
media's focus on the CCLA and the lack of attention being afforded the Federation. 
While the CCLA remains active today, the Federation folded in 1990-1 after 
Whiteside died from cancer and several associations had stopped attending meetings 
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because financial support from the federal government to attend meetings had run out. 
The fall of the Federation could be attributed to a host of factors. The Federation's 
shoestring budget made it impossible to hire a permanent national director and the 
Federation depended on part time labour and volunteers. The situation was 
exacerbated by having the head office in Ottawa while the executive was scattered 
across the country. Ross Lambertson, one of the Federation's last presidents, found it 
"virtually impossible" to manage the organization from his home base in Victoria.352 
Ideology, regionalism, and state funding also contributed to the demise of the 
Federation. It had always been a shaky coalition. Within the Federation human rights 
advocates were sometimes frustrated with their civil liberties counterparts, 
particularly on free speech issues such as pornography. Civil liberties associations 
such as the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) had a history of 
conflict with egalitarians from various movements, notably feminists. As one of the 
BCCLA's presidents, John Dixon, once quipped: "it was very soon the case that we 
got to be called unconscious exploiters only on our luckiest days."353 Regional 
priorities further divided the Federation: members in Montreal or Vancouver 
continually questioned the value of belonging to a national federation when their 
priorities were provincial.354 
Finally, and perhaps most telling, by the late 1980s the Federation had lost its 
main source of revenue when the Secretary of State refused to continue providing 
core funding. 355 The founders of the Federation had never intended the organization 
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to be fully funded by membership fees. It began as a product of state funding and, in 
the end, the Federation became a victim of government cutbacks. 
Between 1962 and 1982 the number of rights associations expanded 
exponentially, supported in large part by government funding (see next chapter). 
Most of the organizations born during this period did not last into the 1990s and were 
lucky to survive more than a handful of years. The number of active rights 
associations peaked in the seventies and coincided with the rise of the Federation and 
the availability of funding from the federal government. Most of these rights 
associations were affiliated with either the CCLA or the Federation; while the former 
achieved greater recognition throughout Canada as a national rights association, the 
Federation was far more representative, with members from every province. Its 
demise and other failed attempts to form a national rights association represent one of 
the more unique aspects of the history of the human rights movement in Canada. 
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Chapter Seven: 
State Funding and the Secretary of State 
One of the central themes in the history of the human rights movement in the 
seventies is the question of state funding. None of the first generation of rights 
associations had access to government funding, and it was an intensely divisive issue 
among rights activists in the seventies. A policy of restraint and respect for the 
independence of voluntary organizations gave way by the seventies to a new 
philosophy where the state, notably the federal government, adopted a significant role 
in promoting citizenship participation through voluntary agencies. Departments such 
as National Health and Welfare, Manpower, Immigration and others provided grants 
for a variety of programs and events. In the period under study, however, no 
department was more visible in the provision of grants, notably for rights 
associations, than the Secretary of State (SOS). With the exception of the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, most rights association in Canada applied for and 
received grants from the SOS, many of them becoming dependant on state funding. 
Unfortunately, SOS files are extremely bare and highly inaccessible. It took 
over three years simply to access those files dealing with rights associations under 
numerous and exhaustive access to information requests. The following chapter 
summarizes the fruits of this research, and briefly reviews the role government 
funding played in maintaining rights associations in the seventies. 
'Strengthening National Unity': State Funding for Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
The federal government's interest in promoting integration and cohesive social 
relations among its citizens dates back at least to World War Two when the 
Nationalities Branch was created to "foster and sustain national consciousness and 
strengthen national unity."356 It was formed in 1941 under the War Services 
Department and in 1945 transferred to the SOS to pursue the integration of ethnic 
groups in Canada with a particular focus on immigrants and refugees. Five years 
later, the branch became an independent department within the federal government 
and was renamed the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 
The first grants offered by the Citizenship Branch of the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration to voluntary organizations began in 1951-2.357 These 
programs were designed to promote immigrant integration through social events and 
education programs. According to Leslie Pal, by the mid-1950s the branch was 
increasingly focused on national unity. "The dual focus on citizenship and integration 
had inexorably led the branch to project itself into wider and wider circles of societal 
activity."358 The branch's concern with immigration and refugees led it into the field 
of human rights where it organized a seminar on human rights at the University of 
British Columbia and funded other citizen-led initiatives. Among the roles of the 
branch, soon after Canada joined the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
for the first time, was to provide information to the Department of External Affairs 
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about the country's progress on citizenship issues such as inter-group (i.e., racial or 
ethnic) relations. 359 
In 1962 the department initiated the practice of offering a limited number of 
grants to voluntary associations fostering Indian and immigrant integration, as well as 
group understanding and citizenship promotion. These grants were capped at $5000 
per organization for three years, and were to be used for specific projects and not 
operational funding. 360 By this prohibition the government wished to avoid getting 
involved in the creation and operation of voluntary groups. Grants were to be directed 
to established organizations.361 As of 1964 no funds had yet been made available to 
rights associations, although a report entitled "A New Focus for the Citizenship 
Branch" in 1965 recommended grants be provided for 'civil liberties leagues' in 
Canada.362 The report had little initial success. In 1966 a total of$202 500 in grants 
were allocated to various non-governmental organizations across Canada 
(approximately $65 000 going to Indian friendship centers alone) with nothing 
allocated for rights associations. 363 
A reorganization of government departments in 1966 led to the re-integration 
of the Citizenship Branch into SOS. The Citizenship Branch of the SOS continued 
with its original mandate associated with citizenship participation: the promotion of 
inter-group and inter-regional understanding throughout the country and increased 
participation by ethnic groups in community activities. It preached tolerance and 
understanding towards racial and ethnic minorities by providing funds for voluntary 
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groups, organizing conferences and publishing educational materials. In 1967 the 
Branch's priorities were narrowed to five areas: human rights, immigrant 
participation, Indian participation, travel and exchange programs, and youth. Human 
rights, in this context, did not extend to the traditional freedoms such as speech and 
association. All the Branch's activities and grants with respect to human rights 
focused on racial and ethnic integration and tolerance. A total budget of $2 003 000 
was allocated to the citizenship development branch ofthe SOS in 1968, with $95 
000 allocated for the human rights program.364 
1968: International Year for Human Rights 
International Year for Human Rights was a watershed for the SOS. In 1968, 
Trudeau became Prime Minister and Gerard Pelletier, former editor of La Presse and 
member ofthe Ligue des droits de l'homme, was appointed Secretary of State. To 
celebrate the anniversary of the UDHR the budget for the human rights program 
expanded exponentially; the $95 000 grant to the Canadian Commission for the 
International Year for Human Rights was a marked increase from the usual $5000 
grants. Other programs enjoyed substantial increases under Pelletier's tenure (1968-
1972), notably grants to native groups and friendship centres, initially budgeted at 
$100 000 in 1967 expanding to $540 000 in 1970 and $5 205 000 in 1972 (see Table 
1). In 1966 $10 900 in grants were given under the category of 'human relations' 
while $30 000 was provided in sustaining grants to the Canadian Citizenship Council 
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and the Indian-Eskimo Association and $73 150 was made available for 'citizenship 
promotion' .365 Grants for the promotion of human rights continued to remain 
relatively high under Pelletier, with $95 000 allocated in 1968 and $80 000 in 1972 
(see Table 2). In his extensive study of Secretary of State funding, Leslie Pal suggests 
that the federal government's largess during this period was partially designed to 
counter French Canadian nationalism by enhancing the role of the federal government 
in the voluntary sector and encouraging citizen participation in national debates and 
institutions. 366 
State Funding in the Trudeau Era 
After 1968 SOS became the central department responsible for the federal 
government's human rights program. A memorandum prepared for the cabinet in 
October 1968 endorsed SOS as the only department with the necessary experience 
and field officers capable of administering a broad human rights program. For years it 
had worked with External Affairs on human rights issues. The memorandum also set 
the stage for providing financial support for rights organizations, suggesting they 
would support national unity by developing public attitudes conducive to equality of 
treatment and opportunity. Cabinet approved the memorandum in December 1968 
and the SOS began dispensing grants soon thereafter?67 
Within two years grants were being allocated to a variety of rights associations 
(see Table 3). A variety of other organizations apart from formal rights associations 
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were funded under the SOS human rights program, from the Nova Scotia Association 
for the Advancement of Coloured People to the Toronto Christian Resource Centre. 
Of the 249 grants totaling $1 082 4 72 provided through the Citizenship Branch in 
1970 to voluntary groups, $58 670 was provided for 22 associations engaged in 
human rights activities. 
Table 1: 
Fundingfor native organizations and friendship 
centres, 1967-1981 
Fiscal Year Budget 
1968 $175 000 
1969 $378 168 
1970 $540 000 
1971 $1 907 110 
1972 $5 205 000 
1973 $8 436 000 
1974 $9 403 633 
1975 $7 175 402 
1976 $* 
1977 $8 395 000 
1978 $8 657 000 
1979 $9 488 000 
1980 $9 488 000 
1981 $10 500 000 
Source: Report of the Department of the Secretary of 
State of Canada, 1968-1981 
*information on grants was not provided for the year 
1975-6 
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Table 2: 
Group Understanding and Human Rights Branch, 
Secretary of State, grants, 1968-1981 
Fiscal Year Budget 
1968 $95 000* 
1969 $100 000** 
1970 $58 670 
1971 $85 000 
1972 $80 000 
1973 $140 000 
1974 $225 000 
1975 $138 395 
1976 $139 132 
1977 $995 000*** 
1978 $995 000 
1979 $620 000 
1980 $224 000 
1981 $500 000 
Source: Report of the Department of the Secretary of 
State ofCanada, 1968-1981 
*International Year for Human Rights 
**The bulk of these funds went to the Canadian 
Council on Human Rights 
***An additional $80 000 was made available for 
educational activities 
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Table 3: 
Funding to rights associations by the Secretary ofStatefor 1969-1970 
Alberta Human Rights Association 
Atlantic Regional Human Rights Conference 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
British Columbia Human Rights Council 
B.C. Human Rights Council (Regional Committees & Council) 
Canada Council for Human Rights 
Canadian-Asian Sikhna Committee, Williams Lake, B.C. 
Canadian Association for Adult Education 
Ecole Polyvalente de Buckingham 
Ecole Secondaire Immaculee-Conception 
Fredericton Civil Liberties Association 
Hamilton Growth Centre 
Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Committee 
Nova Soctia Association for the Advancement of Colour People 
New Brunswick Committee Project 
Saskatchewan Association on Human Rights 
Seminaire bilingue sur les Nations Unies 
Sudbury Mayor's Committee on Human Rights 
Toronto Christian Resources Centre 
United Nations Association of Canada 
University of New Brunswick Human Rights Group 
University of PEl Student Union 
Total 
$4000 
$600 
$5000 
$2500 
$5000 
$19 500 
$1000 
$250 
$300 
$150 
$100 
$1000 
$250 
$5000 
$500 
$3500 
$520 
$1000 
$3000 
$4500 
$500 
$500 
$58 670 
Source: Report ofthe Department of the Secretary of State of Canada for the Year Ending 31 
March 1970. 
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Table 4: 
Individual Paid Memberships in Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations, 1971-6 
Association 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Newfoundland-Labrador H.R.A. 40 120 120 119 130 125 117 
Prince Edward Island C.L.A. NF 100 65 80 35 119 250 
Nord-est du Nouveau Brunswick NF 300 200 400 250 30 30 
Sud-est du Nouveau Brunswick NF NF 1500 10 10 IN IN 
*C.C.L.A., Fredericton 60 40 60 35 52 IN 10 
Nova Scotia C.L. & H.R.A. 233 230 75 125 120 IN IN 
Ligue des droits de I 'homme 350 300 550 750 750 738 487 
C.L.A. Cornwall NF NF 20 55 30 25 20 
C.L.A. National Captial Region 160 150 38 72 79 68 113 
C.L.A. Hamilton 40 20 92 90 90 150 NA 
*C.C.L.A. Toronto 2000 4000 2750 4000 4000 3000 3000 
*C.C.L.A. London 20 20 IN 6 20 IN IN 
Kitchener-Waterloo H.R. Caucus NF NF 14 35 30 40 27 
H.R. Committee, Sudbury Region NA 30 40 IN 35 25 NA 
Owen Sound H.R. Committee 20 20 IN IN IN IN IN 
Kenora Area Civil Liberties Group NF NF NF NF NA IN IN 
*C.C.L.A., Windsor 75 50 IN IN 10 10 10 
*C.C.L.A., Manitoba 200 100 40 10 IN IN IN 
Manitoba C.L. & H.R.A. NF NF NF NF NA NA NA 
Winnipeg C.L.A. NF NF NF NF NF NF 14 
Saskatchewan Association on H.R. 75 75 200 235 475 456 480 
*C.C.L.A., Regina 60 60 75 18 12 12 NA 
Alberta H.R. & C.L.A. 200 200 250 150 250 50 75 
Alberta H.R. & C.L.A., Lethbridge NF NF 25 24 IN 25 IN 
Fort McMurray Citizens H.R. Council NF NF NF NF NF NF 20 
Lethbridge Citizens H.R. Council NF NF NF NF NF NF 25 
British Columbia C.L.A. 500 450 500 463 364 268 259 
British Columbia H.R. Council NF 45 80 72 103 100 85 
Williams Lake H.R. & C.L.A. NF NF 30 30 30 7 36 
Comox-Strathcona C.L.A. NF NF NF NF 41 IN IN 
Quesnel C.L. & H.R.A. NF NF NF 30 70 18 60 
Kamloops Civil Liberties Society NF NF NF NF 22 41 35 
Abbottsford C.L.A. NF NF NF 25 IN IN IN 
Powell River C.L.A. NF NF NF NF NF 57 29 
South Okanagan C.L.A. NF NF NF NA 26 38 100 
North Central C.L.A. NF NF NF NF NF NA NA 
Fair Practices Committee, Whitehorse NF NF NF NA IN IN IN 
Yukon H.R.A., Whitehorse NF NF NF NF NA IN IN 
Source: Rights and Freedoms, No.2 I, March 1976 and No.25, March 1977. 
*chapters of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
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Table 5: 
Rights Associations Receiving Government Funding, 1970-1982 
The following is a list of groups which received government funding throughout the 1970s but are 
not listed in table three. 
Association 
Alberta Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
Association 
Civil Liberties Association, National 
Capital Region 
Comite pour les droits de l'homme du 
nord-est (N.B.) 
Comite pour les Droits de l'homme du 
Sud-Est (N.B.) 
Cornwall Civil Liberties Association 
Fredericton Chapter, CCLA 
Kamloops Civil Liberties Society 
Kitchener-Waterloo Human Rights Caucus 
Lethbridge Citizens Human Rights Council 
Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties 
Nova Scotia Civil Liberties Association 
Prince Edward Island Civil Liberties Association 
Quesnel Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
Association 
Saskatchewan Association for Human Rights 
South Okanagan Civil Liberties Association 
Williams Lake Civil Liberties Association 
160 
Sources ofFunding 
Secretary of State/ Government of Alberta 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
British Columbia Law Foundation 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State/Ministry of Justice (Federal) 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of State 
British Columbia Law Foundation 
Secretary of State 
British Columbia Law Foundation 
British Columbia Law Foundation/ Secretary 
of State 
Between 1970 and 1982, the operations and size of SOS and the Citizenship 
Branch continued to expand. As tables one and two demonstrate, grants to native 
organizations and friendship centres reached $10 500 000 by 1981 and the human 
rights program peaked in 1977 with $995 000, diving as low as $224 000 in 1980 but 
rising to $500 000 in 1981 to coincide with the Trudeau government's project to 
patriate the constitution. The human rights program remained a small percentage of 
the overall budget ofthe Citizenship Branch which was $4.6 million in 1969-70 and 
$44 million in 1971-2. An average of30 to 34 organizations received funding each 
year through this program. Some, such as the Ligue des droits de l'homme, received 
as much as $65 000 in 1978, while the smaller Newfoundland-Labrador Human 
Rights Association received $15 000 in the same year.368 Under Pelletier the branch 
and SOS in general had dispensed with the classical liberal hesitancy ofbecoming 
implicated in the maintenance of social movement organizations and were generously 
providing the bulk of funding for many associations. 
Another innovative program entitled the Opportunities for Youth program was 
initiated in 1971 and proved to be another source of funding for rights associations. 
While direct SOS grants provided project or core funding, groups used the program to 
hire students to conduct surveys and do research.369 The Opportunities for Youth 
program was to provide socially relevant employment to high school and university 
students in high unemployment and economically depressed regions. By 1973, 3014 
different projects were administered under the program employing 30 255 students.370 
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Rights associations also took advantage of the Local Initiatives Program. The 
program was also created in 1971 and, as with Opportunities for Youth, discontinued 
in 1977 as a result of massive budget cuts. The aim of the program was to fund local 
initiatives to benefit the community by producing previously non-existent facilities 
and services or use untapped resources within the community. In 1975 the British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) received a $65 000 Local Initiatives 
Program grant to send field workers across the province to promote human rights 
issues through education programs.371 
State Funding and Rights Associations 
The files of the Secretary of State and its annual report contain a breakdown of 
grants to specific rights association in only one year, 1970, as detailed in table three. 
Otherwise, there is no information on how much money was provided to which 
associations and based on what criteria. Nonetheless, other sources demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of such grants across the country. In fact, three of the four case studies 
received SOS grants ranging from a few hundred dollars to thousands each year. 
Only the Canadian Civil Liberties Association refused to accept government grants, 
although in 1966 it made at least one attempt to request government funding, which 
was refused.372 The groups in St. John's, Vancouver and Montreal were dependant on 
SOS funds (in some cases supplemented by provincial government funds as well) for 
maintaining staff and an office. Each group organized a variety of recruitment 
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campaigns but membership numbers were never high enough to provide sufficient 
funding for operational expenses and in general accounted for less than 10 percent of 
their budget.373 They wholly dependant on government funding. 
The Canadian Council on Human Rights was one example of a national rights 
association unable to survive without state funding. 374 But no organization better 
exemplifies a dependance on state funding than the Federation. The initial meeting 
which led to the formation of the Federation in Winnipeg in 1971 was funded by a 
$3500 grant from SOS acquired by the BCCLA.375 From then on SOS grants ranging 
up to $5000 were provided to the Federation to cover the costs of its annual meetings. 
Operational and project funding was also provided by the SOS over the years, with 
grants as high as $50 000.376 With membership fees capped off at $25 for each 
organization (later raised to $250 in the 1980s), there was no way the Federation 
could have covered its own expenses, much less an annual meeting, without 
government funding. 377 Any attempt to change the fee structure was vigorously 
opposed by such groups as the BCCLA which was determined to keep the fees equal 
for all organizations.378 The Federation once endeavoured to secure non-
governmental funds through an application to the Donner foundation for a $48 900 
grant to study police and native community relations.379 The application failed and 
other attempts between 1972 and 1982, including the creation of the Rights and 
Freedoms Foundation (a charitable wing of the Federation designed to raise funds), to 
encourage large private donations were equally unsuccessful. The group was clearly 
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at the mercy of government funding. With no alternative means of support, the ability 
of the Federation to operate an office, hire staff, publish a newsletter and organize 
annual meetings depended each year on the generosity of the Secretary of State. 
As table three and the discussion above demonstrates, rights groups in British 
Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec, Alberta, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and 
Sudbury, as well as two national groups (Canadian Council on Human Rights and the 
Federation), all received extensive government funding. A thorough analysis of 
recently released SOS files combined with interviews and archival research reveals 
the names of a host of other rights associations at the receiving end of state funding 
(listed in Table 5). Of all the rights associations operating in Canada in the seventies 
which lasted more than a few years, only two, the CCLA and its Hamilton chapter, 
managed to survive without state funding. An entire network of social movement 
organizations was, in effect, bankrolled by the federal government. As the case 
studies will demonstrate, however, dependence on state funding may have constrained 
the activities of rights associations, but it did not discourage them from challenging 
the state on a variety of fronts. 
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Part III: Case Studies 
Chapter Eight: 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
The Sons of Freedom was a minor sect of the Doukhobours in southwestern 
British Columbia, at most numbering a couple of hundred members. Zealous 
traditionalists, they rejected materialism and encouraged their Doukhobour brethren 
to adopt a more religious lifestyle and avoid the trappings of modem society in 
everything from exploiting animals to the use of electricity. This 'encouragement' 
went far beyond simply adopting a particular lifestyle for themselves; bombings and 
destroying Doukhobours' property, burning symbols of materialism and nude parades 
to demonstrate Adamite simplicity were among the Freedomites' more notorious 
activities from the 1930s to the 1960s as they waged a virtual guerilla war in 
southwestern British Columbia. From 1923 to 1962, the Freedomites were 
responsible for over 11 00 arsons and bombings. The federal government and the 
RCMP struggled to deal with the violence, beginning with imposing harsh sentences 
of up to three years in jail for nude paraders, and seizing Doukhobour children, in a 
series of raids between 1954 and 1960, who were then sent to state institutions.380 But 
the violence continued, culminating in a string of259 bombings and arsons in 1962 
alone in the Kootenay region.381 On 24 March 1962 the RCMP's new tactic was 
revealed. One hundred and fifty officers (out of total of700 stationed in B.C.) raided 
the town of Krestova to arrest 57 members of the Fraternal Council of the Sons of 
Freedom, having already detained 10 others and issued warrants for three more.382 
The charge: conspiracy to intimidate the Parliament of Canada and the Legislature of 
B.C.383 
The Freedomites' tactics had earned them little public sympathy despite the 
loss of their children and the imprisonment of hundreds of nude paraders. Coverage 
in the Vancouver Sun and The Province in 1962 suggests that the media approved of 
the police's determination to contain the sect through rigid law enforcement. The 
decision to use the extraordinary charge of intimidating Parliament and the 
legislature, however, had lasting repercussions in the province long after the 
Freedomites had disappeared. In reaction to the raids, a civil liberties committee was 
formed in Vancouver to raise money for the defence of those Doukhobours charged. 
The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) was thus born from a 
concern at excessive police powers and state repression of an unpopular minority 
group, a dominant theme in the organization's activities for the next twenty years. 
This chapter will explore the basic structure of the BCCLA and the civil liberties 
ideology informing its activism, charting its rise from a small collection of academics 
meeting in the halls ofthe University of British Columbia to an outspoken, well 
funded and widely respected community group active in the defence of individual 
rights. Several key developments in British Columbia between 1962 and 1982 are 
also examined from the perspective of the province's most enduring rights 
association. In particular, the BCCLA dedicated itself to defending against 
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censorship, the use of the War Measures Act in 1970, abuse of police powers and 
compulsory treatment of drug addicts. While the association would prove highly 
successful in many of its endeavours, it chafed at the inability of the courts to act as 
an effective forum for the defence of fundamental freedoms in British Columbia. 
A New Era Begins: The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
An Association is Born 
On 9 December 1962 a public meeting held at International House on the 
campus of the University of British Columbia, attended by 80 people, led to the 
creation of the BCCLA. 384 The original Board of Directors consisted mainly of 
university professors and lawyers, led by Philip Hewett, an well-known Anglican 
minister in Vancouver.385 They immediately established a committee to examine the 
Freedomite issue and created a 'Doukhobour Defence Fund' for litigation and 
investigation into the conditions at Agassiz prison where at least 104 Doukhobour, 
men, women and children were held. 
The conspiracy charges leveled against the Fraternal Council had been 
dismissed months prior to the formal creation of the BCCLA. In July 1962, at a 
preliminary hearing, Sid Simons, one of the group's founders, had defended the 
accused by arguing that there was no direct evidence of a conspiracy and that mere 
association with the Council was not sufficient to warrant conviction or even a trial. 
In handing down his decision, Judge William Evans concluded that the Crown did not 
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have enough evidence to justify going to trial. The two witnesses presented by the 
Crown gave contradictory testimony and the judge could find no evidence the 
Freedomites had taken any action to intimidate the legislature.386 More than 100 
Doukhobours continued to be held at Agassiz prison under deplorable conditions, and 
the newly minted BCCLA successfully lobbied the provincial government for several 
early releases. The conspiracy charges were eventually dropped with no one having 
been brought to trial. 387 
The BCCLA was the first attempt to form a civil liberties association in the 
province since the demise of the Canadian Civil Liberties Union's Vancouver chapter 
soon after the end of the Second World War.388 RCMP reports on the new 
organization found no links between the BCCLA and its predecessor, although both 
had been formed and operated largely on the campus of the University of British 
Columbia.389 
Following the initial meeting on 9 December 1962, an executive for the 
BCCLA was elected which proceeded to incorporate the group under the Societies' 
Act on 11 February 1963.390 Hewett soon stepped down as president due to other 
commitments and was replaced by James Foulks, a professor of pharmacology at 
UBC. The remaining executive included John Fomataro (Vice President, professor), 
Michael Audain (Executive Secretary, student), Margaret Erickson (Recording 
Secretary, housewife), and Fritz Bowers (Treasurer, professor).391 The original 
constitution limited the group's operations to those "chiefly carried on in the Province 
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of British Columbia," and drew upon the UDHR, French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the bills of rights in the US, Britain and Canada as its guiding principles. 
A few basic observations can be noted at this stage about the BCCLA, whose 
structure and membership remained relatively consistent between 1962 and 1982. It 
was predominantly a male organization, with only three or four women elected to the 
Board at various stages and serving as the occasional vice president, but never as 
president. The Directors of the association were white, middle class professionals 
living in the Lower Mainland. More than 80 percent of the Directors between 1962 
and 1982 were either lawyers, professors or social workers, with a scattering of 
journalists, housewives and students filling out most of the remaining positions on the 
Board. Membership was open to anyone who supported the group's principles, and 
while several members of the NDP sat on the Board, none from the Social Credit 
Party joined.392 Harry Rankin, a Vancouver city counselor and a communist who 
never joined the Communist Party of Canada, noted the lack of minorities represented 
on the Board and warned the organization against becoming too academic.393 An 
editorial in the Vancouver Sun, heralding the creation of the BCCLA, similarly 
cautioned the group that "this academic, left-wing orientation should not be reflected 
in the causes the [BCCLA] chooses to defend. Trade unionists or Doukhobours .... are 
not the only people whose liberties are occasionally threatened."394 Although the 
BCCLA was never constrained by any kind of partisan bias in its activities, its first 
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twenty years of activity would be characterized by close ties with the NDP and an 
inability to construct a leadership structure which reflected the broader community. 
Dogma in the Classroom: Committees and Early Activism 
The BCCLA's earliest activities were by necessity limited, with a budget of 
less than $2000 in the first few years, rising to $6230 in 1969 at which point the group 
appointed its first part time assistant and secured an office in downtown Vancouver. 
The association initially provided free legal advice over the phone and formed several 
committees to conduct research and lobby government. The existence of a committee 
was no assurance of anything actually being done, but it did hint at the group's 
priorities in these early years. Following the 1963 AGM, committees were 
established to work in the following areas: Sons of Freedom, fund for racial equality, 
legal aid, police powers, censorship, and religion in schools. The committees 
expanded over the next decade to include the rights of B.C. Indians, trade unions, 
private offenses, bail and treatment of prisoners before trial, rights of tenants, 
immigration, children, private offences, criminal libel, contempt of court, 
expropriation, conspiracy, coroner's act and drivers license.395 Dependence on 
volunteer work was a significant obstacle to achieving most of the association's early 
goals. Few of the committees did anything more than provide a report, and most 
became moribund within a few years. 
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The committee on religious education is an example of why this aspect of the 
BCCLA's activities did not prove effective in the long run. British Columbia 
operated a secular education system with no publicly funded religious schools. Only 
the Lord's Prayer was permitted in public schools and clergy were banned from the 
positions of superintendent, teacher, trustee or inspector. In an attempt to combat 
demands by religious groups for separate schools, the provincial government 
amended the Public School's Act in 1944 to require readings from the Bible and the 
Lord's Prayer in all public schools.396 When the BCCLA was formed one of its 
original committees concerned itself with removing the 1944 amendment, but it 
seems to have done very little until 1969 when a report was prepared by one of the 
Board members, Herschel Hardin. The report recommended an amendment to the 
Public Schools Act to secularize public schools and remove all religious practices 
while encouraging the secular study ofreligion.397 The report was forwarded to the 
provincial government but received no response. Hardin then sought out his only 
natural ally outside the BCCLA with the resources to raise the public profile of the 
issue: the British Columbia Teachers' Federation. 
The teachers' federation had been grappling with this issue since at least 1958, 
when local federation leaders raised concerns over religious practices in schools. In a 
response to a letter in 1958 from Vaughan Lyon of the United Church, J.A. Spragg of 
the teachers federation claimed that "many of the active advocates of religious 
education seem to be interested primarily in using the time, authority, and the 
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influence of the public schools to further the specific dogma of their particular 
denomination or sect. It is our opinion that the schools should foster attitudes of 
tolerance and mutual understanding, and that introduction into the schools of the 
divisive influences of sectarian instruction would be inconsistent with this 
objective."398 In 1964, after several failed attempts by various teachers locals to push 
the union into an official position, a policy was adopted at the teachers federation 
annual meeting for the removal ofreligious exercises in B.C. schools. A committee 
was immediately struck to examine the issue, and it concluded that teachers felt a 
degree of coercion in following religious exercises despite the option to be exempted 
under the legislation, and that teachers felt unqualified to discuss the theological 
aspects of Bible readings.399 
These developments did not inspire change. While there was a degree of 
consensus in the teachers federation against religious practices in schools, it was not a 
priority for the union. A later report, compiled by Philip Hewett in 1968, concluded 
that while a majority of teachers. opposed the practice it had broad public support and 
the teachers federation could alienate large segments of the public if it challenged the 
practice.400 The union corresponded briefly with members of the provincial cabinet 
about considering amendments to the Public Schools Act with little success, and the 
issue was quietly dropped by the union's executive. 
Hardin attempted to reignite the debate within the B.C. Teachers Federation 
and the B.C. Parent-Teacher's Federation in 1969 through correspondence with the 
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executive and a request that he be allowed to address the latter's annual meeting. The 
teachers federation and the parents association had the resources and public profile to 
raise a serious public debate on this issue in a way that the BCCLA, still a young 
organization, could not do alone. His request to speak was quickly rebuffed, with the 
parent-teachers' association spokesman noting the failure of a motion two years 
earlier by a local federation to ban bible readings in schools.401 The disinterest of the 
B.C. Teachers Federation and parent-teacher's association's executives, and the 
failure of both the BCCLA and teachers federation to push the government to 
consider amending the legislation, left no more options for action. The committee on 
religious education did not continue operating after its 1969 report. As will be seen in 
the cases of the Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Association and the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, a rights association had targeted religious education as a 
key rights issue from its founding but soon found its efforts ineffective.402 
'Another Unwelcome Organization Issuing Press Releases': Tactics and State 
Funding 
Education was another important aspect ofthe association's activities, as it 
was with most of the other rights associations across the country. It organized 
seminars and invited speakers to lecture on a variety of issues, although few attended. 
More effective was the group's publications, the newsletter Democratic Commitment 
beginning in 1967 and increasing to over 4000 copies a year by the late 1970s, and the 
173 
booklet Arrest published continually for the next two decades. In 1980 alone the 
BCCLA sold 10 000 copies of its three booklets, Arrest, Discrimination and Youth 
and the Law.403 
The BCCLA received its first government grant in 1971 to support its 
educational program. Opportunities for Youth and the Local Initiatives Program 
provided grants in 1971 and 1972 through the federal Secretary of State 
(approximately $6000 each year) to design educational material and programs for 
schools and community groups. The group was given a major boost in 1973 with a 
$35 000 grant from the federal government's Local Initiatives Program to expand its 
operations beyond Vancouver. 404 The new grant provided for the hiring of a group of 
field workers who traveled across the province to create local rights associations to 
inform individuals of their rights. Field workers also provided para-legal services to 
inform people about the availability of legal aid (created under the NDP government 
in 1972), alternative avenues for redress, helping secure counsel, and contacting 
relatives for bail. The project initially enjoyed considerable success; civil liberties 
associations were formed in Powell River, Kamloops, Penticton, Quesnel, Prince 
George, Comox-Strathcona Courtnay, Kelowna, Williams Lake and in the North-
Central and South Okanagan regions. This was the closest the BCCLA ever came to 
forming chapters outside Vancouver, although these new associations were 
independent and did not receive direct funding from the BCCLA outside the 
government grant. Unfortunately, it soon became evident that the local associations 
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depended heavily on the field worker and, once he/she moved on to a new city, 
several associations became defunct within a year or two.405 
The BCCLA received additional support from several city councils between 
1975-1978 for local community projects. A Neighborhood Action Program was 
initiated in Vancouver in 1975 to "try and enlist the support of individuals within a 
neighbourhood and, with the cooperation of local police departments, to reduce the 
incidents of vandalism and harassment allegedly of a racially discriminatory nature. 
The hope was that if people of an area could meet together in an informal atmosphere, 
they could be encouraged to join in a program to help protect their neighbours from 
racial harassment."406 In a rare moment of close cooperation, the BCCLA and RCMP 
built lists of nineteen families in Surrey where racial tensions had been high, 
particularly among East Indians. Teams canvassed the neighborhood, isolated 
individuals suspected of vandalism and other offences to be targeted by the police, 
and organized neighborhood meetings to encourage community cooperation to reduce 
racial tensions. It was a creative and proactive approach to rights activism outside 
Vancouver, albeit limited in scope.407 
Education, legal advice and research were the three main services offered by 
the BCCLA until 1982.408 The scope of these activities would change as additional 
funding allowed the group to establish a permanent office and extend its activities 
beyond Vancouver for a limited time. A Vancouver Sun editorial serenading the 
young organization in 1962, however, not only warned the BCCLA's directors to 
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ensure the protection of everyone's civil liberties whatever their political leanings, but 
also encouraged them to focus on the courts in order to avoid becoming "another 
unwelcome organization issuing press releases. "409 This principle held true for 
several members of the BCCLA, and it became a continuous struggle throughout the 
1960s and 1970s to seek out lawyers willing to provide free legal support or, in some 
cases, to create a legal defense fund. Board members were often called upon to 
provide free legal services, and a network of about 80 volunteer lawyers was available 
to defend people abused by the police or jailed demonstrators, usually students or the 
poor with no means to hire their own lawyers.410 Test cases were another form of 
defending civil liberties in B.C., a process involving a court challenge to undermine 
contentious pieces of legislation. As the BCCLA matured, however, it discovered 
two important obstacles to using the courts as a defence against attacks on civil 
liberties. 
Overcoming Adversity: Obstacles to Human Rights Activism 
The first obstacle was financial. Unlike the many associations created in the 
wake of the International Year for Human Rights or those located in small urban areas 
such as St. John's, the BCCLA had a relatively strong membership base. Sixty 
members in 1962 rose to more than 500 by the late 1970s; in 1972 it collected $4 509 
in dues, rising to $7 416 by 1979 (these numbers include sustaining and 
organizational members). Not until the early 1980s did membership dues exceed 
176 
more than 1 0 percent of the budget. Combined with annual donations of anywhere 
from $500 to $1000 and profits from the booklet of approximately $2000, the 
BCCLA could boast an annual revenue of approximately $10 000 in a good year, 
exclusive of government grants.411 Ten thousand dollars hardly constituted prosperity 
and, limited to these funds, the BCCLA's services would have been severely 
curtailed. The organization was clearly dependent on government funding. 
At one point, in 1975-6, the BCCLA enjoyed a revenue base of almost $150 
000. Most of these monies were government grants directed at specific projects, 
mainly educational work in schools and field workers, not legal services. Any funds 
to hire lawyers would have to come out of donations or membership dues left over 
from administrative costs.412 A legal defense fund was established in 1970-1 with 
usually a few thousand dollars available for costs and hiring a lawyer. The funds 
were used in 1978 for a civil case when a couple sued the Vancouver police for 
physical abuse. The Schucks were grabbed by undercover police, roughed up and 
arrested on suspicion of purchasing illegal narcotics simply for walking near a known 
drug dealer.413 In 1982 the BCCLA funded its first Supreme Court challenge over the 
legality of the provincial Heroin Treatment Act which imposed compulsory treatment 
on heroin addicts. The Schuck case alone cost $1000 and the Supreme Court appeal 
almost $9000.414 Both cases were lost. The high cost of any court action made it 
difficult for the BCCLA, with most of its $150 000 trapped in administration or 
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government project grants, to contemplate taking a case to court unless free legal 
services could be made available. 
Despite its dependance on state funding, however, there is no evidence the 
organization ever shied away from an issue to avoid insolvency. In fact, as the 
discussion below suggests, the BCCLA never avoided taking on unpopular issues 
which could have cost them members, such as the Ku Klux Klan's right to free 
speech. All three levels of government were also targeted by the BCCLA for intense 
criticism on a variety of fronts and at no time was the association in danger of losing 
its funding as a result of its activities. 
The second obstacle was institutional. Until the advent of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, judges generally frowned upon requests by third parties for 
intervener status. Many judges, for instance, were concerned about the possibility of 
interveners turning their courtroom into a public forum comparable to a royal 
commission.415 There was nothing peculiarly Canadian about this philosophy as 
Australian and English rights associations also found the courts hesitant to allow them 
to submit factums, even in appeals to the High Court or Privy Council.416 When the 
provincial government threatened teachers with dismissal in 1970 if they expressed 
sympathy with the Front de liberation du Quebec, several university professors in the 
BCCLA sought to challenge the legislation in court. It came down to a question of 
who had legal standing. The judge found "no question whatsoever of the plaintiffs 
being in jeopardy. I thinkjeopardy must mean actual jeopardy not hypothetical 
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jeopardy, which could arise only if the plaintiffs advocated one or other of the policies 
specified in the impugned Order in Council. ... There is no suggestion they have or 
wish to do so."417 Hippies, protestors and students alike enjoyed free legal advice and 
assistance in bail hearings or magistrates' courts thanks to members of the BCCLA 
Board of Directors, even if in most cases it was a futile gesture to attempt to convince 
a judge that the police had overstepped their bounds.418 In general, however, the 
BCCLA found the courts to be a limited forum for defending civil liberties. 
Reg Robson 
For the first twenty years of its existence the BCCLA would prove to be one 
ofthe most active rights associations in Canada and a leading influence among rights 
associations across the country. A key figure in the association's early history was 
Reg Robson, a sociology professor at the University of British Columbia whose major 
publications focussed on the effectiveness of alcohol treatment centres and 
sociological factors affecting professional recruitment for academics and nurses. One 
of the founders of the association, Robson sat on the Board of Directors until at least 
1982 and served in various executive positions including executive secretary (1969-
1972, 1978), president (1972-5, 1980-2) and treasurer (1975, 1979). No member was 
more dedicated than Robson, who served in these various capacities when no one else 
was available and helped to ensure the viability and institutional memory of the 
association. It was Robson who would fight with the CCLA over their differing 
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visions of what a national association should be and pushed for the creation of the 
Federation while serving on its first executive. Robson took the lead in doing media 
interviews on behalf of the BCCLA during the FLQ crisis, he oversaw the creation of 
new rights associations across British Columbia, and would be a key player in the 
association's most active campaigns, including its reaction to the Gastown riot and 
challenging the Heroin Treatment Act. It was thanks to his dedication and 
perseverance that the association thrived and became an effective rights advocate 
provincially and nationally. 
'A Pitiful Record For An Association That Claims National Status': 
Constructing A National Rights Association 
The BCCLA played a central role in the creation of the Canadian Federation 
of Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations. Robson secured funding to 
organize meetings in Winnipeg and Montreal, initiated the first cooperative actions 
during the October crisis, corresponded (along with Whiteside) with rights 
associations, chaired the meetings, wrote the constitution, and provided leadership on 
the Federation's Board ofDirectors.419 Had Robson and his cohorts managed to 
convince the CCLA to join the Federation, it would have been a truly inclusive 
national rights association. But divisions among rights associations, and particularly 
between the BCCLA and CCLA, made such unity difficult. 
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The relationship between the BCCLA and CCLA was always quite tense. The 
BCCLA letterhead in 1967 indicated that it was formally affiliated with the CCLA, 
although except for doing some research under the CCLA's Ford Grant there is no 
evidence of the two groups having worked together. Affiliation, even if it existed in 
practice, was quickly dismissed by the membership and the BCCLA executive in 
1968 and was never again reconsidered. The Board of Directors decided that the 
CCLA was "primarily an Ontario Association [and] there would be some reluctance 
on the part of the BC Association to regard it as an appropriate Federal organization 
of which they would become an affiliate."420 Nonetheless, the BCCLA accepted 
funding from the CCLA to conduct a survey on due process in British Columbia. The 
report produced by the BCCLA in 1970 was the only project where the associations 
worked together on a common goal. 
Tensions between the BCCLA and the CCLA emerged as early as 1970. On 
behalf of the BCCLA, Robson thwarted attempts by Alan Borovoy and the CCLA at 
this time to create an informal network of rights associations coordinated by the 
CCLA. Robson believed that Borovoy's proposal would have created a paper 
organization dominated by the Toronto group. Robson was interested in creating a 
more concrete and independent association.421 
In fact, the CCLA's efforts to evolve into a national rights association often 
rankled members of the BCCLA. In the BCCLA's newsletter, Democratic 
Commitment, several contributors expressed frustration with the CCLA's practice of 
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'poaching' BCCLA members in British Columbia. By refusing to explicitly 
acknowledge in its solicitation campaigns that it was not affiliated with the BCCLA, 
the CCLA was signing up members who believed they were joining the Vancouver 
association.422 In effect, the CCLA was stealing members from the BCCLA. Robson 
and others on the BCCLA Board of Directors also accused the CCLA of falsely laying 
claim to national status when, in reality, it was nothing more than an Ontario 
organization with a scattering of members outside the province. Hugh Keenleyside, a 
former ambassador and University of British Columbia professor with a reputation for 
advocating western interests in federalist circles, relinquished his membership in the 
CCLA because of poor geographic representation on the Board ofDirectors (twenty-
two were from Toronto and five others from Ontario out of a total ofthirty-two).423 
According to Keenleyside, "even for Canada this is a pitiful record for an association 
that claims national status .... I shall ... confine myself to working with the [BCCLA] 
which makes no pretense to a status it cannotjustify."424 
Despite its problems with the CCLA, the BCCLA was active in working with 
other rights associations. It was represented on the Federation's national executive 
almost every year until1982. The first ten years of the Federation were spent building 
networks among rights associations, establishing an office in Ottawa, and organizing 
annual conferences funded by the Secretary of State. In addition to helping with 
funding applications for various associations, the Federation worked on briefs dealing 
with capital punishment, writs of assistance, the Lavell case, and various immigration 
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Issues. Robson also appeared before House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Justice and Legal Affairs to discuss wiretapping.425 As one of the larger rights 
associations in the country, the BCCLA was able to provide some additional support 
for the Federation, such as printing 5000 pamphlets in 1976 at no charge.426 Support 
for the national federation was, nevertheless, qualified. In 1978 the BCCLA could 
not afford to send a delegate to the national conference without financial assistance, 
and debated the possibility of leaving the Federation if changes to the fee structure 
required larger groups to contribute more. Limited finances and a focus on local 
issues often constrained the BCCLA's ability to function at the national level. 
The BCCLA developed an important national presence in the seventies 
through its involvement in the Federation, and did not hesitate to involve itself in key 
national debates outside the Federation when suitable. The BCCLA made 
representations to the LeDain commission (1973) on illegal narcotics and the 
McDonald commission (1979 and 1980) on national security. Such endeavors 
remained a peripheral activity for a group whose priority remained the defence of civil 
liberties in B.C. The nature of these activities, however, depended largely on how the 
organization understood and conceived of the nature of civil liberties. 
The Ideological Foundations of the BCCLA 
In forming an organization dedicated to individual rights, members of the new 
association found themselves facing important ideological and conceptual challenges. 
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The international debate over the nature of individual rights, symbolized in the 
UDHR and the two covenants, raised serious questions about the importance of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Should a rights association advocate for a 
minimum standard of living and access to education in addition to free speech? 
Rights associations since the sixties have also faced an expanding bureaucracy and 
administrative tribunals on a scale never before seen in Canada.427 These new 
challenges were reflected in the positions taken by the BCCLA between 1964 and 
1982 as the association developed a philosophy regarding the meaning and limits of 
rights activism while tackling some of the key social and political issues of the period. 
Administrative Decision-Making 
Positions proposed and adopted by the BCCLA in the area of administrative 
decision-making suggested a negative approach to rights activism. The positions 
adopted under this heading can be divided into two categories The first concerned the 
increasing judicial powers of administrative tribunals and the need for greater review, 
usually by a court. Among these proposals was a recommendation for a Crimes 
Compensation Board to provide relief for victims of a criminal offence, the creation 
of an ombudsman's office, expanding opportunities for claimants to appeal decisions 
of the immigration review board, and a provision for adequate safeguards against the 
expropriation ofproperty.428 However, the BCCLA was solely concerned with the 
administration of these services, not the impact or nature of those services.429 Its 
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positions were consistent with the idea of negative freedom: preventing the arbitrary 
exercise of state power. 
The second series of issues dealt with under the heading of administrative 
decision-making involved relations outside the realm of the state but regulated by the 
state. Labour legislation was introduced in 1968 to allow the govermnent to end a 
strike if it affected the public interest and welfare of British Columbia. According to 
the BCCLA brief, placing such arbitrary power in the hands of the cabinet without 
appeal to the courts violated workers' rights to negotiate freely and offended their 
fundamental freedom to withdraw their labour.430 When legislation dealing with 
landlord-tenant rights was introduced in 1970, the BCCLA raised concerns regarding 
the potential for landlords to exploit tenants in an economy of increasing 
unemployment and a rising demand for housing. The brief recognized tenants' 
problems as rooted in the larger social and economic problems facing the community, 
but limited its recommendations to procedural matters. Its position was to seek a 
balance of interests through strict regulations on security deposits, precise guidelines 
limiting the landlord's right to evict tenants, and the creation of a tenant bureau to 
mediate disputes. 431 
In the field of administrative decision-making, the BCCLA did not hesitate to 
consider important social and economic issues, from the provision of social welfare to 
industrial relations. In conceptualizing civil liberties, the BCCLA extended far 
beyond the basic freedoms of speech, assembly, association, press and religion. This 
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was inevitable within the context of an expanding welfare state and increasing 
government regulation. For the BCCLA, the solution to each problem was always 
government regulation or some form of judicial or administrative review of state 
agencies. Thus, the civil liberties association concerned itself solely with the role and 
responsibilities of the state. It was a philosophy rooted in the perception of civil 
liberties as negative rights, free from government interference except through 
regulation or appeal to ensure equal access by everyone.432 
Discrimination and Free Speech 
The same philosophy informed the association's approach to issues of 
discrimination. Restrictive covenants were illegal in British Columbia by the mid-
1960s. The lack of legislation specifically banning restrictive covenants forced some 
individuals to cover the cost of court proceedings to have existing covenants declared 
void, and the BCCLA intervened in 1968 to have a regulation of the British Pacific 
Properties Limited removed from banning people of Asian or African descent 
purchasing land.433 A more contentious issue was the BCCLA position on the Ku 
Klux Klan, which received some attention in the press around 1981 following reports 
of flyers appearing in a Vancouver high school. The BCCLA reacted by sending a 
speaker to Argyle high school in December 1981 to speak on the evils of 
discrimination.434 In principle, BCCLA supported the right to free speech no matter 
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how heinous the ideas, and promoted education over the use of the Human Rights 
Code to combat discriminatory ideas spread by the Ku Klux Klan. 
The decision to support the Klan's right to free speech received little debate 
within the BCCLA itself, unlike the divisive argument over affirmative action. A 
brief presented to the Board in 1980 recommended promoting affirmative action 
programs that would require employers to notify minority applicants of potential job 
openings and actively seek to correct any imbalances in the representation of 
minorities in certain sectors of the economy.435 It is not clear if the BCCLA adopted 
any official position on this issue or made any efforts to lobby on the 
recommendations within the brief. The Board debated the question for weeks and 
arrived at no conclusion, an unusual situation for an organization accustomed to 
working by consensus.436 While restrictive covenants and free speech for the Ku Klux 
Klan fit comfortably within the framework of negative freedom, the idea of positive 
programs designed to favour particular groups to counter discrimination did not 
conform to the group's institutional conception of civil liberties. Affirmative action 
expanded the concept of rights beyond what most civil liberties advocates, who were 
concerned with ensuring equality of opportunity and not positive state action, were 
willing to accept. 
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Due Process 
The BCCLA's central focus during this period, due process rights, reflected 
the priority it placed on negative rights. Due process rights generally referred to the 
administration of justice, such as access to legal aid, court proceedings, provisions for 
bail and protections against self-incrimination. The BCCLA spent years attacking the 
habitual criminal provisions of the Criminal Code which dated back to 1947. These 
provisions allowed for anyone previously charged three times before turning eighteen 
years old and charged with a fourth crime to be imprisoned for life. They were at the 
mercy of the National Parole Board which alone could allow habitual criminals to go 
free, while remaining on parole for the rest of their lives. By the 1960s there were 
few such prosecutions in Canada, but in 1963 Stewart McMorran, the Vancouver City 
Prosecutor, began a series of prosecutions against habitual criminals. By 1968 British 
Columbia was the unquestioned leader in charging people as habitual criminals, with 
75 convictions compared with the next largest number in Ontario at 16, a province 
with more than double the population. 437 One of these cases, where the defendant was 
represented by a well known criminal attorney in Vancouver, Thomas Berger, 
involved a three time shoplifter and petty drug user who was prosecuted by 
McMorran and sentenced as an habitual criminal. In his memoirs, Berger notes how 
those "who were liable to find themselves targeted called it 'The Bitch."' The 
legislation was eventually repealed in 1977 by the federal government and replaced 
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with a dangerous offender law permitting the state to detain individuals for 
intermittent periods if it was determined they had a penchant for violence. 
For the BCCLA, it was a question of natural justice. The idea of imprisoning 
an individual for what they might do in the future was reprehensible to civil 
libertarians, and the group was incensed at the provisions of the habitual criminal 
section which allowed the Crown to introduce evidence of people the accused 
associated with to be used against them in court. In effect, the provision allowed for a 
form of guilt by association.438 
Material witness orders were another popular issue for law reformers and 
others concerned with due process rights. A material witness order approved by a 
judge allowed the police to hold an individual for up to thirty days if they had 
witnessed a crime and were considered a flight risk before trial.439 Oftentimes the 
orders could be abused, leading some witnesses to be imprisoned for weeks at a time. 
The BCCLA recommended a full judicial hearing to determine whether or not a 
witness' evidence was in fact material and they were unlikely to attend trial, allowing 
for bail and conditions of detention different from accused criminals, and allowing for 
a witness to testify under oath before trial if their appearance at trial was questionable. 
The association adopted similar tactics in dealing with other administrative issues 
including writs of assistance, providing costs to accused on appeals, pretrial publicity, 
protections against self-incrimination, diversion and others. 
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Due process advocacy highlights the final key component in understanding 
how the BCCLA conceived of individual rights. Rights were conceptualized as 
negative rights. Civil liberties were rights derived from the state, protected through 
judicial review or regulation. An individual's freedom was threatened by the arbitrary 
exercise of state power, such as when welfare officers abused their power, or by the 
lack of procedural safeguards in areas where people are easily exploited, such as 
landlord-tenant relations. As discussed in chapter one, civil liberties is generally 
associated with civil and political rights (negative) while human rights incorporate 
economic, social and cultural rights (positive). When measured against such 
documents as the UDHR or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the ideological borders established by the BCCLA clearly favour 
negative rights. The latter covenant encourages its members to provide access to 
education, a minimum standard of living and health care, and fair wages. The 
BCCLA never addressed these issues, and its positions in such areas as social 
assistance were careful to not specify what minimum standard of support was 
appropriate. Its focus on negative rights represented the kind of a minimalist 
approach to rights advocacy derided by the critics of human rights activism discussed 
in chapter two. 
Defending Free Speech in British Columbia 
'It's Simple Common Sense': State Censorship 
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Censorship is the most direct form of undermining free speech, arguably the 
most fundamental right in a democratic society. There was no shortage of forms of 
censorship in Vancouver to occupy the BCCLA. For instance, producers of 
potentially obscene or contentious literature and art had to face a myriad of potential 
obstacles in the 1960s and 1970s. Under the City Charter, the Chief License Inspector 
had wide powers to censor publications and performances within the city. Section 
277 (c) of the Charter read as follows: 
The Chief License Inspector shall have power at any time summarily to 
suspend for such period as he may determine any license if the holder 
of the license .... (c) Has, in the opinion of the Inspector, been guilty of 
such gross misconduct in or with respect to the licensed premises as to 
warrant the suspension of his license.440 
Bylaw 2944 further provided the Chief License Inspector with explicit power 
to censor theatre: "It shall be deemed cause for the cancellation, suspension or 
revocation of any license granted, hereunder for any person to produce in any building 
or place in the City any immoral or lewd theatrical performance or exhibition of any 
kind, and the Inspector shall have full power to prohibit or prevent any indecent or 
improper performance or exhibition."441 Neither the city charter nor the bylaw 
defined gross misconduct or immoral material, a decision left up to the subjective 
analysis of the inspector. In a 1969 interview, the Chief License Inspector, Milton 
Harrel, claimed to use "simple common sense" in determining if a production was 
obscene.442 He was also in a position to pressure theatres or newspapers to change 
their format by simply threatening a ban or removal of license. 
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The post office and customs office could prohibit material from entering 
Vancouver. McMorran was responsible for prosecuting local violations of the 
Criminal Code, including obscenity charges, during this period. He was zealous in 
his work. By 1966, McMorran was barred from eight of ten magistrates courts for 
disrespect and bad behaviour. Another agency for censorship was the provincial film 
censor. Under the 1913 Moving Pictures Act, a censor was hired to regulate the 
distribution and content of films in the province. Section 5 of the Act allowed the 
censor to "permit or absolutely to prohibit the exhibition of any film or slide which it 
is proposed to exhibit in the Province. "443 Seventy four films were censored in 1931 
although, by the 1960s, only two or three films on average each year were being 
censored. 
The provincial government in British Columbia was occasionally active in 
censorship. The Minister of Education banned Philip Roth's Defender of the Faith, 
from being distributed to grade twelve students in 1967.444 Local governments, 
however, were by far the most prolific censors during this period. In 1968, the 
BCCLA's Vice-President, Bill Deverell, defended Doug Hawthorn who was in court 
for selling Kama Sutra calenders in his Vancouver psychedelic shop.445 New 
Westminster passed a by-law banning the distribution of newspapers on city streets in 
1969. In practice, the by-law did not affect mainstream media such as the Vancouver 
Sun and The Province, which were left unmolested while vendors selling alterative 
papers were harassed and denied licenses. When the BCCLA failed in its efforts to 
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pressure the police to act on the new law in order to challenge it in court, it sold 
newspapers themselves in New Westminster to force the Crown prosecutor to act, 
who subsequently claimed the by-law did not apply to newspapers.446 Darwin 
Sigurgreirson represented the BCCLA in the B.C. Supreme Court in 1971 when the 
court upheld a Surrey by-law giving the City Council control over special events, a 
law primarily designed to prohibit rock concerts. 447 As late as 1978-9, Vancouver's 
mayor was threatening to require licenses for merchants selling pornography and 
Penticton banned the distribution of pamphlets on its streets.448 
Theatre and the Chief License Inspector 
It was the censoring of local theatre that eventually cost the Chief License 
Inspector some of his broad powers of censorship. Harrel was targeted by the 
BCCLA for threatening to remove the license of David Gardner, who ran the 
Vancouver Playhouse, ifhe presented the rock musical Hair because of its final scene 
depicting people in the nude. Despite offers of free legal counsel from the BCCLA, 
Gardner chose to acquiesce instead of taking on the city and the play was removed.449 
Inspector Harrel also imposed a fine on the Gallimaufry troop's performance of The 
Beard at the Riverqueen Coffee House. When the proprietors of the Riverqueen were 
arrested on obscenity charges, the BCCLA provided legal counsel to appeal their 
convictions.450 On 8 July 1969, Harrel shut down a production of Camera Obscura, a 
Gallimaufry Theatre production allowing actors to wear transparent clothing at the 
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Arts Club. The BCCLA quickly offered them free legal counsel to defend against the 
charges, and subsequently contacted Charles Fleming (Deputy Cooperation Counsel 
for Vancouver) in an effort to convince him that the bylaw empowering the inspector 
to close down theatre productions was ultra vires the city's jurisdiction since it was a 
use of the federal criminal power. Fleming agreed and suggested to Council that the 
section be re-written. On 15 July 1969, City Council voted to instruct Fleming to 
remove theatre censorship from the section in bylaw 2944, thus limiting the power of 
the licensing inspector. Unfortunately for the BCCLA it was less successful in having 
the entire bylaw amended. Harry Rankin, a member of the BCCLA and an alderman, 
pushed Fleming to further recommend the removal of section 277 (c) dealing with 
gross misconduct, which Fleming supported and in tum recommended to Council. 
Section 277 (c), however, was upheld by the provincial Supreme Court and the censor 
continued to threaten Gallimaufry with license removal if it did not cooperate and 
stop producing obscene productions.451 
Censorship in the Private Sector: The Pacific National Exhibition 
The private sector had its own role to play in censoring unpopular ideas. The 
Victoria Times was unwilling to print articles on homosexuals in 1970, and thirteen 
other papers similarly refused when they received a copy of an article being circulated 
to papers across the province.452 Several store owners in Vancouver also agreed in the 
late 1960s to voluntarily remove copies of Playboy from their shelves. One example 
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of private sector censorship directly involving the BCCLA, which substantially raised 
its public profile, involved a challenge to a regulation imposed by the Pacific National 
Exhibition. The amusement park passed a regulation in 1969 prohibiting booths with 
partisan or political purposes.453 
The BCCLA was less opposed to a ban on political parties if it applied equally 
to all parties, but raised concerns over indiscriminate use of the regulation to censor 
any form of social activism. Its fears were quickly proven justified. Among those 
banned from setting up booths at the Pacific National Exhibition were the People's 
Co-Operative Bookstore, China Arts and the Combined University Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament. When the BCCLA was refused a meeting with the Pacific 
National Exhibition Board of Directors, it took the unusual step of setting up a picket 
in front of the parade grounds. The picket, supported by British Columbia Federation 
of Labour and the Vancouver Labour Committee for Human Rights (the local JLC 
committee), received coverage in the newspapers and television media, particularly 
once the groups began calling for a labour boycott of the Pacific National Exhibition. 
The groups directed its public criticisms against the Pacific National Exhibition as 
well as the Vancouver City Council which provided the grounds free of charge. After 
the picket was moved to City Hall, Mayor Tom Campbell intervened to mediate the 
dispute and the ban was soon lifted.454 The BCCLA had achieved an important, and 
very public, victory against censorship. 
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'I Wouldn't Tolerate It On The Streets Any anger': Defending the Georgia Straight 
Despite the BCCLA's success with the Pacific National Exhibition, the issue 
paled in comparison to the virtual war of survival fought by the Georgia Straight. 
Members of the BCCLA would play a critical role in defending the right of the 
Straight to be distributed in Vancouver. The Georgia Straight was an alternative 
paper, part of the hippie youth culture challenging conformity and authority. Founded 
in 1967, the paper soon had a circulation of 60 000 to 70 000.455 Jean Barman quotes 
one of the paper's founders in her history of British Columbia who admits to not 
knowing "any particular reason for the founding beyond a general pervasive desire to 
annoy establishment institutions in general and established newspapers in particular. 
Also, if one wished to be flowery, to provide a local voice for whatever counter-
culture exists in Vancouver."456 
It took less than six weeks for Tom Campbell to attack the new paper. He 
urged the City Licensing Inspector to use his power under section 277 (c) of the City 
Charter to suspend the paper for gross misconduct. Campbell described the paper as 
'filth' and made it clear that "as far I'm concerned, this was a 'rag' paper; it was a 
dirty paper; it was being sold to our school children; and I wouldn't tolerate it on the 
streets any longer."457 Within weeks the paper was suspended and initially the 
BCCLA failed to have the suspension lifted. Justice Thomas Dohm, presiding over 
the BCCLA's challenge to the suspension order, went so far as to praise the mayor for 
his actions. The case was appealed before the provincial Appeals Court, with a 
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representative from the Attorney-General of Canada appearing alongside the 
Straight's lawyers to argue for freedom of the press. While the appellate court 
concluded there was no Supreme Court of Canada decision establishing freedom of 
the press as a federal power, it chose to void the suspension on the grounds that the 
licensing inspector should have provided a hearing to explain why the paper was 
suspended. However, the court's ruling was mooted by an earlier decision of the City 
Licensing Inspector to lift the ban after he was satisfied the content of the paper had 
changed.458 
Not to be outdone, the mayor sought support from City Council to reinstate 
the suspension and when the council refused, at a meeting attended by the BCCLA, he 
hired a private law firm to consider an injunction. The firm recommended the mayor 
wait until the results of an obscenity charge against the Straight were concluded in the 
hopes it would deter the publishers from allowing contentious material to appear in 
the paper.459 
The first two years were a constant battle for Don McLeod, the Straight's 
publisher. After the suspension was overturned in court, other 
municipalities prohibited the sale of the newspaper on their streets; 
McLeod and the Straight's vendors sold the paper openly and courted 
arrest. For poking fun at a judge, the Straight was charged with 
criminal libel, sparking a legal battle that lasted years. For the ribald 
humour of its comics pages, the Straight fought nine obscenity 
charges. For printing instructions on marijuana-growing, the Straight 
was charged with 'inciting to commit an indictable offence'. A sex-
advice column from a hippie doctor brought four separate obscenity 
charges. For running an excerpt from a novel, the Straight faced 
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another obscenity charge. In March 1968 the Straight was found guilty 
for defamatory libel when it awarded Magistrate Lawrence Eckhardt 
the Pontius Pilate Certificate of Justice for sending a group of hippies 
to jail for hanging around outside the courtroom.460 All this took place 
within two years of 5 May 1967.461 
Even the University of British Columbia's bookstore refused to distribute the Georgia 
Straight.462 
The BCCLA was not involved in the libel suit but was successful in having 
the local bans removed. Relations between the BCCLA and the Straight were often 
strained though, and many times the two acted independently in challenging the bans. 
The BCCLA was still considered by many in Vancouver, including writers for the 
Straight, as a middle class organization lacking proper representation by women or 
minorities.463 It was not uncommon for the Straight to refuse the BCCLA's offers of 
assistance.464 Nevertheless, in at least one case, counsel provided by the BCCLA 
helped McLeod defeat an obscenity charge. In May 1969, McLeod was charged with 
obscenity under section 150 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code for various pictures 
published in the Straight and two articles entitled 'Penis De Milo created by Cynthia 
Plaster-Caster', and 'Young Man Wants to meet women 30 yrs old for Muffdiving, 
etc." Thomas Berger, a future appellate court judge, defended McLeod and used 
Frederick Bowers (one of the founders of the BCCLA) to testify to the publication's 
literary merit. The original trial judge had dismissed the charges because undue 
exploitation of sex, which formed the basis of the Crown's obscenity charge, was not 
part of the test established by the Supreme Court. The judge also did not find the 
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pictures published in the Straight obscene and "dismissed the charge, having no 
evidence before him of what the word 'muffdiving' means, and declining to take 
judicial notice of a word that he has never heard before."465 The appeal judge 
supported the lower court conclusion in regards to the charge of obscenity and held 
"the view that there will always be those few in society who will continue to abuse 
civil rights and liberties and to confuse freedom with licence to print anything, 
forgetting that the rest of society has a right to be protected against unwarranted shock 
or abuse .... [B]ut I find that there is no undue exploitation of sex in the article, and 
that the article in the context in which it is written does not amount to an obscene 
publication with sec. 150 (8)."466 
In dismissing the charges in R v McLeod, Judge Isman also suggested that the 
city prosecutor, McMorran, was too eager in his policies and the vague criteria he 
applied led to inconsistent prosecutions.467 This verbal reprimand as well as the 
dismissal of the charges represented a successful conclusion for the BCCLA and the 
Straight against the state's attempt to suppress the newspaper. Nonetheless, there 
were many unforseen implications arising from the city's constant attempts to 
undermine the paper. McLeod also had to deal with having been found guilty of 
growing marijuana, placing him under the continued scrutiny of the police and fearful 
of further action which could jeopardize his parole. As a result, his "lawyers now 
regularly read and pre-censor samples of the Georgia Straight. The Straight's 
vendors also appear to undergo more than usual police harassment and suspicion for 
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vagrancy or drugs or whatever. "468 Censorship was not limited to direct action in 
court. 
The mainstream media remained silent throughout most of these 
developments, perhaps because they cared little for hippies or were intimidated by the 
possibility of being charged with libel themselves. The coverage was limited to 
discussing why the Straight had been charged with libel, and no critical commentary 
or discussion on freedom of the press was raised in either the Vancouver Sun or The 
Province. 469 It was not until1973 that Alan Fotheringham, a popular columnist for 
the Vancouver Sun, commented on the court's imposition of a $1500 fine against the 
Georgia Straight. Fotheringham lamented the inability of the mainstream media to 
raise their voices against a campaign of injunctions and suits directed at other 
members of the press. "Some day some scholar interested in the law and its abuse is 
going to do a serious study of how authorities in this town- particularly [Stewart] 
McMorran- have attempted to intimidate and to bust the Straight by persistent 
harassment and prosecutions which more often than not failed. The documentation 
will cause a scandal and everyone will ask what the rest of us were doing- including 
the newspapers- while this was going on."470 
The October Crisis 
Soon after Berger had successfully appealed the obscenity charge against the 
Straight, the BCCLA found itself embroiled in the October crisis. Trudeau's decision 
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to declare the War Measures Act received a quick condemnation from the association 
which could find no evidence of a legitimate insurrection to justify the use of war 
powers: 
The BCCLA is opposed to the new legislation [Public Order Act] as 
reported by the media, which was introduced in the House of 
Commons by the Government, 2 November 1970, to replace the War 
Measures Act. We oppose the new legislation for the same reason as 
we objected to the invocation of the War Measures Act, namely that 
the government has failed to indicate why the powers presently held by 
the government under the provision of the Criminal Code are 
inadequate to handle the threat posed by the terrorist activities of the 
FLQ.47I 
Opposition to the federal government was a bold move given the amount of 
support the Prime Minister's action enjoyed in British Columbia, particularly among 
the mainstream media. The same newspapers Fotheringham noted had remained 
silent about attempts to suppress the Straight were quick to support the use of war 
powers. As with most Canadian newspapers, The Province and the Vancouver Sun's 
headlines were dominated by the FLQ crisis from October to December 1970. The 
Vancouver Sun, by far the largest paper in the province and with the highest 
distribution west of Toronto, only began criticizing the government in late November 
over continued secrecy behind the investigation into the kidnapping.472 The powers 
were portrayed as a "temporary measure, to be lifted when its purpose is achieved and 
possibly replaced by a new act designed to stamp out revolutionary violence of the 
kind typified by the Front de liberation du Quebec. The pledge to restore normal 
democratic liberties when the danger is past is explicit enough for most Canadians to 
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take it on faith."473 Concerns raised by the BCCLA received very little attention in the 
Vancouver Sun (none in The Province), although at one point the paper noted that it 
was "disquieting to know so many Canadians have been jailed without probable 
cause. "474 
The press reserved their criticism on the use of war powers for developments 
closer to home. Detentions and army patrols were limited to Ottawa and Quebec, yet 
the crisis atmosphere caused by the invocation of the War Measures Act was not 
unfelt in British Columbia. The first controversy was a minor one. According to the 
April 1971 edition of Democratic Commitment, several 
self-appointed guardians of public virtue in the ranks of public officials 
in our Province, jumped on the band wagon to further curtail the civil 
liberties of the citizens of the Province. The Mayor ofVancouver 
[Tom Campbell] proposed to use the War Measures Act to run hippies 
and draft-dodgers out of town, Alderman Halford Wilson introduced a 
resolution at a meeting of City Council which would have banned 
public meetings on city-owned property, [and] various members of 
City Council tried their best to prevent a parade which had been held 
annually for the previous five years in Vancouver.475 
Neither the Vancouver Sun nor The Province had any kind words for such blatant 
attempts to exploit the situation to pursue interests pre-dating the crisis and totally 
umelated to the terrorist activities. The Vancouver Sun was particularly virulent in its 
condemnation, suggesting that "the least responsible reaction to be found anywhere in 
Canada was that of Vancouver's own mayor. At a time when the country was in the 
grip of horror, Tom Campbell tried to capitalize on the invoking of the War Measures 
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Act to further his vendetta on local hippies and draft dodgers. His personal 
politicking with such a sad affair can only be described as damnable. "476 
The second controversy was a great deal more serious. The provincial cabinet, 
under the leadership of W.A.C. Bennett, passed an order in council calling for the 
dismissal of any teacher expressing sympathies with the FLQ or calling for the 
overthrow of democratically-elected government.477 Universities, colleges and school 
boards were included in the order and the implicit threat was that any institution 
failing to apply the new regulation would lose its grant from the government. In a 
province so distant and untouched by the October crisis, the declaration was little 
more than a show of force by a Social Credit Party soon to be defeated in the 
upcoming election. The order was prompted by the actions of Arthur Olsen, a 
Dawson Creek high school teacher, for reportedly expressing sympathy for the 
FLQ.478 The press quickly distanced themselves from the order. The Vancouver Sun 
characterized the decision as "an overreaction which serves to emphasize the very 
dangers that Mr. Trudeau was so anxious to guard against," and The 
Province considered the order a far reaching abuse ofrights.479 
For the BCCLA, the order and Bennett's threats to refuse grants to schools 
with teachers sympathetic to the FLQ represented a blatant attack on freedom of 
speech and offended one ofthe association's most basic principles. It sought to 
challenge the validity of the order in court (once again represented by Thomas Berger) 
and were refused a hearing because the BCCLA members in the case had no direct 
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standing. 480 In effect, until someone was actually dismissed under the authority of the 
order in council, the legislation could not be challenged. 
Once again, the courts proved a difficult venue for the defence of fundamental 
freedoms. The unwillingness of judges to accept interveners was compounded by a 
decision in the provincial Supreme Court refusing to consider the constitutionality of 
legislation unless the appellant could demonstrate standing. The threat of dismissal 
alone was an infringement on freedom of speech; the cabinet did not have to dismiss 
anyone to exercise a degree of control over the rights of teachers to speak freely. 
While it is unlikely many teachers, if any, were affected by the order, the defeat 
established a poor precedent for future confrontations between the BCCLA and the 
cabinet. With the exception ofthe dismissed obscenity charge against McLeod, the 
courts had, once again, proven to be a limited forum for the defence of civil liberties. 
Civil Liberties and Police Powers: The Gastown Riot 
Symbols of authority are often the central target of protest movements. 
Georgia Straight was used as a forum for criticizing the mainstream press and openly 
mocking the legitimacy of the courts. The most visible symbol of authority in any 
society, however, is the police. Limiting the gamut of police powers has been one of 
the key objectives of civil liberties associations since their inception. 
During this period the BCCLA was the only organization consistently 
concerned with police-community relations in British Columbia. It was mildly 
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successful in convincing the police to change tactics and accept new procedures, but 
in most cases the group could only hope to bring public attention to police activities 
through the press or a court challenge. Suppression of the Sons of Freedom by the 
RCMP and provincial government had led to the creation of the BCCLA. The 
Schuck trial discussed earlier, where a couple was harassed for walking near a drug 
dealer, was an attempt by the BCCLA to convince a judge to award damages as a 
result of police tactics. The police were launched into the headlines once again in 
1971 when Fred Quilt, an Indian in northern British Columbia, died while in police 
custody for drunk driving. The BCCLA worked successfully with native groups to 
have an inquest called over the circumstances of Quilt's death, although the 
investigation subsequently rejected claims of police brutality as the cause of death.481 
A group of teens were pulled over by police around the same time near Saanich for 
having 'suspicious materials' in their vehicle (an empty oil can and some tubes). 
According to an investigation by the BCCLA, the three teens had their car impounded 
and were forced to walk home in the middle ofwinter.482 To discourage prostitution, 
the police would sometimes target suspected pimps with continuous fines and parking 
or speeding tickets to put them out ofbusiness.483 Accusations of police abuse were 
also raised following drug raids in Coquitlam and Port Moody. Interrogating children 
in schools, equipping officers with mace and riot sticks, unfairly suspending drivers' 
licenses, raids on book sellers, searches without warrants and harassing juveniles were 
among the many serious accusations laid against the police by the BCCLA. 
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Tensions between youth and police climaxed in the Gastown riot of 7 August 
1971 which proved to be an important symbolic event in the province's history. The 
riot was, in some ways, just another addition to the list of police abuse of powers 
during this period, but it also brought to the fore the conflicts between institutions of 
authority and various movements in the province. In the context of the seventies, the 
riot was representative of the battles being fought by the Straight, Doukhobours and 
the BCCLA against the courts, municipal government and the police. 
It was a smoke-in. Prompted by articles in the Georgia Straight hundreds of 
youths had converged on Maple Tree Square in the popular area of Gastown in 
downtown Vancouver. For the previous week, writers Kenneth Lester and Eric 
Sommer had been promoting the gathering to protest drug laws and recent drug raids 
in the area (Operation Dustpan). Hundreds of young people, many described by the 
media as hippies, had assembled in the square; some were smoking pot, others 
playing music or just wandering around. By 1 O:OOam, combined with people on the 
street, the crowd had expanded to almost 2000. Inspector Abercrombie, who was the 
senior officer in charge at the scene, decided to clear the crowd after receiving false 
reports of windows being broken. He ordered the crowd to disperse within two 
minutes. When his first warning was ignored, Abercrombie ordered four policeman 
on horseback with riding crops to disperse the throng. They were followed by police 
officers in riot gear supported by plain clothes officers scattered among the crowd. 
Absolute pandemonium broke out. People coming out from stores and restaurants in 
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Gastown found themselves caught up in a battle between police and youths, some of 
the latter throwing rocks, pieces of cement and bottles.484 Abercrombie quickly 
realized he was faced with a riot in the making. 
The violence soon got out of hand. Observers were available from the 
BCCLA and the media, having followed the calls issued through the Georgia Straight 
by Lester and Sommer. Officers used their horses to pin people into doorways and 
hack at them with their sticks; a woman was pulled by her hair screaming across 
shards of broken glass by two police officers; a police officer was struck by a brick, 
which led to the crowd cheering; and, youths shouting obscenities were beaten by 
police.485 A clash between police and youth had unexpectedly erupted into 
uncontrolled violence in the heart of Vancouver. 
Seventy-nine people were arrested and thirty-eight charged with various 
offences. There was an immediate public backlash. Newspapers lined their front 
pages with details on the riot and its aftermath, with editors commenting extensively 
on the incidents of violence. Vancouver Sun editors called for an inquiry, noting the 
"volume of rhetoric and abuse that has been pouring out ever since [the riot] ... has so 
confused the public that only a detached, impartial and coherent assessment of the 
whole affair will now suffice to put blame where it belongs."486 An editor for The 
Province was convinced there would be "deepening suspicion and hostility between 
young people and the police- unless Attorney General Peterson steps in at once and 
orders an independent investigation of the whole affair."487 Naturally, the Georgia 
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Straight was quick to condemn the police and point to the riot as evidence of a police 
force hostile to youths. Mayor Tom Campbell defended the police and claimed that a 
conspiracy by Sommer and Lester was responsible for the violence. But he publicly 
stated his support for the Attorney General to call an inquiry into alleged police 
abuses. 488 Gastown merchants, sympathetic with those caught in the riot, organized a 
bail-fund and planned a social gathering for protestors and police to ease tensions 
within the community.489 Campbell, the BCCLA, and the media (including the 
Georgia Straight) were all calling for a provincial inquiry, and as a result Justice 
Thomas Dohm (a provincial Supreme Court judge) was ordered in late August by the 
Attorney General to investigate the causes behind the Gastown riot. 
The Dohm inquiry lasted for ten days and heard forty-eight witnesses. Joseph 
Laxton represented the BCCLA which had managed to raise $1200 to cover his legal 
fees. Its position centered on the use of excessive force by the police. For the past 
few years the association had opposed the acquisition of more riot sticks by the local 
police force, fearing an increase in confrontations between police and youths, and the 
riot seemed to have confirmed its earlier concerns. A public statement released by 
James Wood of the BCCLA (based on reports from its observers on the scene) 
criticized the tactics employed by the police, their use of plain clothes officers and the 
prejudice displayed by officers in targeting youths with particular hair cuts and 
clothes.490 
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As the inquiry progressed, two different interpretations over the causes of the 
Gastown riot emerged. On one side was the BCCLA, supported by the B.C. 
Federation of Labour and other advocacy groups. It saw the riot as a reflection of 
underlying tensions between youths and police that had been building for years.491 
Youths were frustrated with strict drug laws while police harbored negative and 
prejudicial attitudes towards hippies, an attitude encouraged by the rhetoric and 
blustering of local politicians like Campbell. Research conducted by the BCCLA 
concluded that police officers were increasingly alienated from the community 
through the use of patrol cars over foot patrols, distinguishing uniforms, lack of 
civilian participation in the administration of the police force and a poor system for 
handling complaints. These factors all contributed to a fundamental problem between 
youths and symbols of authority; since March 1970, twenty-five separate 
demonstrations by youths had occurred in Vancouver and Victoria alone.492 
On the other side ofthe debate were the policemen's union, municipal 
politicians, the media and the Dohm report. The report acknowledged Abercrombie's 
overzealousness, noting how the crowd had not degenerated into a mob and admitting 
that individual officers used "unnecessary, unwarranted and excessive force." He 
recommended that the Board of Police Commissioners adopt a policy of no longer 
allowing demonstrators to take over public streets, training squads of police officers 
specifically for crowd control duty, continuing to use horses for crowd control but 
only after sufficient warnings and keeping off sidewalks and store fronts, eliminating 
209 
the use of plainclothes officers, providing better sound equipment and not using 
motorcycles. 493 
Responsibility for the riot, however, was placed squarely on the shoulders of 
Sommer and Lester whose "true motivation is their desire to challenge authority in 
every way possible .... Any popular cause serves their purpose if it enables them to 
gather a gullible crowd who may act in such a way as to defy any authority. The 
harassment of young people by the drug squad police and the resultant hostility was 
grist to their trouble-brewing mill." Dohm, George Murray of the policeman's union 
and Mayor Campbell all blamed the riot on a conspiracy by anarchists to cause havoc 
on the streets. The editor of The Province considered the "root cause of the whole 
ugly business ... [was] two dangerous yippies [trying] to use a protest against 
marijuana law as a means of gathering a crowd for a confrontation with police."494 
This sentiment was shared by the editor of the Vancouver Sun who lambasted 
Campbell for his inflammatory rhetoric but laid blame at the feet of a small group of 
troublemakers.495 
Compared to riots in American cities, the Gastown riot was a minor affair, 
small in numbers and limited in the degree of violence. For the city of Vancouver, 
and to a lesser extent the province as a whole, no event better represented the 
divisions within the community throughout this period. Institutions of authority 
focused on the superficial causes of the riot, unwilling to consider the broader 
implications of the conflict. The BCCLA and other advocacy groups sought a deeper 
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explanation, looking to the underlying strain emerging from the nature of the youth 
protest movements with their illicit drug use and hippie culture, and the attitudes of 
the state and media to this new movement. The arrival of an NDP government in 1972 
and the BCCLA's increasing public profile through such events as the Pacific 
National Exhibition affair may have contributed to the Police Commissioner's Board 
greater receptiveness in the early 1970s. The BCCLA was involved in drafting a new 
procedures manual for the Vancouver police and was invited to the opening of the 
new police college in 1975. Frustrated with its inability to curb police abuses through 
individual cases, the association had turned to working with the police on procedures, 
training and policies.496 The willingness of the police to entertain feedback from 
community groups was most likely prompted, however, by the fallout from the riot. 
Taking the Government to Court: The Case of the Heroin Treatment Act 
Illegal narcotics and their popularity among youths was undeniably one of the 
central causes of the Gastown riot, and had been an issue for the BCCLA since the 
mid-1960s. The association framed the debate as a question over the role of the state 
in regulating behaviour versus the right of an individual's freedom to determine their 
own lifestyle. With the highest number of drug addicts and users in the country, 
Vancouver loomed large in the battle against illegal drugs. The BCCLA's battle 
against the Heroin Treatment Act was its last major initiative before the passing of the 
Charter in 1982 and represented the organization's most concerted effort to use the 
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courts to defend individuals from state abuse of their civil liberties. The history of 
Heroin Treatment Act also highlights one of the most divisive public debates on a 
civil liberties issue in the province during this period. 
Treatment was the new catch word on the war against drugs in the 1950s and 
1960s. Attempts to use criminal sanctions were giving way to a recognition that the 
use of illegal narcotics had increased despite already existing draconian measures. 
Emerging "pro-treatment sentiment as a response to the Vancouver drug scare of the 
1950s marked the beginning of the new era of conflict over narcotic control."497 A 
Narcotic Addiction Foundation was set up in British Columbia on 13 September 1955 
(a second opening up in 1961) to provide homes for drug users to work off their 
addiction. 498 
Compulsory treatment as the new treatment paradigm was also reflected in the 
Narcotic Control Act, passed by the federal government in 1961 to replace the pre-
existing legislation dealing with illegal drug use. It was the first major revision of the 
drug laws since the 1920s. The legislation maintained most of the provisions of the " 
original Opium and Drug Act including its extensive powers for search and seizure, 
removing only the minimum sentence for possession to provide judges more 
flexibility in dealing with first time drug users. Part II of the Act, however, which 
never passed into law, provided for compulsory treatment followed by ten years of 
parole for first time offenders. In theory, treatment could stem the flow of illegal 
drugs into Canada by eliminating the demand for drugs. Part II also allowed for 
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preventative detention of convicted traffickers. This new law, based on the desire to 
reform instead of punishing addicts, was unquestionably a major step with the 
potential to completely reverse the traditional law enforcement paradigm. None of 
these provisions were ever employed; the institutions designed to treat addicts were 
never built and Part II was never proclaimed.499 
A new problem born in the sixties revitalized the debate on how to deal with 
drug addiction. Marijuana use increased exponentially during this period, notably 
among middle class youth and on university campuses. Unlike the previous 
generation of users, portrayed as poor, downtrodden and on the periphery of society, 
these new users were part of mainstream society and used drugs as a form of social 
protest against prevailing social norms. Attempts to deal with this new problem 
through traditional law enforcement techniques failed miserably. In 1965, there were 
only 60 convictions for possession of marijuana, a figure which increased to over 
6000 by 1970, with no noticeable deterrent effect on users.500 The Gastown Riot was 
the perfect example of the new drug culture among youths in Canada and its clash 
with police. 
In 1969 the federal government implemented a royal commission (chaired by 
Gerald LeDain) to investigate the use of narcotics in Canada. The report called for 
compulsory treatment of addicts administered by the provinces, and favoured a 
system of methadone and heroin dosages. 501 But the commission was divided on the 
issue. A minority dissent by Professor Marie-Andree Bertrand, a criminologist, 
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rejected compulsory treatment because the psychological aspects of addiction could 
not be properly dealt with through a regime of forced treatment rejected by the 
patient. She further called for the complete decriminalization of cannabis and for a 
system to provide for its legal distribution. 502 In retrospect, the report accomplished 
very little. Few of the recommendations were adopted and the only major change to 
the drug laws in the 1980s was abolishing writs of assistance, a change not based on 
the commission's findings. 
The BCCLA had maintained a consistent interest in drug laws dating back at 
least to 1966 when the association hosted a well attended seminar on the question of 
illegal drugs and whether or not they should be legalized. When the LeDain 
commission held hearings in Vancouver in 1969 and 1970, hundreds of people 
attended and dozens made presentations. The police called for greater regulation of 
the drug trade and various individuals demanded the state not interfere with their 
chosen habits. 503 The BCCLA's position reflected its civil libertarian ethos. 
Individual actions, not conditions, should be illegal. An alcoholic caught driving and 
threatening others or a drug addict stealing to pay their habit should be the target of 
criminal proceedings, but otherwise the association felt criminalizing possession and 
the use of non-medical drugs violated the individual's right to live their chosen 
lifestyle. It also noted the failure of criminal laws in the United States and other 
countries to discourage drug use. LeDain's first report in 1969 supported greater state 
regulation of drugs because addicts were a strain on public funds, but the BCCLA 
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quickly dismissed the idea since the same point could be made for smoking tobacco. 
The second report received a mixed response from the association. It supported 
recommendations requiring police to abstain from violence and entrapment to obtain 
evidence, removing the onus of proof on the accused, and the destruction of 
individual records. But the report did not go far enough. To ensure complete 
protection of individuals' civil liberties, the BCCLA felt the commission should have 
recommended the complete legalization of cannabis. The report's support for fines 
for the possession of cannabis reflected undue deference to the police and a 
patronizing attitude towards addicts.504 According to the BCCLA, the Narcotic 
Control Act "creates a legal fiction. It transforms a relatively harmless substance into 
the equivalent drug such as opium and heroin."505 
For years, provincial politicians had been talking about dealing with the drug 
problem in British Columbia. An attempt in 1969 to legislate a ban against LSD 
(unless its use was approved by the health minister) was struck down by the Supreme 
Court of Canada for invading federal jurisdiction over criminal law. A speech by a 
member of the Attorney-General's office under the NDP in 1973, Malcolm Matheson, 
recommended compulsory treatment and the creation of quarantines for addicts to 
which the BCCLA objected as simply another type ofprison.506 Outside occasional 
comments by individual members of government, however, there is no evidence the 
NDP seriously contemplated new legislation to implement the recommendations of 
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the LeDain commission. The election ofthe Social Credit Party in 1975, however, 
would soon lead to the opening of a new front on the war against drugs. 
The decision to act on the LeDain report drew the Social Credit Government 
into a major political controversy lasting years. In 1977 the province introduced the 
Heroin Treatment Act to provide for compulsory treatment of heroin addicts.507 
Heroin use had reached remarkable levels by the late 1970s in British Columbia. The 
heroin trade alone was estimated at $255 million per annum, the fifth largest industry 
in the province. Sixty-one percent of all heroin addicts in the country were in British 
Columbia, an increase of 167 percent since 1970 and 586 percent since 1956.508 
Traditional law enforcement mechanisms had clearly failed to effectively combat the 
drug trade. 
The Act provided for the creation of area coordinating centres, a commission 
to administer the Act and evaluation panels consisting of medical practitioners and 
psychologists. Under section 13 of the Act, police were given the power to require 
suspected drug addicts to present themselves at area coordinating centres to be 
evaluated by a panel of experts as to the extent of their addiction. 509 Once the panel 
decided treatment was required, the Act empowered the commission to apply to a 
court to forcibly detain the individual for up to three years, of which six months could 
include incarceration. Appeals against the detention order were available through the 
appellate court although the onus of proof was reversed to require the defendant to 
demonstrate they were not in need of treatment. Having been defeated in 1969 in 
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their attempt to ban LSD, the government was careful to focus on treatment, not 
criminal sanctions, as the basis of their new drug legislation. 
Opposition members in the Legislature accused the government of using the 
bill as a political tactic by playing off public fears of drug use and drug related crimes. 
Few other debates in British Columbia politics in the seventies raised as many 
concerns about individual rights. Due process concerns loomed large in the debate. 
One member characterized the medical board as a disguised judicial hearing and 
condemned the decision to reverse the onus of proof. Others suggested the Bill was 
unconstitutional and violated the federal Bill of Rights, and quoted the Canadian Bar 
Association's brief describing the bill as criminal law cloaked as health legislation. 
Since voluntary treatment had failed in several other jurisdictions, the viability of a 
compulsory system was questioned. Norman Levi, a former cabinet minister and 
member of the BCCLA, declared his opposition to spending "billions of dollars of 
scarce resources fighting an impossible war. I'm not prepared to do that at all .... But 
this idiocy of trying to beat something that we can't beat. ... If you are going to look at 
it from the medical position, what we have to do is follow it through logically."510 
The government responded to these accusations with the claim that the new 
legislation would not only protect the safety of the community but, in an excellent 
example of the flexibility of rights discourse, the civil liberties of drug addicts as well. 
Introducing the legislation in second reading was Minister of Health Robert H. 
McClelland. He acknowledged how 
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one of the most overriding concerns that has been expressed to date, at 
least, of those opposed to this proposed health legislation is the 
infringement upon the civil liberties of known heroin users. I can't 
repeat this often enough, but anyone with any knowledge of the nature 
of narcotic dependency is fully aware ofthe lack of normal civil 
liberties to which narcotic dependent individuals can be enjoyed .... 
[T]his plan is designed to help individuals retain a state of being where 
the same civil liberties that most people ordinarily enjoy are accessible . 
... [A] sincere desire to improve one's lot in life is paired with an 
insatiable thirst for immediate gratification .... [T]he coercive aspect of 
the heroin plan would immediately address and remedy this 
dynamic.511 
The government's case rested on the inability of voluntary treatment programs 
in the past to deal with heroin addicts and the overriding needs of the community over 
the individual. Kenneth Rafe Mair, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 
considered the availability of counsel when called before the Board of Review and the 
appeals process as sufficient provisions to satisfy due process. He accepted that "the 
Mental Health Act is [not] easy legislation .... I don't pretend that they do not in some 
way erode what we consider to be the pure civil liberties to which we are entitled. 
But to the extent that it varies from those principles, I am convinced it is justified in 
light of the ill that we seek to cure. "512 The debate split among party lines, with the 
NDP providing the main voice of opposition against the Social Credit government.513 
Among the many groups in opposition to the proposed legislation were the 
Canadian Bar Association, Elizabeth Fry Society, B.C. Corrections Association, 
Narcanon Society and former Chair of the B.C. Police Commissioner, John Hogarth. 
In presenting a petition of 9000 of his constituents in Langley, the lone Liberal in the 
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Legislature, Gordon F. Gibson, claimed the mainstream media were also against the 
Bill.514 The most extensive coverage appeared in the Vancouver Sun, in which the 
editorial section was adamantly against the legislation, particularly over the threat it 
represented to civil liberties. In the midst of the debate in mid-June, the paper 
concluded that relevant statistics did not "provide a rationale for a multi-million 
dollar treatment program- such as that proposed by McClelland- that denies due 
process of law, turns policemen into health officials and health officials into judges, 
and has every chance of failing to achieve its goal, and may not be within the 
jurisdiction of the province to enact."515 
The Heroin Treatment Act was the perfect cause for the BCCLA. The 
association had been debating the issue for years and had a clear stance against any 
form of compulsory medical treatment. Due process and police powers were the main 
points of contention against legislation with the potential to effect everyone in the 
community, not only minority groups. Programs such as affirmative action raised 
difficult questions over the scope of civil liberties whereas the Heroin Treatment Act 
was a simple question of negative rights threatened by state action. It pitted the 
BCCLA against a political party whose policies it generally opposed,516 and 
immediately provided them with such allies as the NDP, Canadian Bar Association, 
Elizabeth Fry Society and the media. 517 The controversy also had the potential to 
provide the association with publicity and a forum to promote its views. Throughout 
the debate in the Legislature, NDP politicians quoted from BCCLA briefs and the 
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Vancouver Sun noted the association's opposition in articles and editorials.518 When 
the Act was assented to on 29 June 1978, the BCCLA prepared its court challenge on 
the constitutionality of the legislation. 
Jim Dybikowski appeared before the B.C. Supreme Court on behalf of the 
BCCLA in June 1979. Requests to the provincial and federal government to have the 
legislation reviewed by the courts were rebuffed and the association had been forced 
to bring the legislation to court on its own. Judge Allan McEachern heard the case 
and initially refused the group standing because, as in the teacher's case during the 
FLQ crisis, Dybikowski was not directly affected by the legislation. Brenda Ruth 
Schneider, a heroin addict living in British Columbia, replaced Dybikowski as 
appellant and the judge allowed the BCCLA case to go forward with Dybikowski as 
counsel. Since there was no constitutional basis upon which to challenge the 
legislation for violating Schneider's civil liberties, the BCCLA's case rested on 
whether or not the province had the appropriate jurisdiction to pass the Heroin 
Treatment Act. 
Counsel for the Attorney General stressed that the Act was designed to treat 
heroin addicts and fell under comparable jurisdiction such as the provincial Public 
Health Act. Treatment, not punishment, was the purpose of the legislation, and it 
therefore also fell under provincial jurisdiction over 'property and civil rights' and not 
the federal criminal law power. In contrast, Dybikowski claimed the pith and 
substance of the legislation was punishment because it provided for incarceration and 
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compulsory detention in the guise of treatment. Due process rights were at stake. 
Persons tested under the Act had no power to examine or question the results. They 
were barred from choosing their own medical examiner. Accused could not introduce 
or collect evidence themselves, and upon detention a person lost all liberty and was at 
the mercy of the director's discretion. The core of the BCCLA's case, however, was 
the federal Narcotic Control Act. Despite Phase II of the federal anti-drug legislation 
not yet being declared, it was proof Parliament intended to legislate in the field of 
treatment of addicts as well as punishment of dealers. 519 
McEachern's decision in favour of the appellant, Schneider, was the greatest 
court success the BCCLA achieved prior to the passing of the Charter. It was a high 
profile case, initiated and funded by the association, against a major piece of 
provincial legislation. The judge considered the legislation criminal law because 
health legislation was meant to apply equally to all residents as opposed to targeting a 
particular subset within the community. His decision revolved around the question of 
jurisdiction in relation to the treatment of addicts. According to McEachern, the 
federal Narcotic Control Act was also designed to deal with treatment and, as such, 
the province could not legislate in this area. 520 
After succeeding in the provincial Supreme Court, the Schneider case faced an 
uphill battle. In 1981 the British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously struck 
down the lower court decision and ruled the legislation intra vires. The appellate 
court's analysis of the Narcotic Control Act and claimed the Act had no relevance to 
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the provincial legislation by virtue of Phase II not being declared. Its decision 
focused on the narrow language of the statute itself and its concern with dependency, 
patients and treatment to conclude the legislation was designed to help addicts, not 
punish them. McFarlane decided that "the provisions of the impugned statute for the 
examination, apprehension and detention of dependant persons or patients are in no 
way intended to be punitive. They are provided for as ancillary to 'treatment' as 
defined. The legislative plan is not to punish users of narcotics. "521 
Within a year the BCCLA funded an appeal to the Supreme Court where 
another unanimous decision found the legislation intra vires. Brian Dickson, in 
presenting the decision for the entire court, believed that the Heroin Treatment Act 
did not fall under any all-encompassing federal residuary power. Since Phase II of the 
federal legislation was not yet declared, the paramountcy argument was rejected. The 
due process argument put forth by the appellant raised some concerns for Dickson as 
the legislation dealt with 'local evils' and curtailed the individual's freedom, but this 
was not enough in his opinion to place the treatment of drug addicts under the 
criminal law power. There were already several provisions for appeal available under 
the legislation and a written statement from the Director of the review board was 
necessary to commit a patient, satisfying the requirement for due process. Quoting 
the LeDain report, the judge concluded that narcotics were a medical, not criminal, 
condition and the Heroin Treatment Act was in pith and substance a public health 
ISSUe. 
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Due process arguments aside, the BCCLA also objected to the Heroin 
Treatment Act because it violated some of the fundamental principles upon which the 
organization was founded. The law was being used to punish people for their state of 
being, not actions, and refused individuals the right to choose their own form of 
medical treatment. Moreover, the legislation violated the integrity of the judicial 
system by establishing a non-judicial decision making body with the power to 
incarcerate and detain people for years, allowing only for an appeal against the 
question of whether or not treatment was needed, a question the BCCLA felt was 
unsuitable for provincial Supreme Court judges. Unfortunately, until the advent of 
the Charter, the BCCLA could not present a case before the courts based on the 
violation of a fundamental freedom. 
Conclusion 
Despite its failure in the Supreme Court and at a cost of almost $9000, the 
case shone the national spotlight on the BCCLA. After twenty years, the BCCLA had 
grown from an association of sixty members with a budget of a few hundred dollars, 
to over 1000 members and $150 000. Between 1962 and 1982, the BCCLA was an 
active defender of individual rights locally and nationally. Irrespective ofbackground 
or political affiliation, the BCCLA was willing to defend an individual's rights before 
the courts, in its political lobbying, and through various educational campaigns. 
Although it was a young organization, struggling year by year simply to stay afloat, 
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the BCCLA was successful in employing rights discourse to defend the interests of 
the marginalized. Its appeal was consistent in each case: each individual had 
fundamental freedoms, such as free speech, and the community had a moral 
responsibility to respect these rights. At a time when the mayor of Vancouver was 
waging a virtual war on hippies and the Georgia Straight, and the Ku Klux Klan was 
promoting hate mongering, it was the rare organization willing to come to the defence 
of those who were easy targets for vilification and state suppression. 
Yet, the first twenty years ofthe BCCLA's existence was marked by constant 
failures to achieve its own goals. Courts were poor forums for the defence of civil 
liberties in the seventies. Two of the most controversial state policies violating civil 
liberties, the order in council directed against teachers in 1970 and the Heroin 
Treatment Act, survived legal challenges while the BCCLA was forced to expend a 
great deal of its resources in the courts. The history of the BCCLA also reflected a 
minimalist approach to rights activism. At no time did the group embrace positive 
rights or promote economic, social and cultural needs as rights. The repertoire of 
strategies employed by the BCCLA involved working directly with state officials or 
state institutions, in contrast to other social movement organizations which were 
willing to employ civil disobedience or mass mobilization (e.g., boycotts). But this 
was no classical liberal association. Its focus on the due process rights of workers and 
welfare recipients reflected the new issues facing human rights activists under the 
welfare state in Canada. Civil liberties advocates were ideally suited to raise concerns 
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about abuses of power derogated to welfare state agencies. The organization was also 
the leading community group in Vancouver intent on policing the police. The 
BCCLA remains active in 2004, and is the oldest operating civil liberties association 
in Canada. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Ligue des droits et libertes 
Trudeau: "It's true that there are a lot of bleeding hearts around who 
can't stand the sight of soldiers with helmets and guns. All I can say 
is: go on and bleed. But it's more important to maintain law and order 
in society than to take pity on people whose knees start to quake as 
soon as they see the army .... Society must take every means available 
to defend itself against the rise of a parallel power which would defy 
the power of the people's elected representatives, and I believe that 
there are no limits on this obligation. Only cowards would be afraid to 
go all the way." 
Reporter: "How far would you go?" Trudeau: "Just watch me."522 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau's famous words during the October crisis in 1970 
continue to reverberate today as evidence of the Prime Minister's unwavering 
hostility to those who openly challenged his decision to invoke the War Measures 
Act. His reference to 'bleeding hearts' was not directed simply to his political rivals 
in the House of Commons but to the rights associations across Canada who were 
among the most vocal opponents of the government's actions during the crisis. 
Surprisingly, Quebec's only rights association was noted not for its actions but its 
silence. When the ultimate challenge to the rights of Canadians and Quebeckers from 
the state presented itself, the Ligue des droits de 1 'homme (later renamed the Ligue 
des droits et libertes) failed to distinguish itself and fulfill its central mandate. The 
failure of the Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH) during the FLQ crisis would lead to 
profound changes in the structure and orientation of the association. 
A study of the LDH offers invaluable insights into the history of the human 
rights movement in Canada. First, it was by far the most egalitarian rights association 
in Canada, focussing on broader questions of social justice after 1972 as well as on 
social, economic and cultural equality as compared to the BCCLA's focus on civil 
liberties. Secondly, the LDH is the only Canadian rights association to truly deal with 
the question of collective rights in the case of minority language and cultural rights, in 
contrast to other groups' primary concern with individual rights. Thirdly, as the 
second largest rights association in the country and the most well funded by the state, 
it raises questions about the implications of state funding, particularly when the group 
raised the ire of the state with its controversial language policy. 
Unlike the history of the three other case studies in this work, the early history 
of the LDH can be easily divided into three distinct periods. In each period, the 
organization experienced significant transformations in its structure, leadership and 
orientation. The years 1963 to 1970 were the 'law years' of the LDH when legal 
reform and a concern for civil liberties dominated the association's agenda. During 
this period it embraced the same principles and tactics as the BCCLA and, as will be 
seen in the following chapter, the CCLA. From 1970 to 1975, in the wake ofthe 
October crisis, the group espoused a broader conception of human rights, focussing 
on social, economic and cultural rights instead of simply civil and political rights. 
Finally, with the passing of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in 
1975, the LDH experienced a slow decline as it struggled with internal conflicts and 
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funding problems. By 1982 it had become clear that the LDH, as with many rights 
associations of the period, had peaked in the mid-1970s. 
1963-1970: The Birth of A Civil Liberties Association 
In contrast to the three other case studies, no specific event triggered the 
creation of the Ligue des droits de l'homme. Its origins can be traced to several 
leading intellectuals in Quebec in 1963 who envisioned a modem rights association to 
serve Quebec and possibly the nation as a whole. It was an initiative of Father Gerard 
Labrosse, a French speaking Jesuit priest, who recruited Pierre Elliot Trudeau (law 
professor at l'Universite de Montreal), Jacques Hebert (a publisher) and J.Z. Leone 
Patenaud to help form a provisional committee alongside 19 others. 523 Included in 
this collection of prominent figures was Frank Scott, famous for his defeat ofthe 
Padlock Act and a renowned constitutional scholar, and Therese Casgrain who was 
notable in the women's movement and a key figure in the successful drive in 1940 to 
grant women the vote in the province. Labrosse drafted the constitution and the 
provisional committee compiled a list of potential members to form the 
administrative council, the association's governing body. By May 1963 the 
provisional committee had recruited 54 individual members and four group members, 
one of which was the Federation des travailleurs du Quebec.524 
A general assembly met on 29 May 1963 with Frank Scott presiding. During 
the meeting the constitution was voted on and accepted, and a Montreal lawyer, Alban 
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Flamand, was elected the first president. During the proceedings the only real debate 
surrounded the name of the association. Originally, it had been dubbed the Ligue des 
droits de l'homme de la Province de Quebec but Trudeau, determined to have the 
group play a national role, suggested the provincial reference be eliminated. Thus 
was born the Ligue des droits de l'homme/Civil Liberties Union.525 
Introducing the Ligue des droits de l 'homme 
A concern with civil liberties was expressly articulated in the group's 
constitution, a document strongly reflecting the ideas of Frank Scott who had long 
been a leader among human rights activists in Canada. Article one of the constitution 
read as follows: 
i) To protect civil liberties, whether they are physical, intellectual or 
moral, without distinction as to sex, religion or ethnic origin and in 
particular but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, liberty 
of movement, thought, speech, press, religion, assembly, association, 
and the equality of all before the law. 
ii) Within the context of existing law, to inform the public and to 
intervene on behalf of persons claiming violations of their civil 
liberties. 
iii) To advocate changes in the law by 
a) Studying critically the relevant laws and the Constitution of our country 
b) Making proposals to municipal, provincial or federal authorities or to any 
other authority and, 
c) Informing the public. 526 
Of the individuals chosen to lead the association, eight were lawyers, eight 
journalists, two union organizers, one professor, one economist, two business men 
and two student leaders. There was a clear elitist bias to the League, which drew 
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most of its members from the professional and well educated classes, and with a 
strong anglophone presence; eight of the twenty five initial members were English 
speaking.527 Few minorities or women were brought into the fold and the 
organization would have to claim to speak on behalf of people who were not active 
within the organization. A recruitment campaign prepared in February 1966 qualified 
the group's interest in being "plus sur la qualite que la quantite" of its membership.528 
In addition, all new members to the association had to be approved by the 
administrative council. By requiring all new members to be approved in a vote, the 
LDH could effectively filter potentially contentious members. 
There are several key insights suggested by the constitution and the group's 
initial statements. First, there was no reference to language rights. While language 
rights would become a central issue for the organization by 1972, for this early period, 
it was not reflected in the group's priorities. While in 1963 this was consistent with 
the political context of the period as language rights would not become a major 
political issue until the late 1960s, at the same time the association refused to adopt a 
position on language rights before 1972, even after the issue had begun to dominate 
Quebec politics. Perhaps out of a concern for implicating themselves in the one of 
most controversial issues of the period, language rights were not explicitly asserted by 
the LDH in this stage of its history. Most likely, however, members such as Scott 
would have wanted the League to focus on individual rights as befitted a proper civil 
liberties association, as opposed to entering into the debate over language rights as 
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collective rights. Secondly, as was the case with the BCCLA, the constitution of the 
new LDH focussed on equality of opportunity, political and civil liberties and anti-
discrimination. There was no reference to the social and economics rights of youth, 
women, the elderly, aboriginals or the disabled. These issues would not mobilize the 
organization for another decade. Thirdly, there was no reference to Quebec's right to 
self-determination, another issue not raised until the 1970s. 
Finally, it is no coincidence the LDH was formed during this stage in Quebec 
history. These were the formative years of the Quiet Revolution, a period when 'le 
grand noirceur' had finally been exorcised and the economic, social and political 
modernization of the province was in full swing. Many of the LDH's founders, such 
as Pelletier and Trudeau, could arguably be considered among the leaders of the Quiet 
Revolution. With the Union Nationale having been defeated in 1960 by the Liberals 
(who would stay in power until1966) and the repression associated with the 
Duplessis years experienced by Scott in his battle against the Padlock Act or 
Casgrain's fight for women's rights behind them, the potential for social change was 
palpable. Scott had presided over the formation of the Montreal branch of the CCLU 
only to see it bitterly divided between communists and social democrats. The LDH 
represented another attempt to establish a viable rights association in Quebec 
promoting the traditional liberal values Scott had placed a great deal of faith in, and 
for the first time there was a legitimate hope the state would support and not prove an 
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obstacle to reform. The principles of the Quiet Revolution made the optimism of the 
LDH' s founders possible. 
The LDH began as an organization fully funded by its members and 
deliberately chose to avoid government funding. The more militant members of the 
newly-formed association were determined to ensure the group's independence and 
autonomy, and government funding threatened to institutionalize the association and 
make it dependent on the state. Revenue after one year of operations thus amounted to 
only $2 580.529 Membership in the organization fluctuated between 100 and 300 
members during this period. 
Denominational Education 
The LDH faced a variety of issues in the first seven years of its existence. As 
with the BCCLA and other rights associations of the period, the question of religious 
education was debated. This issue was raised by Dr. Henry Morgentaler (soon to be 
famous for challenging the abortion laws) at the 19 January 1967 meeting of the 
administrative council. Surprisingly, for the first twenty years of its existence, 
religious education did not figure prominently in the group's activities, despite being 
centred in the most religiously oriented provincial education system with the possible 
exception ofNewfoundland. Morgentaler's concerns were the same as those raised 
by the BCCLA, CCLA and the Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Association 
(NLHRA): teachers were being fired or rejected for work because they did not 
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conform to tenets of a particular faith, and students of minority faiths were forced to 
expose themselves to other religions. But the motion was defeated and Morgentaler 
did not pursue the issue. 530 
Prevost and the Administration of Justice 
Inadequacies in the legal system, particularly in the administration of justice, 
were the central focus of the association's work in its early years. Members of the 
LDH were involved in consulting the provincial government. Casgrain sat on a 
Conseil consultatif de !'administration de lajustice for the Ministry of Justice as of 
1965 and Scott was appointed in 1966 as chairman of the Civil Rights Committee for 
the Office of the Revision of the Civil Code presided over by another LDH member, 
Paul Crepeau. 531 Within the League, a law committee was formed to research current 
problems in the justice system in Quebec. George Wesley, a founding member of the 
LDH, prepared a report in the same year the LDH was founded which highlighted 
serious problems in the administration of justice in Quebec. According to Wesley, 
there was an estimated 14 000 cases awaiting trial at the Superior Court in Montreal 
alone, compared to 2550 in Ontario. Some cases had to wait a remarkable 4 to 5 
years before being heard, with the average wait being 36 months. Judges were also 
underpaid, with the average salary of a Superior Court judge being $17 000 compared 
to $22 000 in the United States. A shortage of judges led to constant delays, and 
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economically weak litigants were at the mercy of those who were well financed and 
could stretch out legal proceedings for long periods oftime.532 
As a solution to the many problems plaguing the judicial system, the LDH 
proposed the appointment of a commission to investigate the administration of justice 
and, in 1967, its lobbying paid off. Thanks largely to the efforts ofthe LDH, the 
Minister of Justice appointed the Prevost commission in 1967 to report on the 
administration of justice in penal and criminal matters in Quebec.533 As discussed in 
chapter four, the commission was to investigate the efficiency of the courts and police 
forces, treatment of prisoners and current police methods in investigating crime. 
What emerged from the inquiry was the most comprehensive analysis of the 
provincial justice system ever produced. Out of 253 meetings and 181 public sessions 
the Prevost commission produced a massive compendium condemning the judicial 
system and recommending vast changes to the system. 
Virtually all the recommendations forwarded by the LDH in its report to the 
commission were accepted and included in the report. These included 
recommendations providing for operating some twenty-four hour courts, 
indemnifying victims of crimes, more resources for the judicial system as well as 
hiring more judges and police officers and stricter regulations on search warrants. 
The League even recommended the Commission go beyond its provincial mandate 
and inquire into the uncertainty and arbitrariness of penal sentence which the 
Commission did, recommending the system be reformed to impose more lenient 
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sentences and focus more on rehabilitation rather than punishment.534 Many of the 
LDH's recommendations endorsed by the commission, including twenty-four hour 
courts and expanding the judicial system, would eventually be established although 
not for many years to come. 
Prisoners' Rights 
Prisoners' rights was another pertinent issue in the 1960s for the LDH, and 
was consistent with its general concern for the administration of justice in the 
province. One of the critiques by the Prevost commission of the province's prison 
system was its focus on punishment instead of rehabilitation, and this was clearly the 
case with the new psychiatric wing being planned for St. Vincent de Paul prison in 
1965. St.Vincent de Paul was a federal penitentiary with a special wing for mentally 
ill offenders, an additional wing designed to isolate particularly violent felons, 
including those who represented a threat to the rest of the prison population. Cells 
were designed for complete isolation, with no windows or views of other prisoners 
with guards patrolling above looking down on prisoners.535 In a letter to the Solicitor 
General Guy Favreau in 1965, professors at the McGill forensic science clinic 
suggested the new wing would simply encourage violence: "As spatial and social 
isolation become more rigorous, destructive impulses tend to intensify in some 
individuals, precisely the type for whoni this unit is designed. These impulses find 
solution in three ways, often interchangeable; aggression directed against the self in 
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self-mutilation and suicide; against others in physical violence, or in the demolition of 
the cell; or there is withdrawal, with mental break:down."536 
The LDH helped organize a coalition of groups including the John Howard 
Society and the Quebec Criminological Society to lobby the federal government to 
stop construction of St. Vincent de Paul.537 Activists with the LDH organized 
seminars, wrote letters and toured the prison. 538 Opposition was also raised to the 
construction of a Special Penitentiary at Ste-Anne des Plaines as a maximum security 
prison with similar isolation units. Lucien Cardin, Minister of Justice, justified the 
building of a new wing because those inmates placed in the new section were the 
worst of the worst: hardened habitual criminals guilty of causing disturbances in 
prisons and in some cases murdering prison guards.539 In response, the coalition of 
forty-eight groups including the LDH organized a delegation in 1966 to the Solicitor 
General.540 It was a failed initiative and the government refused to give in, 
determined to construct both facilities. Nonetheless, the LDH would continue to 
advocate on behalf of prisoners, visiting prisons and lobbying both levels of 
government. 
The Beginnings of a Crusade: A Bill of Rights for Quebec 
Most of these issues remained peripheral to the LDH's main concern during 
this period which was the question of a bill of rights for Quebec. From its founding in 
1963 to the passing of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in 1975, 
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the LDH was a consistent advocate for a provincial bill of rights. In contrast to most 
human rights codes, the LDH favoured a bill of rights which would incorporate both 
fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly with the anti-discrimination 
provisions found in human rights codes. Saskatchewan was the only province in 
Canada with a bill of rights (Alberta's 1946 Bill of Rights was invalidated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada). Since there remained some confusion regarding 
jurisdiction in the field of individual rights, most provinces limited their human rights 
legislation to actions clearly in their sphere of influence. 
The LDH' s vision of a provincial bill of rights was first articulated by law 
professor (and future parliamentary leader of the Parti quebecois) Jacques-Yvan 
Morin in a 1963 article published in the McGill Law Journal. At the time the LDH 
was only in its infancy, but the article was later republished by the LDH with the 
association's endorsement and Morin was asked to chair a committee to lobby the 
provincial government for a bill ofrights.541 The proposed bill of rights offers a 
glimpse into the LDH's perception of rights in its formative years. Given Morin's 
disposition to construe provincial jurisdiction broadly (he challenged the assumption 
that only the federal government could legislate on human rights), there were articles 
protecting the five fundamental freedoms (speech, religion, association, assembly, 
press), equality for women, non-discrimination and the right to form unions (although 
there was a provision banning the police and essential services from striking at a time 
when civil servants did not have collective bargaining rights). Nearly a quarter of the 
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proposal dealt with the administration of justice (e.g., right to reasonable bail and 
access to counsel) which was consistent with the LDH's priorities during this period. 
Surprisingly, there were provisions for the recognition of economic and social rights; 
Morin wanted to ensure access to a free education, minimum salary and standard of 
living, as well as the right to work and to social security. The inclusion of these rights 
in any provincial bill would have made Quebec the most progressive province in the 
field; even the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights did not include such sweeping economic 
and social rights. In suggesting clauses for education and social rights in a provincial 
bill of rights, the LDH also distinguished itselffrom the advocacy ofthe BCCLA, 
which would have considered education as a question of public policy, not rights. 
Finally, the proposed bill ended with recommendations for a human rights 
commission and ensuring the supremacy of the legislation over all other statues by 
making it impossible to amend the bill without a two-thirds vote in the National 
Assembly. 
Morin's piece was followed up by a campaign throughout the 1960s to 
convince the provincial government to pass a bill of rights. This campaign mainly 
took the form of organizing seminars and public engagements, with prominent 
individuals such as Frank Scott espousing the benefits of a provincial bill of rights. 542 
In its presentation before the Prevost commission the LDH raised the issue again. 
These efforts bore some fruit. In volume five of its extensive report, the Prevost 
commission recommended that the Minister of Justice introduce a 'Charte des droits 
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fondamentaux de la personne humaine' to define people's rights, specify the means 
and recourse through which such rights could be recognized, and establish sanctions 
in cases where such rights were violated. The report failed to specify the contents of 
such a charter but the recommendation in itself was a validation of the LDH's 
position. 543 
Morin and Scott were also part of a committee seeking to entrench rights in 
the Civil Code. While a bill of rights would protect rights in public law, a declaration 
of rights in the Civil Code would complement a bill of rights by entrenching rights in 
private law. Paul Crepeau, as president of the Office for the Revision of the Civil 
Code, appointed Scott chairman of the Civil Rights Committee. The committee was 
to propose a declaration of rights for inclusion in the Civil Code and it was composed 
of Morin and two other well known lawyers from Quebec, Jean Beetz and Gerald 
LeDain. Their report was submitted in 1966 with 1 0 articles to be added to the Civil 
Code. This draft declaration of human rights included asserting an individual's right 
to privacy, dignity and reputation, enjoyment and disposition of property, inviolability 
of one's home, life, physical security and personal freedom. Under the new Civil 
Code all individuals had the right to freedom of conscience, opinion and expression, 
peaceful assembly and association as well as the right to assistance if in peril (thus 
requiring others to give aid). A detailed clause guaranteed equal access without 
discrimination to enter public spaces and access goods and services. Anyone 
violating these articles would be subject to civil damages under the Code. 
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Members of the LDH were therefore at the forefront of proposing significant 
revisions to provincial law to better protect individual rights. The work of the LDH, 
combined with the lobbying efforts of the United Council for Human Rights, finally 
paid off in 1970 when the newly-elected Liberal government under Robert Bourassa 
appointed two people to draft a bill of rights. Frank Scott, who was still on the 
administrative council of the LDH, and Paul Crepeau were asked by the government 
to draft the bill which they completed in 1971. By this stage each political party in 
Quebec had expressed some support for a provincial bill of rights and most had 
placed it in their election platforms.544 An election in 1970 postponed any plans to 
enact a bill of rights in the near future. 
In an important symbolic move demonstrating the role played by the LDH in 
pushing for a bill of rights, the Bourassa government's newly appointed Minister of 
Justice used the LDH's 1970 annual general meeting as a platform for announcing his 
intention to establish greater protections for individual rights. Among the reforms 
Jerome Choquette suggested were the insertion of a declaration of human rights in the 
Civil Code and in a future Quebec constitution, creating a permanent commission for 
the revision of civil rights in the Civil Code, creating a system of legal aid and 
instituting new measures to improve the speed and efficiency of the courts. Most 
importantly, Choquette committed himself to a provincial bill of rights to complement 
the Canadian Bill of Rights which he characterized as 'almost worthless'.545 This 
apparent success, however, achieved little. Although initially warming to the idea of a 
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provincial bill of rights and promising to present a Declaration of Rights before the 
National Assembly, Choquette soon refused to go ahead with the proposal. It would 
take another five years before he would honour his commitment to introduce a bill of 
rights into the National Assembly. 
With human rights codes being passed across the country in almost every 
province, why was the Quebec government so recalcitrant? Duplessis had responded 
to demands for a bill of rights in the 1950s by claiming that the only thing Quebeckers 
needed to defend themselves against discrimination was the Bible.546 Clearly, under 
his regime there was little chance of passing anti-discrimination legislation. But the 
sixties was the period of the Quiet Revolution and the blossoming of the rights 
revolution. Jean Lesage's Liberals had ushered in a new era of Quebec politics more 
sympathetic to the idea of state protection for individual rights, and the Union 
Nationale of Daniel Johnson and Jean-Jacques Bertrand was a far cry from the party 
under Duplessis, having publicly endorsed the idea of a provincial bill of rights. And 
yet, successive governments in Quebec hesitated to act on this issue. The most likely 
explanation for this hesitation was the highly contentious issue of language rights. 
The entire question of language rights had proven to be a political time-bomb in the 
late 1960s and a riot in the St. Leonard suburb of Montreal in 1969 followed by a 
divisive debate regarding the Union Nationale's Bill 63 providing parental choice for 
the language of their children's education simply inflamed the issue. Lesage and the 
Liberals were unwilling to consider a provincial bill of rights until a commission 
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appointed under the previous government to study language issues in Quebec 
(Gendron Commission) completed its report.547 Any attempt to pass a bill of rights 
would invariably sink the government into a debate on language rights and most 
politicians in Quebec were not interested in doing so until the timing was propitious. 
For these reasons, the LD H' s dream of a bill of rights for Quebec remained 
unfulfilled by 1970. It is interesting to note how the LDH itself continued to avoid 
the question of language rights. The group had failed to assert language rights in its 
declaration of principles, made no presentation before the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and in 1969 avoided taking any position on Bill 63. 
Morin's proposal for a provincial bill of rights and the Civil Rights Committee's 
recommendations for the Civil Code made no mention of language rights. When the 
League publicly endorsed Trudeau's call in the late 1960s for a constitutional bill of 
rights, it conveniently sidestepped any mention of his position on language rights. 548 
It was also a hallmark of the LDH's activism during this period that while in some 
situations it may have advocated for social and economic rights, it did not explicitly 
take a position in favour of collective rights. At no time did it express any support for 
Quebec self-determination nor for the protection of the French language. This was no 
doubt the type of organization envisioned by such founders as Trudeau and Scott, 
both of whom rejected the nationalists' stand demanding special protections for the 
French language in Quebec. 
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In 1969, Claude Forget (who would later become Minister of Social Affairs 
under the Liberals) resigned as president of the LDH. It was not a happy parting. 
Forget, who wrote an extensive discussion paper on economic and social rights on 
behalf ofthe Quebec committee for International Year for Human Rights,549 accused 
the League and its members of being incapable of accomplishing anything. He 
characterized the organization as composed of dilettantes and elites who had never 
been victimized themselves; it was an anachronism failing to function properly.550 
Forget's embittered resignation highlighted the basic weakness in the League in this 
early period. With limited funds and only a few dedicated volunteers, the LDH was 
capable of only a few minor achievements. In particular, the association had adopted 
a minimalist approach to rights activism, and was exclusively focussed on lobbying 
for legislative and policy reform as evinced in its focus on law reform and the Prevost 
commission, a bill of rights for Quebec, the Civil Rights Committee and lobbying 
policy makers for changing regulations dealing with prisoners. It had limited contact 
with other social movement organizations in the province, and did not participate in 
the United Council for Human Rights, a coalition of human rights groups in Quebec. 
The LDH's early years reflected a limited vision of social change, one based on a 
small group of elites working the legal and political system to protect basic civil and 
political rights. 
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1970-1: The October Crisis 
The defining moment in the history of the Ligue des droits de 1 'homme 
remains the October crisis of 1970. Within a few years, the fundamental orientation 
of the League, its organizational structure and leadership would alter dramatically. At 
the initiation of the crisis, the LDH was a collection of intellectual, economic and 
political elites with close ties to government, including Prime Minister Trudeau 
(although the Prime Minister was no longer a member, Frank Scott, Therese Casgrain 
and Jacques Hebert were all friends of Trudeau), concerned primarily with defending 
civil liberties through legal reform. Quiet back room diplomacy was the association's 
core strategy. But by 1973, the LDH had transformed itself into a more broadly-based 
organization with few ties to governing elites. It retained an interest in public policy 
and law reform but preferred coalition building with other social movement 
organizations and taking on larger issues of social justice. A permanent staff made 
available through extensive government financing soon came to control most of the 
activities of the LDH. All of this could be dated back to the inability ofthe LDH to 
take an effective stance during the October crisis, eventually leading to the downfall 
ofthe group's old guard. 
'Just Watch Me': Human Rights and the October Crisis 
Compared to the later events, the government's initial reaction to the second 
kidnapping was relatively muted. Fifty people were arrested immediately following 
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the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, five days after Cross had been abducted. In the 
federal cabinet, discussions soon turned to the use of extreme methods to deal with 
the second abduction. Pelletier was one of the key advocates pushing for the use of 
the War Measures Act. Recently released cabinet documents reveal two meetings on 
15 October, one at 9:00am and another at 2:30pm, when the cabinet met to consider 
implementing some form of emergency legislation. Bourassa was calling for special 
measures from the federal government to help his embattled administration, which 
Trudeau interpreted to mean an amendment to the criminal code or special temporary 
emergency legislation. It was Pelletier who recommended to the Cabinet security 
committee that the War Measures Act be employed, although the committee rejected 
his recommendation. Pelletier raised the issue again in cabinet during the first 
meeting as did several other ministers. John Greene, Minister of Energy, Mines and 
Resources, could not see how the government could establish the existence of an 
insurrection, particularly as the security panel had not come to such a conclusion. 
Nonetheless, it was much less a debate than a discussion. The cabinet was 
unanimously behind some form of emergency legislation. 551 
The cabinet was not insensitive to the potential repercussions of declaring the 
War Measures Act. Trudeau was particularly worried about the retroactive nature of 
the legislation offending rights activists, an accurate prediction in hindsight. John 
Turner, Minister of Justice, felt the interference with civil liberties and admitting the 
insurrection was apprehended would make the use of wartime legislation seem like 
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overkill, and he stressed the need to mobilize Parliamentary and public support 
behind their decision. 552 These considerations had little impact on the resolutions that 
followed. In fact, three days later, the cabinet discussed the possibility of having 
police officers stationed at every radio and television station to prevent the press from 
'mishandling' any information related to the crisis.553 
The Quebec media was an early victim of increased state powers. Among 
those arrested after the War Measures Act was declared on 16 October 1970 were 
several journalists and media personalities, including Louis Fournier from CKAC, 
Yves Fabre a photographer from the Journal de Montreal, and journalist Pol 
Chantraine. Through the War Measures Act the police were able to delay the 
reporting of Laporte's death by two hours. McGill University's student newspaper, 
The McGill Daily, received a warning from authorities about their editorials (which 
condemned the War Measures Act) as being too sympathetic to the FLQ, and received 
threats that such opinions would not be tolerated.554 In Toronto, the University of 
Toronto publication Varsity was confronted by its printer, who refused to publish the 
magazine with the FLQ manifesto. Within Radio Canada, Vice President E. S. 
Hallman warned his reporters to be cautious in reporting on the FLQ crisis. 555 At a 
public seminar in Montreal, Michel Bourdon, a journalist with Radio Canada, accused 
the leadership at Radio Canada of harassment and censorship. Bourdon was soon 
suspended and an investigation instituted to consider his allegations. The issue 
reached the House of Commons in mid-November 1970 when Secretary of State 
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Pelletier was asked if the government was putting pressure on the media to limit its 
coverage of the affair. Pelletier vigorously denied the accusation, stating they had 
only warned journalists to be sure of their facts and to verify them extensively before 
reporting. Whether or not any direct political pressure was placed on Radio Canada, 
it is clear tensions were high. Two pieces were banned from the show Les Beaux 
Dimanches and a documentary, the Testament of Lenin, was not shown out of 
concern it might incite the populace to violent action. As for Bourdon, he and another 
journalist, Denis Vincent, both lost their jobs. They claimed to be speaking in their 
capacity as leaders of the National Association of Broadcast Employees and 
Technicians, one of the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) unions, but their 
dismissal was not rescinded. 556 
The central issue, however, was not freedom of the press but the detention of 
individuals and suspension of their traditional rights to due process. Habeas corpus 
was suspended and people held in jail for several weeks without being charged. 
Individuals were detained without any notification to their families of their arrest and 
were denied legal counsel, while others were held completely incommunicado.557 The 
regulations passed under the War Measures Act made membership in the FLQ a crime 
and, most importantly, was made retroactive. A person who had been active only 
briefly in the FLQ seven years earlier and had not supported the organization since 
then was criminally liable under the regulations. By the end of the crisis, over four 
hundred people had been arrested and detained under the emergency legislation. 
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Mobilizing Human Rights Activists Against the War Measures Act 
As was the case in 1938 with the Padlock Act and in 1946 with the espionage 
commission, the FLQ crisis stimulated the formation of ad hoc civil liberties 
associations. Professors at the Universite de Montreal instigated a meeting of 200 
people on the same day the War Measures Act was declared to call for its revocation 
and removal of the army from Quebec. They formed the Co mite quebecois pour la 
defense des libertes with plans to create similar committees at all four Montreal 
universities. 558 In tum, McGill students formed a Co mite pour la defense des droits et 
libertes and initiated a petition to revoke the War Measures Act. A Co mite quebecois 
pour la defense des libertes civiles, made up of a collection of progressive 
organizations, emerged in Montreal to hold a seminar on freedom of the press on 28 
October 1970 which led to Michel Bourdon being fired from Radio Canada.559 
Another group, the Mouvement pour la defense des prisonniers politiques (MDPPQ), 
led by Dr. Serge Mongeau who had recently been an independent candidate in the 
South Shore riding of Taillon in April1970 (against Rene Levesque), found itself 
revitalized by the crisis. Originally named the Comite d'aide au group Vallieres-
Gagnon, it was reorganized on 30 June 1970 as the MDPPQ. Although the police 
labelled the MDPPQ as an FLQ front, the purpose of the organization was to raise 
bail and legal fees for anyone imprisoned for taking part in demonstrations for 
political reasons. 560 On 20 January 1971, several thousand demonstrators took part in 
a protest organized by the MDPPQ, trade unions and other Left wing groups to call 
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for the release of the prisoners arrested since October. The group would remain 
active until 1973. 
Of course, the most important group to have emerged from the October crisis 
of 1970 was the Canadian Federation of Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
Associations. A birth-child of the crisis, the Federation would remain active for 
another twenty years promoting the cause of civil liberties and human rights across 
the country. 
Another organization was formed in December 1970 in Waterloo, Ontario in 
reaction to the seizure of a Guelph student newspaper and arrest of a Kitchener 
resident for distributing a pamphlet on Quebec in violation of the regulations under 
the War Measures Act.561 The Citizens Commission oflnquiry into the War 
Measures Act was composed of university professors, labour leaders, a church 
minister, journalist and a former Premier of Saskatchewan.562 Its purpose was "to 
investigate the reasons for the invocation of the War Measures Act and the 
subsequent Public Order Act and the alleged abuses following their wake."563 While 
the group held several public sessions in Ontario and Quebec, the goal of organizing 
provincial committees across the country to conduct similar investigations was never 
realized. Within a year the group effectively petered out, and there is no evidence it 
even produced a report. 
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'Il nous paraftre excessif et contraire a l 'esprit de nos lois': The League Takes 
Action ... 
As groups mobilized within and outside Quebec to deal with the crisis, the 
LDH, the only established rights association in Quebec, failed to distinguish itself. A 
declaration released on 19 October 1970 was far from a clear condemnation of the 
government's actions. This was the League's first statement on the crisis. Stating its 
complete opposition to the tactics ofthe FLQ and the use of violence, the declaration 
raised concerns over the arrest and detention of individuals for long periods of time: 
La Ligue des droits de l'homme demande que les personnes accusees 
d'avoir commis un crime soitjugees suivant la loi et deplore le fait 
que, dans certains cas, on ait detenu des accuses pendant des periodes 
tres longues, avant meme que ces accuses nient ete trouve coupable, 
ces injustices s'etant produites avant le 16 octobre 1970, il y a lieu de 
croire qu'elles se reproduient d'autant plus aisement qu'elles seront 
devenues legales. 564 
The statement goes on to condemn the use of war time powers to deal with the 
situation in Quebec: "Elle [LDH] ne peut accepter, a aucun prix, !'utilisation de la Loi 
des mesures de guerre pour faire face a la situation qui existe dans le Quebec et dont 
elle reconnait !'extreme gravite." However, these comments were balanced by an 
acknowledgement that the federal government was taking into consideration the 
interests of the province's citizens and using the only law available.565 Instead of 
calling for the immediate abrogation of the War Measures Act, the declaration called 
for the government to bring the law before Parliament and work with the opposition 
parties to repeal the legislation as soon as possible. It further called on the Minister of 
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Justice to advise families whose members had been arrested and detained, to release 
those individuals where investigations and searches did not justify the charges, 
provide prisoners with access to legal counsel, and to establish a commission of three 
eminent personalities to ensure those detained had access to appropriate services and 
supervisiOn. 
As the events dragged on and people continued to be arrested and detained 
under the Act, the LDH maintained its diplomatic position. In a press release on 27 
November 1970, it challenged the retroactivity of the law, guilt by association, arrest 
without warrant and detention without bail. "Il nous paraitre excessif et contraire a 
l'esprit de nos lois de les pourchasser indefiniment et de les rendre passaibles ajamais 
des sanctions de la loi pour leur appartenance passee a un groupe, pour une 
declaration favorisant une method politique ou pour des convictions qu'ils ont depuis 
lors recusees."566 As Trudeau predicted, the retroactive nature of the regulations 
passed under the War Measures Act was a particularly sore point for human rights 
activists, and the LDH declaration warned the government against arresting young 
men who were only associated with the FLQ in its early years. Another press release 
on 1 April1971, however, reiterated its position supporting the government's right to 
protect itself, and limited its critique to the wide powers of the War Measures Act. 
The LDH proposed a new formula for using the War Measures Act, one which would 
require the government to provide, in writing, the reasons why it made the 
proclamation which would have to be ratified by two-thirds of Parliament. It further 
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called for the removal of the War Measures Act from the statute books, for all 
regulations passed under the Act to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and for the 
government to respect the tenets of the UDHR in respect of non-retroactive laws, 
innocence until proven guilty, the right to association and freedom of expression.567 
Alongside these claims was a reiteration of the group's position calling for a bill of 
rights in the Canadian constitution as a symbolic recognition by the state of the need 
to respect individual rights. 
The statements issued on 19 October 1970, 11 November 1970 and 1 April 
1971 were the sum total ofthe LDH's public declarations during the crisis. No 
demonstrations were organized, no briefs presented to the federal or provincial 
government, no letters sent to public officials and no attempt to rally support against 
the legislation. While students held sit-ins and demonstrations and formed ad hoc 
civil liberties groups, and the MDPPQ, Committee ofTen (a group ofleading 
personalities in Quebec calling on the both governments to negotiate with the 
kidnappers) and organized labour adopted a more confrontational approach to the 
federal and provincial government's actions, the LDH remained relatively silent. The 
press releases established the group's opposition to the use of the War Measures Act, 
but little action was taken to challenge the government's position.568 Years later 
Sandra Djwa, interviewing Hebert for her biography on Frank Scott, noted that Hebert 
(president of the LDH during the crisis) justified the LDH's actions during the crisis 
by "pinpointing the difference in emotional climate between Quebec and Ontario 
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when he observed the Quebec Civil Liberties Union could not take a position like that 
adopted by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Toronto, which condemned 
the use of the Act, because Quebecois members were so conscious ofliving in 'a 
climate of fear.' In the Montreal group there was complete unanimity about the need 
to restore order, but the middle-of-the-road position they took annoyed both the 
moderates and the extremists. "569 
Comite d'aide aux personnes detenues en vertu de la loi 
Nonetheless, the LDH did contribute to reducing the impact of emergency 
powers on individual civil liberties in one significant way. On 25 October 1970 the 
LDH formed a Comite d'aide aux personnes detenues en vertu de la loi sur les 
mesures de guerre (Committee to Help Persons Detained Under the War Measures 
Act) with a mandate to inquire into the conditions of prisoners held under the War 
Measures Act. Amidst criticism that the LDH, as the province's leading rights 
association, was doing little to counteract the harsh measures and limits on individual 
rights imposed by the state, the committee was unquestionably its most effective 
contribution to the battle against the zealousness of the federal and provincial 
governments in stamping out the FLQ. This initiative was consistent with the LDH's 
historical concern with the rights of prisoners. The goal was to focus exclusively on 
getting access to prisoners and helping them contact their families, evaluate the 
conditions of their detention and provide some of them with legal counsel. The 
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committee received generous funding from the CCLA in the amount of $4000, $5000 
from the provincial government, and more than $5000 from various individual and 
group donations. 570 
The purpose of the committee was to provide the prisoners with all the 
necessary support and services while reporting complaints to the ombudsman (the 
most direct forum for seeking compensation for abusive action by government 
agencies). Jacques Hebert, Reverend Jacques Tellier and Rolland Parenteau were 
given access to the prisoners by the provincial Minister of Justice starting 28 October 
in order to investigate the conditions under which they were being held, and in many 
cases the committee was successful in winning their early release. The committee 
also created a legal aid sub-committee, led by Paul Crepeau, to provide prisoners with 
free access to legal counsel. It managed to convince the ombudsman, who had done 
very little in the first few weeks, to investigate and consider compensation for loss of 
employment to those who had been detained for too long (eventually $200 was given 
to a large number of those detained). In addition, the committee provided financial 
assistance to families whose breadwinners were detained, intervened with landlords to 
prevent families and individuals from being evicted when rent was not paid in time, 
negotiated with banks and other credit institutions on loan payments, and spoke on 
behalf of students who missed exams. It also made several recommendations to the 
Minister of Justice relating to the unnecessary seizure of books and documents 
unrelated to the crisis, raised concerns regarding the unjustified treatment of certain 
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prisoners during their imprisonment and interrogations, and complained about those 
being held incommunicado. Hebert was particularly concerned that Parthenais 
detention centre, a prison designed to hold people for a few weeks at most, was being 
used for long term incarceration of people arrested during the crisis. 571 In its formal 
report, the committee suggested that "all the prisoners, men and women, were being 
held in conditions unworthy of a civilized country."572 By the time most of the 
prisoners had been released, the committee had met with 130 prisoners. One member 
of the committee concluded that it was "evident que la Comite ... ajoue une role 
indispensable qui, dans une certain mesure, a pu attenuer les effets des lois 
d'exception. Par ailleurs, comme le demontre le rapport financier, le Comite a obtenu 
un large appui du public qui a repondu aux appels lances a la radio et dans les 
joumaux."573 
The Backlash: Hebert Defends the League 
Despite its efforts with the prisoners committee, the LDH was perceived in 
many circles as having failed to distinguish itself during the crisis. Letters to the 
editor published in Le Devoir called on Hebert to resign because of his failure to 
position the Ligue more critically during the crisis, one of them suggesting that "if 
your degree of patience is proportional to the level of your friendship with Mr. 
Trudeau, leave the union Mr. Hebert."574 An editorial by Claude Ryan appearing in Le 
Devoir on 3 April1971 referred to a perception in the media that the LDH's role in 
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advocating for the protection of civil liberties in Quebec had been supplanted by the 
more active association in Toronto, the CCLA, which had been far more critical of the 
use of the War Measures Act. While the editorial in question lauded the position 
taken by the LDH in its 1 April1971 statement against the creation of permanent 
peacetime emergency legislation, the LDH' s position in general failed to have the 
force of the more stringent CCLA position (discussed in chapter five). 575 Another 
article in the Montreal Gazette on 5 April 1971 predicted Hebert would face a bitter 
crowd at the LDH's annual general meeting the following day because the League 
"under Hebert's leadership has been woefully negligent in doing battle against alleged 
injustice and abuses in this province practically all of them stemming from the 
October crisis."576 The Montreal Gazette article hinted that Hebert's relationship with 
Trudeau had stayed the former's criticism of the federal government during the crisis; 
the two had travelled together in China in the early 1960s and co-written a book on 
their experiences, and had founded the LDH with Pelletier in 1963.577 In 1971, less 
than a year after the crisis, Trudeau would appoint Hebert to the Canadian Radio and 
Telecommunication Council and would later appoint Hebert to the Senate.578 As a 
report prepared for the Secretary of State in 1972 concluded, since Trudeau "was one 
of the association's founding members along with Jacques Hebert, now president of 
La Ligue, and others, and because of the ambiguous stand taken by the association on 
the War Measures Act, many citizens are not convinced that the group is non-
political, as such a group must be."579 
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Hebert made no attempt to counter the claims that he had been soft on the 
federal government during the crisis. The League's statements during the FLQ crisis 
reflect a clear opposition to the use of the War Measures Act balanced by a degree of 
deference to the federal government. Hebert's sympathy towards the federal 
government, and in turn Trudeau, was reiterated during a meeting ofthe 
Undersecretary of State's Advisory Committee on Human Rights in January 1971 
where Hebert was asked to consult with the group on how the federal government 
could involve itself in the field of human rights. Hebert confirmed his belief that the 
province, not the federal government, was responsible for any human rights issues 
arising out of the crisis: 
... although the War Measures Act was a Federal law, we must 
remember that it was under the jurisdiction of the Province of Quebec 
and it was totally administered by Quebec and the Quebec Police ... .I 
don't think it was felt that the Federal government lacked in some way, 
as far as Human Rights were concerned. After all, it was not their 
responsibility .... [P]eople were detained in the Provincial jail, so it 
was, to my point of view, totally provincial.580 
Criticism of the LDH, and Hebert in particular, was highlighted during a 
protest in the offices of his publishing house, Editions du Jour, in March 1971. 
Members of the MDPPQ and a group calling itselfLes Chevaliers de l'independance, 
20 in total, marched into Hebert's office to call attention to the LDH' s weak 
performance during the crisis. They were further protesting the publication on the 
same day of Gerard Pelletier's The October Crisis by Editions du Jour. With large 
signs stating 'Hebert is a Traitor' and sporting two-by-fours, the grim faced protestors 
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refused to allow anyone in or out of the office, forcing Hebert to sleep in his office for 
a couple of nights to avoid a violent confrontation.581 Among their demands was for 
the LDH to call a general assembly to denounce the retroactivity of the Public Order 
Act and the treatment of prisoners in Orsainville prison, speak out against the 
treatment of Paul Rose and others in Parthenais prison, and to provide observers 
during the trials of those arrested during the crisis. The protestors also called upon 
the LDH to demand that women be allowed on juries and for the organization to 
affiliate with the Federation Intemationale des Droits de l'Homme. Hebert attempted 
to negotiate with the protestors but, failing to come to an accord, he eventually called 
the police and the sit-in was brought to an end after 36 hours. 
The protest was well covered in the press, with Le Devoir, La Presse and 
Montreal Gazette, among others, providing coverage. A bitter letter published in the 
Montreal Star addressed to Serge Mongeau (treasurer of the MDPPQ) from Hebert 
accused Mongeau of orchestrating a publicity stunt and claiming Mongeau (whose 
books had been published by Hebert) could have discussed the issues with him 
personally at any time.582 Four days later, in what was one of the most striking attacks 
on the LDH and Hebert since October 1970, an open letter endorsed by the members 
of the MDPPQ published in Le Devoir raised the core issues dividing the LDH from 
people on the militant Left in Quebec. The letter accused Hebert of treating them as 
"d'imbeciles, de laches, de sauvages, de tiers-a-bras, etc ... c'est bien votre droit de 
ne pas aimer nos manieres, et nous avouons ne pas etre tres familiers avec la 
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dialectique byzantine des eminences de la Ligue."583 According to the letter, while 
Hebert's work with prisoners was laudable, the committee was a separate 
organization independent of the LDH. From their perspective, the LDH did virtually 
nothing other than distribute some press releases. Hebert should have denounced the 
justice system itself instead of working with the established authorities, particularly in 
regard to the denial of justice for militants and separatists who were imprisoned for 
their beliefs. They noted the LDH's silence regarding contempt of court charges laid 
against several people after October and pointed out how the number of charges had 
increased dramatically since October with penalties ranging from a few days in jail to 
fifteen months. Their most scathing accusation, however, was to suggest that Hebert 
and the LDH, which had never taken a position on Quebec self-determination and had 
close ties to the federal government, were only willing to defend federalists and not 
separatists. In particular, they pointed to the refusal of the LDH to take a public stand 
on the recently imprisoned Valliere and Gagnon who had yet to be found guilty of a 
crime (the LDH claimed it would require two specialists to study the case at a cost of 
$15 000 for two years before it could take a position). 
The hostile encounter between the MDPPQ and the LDH had more symbolic 
than practical consequences. Hebert was re-elected as president of the LDH and there 
were no further confrontations between the two organisations. But for many on the 
Left, including members of the League, the LDH had failed to act against the most 
repressive attack on civil liberties in Canada since World War Two. Organized 
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labour and many members of the Parti quebecois, Rassemblent pour l'independance 
nationale, MDPPQ and other political movements were not only targets for arrest in 
October 1970 but among the federal and provincial governments' most vocal critics. 
When the CLC presented a brief to the federal cabinet in 1971, Louis Laberge, 
president of the Quebec Federation of Labour, entered into a shouting match with 
Trudeau over the War Measures Act.584 The failure of the LDH to act more 
aggressively during the crisis was a particularly significant omission for a civil 
liberties organization. Since the 1930s rights associations in Quebec had never 
hesitated to defend unpopular individuals and associations, particularly those on the 
militant Left who were often the target of state repression, as was the case with 
individuals prosecuted under the Padlock Act. Even Frank Scott, a founding member 
ofthe LDH with a history for taking key civil liberties cases to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, openly supported the use of the War Measures Act. 585 
The LDH had placed itself in a difficult position by trying to condemn the use 
of the War Measures Act while simultaneously hedging its criticism of Trudeau's 
government. Hebert's situation was exacerbated when Trudeau was quoted in a 
television interview (and previously in a radio interview as well on 7 May) on 16 May 
claiming the LDH supported his position during the crisis. When asked how he 
viewed the crisis as a civil libertarian, Trudeau responded with the claim that the 
"Civil Liberties Union of Montreal supported the government's invocation of the War 
Measures Act. Never forget that. It's easy when you're sitting in Toronto and 
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Vancouver to talk about civil liberties. But the Civil Liberties Union of Montreal 
supported the government; don't forget that."586 At its 1971 annual general meeting 
the LDH resolved to send a letter to Trudeau asking him to retract his comments. But 
Trudeau refused. He argued in his letter to Pierre Jasmin, Director General of the 
LDH, that the LDH had acknowledged that the government was acting in the interests 
of the people and were working under extreme circumstances. As far as Trudeau was 
concerned, the LDH understood the necessity of his government's actions and 
supported them. 587 
Fourteen years later, the League's conduct during the FLQ crisis continued to 
rankle its members. The events of October 1970 would be reflected upon by future 
members of the LDH as an abysmal failure on the part of the LDH. In a report to the 
administrative council in 1984, the LDH's actions in 1970 were characterized as 
shameful and a failure to live up to the organization's mandate.588 This attitude was 
to be a major stimulus for instigating the institutional and philosophical changes in 
the LDH between 1970 and 1972. 
1970-1975: Transition Years 
The impact of the FLQ crisis did not have immediate implications within the 
LDH. It would be another two years before Maurice Champagne, a professor at the 
University of Montreal, would take over as Director General of the LDH and 
introduce a manifesto representing the new orientation of the League backed-up by a 
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new administrative council. Between those two years the organization would become 
increasingly active in the defence of civil liberties in Quebec and support the 
formation of a new national rights association. 
State Funding 
One of the most profound changes in the institutional structure of the LDH 
was the infusion of state funds. In the midst of the October crisis of 1970, Hebert 
reported to members of the administrative council that he had secured a grant of $20 
000 from the Secretary of State (presided over by Gerard Pelletier). 589 An intense 
debate on 26 April1971 at the Annual General Meeting surrounding the question of 
state funding ended in a resolution to accept a federal grant, but with the caveat that 
all future funding must be approved by the administrative council.590 
The infusion of extensive state funding could not help but have a profound 
impact on the organization. Up until1970, meetings ofthe LDH administrative 
council had taken place in Casgrain's home or Hebert's publishing house. They had 
no money to hire lawyers or fund legal cases, and they could not hire any full time 
stuff. Within the next five years the LDH was able to hire a full Director General, 
secretary, assistant to the Director General, receptionist, and a researcher. And the 
level of funding itself from the state was staggering, far more than most other rights 
associations in Canada. Between 1963-1969, revenues averaged around $1200 per 
year. In 1971 and 1972, revenues for the association were $24 614 and $28 252 
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respectively, soaring to $126 395 in 1975 with the bulk coming from the federal 
(Secretary of State) and provincial governments (Minister of Justice). 591 While it is 
true the BCCLA was taking in similar monies during this time period ($30 494 in 
1973 and $115 426 in 1975) its grants were locked into specific projects whereas the 
LDH was offered more core grants allowing them to hire full time staff. In addition, 
the BCCLA's grants peaked in 1975 and its revenues would drop afterwards, whereas 
the LDH continued to enjoy a revenue base well over $100 000 for the next several 
years. Revenue from membership fees rose from $1200 (1973) to $2635 (1975), but 
continued to represente a minuscule portion of the group's revenues (LDH 
membership had risen from about 200 in 1972 to about 1000 in 197 5). 592 It was fully 
dependent on state funding. 
The 1972 Manifesto: From Civil Liberties to Human Rights Activism 
The second most intense change to the LDH was initiated with the publication 
of a new manifesto in September 1972. From an association of elite members with a 
focus on singular cases and individual rights, the association began to take on the role 
of encouraging social transformation in Quebec and a concern with collective rights. 
The manifesto called upon the League to adapt to the changes occurring within 
Quebec society and to consider the problems of poverty, women's rights, ageism, 
youth, ethnic minorities, the right of citizens to be better informed on ways to 
challenge exploitation and the right of everyone to participate equally in social 
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institutions. It embraced notions of positive freedom instead ofthe group's traditional 
focus on negative freedom. Economic, social and cultural rights were given equal 
priority in the manifesto to civil and political rights. Native rights, handicapped, non-
unionised workers, immigrants, families and others fell under the new mandate. 
Several of the original priorities would continue under the new orientation: prisoners' 
rights, police abuse of powers and a bill of rights for Quebec. But now, instead of 
concerning themselves with specific abuses of individual rights, equality would be 
achieved by improving the social conditions in which those rights were exercised. 593 
The manifesto raised a number of concerns about social inequalities in Quebec 
society. According to the report, many elderly were kicked out by their children and 
had no home to go to, were rejected by hospitals for not being sick enough while old 
age homes rejected them for being too sick. Discrimination against women was 
prevalent. Children and teenagers were abused, families raised children in decaying 
urban environments, prisoners were held in degrading conditions, police abused their 
powers, immigrants were summarily rejected from entering the country with little 
recourse to appeal, college students were denied freedom of opinion and employees 
were dismissed for union activity. Among the specific issues raised in the manifesto 
were the lack of human rights legislation, Montreal bylaw 3926 (anti-demonstration 
legislation passed in 1969), judges abusing their power through charges of contempt 
of court and the need for reforms in the training of police officers, appointment of 
judges and providing legal aid. It was a broad attack on both specific problems and 
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fundamental inequalities in Quebec society and went much further than the civil 
liberties-oriented BCCLA. 
This new orientation was bound to have some significant repercussions, one of 
which was the loss of many of the old members. Perhaps the most notable loss for the 
association was Frank Scott, who left the administrative council in 1972 while 
remaining an ordinary member. In a letter to Maurice Champagne, the new Director 
General of the association, Scott expressed concern about the association's new 
direction: 
Since reading the last public declaration of the League I have felt that I 
could not honestly continue to be a member of the Council. It is 
evident that a totally new conception of the League is now dominant, 
and however valid this may appear to the present executive it is a 
concept which I find quite at variance with my notion of what a proper 
Civil Liberties Union should be. There were political statements in 
that declaration which I do not think we had any right to make. 594 
Those political statements included a demand by the LDH for a minimum salary for 
workers and attacks on the government for being secretive and not providing the 
public with enough information about its operations.595 The League was crossing the 
boundary into politics, an area Scott felt the association should avoid in its goal of 
being non-partisan. 
Scott's alienation from the LDH was a reaction to the association's move 
towards advocating for positive rights. While he had always been an avowed social 
democrat and determined supporter of the CCF/NDP, Scott was liberal when it came 
to human rights advocacy. In other words, Scott's brand of rights activism was rooted 
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in the idea of equality of opportunity as opposed to a more expansive approach to 
rights activism in which the state was expected to ensure more than simply formal 
equality among individuals. As noted in chapter four, leading members of organized 
labour echoed Scott's opposition to the inclusion of economic, social and cultural 
rights in the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights. Scott was also the author of the 
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights which offered no provisions for economic, social or 
cultural rights. The LDH's call for a minimum wage and the declarations within the 
1972 manifesto on a variety of social and economic issues were clearly at variance 
with the organization Scott had helped found eight years earlier. Scott's decision to 
leave the administrative council was thus in many ways symbolic of the League's 
increasing shift towards human rights activism and the larger divisions within the 
human rights movement. 
The League and the Left in Quebec 
The League's new demands on the Quebec state were part of the overall socio-
political transformations occurring within the province during this period. Organized 
labour in Quebec became increasingly radicalized. Kenneth McRoberts has suggested 
that "during the 1960s and 1970s the Canadian Labour Congress was still clearly tied 
to the conventional 'trade unionism' Quebec union leaders had decried. The 
Confederation des syndicats nationaux and Centrale des syndicats du Quebec, in 
particular, concerned themselves with much more than the normal objectives of 
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collective bargaining and, consequently, advanced broad-based critiques of capitalist 
society. "596 
During this same period the Quebec independence movement was maturing. 
By the 1970s the independence movement had manifested itself most directly in the 
form of a new political party, the Parti quebecois, which soon "secured a monopoly of 
the national question."597 The Parti quebecois was primarily a coalition of nationalists 
of varying political stripes with a strong middle class base of support, but for most of 
the 1970s it was also a social democratic party with strong links to the political Left. 
When it was founded the party "adopted the mantle of a social-democratic party .... 
[The party] stressed the role of the state as the central economic planner ... .It 
identified itself as the party with a 'favourable bias' toward the working class."598 
According to John Saywell, the "economic programme of the party remained far to 
the left of anything proposed by the national or provincial New Democratic 
parties."599 After coming to power in 1976 the party quickly moved to implement a 
number of policies which many historians have characterized as social democratic, 
including pro-union labour legislation with regulations restricting the use of 
replacement workers, public automobile insurance, raising the minimum wage, and 
nationalizing parts of the asbestos industry. McRoberts, who has forwarded a detailed 
analysis of the political orientation of the Parti quebecois, is critical of the social 
democratic label and notes how the party did not formally allied with organized 
labour and never "assigned the Quebec working class the privileged position that one 
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would expect of a social democratic party."600 Levesque, in particular, was a powerful 
moderating influence within the party and continually fought against moving the party 
to the Left. Nonetheless, even McRoberts acknowledges that until the late 1970s the 
Parti quebecois' membership, electoral support base and platform were consistent 
with social democratic parties of the period and favoured a strong, active role for the 
state.601 
The massive expansion of organized labour in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s, 
combined with the rise of the Parti quebecois and its success in 1976, strengthened 
the Left in Quebec. Since the onset of the Quiet Revolution the Quebec state had 
played an increasingly prominent role in the social and political life of Quebeckers. 
Francophones in Quebec "came to view the Quebec state as a powerful instrument 
capable of improving their social and economic condition and, moreover, obligated to 
do so."602 The LDH's shift towards positive rights and greater demands on the state 
was thus consistent with broader developments within Quebec at this time. 
With the acceptance of the new manifesto by the administrative council in 
1972, structural changes were introduced to make the association more inclusive. The 
elitism which had characterized the LDH since its founding was being shed. 
Membership fees, having risen to 10 dollars per person in the late 1960s, were 
reduced to 2 dollars. No longer would new members have to be voted on and 
accepted by the administrative council. Following the elections of 1972, the 
administrative council, once dominated by lawyers, professors and journalists, 
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became more representative.603 There were now only four lawyers, a criminologist, 
sociologist, psychologist, social worker, journalist, chemist (ex-prisoner) and various 
advocates for the rights of women, youth, non-unionised workers and others.604 
Maurice Champagne 
One of the central architects of this new orientation was Maurice Champagne. 
Champagne's background was typical ofthose attracted to the League. He was well 
educated, with a Bachelor's degree from the University of Montreal in 1955, a 
Masters degree in medieval studies from the same university in 1957 with a second 
Masters degree in 1965 in French literature. Three years later he completed his 
Doctorate at l'Universite de Nice in France in the field of child psychology. As with 
many of the LDH's leaders, he was a professor for a short period of time and became 
the Director of Studies at College Saint Denis until he joined the LDH full time.605 
Champagne had been elected Vice-President ofthe LDH in 1971 and was later 
elected president, a volunteer position he vacated in 1972 to become the LDH's full 
time director. It was Champagne who recommended the group develop a manifesto 
to focus its goals and he was mandated by the group to draft the proposal. 606 
'Le simple respect des droits individuels et collectifs ': Language Rights and Self 
Determination 
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It became clear early on that the manifesto and the proposed new direction 
was not a hollow declaration. No issue made this more evident than the group's 
decision to take a position on language rights, an issue the old guard had vigorously 
avoided. A committee on language rights formed by the LDH reported on 12 April 
1973 with a series of principles it felt should guide the government in determining its 
language politics. A year later the Bourassa government introduced Bill 22, 
legislation designed to protect the French language by removing, among others things, 
parental choice for a child's education as established in Bil163 in 1969 (language of 
education would now be based on a competency test). Whereas the LDH had 
studiously avoided taking a stance on Bill 63, it eagerly jumped into the fray in 1974. 
The association wanted French entrenched as the official language of Quebec and 
education used to promote the French language, two ofthe core objectives ofBill22. 
But the LDH's position went much farther. Alongside a statement acknowledging the 
equal rights of aboriginals and ethnic minorities to explore their own separate cultural 
identities, the LDH forwarded the radical suggestion of having all primary education 
in French with a transition period for current students to French education within 16 
years. The justification was that, since English speakers were over protected by the 
dominant North American environment, it would be just for them to cede some of 
their privilege to the majority in Quebec so francophones could exercise their right to 
survival (the LDH's own publications were now to be printed only in French).607 In 
forcing students to be educated in French, the LDH was committing what the old 
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guard would have considered blasphemy: placing the collective interests of French 
society (through the preservation of the French language) over individual choice. 
According to the declaration, the "droits linguistiques pour la majorite fran9ais au 
Quebec sont des droits collectifs qui ont une importance telle qu'ils peuventjustifier 
pleinement, a ce moment de notre histoire, des mesures qui aient pour effet de creer 
des obligations particulieres aux individus, notamment dans les limites qu'il faut 
apporter au choix de la langue d'enseignement pour les parents et les jeunes."608 The 
LDH supported aspects ofBill22 but were concerned with those parts ofthe bill 
which threatened to legalize "both in spirit and in letter those very bilingual practices 
that should have been curtailed in order to affirm the priority ofFrench."609 Bourassa 
criticized the LDH's proposals, attacking the association publicly on a radio show 
using several choice epithets to describe the organization's ideas on language 
rights.610 
If taking a position on language rights hinted at a new orientation, the decision 
to adopt a position on the right to self-determination was proof the LDH had 
abandoned its roots. Although the group shied from going as far as to take an explicit 
position on separatism, the LDH asserted the right of minorities to self-determination 
as stated in the Charter ofthe United Nations. In a special declaration issued in 1972 
the LDH advocated that no fair negotiations for rights could take part between 
minority and majority unless the fundamental right to self-determination of a minority 
was recognized by the majority.611 An editorial published the next day in Le Devoir 
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warned against taking such a extreme position. If the LDH hoped to advocate a 
rights-based approach to self-determination, the editor argued, it would have to affirm 
its position on the basis of minority rights: "Ce n' est done pas pour defendre 
l'independantisme que le Ligue affirme le droit a l'auto determination, mais c'est 
plutot pour forcer tous les hommes politiques a affirmer leur respect pour les droits 
des minorites .... Le simple respect des droits individuels et collectifs exige qu'on 
laisse aux hommes et aux peuples la liberte d'evoluer comme ils l'entendent."612 
The organization's new orientation put its leaders at odds with other rights 
activists in the province. Once again, Frank Scott found himself in conflict with the 
LDH. In a letter to Walter Tamopolsky in 1976, he claimed that "the League was 
captured by a group of extreme nationalists and separatists whose chief concern was 
to see that [an amended] Bill 22 was enacted and that the Charter of Human Rights, 
which Crepeau and I drafted, was not put into force until the language position was 
clarified."613 Even the Premier shared Scott's views. Bourassa publicly condemned 
the LDH for being run by fanatical nationalists with unrealistic policies on language 
rights. 614 The LDH was clearly drawing on the rhetoric encouraged by the Parti 
quebecois and the current political battles raging in the province over language and 
education. In addition to the adoption of positions on language rights and self-
determination, the organization's new cadre ofleaders associated civil liberties 
ideology with anglophone culture. Normand Caron, Champagne's successor as 
Director in 1975, believed that the LDH's main contribution to the national federation 
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(discussed ahead) was to challenge anglophones' definition of human rights as purely 
civil and political rights.615 Years later, Lucie Lemonde, president of the LDH in the 
1990s, expressed similar sentiments when reflecting upon the association's early 
activism: "c 'etait la conception anglaise des droits civils (civil liberties) qui 
prevalait."616 The LDH's new orientation evolved within the context of an 
increasingly influential sovereignty movement which, in 1973, had garnered the Parti 
quebecois 30 percent of the popular vote. Although there were no formal ties 
between the Parti quebecois and the LDH during this period, they often entered into 
coalitions together on various issues, such as calling for more government sponsored 
daycare.617 
Office Des Droits des Detenu-e-s (ODD) 
In addition to adopting positions on language rights and self-determination, 
the League followed through with its new mandate to advocate for social, economic 
and cultural rights with the creation of offices for the elderly, prisoners and women. 
Both the women's committee and the office for the elderly floundered by 1974 due to 
lack ofinterest.618 In contrast, the Office des droits des detenu-e-s (ODD) proved to 
be an impressive success. 
The LDH had always advocated on behalf of the rights of this unpopular class 
of citizens and, while a few other rights associations across Canada took up the cause 
of prisoners' rights, no group did so to the extent of the LDH. In the 1960s the LDH 
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had taken up the cause of St.Vincent de Paul and Ste-Anne des Plaines, and in 1971 
formed a committee which successfully lobbied Choquette to transfer Paul Rose and 
Bernard Lortie from Parthenais prison. Parthenais was designed to hold prisoners 
only for short periods as people awaited trial, and these two FLQ prisoners had been 
in Parthenais for months.619 In fact, the LDH had even opposed the construction of 
Parthenais itself in the early 1970s, to no avail. ODD was simply an extension ofthis 
type of advocacy. It was formed as a separate office, which meant it had its own 
executive and administrative council and did not have to answer to the administrative 
council of the LDH except in cases dealing with broad policy issues. Its mandate was 
to develop an open and accessible prison system concerned with rehabilitation, make 
prisoners aware of their rights, conduct extensive research on prisoners' rights and 
inform the public, and defend prisoners' rights whenever possible.620 The committee 
was chaired by Raymond Boyer (one of the individuals detained by the espionage 
commission in 1946), with Pierre Landreville as Vice President and Champagne as 
secretary. 621 
While the ODD was in many ways an extension of the goals adopted by the 
LDH in its early years in seeking justice for prisoners, the ODD went much further 
than its predecessors, demonstrating once again the influence ofthe LDH's new 
mandate.622 The ODD not only sought fair treatment for prisoners but it favoured the 
complete abolition of prisons altogether: "L'objectif de l'ODD est !'abolition des 
prisons. L'emprisonment est fondee sur la discrimination et la destruction de la 
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personne incarceree. A courte terme, l'ODD prone des changements qui non 
seulement ameliorent les conditions de vie des personnes detenues mais qui vont dans 
le sens de l'abolition."623 
In 1972 the ODD secured a major grant from the Donner foundation ($41 000) 
to conduct a major research program into the conditions of prisons in Quebec.624 
With the support of the provincial Minister of Justice it conducted an extensive study 
into prison conditions and policies later published as a book in 1976 (Les prisons par 
if;i).625 Thanks to the Donner foundation and, in 1975, grants from the United Way, 
the ODD was able to operate without government funding. In fact, it became a staple 
position of the ODD to reject government funding except for specific projects, to 
avoid any conflict of interest, an ironic position given that it was an office ofthe state-
subsidized LDH. 626 
In addition to its work in spreading awareness and taking on individual 
dossiers the ODD promoted coalition-building among social movement organizations, 
including with its campaign for the closure ofParthenais. Parthenais prison (Centre 
de prevention de Parthenais) had been built to accommodate short term prisoners who 
were awaiting trial (it was built on the lOth to 13th floor of the Quebec Provincial 
Police building in Montreal), yet in practice prisoners would be incarcerated for 
extended periods of time. The conditions were deplorable. A hunger strike in 1974 
protested poor food, being required to eat in their cells near the toilet instead of on 
tables, not being able to use the telephone, lack of clean clothes and being kept in 
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individual cells for extended periods, sometimes days, without being allowed 
outside.627 More than most other prisons, Parthenais experienced widespread 
demonstrations by prisoners: four hunger strikes in November 1970, January 1972, 
August 1972 and July 1973, with a riot in 1973 and six prisoners mutilating 
themselves in protest on 9 September 1973.628 A seminar was organized by the ODD 
on 7 October 1974 in collaboration with the School of Criminology at the Universite 
de Montreal to bring together groups to collectively pressure the government to close 
the controversial prison. In the following year, on 23 February 1975, at the initiative 
of the ODD, twelve associations (including the three labour federations) linked 
together to form a common front calling for the closure of Parthenais. The LDH 
secured promises from Choquette for the closure of the prison but without a firm date, 
and the common front was designed to bring greater public pressure to close the 
prison.629 As an organization now concerned with direct democracy and encouraging 
public participation in policy making, the LDH encouraged coalition-building. It 
developed strong ties with organized labour in particular, ties which did not exist 
before 1972. Several coalitions from protesting the War Measures Act to advocating 
for prisoners and daycare were successfully formed after 1972. 
Abortion 
The LDH dealt with issues of provincial and national concern. In fact, the 
League rarely shied away from taking on national issues during this period and 
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placing them in a provincial context, although it was unquestionably a provincial 
organisation first and foremost. Abortion was one such issue. The League's first 
major publication (the LDH never published a newsletter before 1982) appeared in 
197 4 in the form of a book entitled La Societe Quebecois face a l 'avortement. It 
provided a detailed analysis of the abortion issue in Quebec, noting attitudes and 
changing perceptions in Quebec society. Statistics offered a general idea of the 
problem. Therapeutic abortions rose in Quebec from 534 in 1970 to 2847 in 1972 
thanks to the 1969 omnibus bill which decriminalized hospital-sanctioned abortions. 
However, only five francophone hospitals provided abortions (mostly in Montreal) 
compared to 133 anglophone institutions. There was a clear hesitancy among 
francophone institutions to provide this service, a serious problem for poor 
francophone women who could not afford to travel abroad or out of province for 
abortions. 
Instead of using a pure rights-based approach by arguing that abortion was a 
human right in itself, the League characterized the issue as a question of social justice. 
"La Ligue ne saurait reconnaitre l'avortement comme un droit mais comme une 
mesure d'exception legitimee par le droit a Ia sante eta Ia qualite humaine de Ia vie 
pour tous ainsi une par le droit de la femme a decider de ses matemites et a les voir 
faciliter par la societe et 1' etat. "630 It went to great pains to place abortion in the 
context of positive rights, such as promoting gender equality (as opposed to simply a 
question of individual liberty): "La discrimination systematique qui est fait ala 
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femme, par 1' absence de politiques et de services adequats de garderies, contribue a 
maintenir un partage injuste des taches et des responsabilites entre 1 'homme et la 
femme."631 The problem was not with the law but in the socio-political context of 
Quebec where people knew little about abortion or its implications, with minimal 
education on sexuality and contraception, and limited support services. It was a truly 
egalitarian position and contrasted sharply with the group's previous focus on 
negative rights. 
Renewing the Debate Over a Bill of Rights for Quebec 
Abortion and prisoners were just a few examples of the renewed activism of 
the LDH during the transition years. Yet, while all these issues remained important, 
implementing a bill of rights in Quebec remained the group's central priority. With its 
new philosophy firmly entrenched by 1972, the LDH sought to negotiate with the 
government to make its vision of a bill ofrights a reality. Unfortunately, Jerome 
Choquette continued to vacillate. The LDH responded by forming a committee to 
draft a proposed Charter of Rights for Quebec and by February 1973 had consulted 
with a variety of jurists, judges, union leaders and others on the contents of the 
proposed bill.632 Its goal was to stimulate a massive public debate to pressure the 
government to go ahead with passing a provincial bill of rights. It was fully 
consistent with the group's new philosophy of a 'societe de participation,' and would 
encourage greater public participation in public policy. A total of 500 000 copies of 
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the League's proposed bill were distributed across the province Le Devoir and La 
Presse distributed 50 000 and 100 000 copies respectively. Le Solei! carried a full 
page advertisement and 50 000 information packages were sent to individuals and 
organizations.633 Members of the executive council participated in radio shows, 
television programs, newspaper interviews and various conferences to promote the 
proposal. By the end of 1973 the group had managed to encourage the participation 
of almost 400 groups in the debate on the bill of rights. 634 
A proposal for a provincial bill of rights was completed by May 1973 and 
demonstrated just how far the League had come since Morin's draft ten years earlier. 
All of the basic provisions in the Morin proposal were to be found in the new draft 
with only minor variations. Unlike Morin's draft, however, this new proposal had 
specific provisions for economic and social rights for children, the elderly and the 
handicapped. For instance, it recognized the rights of children to be treated equally 
with adults and for the handicapped to have equal access to public transportation. 
References to collective rights appear in the 1973 draft, whereas Morin focussed 
exclusively on individual rights. 635 Finally, and most telling, it included language 
rights. The proposal would establish French as the official language of Quebec while 
asserting the right of the people and government to act in the protection of their 
language. In such areas as immigration the state was called upon to do all in its 
power to assure the supremacy of the French language. 
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Despite continued efforts to pressure the government to act, nothing 
developed. In a speech before the Canadian Jewish Congress in March 1974, 
Choquette made it clear that "si cette Charte n'a pas ete presentee jusqu'a date, c'est 
en large partie a cause de la difficultue de reconcilier, dans la domaine linguistique, 
les aspirations de la majorite franc;ais au Quebec de voir exister et se developper une 
vie culturelle franc;aise meme economique avec, ce qui est aussi important, le droit de 
ceux qui sont ici et qui sont deja integres, dans la minorite anglophone, d'exercer leur 
libre choix en matiere d'education et en matiere de communication avec leurs proches 
ou dans leurs affaires."636 
Then, in late 1974, the Bourassa government introduced Bill22. With the 
controversial issue of language rights solved for the Bourassa government, it could 
now move towards implementing a bill of rights. 
The efforts of the LDH (the United Council for Human Rights had by now 
become defunct) had clearly paid off when, in the speech from the throne in 1974 
announcing the government's intention to introduce language legislation, the 
government committed itselfto a bill ofrights.637 By March 1974 a committee ofthe 
Department of Justice began a study on a potential bill of rights and solicited input 
from the LDH. Months later, on 29 October 1974, the government introduced Bill 
50: Loi sur les droits et libertes de la personne. Led by Champagne, the LDH 
expressed both support and concern over Bill 50 before a legislative committee. In 
many ways the Bill was far ahead of most provincial human rights codes in Canada 
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and the section on the proposed Human Rights Commission represented about 70 
percent of the LDH's own recommendations, including provisions to ensure its 
independence by requiring it to report directly to the National Assembly.638 But the 
legislation had some significant flaws. Section 60 limited the Commission's 
investigations to cases of discrimination whereas the League hoped the Commission 
could have a broader mandate to investigate all complaints as well as take on 
educational activities. There was also no provision for a right to access to 
information and the LDH felt the Charter should include a clause asserting 
francophones' right to self-determination. 639 
The final version of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
passed in 1975, owed a great deal to the efforts ofthe LDH (and, in particular, to 
Champagne who led the LDH at the time and would be remembered years later as one 
of the architects of the Charter).640 A few months before the legislation was passed, 
the Quebec representative to a conference of human rights ministers in British 
Columbia credited the LDH with being the leading influence on Bill50.641 In the 
debate in the National Assembly on the proposed legislation, no group except the 
LDH was mentioned, with the official opposition pointing to the LDH's demand for a 
paramountcy clause to support its own call to make the legislation dominant.642 The 
first eight articles of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms incorporated the 
recommendations of the 1966 Civil Rights Committee which Frank Scott chaired 
while a board member for the LDH. There were also specific provisions for the 
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protection of the elderly and children in both the proposed and final draft Charter. As 
mentioned earlier, the section on the Commission was predominantly copied from the 
LDH proposal. Small changes in wording and the inclusion of certain clauses such as 
civil status and social condition (as opposed to social origin) as a category of 
discrimination, while changing references to 'men' to 'human beings' and including a 
right to information as provided by law emerged from the LDH brief.643 Language 
rights were not included in the final version of the bill and the LDH did not discuss 
language rights in its presentation before the Parliamentary committee, most likely 
since Bill22 had just been passed. Perhaps the LDH's greatest success was to 
convince the government to make the Charter a fundamental law of the province, an 
issue it had vigorously promoted alongside the Parti quebecois whose parliamentary 
leader, Morin, had drafted a bill of rights in 1963 endorsed by the LDH. Choquette 
vigorously opposed a paramountcy clause out of concern that the application of the 
Charter to existing legislation would cause widespread instability. In the end he 
partially relented, agreeing to insert a section to ensure that all future laws would be 
required to conform to the Charter (unless explicitly stated otherwise) and that two-
thirds of the National Assembly would have to consent to amend the human rights 
statute in the future. 644 
With the passing of a Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the League 
basked in what would be its greatest accomplishment. The group peaked in 1975 
with high levels of funding, several full time staff, a highly active ODD, a book length 
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publication on abortion and various other public policy initiatives wherein the LDH 
was consulted on proposed legislation. At the same time, a fundamental ideological 
shift had occurred within the organization with its new approach to rights activism. 
Not coincidentally, this ideological shift was linked with the rise of French Canadian 
nationalism and the Quiet Revolution. Nationalists transformed the LDH with 
positions on language rights and self-determination. Parallelling these developments 
was the strengthening of the political Left in the province, symbolised not only in the 
ideology of the FLQ and the rising power of organized labour, but as well in the rise 
of the social democratic Parti quebecois in the 1970s. 
The LDH and the Federation 
These transition years were also marked by a stronger relationship with other 
social movement organizations. For years the LDH had remained relatively aloof 
from other rights associations except to produce a bilingual version of the CCLA's 
booklet, Arrest and Detention, for distribution in Quebec.645 But during the transition 
years it was becoming increasingly involved with other rights associations. This 
desire to branch out beyond Quebec was evident from the group's involvement in the 
founding of the Federation. Since the LDH was heavily state-funded it did not share 
the CCLA's qualms about government funding. By the mid-1970s the LDH had 
overtaken the BCCLA as the second largest rights association in Canada, and its 
presence on the Federation's board also had an important symbolic role because the 
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LDH was the dominant francophone rights association in the country. Although the 
LDH never hesitated to take on national issues outside the Federation, such as 
abortion, it coordinated briefs with the Federation, supported Federation initiatives, 
and allowed the Federation to act as its spokesperson on such key issues as the 
McDonald commission investigation into RCMP illegal activities in the seventies. 
Maintaining strong ties with other rights associations was an important aspect 
of the LDH's work, although the organization did not consider it a major priority. For 
the LDH, the Federation offered the prospect of a stronger voice at the national level 
on those occasions when it dabbled in national issues.646 The leaders of the LDH also 
saw their role as offering an alternative ideological approach to rights activism. In a 
predominantly anglophone organization, the LDH insisted on recognizing collective 
as well as social, economic and cultural rights: "Si on rappelle que les anglophones 
sont surtout orientes vers la lutte pour les libertes civiles, I' influence de la Ligue des 
droits de l'homme apparait encore plus grande quant aux libertes de Ia personne" 
(italics added).647 
New Orientations and Divisions: 1975-1982 
The passing of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms was the 
cornerstone of the second major transformation in the League's priorities since its 
formation in 1963. For years, the group had taken on the responsibilities of a human 
rights commission in Quebec. It instituted educational programs to promote 
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awareness of rights, lobbied the government to change legislation to protected rights, 
and mediated rights abuses between private citizens. All these responsibilities would 
now be taken up by the Quebec Human Rights Commission. 
The Implications of Success: State Funding 
With the creation of the Human Rights Commission the League also lost one 
of the key guiding influences in the new orientation established in 1972: Maurice 
Champagne. While Rene Hurtubise, a Quebec judge and former president of the 
League (1964), was appointed president of the Commission, Champagne left the 
League to take the position of Vice-President of the Commission, further evidence of 
the impact of the LDH in the passing of the Charter. Before leaving, Champagne 
presented a final brief to the association as a type of mini-manifesto to help guide the 
group along its second major period of transition. It did not chart any new ideological 
paths for the organization and, in fact, the fundamental orientation established in the 
early 1970s remained constant throughout these years. Instead, Champagne 
encouraged the group to expand its grass roots base in order to become a broad-based 
organization representing various sectors of the community. Using rights discourse, 
the League could bring together youth, prisoners, minorities and other collectivities to 
achieve social peace.648 
One of the unexpected implications of the Charter, however, was a financial 
crisis. With the establishment of a Human Rights Commission, the Bourassa 
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government no longer felt the need to provide generous funding to the League. At the 
same time, the federal government was reviewing its own funding program. 
However, the federal government's decision to withdraw its own grant was associated 
with the League's language policy. In 1976 the League accused the federal 
government of trying to influence its controversial language policy by withholding 
financial support. There was a clear lesson to be learned: government funding was 
not always unconditional.649 A hastily convened press conference bringing the issue 
to light managed to convince the federal government to reinstate its grant.650 What 
began as a major financial crisis soon settled into a reduced budget for 1976 ($75 747) 
and some staff cuts.651 The financial crisis forced the organization to seek out 
members as a basis of support for the first time, and in 1977 it had accumulated $3 7 
811 in membership fees alone, almost 30 percent of the budget. By 1977 it had 
approximately 2000 individual members and 100 member organizations, making it 
the second largest rights association in Canada behind the CCLA which had a little 
over 3000 members. For at least one year, the LDH was no longer fully dependent on 
state funding. 
The LDH's daily activities and tactics continued much the same as it had done 
since 1972. The League educated people about their rights, formed action groups 
among victims of abuse (i.e., women and elderly), conducted research, presented 
briefs to government and developed relationships with local, national and 
international groups. Notably, there continued to be little courtroom activity. 
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Whereas the BCCLA, and as will be seen the CCLA, often sought out the courts for 
the defence of individuals' rights, the League's focus on social justice was not 
conducive to spending precious resources on legal action. It hired lawyers for a 
couple of days per week and, working with volunteer lawyers, provided people with 
advice and consultations pro bono. Yet this remained a marginal aspect of the 
group's work and by 1982 the association had not taken a single case to court. 
National Security and The Montreal Olympics 
As the LDH entered into this new period an event of international significance 
gripped the city and the country for a short while. In 1976, the Olympics came to 
Montreal and with it increased government repression. There were two particular 
causes taken up by the LDH during the Olympics which occupied much of the 
group's work in 1976.652 The first was designed to deal with the housing crisis caused 
by a massive surge in visitors to the city and skyrocketing rental costs. Individuals and 
families with low incomes were kicked out of their homes so that ambitious landlords 
could profit off the games, creating a minor housing crisis in the city. In one press 
release, the League estimated there was a shortage of 25 000 living units during the 
Olympics.653 In conjunction with the United Way, the League set up a call centre to 
inform renters of their rights and attempted to help them find temporary lodging 
during the Olympics.654 Meanwhile, the LDH's new housing committee organized 
protests against the destruction of low income housing and called upon the city and 
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landlords to improve housing conditions, including a march of 150 residents 
demanding heat, hot water and potable water in their homes. In the case of the latter, 
the city responded by sending housing inspectors and cistern trucks.655 
The Olympics also caused a minor stir after a series of firings from the 
committee organizing the Olympics (Comite Organisateur des Jeux Olympiques). 
These firings resulted from RCMP reports labelling particular individuals as security 
risks. None of those fired were given reasons or explanations; they were simply 
dismissed. It soon became clear, however, that the individuals in question were fired 
for their political opinions, in direct violation of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms. Fran9ois Cyr and Sylvie Cameron were militant members of the 
Revolutionary Marxist Group, Carol Cohen was an organizer for the Young Socialists 
and Stuart Russell was a militant for the Young Socialists and the Ligue socialiste 
ouvriere as well as the Comtie Homosexuel Anti-Repression.656 Initially the Human 
Rights Commission refused the League's overtures for an investigation because 
certain parts of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms were not yet operative.657 
Eventually, after continued pressure from the League, the Commission attempted to 
investigate the matter only to be turned back by the federal Solicitor General, Francis 
Fox, who used the broad discretionary powers of his office to refuse providing 
information on the RCMP for reasons of national security.658 
From the Ligue des droits de l 'homme to the Ligue des droits et libertes 
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In 1977, the resignation of Simone Chartrand and Norman Caron from the 
staff of the League signalled the rising dominance of the committees within the 
association. With the departure of Maurice Champagne in 1975, Normand Caron had 
taken over as Director General with Simone Chartrand as his assistant. By 1977 the 
two were gone and their positions eliminated and replaced by a general coordinator 
and researcher. The energy and dedication brought to the organization by Caron and 
Chartrand dissipated with their absence and the staff became more concerned with 
simply maintaining the organization while the committees were responsible for most 
of the new initiatives. These were the beginnings of the core divisions which would 
plague the League in the following years as the group became increasingly 
decentralized, a situation made worse by limited leadership from the administrative 
council. 
Between 1977 and 1979 a host of new committees emerged. One of the 
committees formed during this period was a women's committee which evolved into 
an Office of Women, although it never achieved the same prominence as the ODD. 
In fact, it seems to have accomplished little early on except to convince the League to 
change its name in 1978 to the Ligue des droits et libertes (the English name, Civil 
Liberties Union, remained unchanged) to remove the gendered aspect ofthe group's 
title.659 
National Security and Operation Liberti 
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Committees on the handicapped, aboriginals, workers and academic freedom 
were also formed. After the provincial appeals court denied a request by the Keable 
commission on 21 February to access federal government records on the RCMP, a 
national security committee was launched within the League. Jean F Keable had been 
appointed by the Parti quebecois government on 15 June 1977 to investigate 
allegations of wrongdoing by the RCMP with a mandate similar to that of the 
McDonald commission (discussed in the following chapter). Keable's failure to 
access RCMP documents because the federal Solicitor General used his power to 
block access for reasons of national security infuriated those who were critical of the 
McDonald commission and wanted an independent Quebec inquiry. Within a month 
of the appeals court decision (later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada) 
Operation Liberte was launched by the national security committee at a colloquium in 
May at the University of Montreal. The colloquium brought together 400 people 
representing dozens of groups, including the three large union centrales, to discuss the 
ways in which police were using national security to abuse individual rights. Among 
the concerns raised at the meeting was the use of electronic listening devices, mail 
opening, police promoting criminal activities such as stealing arms and explosives, 
harassing individuals and organizations, and utilising medical dossiers.660 It soon 
began publishing a newsletter, Operation Iiberti, with a circulation of 100 000 for its 
first issue in 1978. 
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As with the ODD and its call for the elimination of all prisons, the work of the 
national security committee demonstrated the broader approach to rights proffered by 
the League. It offered a radical Left-wing critique against social and political 
institutions. In a publication entitled Mounting Repression: Its Meaning and 
Importance in Canada and Quebec, the RCMP was portrayed as an institution 
defending the interests of Canadian and American capitalists. Its main purpose was to 
intervene against labour, undermine revolutionary movements and harass individuals 
and groups promoting socialism. The expansion of national security measures, 
including spying on unions and other Left wing organizations, was explained as a 
manifestation of the economic crisis in the capitalist system caused by the recent 
economic depression which led the federal government to impose wage and price 
controls. Among the regulations highlighting the new national security state were 
article 41 of the Federal Court Act (introduced December 1970) allowing judges to 
keep certain documents inaccessible to the public if related to national security; 
privacy legislation allowing police to use wiretaps; citizenship regulations allowing 
the refusal of citizenship for people deemed a national security risk; the 1977 federal 
Human Rights Act refusing individuals access to their personal dossiers if deemed 
necessary for reasons of national security; and immigration regulations passed in 1977 
allowing security certificates to deny entry or deport those considered national 
security risks without having to justify the action. Operation liberte was mandated to 
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combat the emerging national security state by cementing alliances and presenting a 
common front against all new initiatives justified for reasons of national security.661 
Unsurprisingly, many of the members of the national security committee were 
also members of the Parti quebecois. 662 Since the mid-1970s members of the 
separatist party had begun playing a more prominent role in the LDH, although the 
association never adopted a policy of outright support for separation and did not 
endorse the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association. The Parti quebecois' 
original platform was far more social democratic and oriented towards social reform 
than any of the other political parties, and thus had more in common with the post-
1972 orientation ofthe LDH. The LDH had also broken with the past by staking out 
positions on self-determination and language rights, two issues which were at the core 
of the Parti quebecois' politics. It is thus impossible to divorce the LDH from broader 
movements occurring within Quebec in the seventies. 
Crisis Within the League 
By 1979 the LDH had become so decentralized that it no longer reflected the 
organization once run efficiently by Champagne, Caron and Chartrand. The 
administrative council was providing little leadership.663 Facing further cutbacks in 
1979 from government grants, the administrative council decided to cut members of 
the staff. But the unionised staff favoured non-hierarchical and equal pay policies and 
refused to accept the decision of the administrative council; coupled with existing 
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personality clashes, the staff decided to quit in unison in 1979.664 For two months the 
LDH was paralysed with the only employee being Jean Claude Bernheim, the non-
unionized ODD staff member. Only one staff member was hired in 1979 and for the 
next two years the LDH operated with a small budget and limited staff. Divisions 
within the League continued to hamper its ability to work collectively. Two members 
of the administrative council, Elizabeth Roussel and Andre Legault, resigned from 
their posts in the administrative council in 1980 convinced the council had became a 
useless body providing no direction or leadership.665 
As a result of the divisions and tribulations in 1979-80, the League was 
generally inactive; most of the other committees were either defunct or doing little as 
a result of minimal resources or lack of direction. Nonetheless, the ODD achieved a 
major success by getting the provincial vote for prisoners. Under provincial election 
law prisoners were not specifically denied the vote, yet they were denied the facilities 
to exercise their democratic rights. For years the ODD had sent letters, distributed 
press releases and met with government officials demanding prisoners be given the 
right to vote. Finally, in 1979, the government acceded and prisoners in Quebec were 
allowed to vote for the first time in the referendum in 1980.666 Unfortunately, the vote 
continued to be denied to federal prisoners in federal elections, but it was nonetheless 
a significant victory in the mission to recognize the rights of prisoners in the province 
of Quebec. 
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Between 1980 and the group's twentieth anniversary in 1983, the League 
experience a revival of sorts. With the mass resignation of the five staff members in 
1979 and their replacement with a new staff, tensions within the organization declined 
and the association was able to focus its energies on securing more funding. In 1980 
the group could boast a budget of$210 755.667 Most of its revenue came through 
government grants; in 1981 the group only amassed $8 429 from members. The one 
exception to the group's dependence on state funding was money for the ODD which 
was provided by the United Way. This source of revenue was threatened, however, 
when the ODD published a Charter of the Rights of Prisoners in 1980 with a 
provision suggesting prisoners had a right to escape given the conditions under which 
they were held.668 United Way officials threatened to cut off funding unless the LDH 
issued a declaration retracting the clause, but the ODD and the LDH remained 
adamant in its stand that its policies could not be dictated by outside funding donors: 
"La Ligue a toujours refuse qu'un bailleur de fonds, quel qu'il soit, nous dite nos 
lignes de conduite et nos positions. C'est le genre de compromission que nous 
trouvons tout a fait inacceptable. Un organisme comme le notre ne peut accepter 
d'avoir les mains liees par de telles contraintes."669 As a result, within a few years its 
funds were cut off and the group was once again fully dependent on state funding. 
Nonetheless, the new staffhired in 1980-1 was able to reorganize the League 
and place it back on its collective feet. Since 1979 the group had been haemorrhaging 
elected members and having a hard time getting quorum. The group lost its status as 
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a charity organization because it had failed to submit reports; membership lists were 
lost; there was little contact with the membership and the only two active committees 
were the aboriginal committee and ODD. By 1982 the new staff had helped 
reinvigorate committees on immigration, health and social services, national security 
and youth. The administrative council was finally achieving a regular quorum and a 
new full time coordinator was hired, alongside a secretary and a part time bookkeeper. 
A newsletter was also organized to provide information to the membership on the 
activities of the League. For twenty years the League had never bothered to publish a 
newsletter, most likely since its funding came from the state and not the membership, 
but its revival in the early 1980s led to the publication of the League's first official 
newsletter.670 Thanks to these new efforts the organization was able to boast a level 
of activity it had lacked for several years. 
The period from 197 5 to 1982 proved to be the most difficult in the history of 
the League but it managed to end on a positive note. In 1982 the LDH hosted the first 
meeting in North America of the Federation International des Droits de l'homme for 
which the League was the Canadian representative. Gilles Tardif, League president, 
was elected a Vice President of the international organization. With the passing of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 a new era opened up for the League, one in 
which the courts would play a prominent role in the defence of rights. Most 
importantly for the organization itself, it had survived a difficult period in which its 
purpose and internal cohesion were under attack, and it emerged by 1982 intact and 
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on healthy footing. A new beginning was underway for the second oldest and second 
largest rights association in the country. 
Conclusion 
By the 1980s the LDH had embraced an expansive approach to human rights 
activism in contrast to the minimalist approach of civil liberties groups such as the 
BCCLA. The LDH employed rights discourse to demand recognition of the 
economic, social and cultural needs of the elderly, youth, disabled, francophones and 
others. No civil liberties association in Canada had ever suggested that prisoners had 
a right to escape because of their living conditions, that the state's violations of 
individual rights for national security reasons were linked to the crisis facing 
capitalism, or that extensive economic, social and cultural rights should be recognized 
in human rights legislation. 
Yet, as we can see in the history of the League, even an organization dedicated 
to an expansive interpretation of human rights had little in the way of a grass roots 
following. By the mid-1970s the LDH was arguably far more representative of its 
community than its fellow rights associations, with ex-prisoners, women, aboriginals 
and others joining the group. But it remained dominated by educated, middle class 
professionals, which was consistent with most social movement organizations which 
relied on experts instead of mass mobilization. In addition, the focus on mobilizing 
small numbers of skilled activists was undoubtedly a result of state funding and its 
296 
ability to function without having to recruit large numbers of constituents. Even 
when the LDH was required by necessity to build up a large membership base, it had 
a weak relationship with its membership except through dues and donations. The 
association's professed goal of promoting a 'societe de participation,' which was 
manifested most clearly in its campaign for a provincial bill of rights, was a rare 
example of a rights association employing a strategy that required mobilizing large 
segments of the population to promote change. The bill of rights campaign remains a 
rare instance when the LDH abandoned insider tactics in favour of mass mobilization 
in its formative years. 
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Chapter Ten: 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
On the night of 11 May 1974, undercover agents from the RCMP and Niagara 
Regional Police slowly crept into the Landmark Motor Inn Hotel in Fort Erie, 
Ontario, in preparation for a massive drug raid. Without a warrant but under the 
authority of a writ of assistance authorized through the Narcotic Control Act, 50 
police officers prepared to storm the hotel in search of heroin and marijuana. 
Although three of the officers had been recognized by drug dealers who quickly left 
the scene, the raid went ahead. Approximately 115 patrons were arrested and 
detained. All35 women were herded into the woman's washroom, stripped and 
subjected to vaginal and anal searches; those who refused to comply were threatened 
with having a male officer come into the room and force the search on them. 
Meanwhile, only seven of the male patrons were similarly searched. With the 
searches completed, the bounty of the raid become depressingly clear: 6 ounces of 
marijuana were found, and most of it lying on the floor, not in people's orifices. 
According to a later Globe and Mail editorial, "considering the manner in which the 
raid was conducted, according to testimony from the mouths of the officers who 
planned and executed it, it is highly probable that the Niagara Regional Police has 
succeeded in making itself the laughing stock of its community; that is, among people 
who aren't afraid to go out to have a drink for fear that they'll end up stark naked and 
leaning spread eagled against some washroom wall."671 
This monumental blunder was not without serious consequences. Media 
coverage was extensive across Ontario and the Toronto papers, notably the Globe and 
Mail and the Toronto Star, covered the story almost continually throughout May to 
August 1974.672 Solicitor General for Ontario, George Kerr, promised an 
investigation by the Ontario Police Commission. Rights activists, led by the Toronto-
based Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), called on the Ontario 
government to appoint an independent inquiry to avoid the possibility of a cover up 
by a Police Commission investigating its own officers. A rally organized by the 
CCLA in June 1974 was attended by nearly 1000 people from the Niagara Falls 
region with speakers including writer and journalist Pierre Berton as well as political 
figures and members of the Ontario Federation of Labour who endorsed the demand 
for an independent inquiry. Bowing to public pressure stimulated by the press and the 
CCLA, Kerr created an inquiry under Justice J.A. Pringle. Although Pringle's report 
would later acknowledge that the police were within their powers under the Narcotic 
Control Act to raid the Inn based on a mere suspicion of drug use, he called the raid 
'foolish' and 'unnecessary'. Both Pringle and Kerr called on the federal government 
to clarify and narrow the powers of police when searching for drugs.673 
The events surrounding the Fort Erie drug raid represent the central themes in 
the history of the CCLA. Created ten years before the Fort Erie affair in the wake of 
another scandal surrounding excessive police powers, much of the early history of the 
CCLA until the Charter was dominated by the desire to curb police abuse of powers 
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and see the implementation of a independent review board for civilian complaints of 
police actions. In its brief to the Pringle Commission, the CCLA (the only group to 
present a brief) was critical of the system of police investigating police and suggested 
that "the concept of self-investigation is, to say the least, structurally uninspiring."674 
Police abuse and a civilian complaint system were key issues throughout the group's 
first 18 years of operation but by no means its only priorities. Free speech, religious 
exercises in public schools, due process, native poverty and the rights of welfare 
recipients were among the central causes adopted by the CCLA in its early years. 
This chapter examines the early history of the CCLA and its unique place 
among the second generation of rights associations. Its history brings to the fore 
questions about the impact of state funding, the viability of forming a national 
association and the ideological divide between civil liberties and human rights 
activism. 
No group contrasts more deeply with human rights organizations such as the 
LDH than the CCLA. Whereas the post-1972 LDH promoted social, economic and 
cultural rights, the CCLA embraced a negative conception of freedom and focussed 
its efforts on the defence of civil and political rights. The LDH was one ofthe key 
founders ofthe Federation while the CCLA sought to establish itself as the country's 
only viable national rights organization. As of 1970 the LDH, and most rights 
associations in Canada, accepted government funding, in contrast to the CCLA's 
consistent refusals. Thus, the CCLA evolved into the largest group in terms of 
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membership. Although the LDH occasionally had lawyers provide free advice to 
people off the street, legal action remained a peripheral aspect of the organization's 
activities compared to the CCLA which brought dozens of cases to court, several of 
them to the Supreme Court of Canada. Finally, no other organization exemplifies the 
evolving relationship between organized labour (a leader in the human rights 
movement since the 1930s) and contemporary rights associations. It is clear that, in 
the case of the Canadian Labour Congress, the leading labour organization in the 
country increasingly deferred to rights associations such as the CCLA in leading 
human rights campaigns. 
First Steps: 1964-1968 
'It Makes The Quebec Padlock Law Look Like The Bill of Rights': Bill 99 
As the birth-mother of the CCLA, Bill 99 (Ontario Police Bill) seemed an 
innocuous piece of legislation. In first reading in March 1964, Attorney General 
Frank Cass characterized the legislation as simply a series of amendments to the 
Police Act to define and clarify the powers of the Ontario Police Cornrnission.675 
Once the press realized the contents of the legislation, however, a political 
controversy erupted that would only be settled with the resignation of the Attorney 
General and the appointment of the McRuer Royal Commission on Civil Rights. 
According to Walter Tarnopolsky, a constitutional expert and future leader ofthe 
CCLA, the incident "illustrates both the extent to which Parliament and the provincial 
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legislatures may restrict rights and freedoms deemed to be fundamental, and the 
power of an aroused public opinion to force even those legislatures which are 
dominated by a government party having an overwhelming majority to revoke 
provisions which are believed to be too drastic for the ends sought to be achieved. "676 
Organized crime was increasingly perceived in the early 1960s as a problem in 
Ontario. Following a speech in the legislature by Liberal opposition leader John 
Wintermeyer in 1961 in which he claimed that organized crime was rampant, the 
provincial government appointed Justice W.D. Roach to investigate the level of 
organized crime in Ontario. Roach concluded in his report, submitted on 15 March 
1963, that organized crime had not reached dangerous levels although it was certainly 
present.677 Convinced the Roach inquiry was incomplete, the newly established 
Ontario Police Commission persuaded the Attorney General of the need for a 
continuous investigation into the impact of organized crime. Cass agreed, but the 
Commission soon found itself unsure about its ability to hold in camera hearings and 
detain suspects, and the Attorney General himself questioned the Commission's 
powers under the current legislation. The solution was Bill 99. Under the new bill, 
the notorious section 14 allowed the Commission to arrest and detain individuals 
without notifying their next of kin, deny them access to legal counsel, and jail them 
for eight days if they refused to testify before the Commission. Bail and the right to 
appeal were withheld. Should witnesses continue to frustrate the Commission they 
could be held almost indefinitely for 8 day periods, and those who testified were 
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subject to a $2000 fine and a year in jail if they or anyone else revealed information 
presented before the Commission.678 The new leader of the Liberals, Farquhar Oliver, 
called on the government to retract the bill or call an immediate election. In Ottawa, 
J.W. Pickersgill suggested the bill made the Quebec Padlock Act look like the Bill of 
Rights.679 
It did not take long for the media to condemn Bill 99 and demand its removal. 
One Toronto Star editorial appearing on the front page within 24 hours of the 
legislation being introduced suggested that it was 
the most offensive and dangerous legislation ever introduced in 
Ontario. It was brought in like a thief in the night- slipped through the 
Conservative caucus when only 12 members were present, and 
introduced to the Legislature under the pretence that it was concerned 
only with police pensions and other routine matters. Now that its real 
nature is known, the Legislature should lose no time in rejecting it.680 
Eventually, section 14 was replaced with a new section clearly detailing the rights of 
witnesses before the Commission, including the right to counsel, habeas corpus and 
other remedies, and the rights of witnesses guaranteed under the Evidence Act and in 
civil court. In camera sessions could only be held at the behest of the witness.681 
Cass was replaced by A.A. Wishart as Attorney General and the McRuer commission 
was soon appointed. However, the most enduring legacy of Bill 99 was 
unquestionably the creation of the CCLA. 
Since the late 1950s, the Association for Civil Liberties had been effectively 
moribund. It existed only on paper with Irving Himel, a prominent Toronto Jewish 
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lawyer, as its sole member and leader. The police bill spurred Himel to reinvent the 
group. He brought together a collection of prominent members ofthe Toronto 
community with an interest in civil liberties to form the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (CCLA) and transferred the remaining $10 000 from the accounts ofthe 
Association for Civil Liberties to the CCLA. The CCLA officially came into being at 
a meeting at Osgoode Hall on 11 February 1965 although its early years would prove, 
as was the situation with all rights associations during this period, a struggle for 
simple survival.682 
Staffing and Funding the CCLA 
As was the case in the early years of the LDH and the BCCLA, the CCLA was 
a relatively elitist organization. The CCLA's president was J. Keiller Mackay, former 
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario and famous for having presided over the Drummond 
Wren case in 1945, where he ruled restrictive covenants illegal.683 Among its other 
more notable founding members were Professor Harry Arthurs (Osgoode Hall Law 
School), June Callwood (writer), Pierre Berton (writer, journalist), Abraham Feinberg 
(rabbi emeritus of Holy Blossom Temple), Professors Edward McWhinney, Mark 
MacGuigan and Bora Laskin (University of Toronto Law School), Reverend Donald 
Gilles (Bloor Street United Church), Ron Haggart (Toronto Star columnist) and 
lawyers Glen Howe and Sidney Midanik. Julian Porter, a young lawyer and son of 
Chief Justice Dana Porter of Ontario, was the part time counsel for the organization, 
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Himel was chair of the Board of Directors and Doris Dodds (founder of the Ethical 
Education Association to oppose religious instruction in public schools) served as the 
executive secretary.684 Many of the CCLA's founders would go on to have highly 
distinguished careers. For example, Bora Laskin became Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court and Mark MacGuigan would serve as Minister of Justice as well as 
External Affairs under Trudeau. As with the BCCLA and LDH, this was clearly a 
middle class, caucasian, male-dominated organization. 
Members were to provide the bulk of the group's funding, although 
surprisingly (for a group later famous for refusing state funding) there was an attempt 
to secure state funding a few years after it was formed. 685 A request by Sidney Linden 
to the Secretary of State for a grant in 1966 was refused and it was the first and last 
time the CCLA ever sought money from the govemment.686 As with the BCCLA and 
the LDH, in its initial years funding for the organization was minimal and desperate. 
As part of the revitalization of the CCLA and distancing itself from the Association 
for Civil Liberties, the new group hoped to establish a permanent office with paid 
employees (the Association for Civil Liberties was voluntary and had no office). But 
the group was forced to close its office and dismiss its staff due to lack of funds in 
November 1966 (having peaked at 330 members), only to be saved from ruin by a $10 
000 operating grant from the Atkinson Foundation. After this, the group's funding 
improved substantially with an $80 000 grant in 1967 from the estate of Clement 
Wells which allowed them to hire a full time general counsel.687 
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When the CCLA was created in 1964, it joined an already vigorous human 
rights movement in Ontario. Under the leadership of Alan Borovoy, a young lawyer 
trained at the University of Toronto, the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights 
was easily the most active of the JLC's human rights committees. As previously 
noted, most of the work of the labour committees centred around discrimination 
issues. The CCLA also had the advantage of operating in a province, unlike the LDH 
(until1975), with a well funded and active Human Rights Commission. Ontario had 
been the first province to pass a Human Rights Code and the first to employ full time 
commission staff. However, there were critical distinctions among the CCLA, the 
Human Rights Commission and the labour committees. From its inception, members 
of the CCLA saw themselves focussing on civil liberties issues such as censorship 
and due process of law, while discrimination cases were to be left primarily to the 
Human Rights Commission and JLC.688 By the early 1970s labour's human rights 
program would be on the decline and the CCLA would be on the rise as the dominant 
rights association in the province, with a host of other rights associations emerging in 
cities throughout Ontario. Between 1964 and 1968, however, the CCLA was a small, 
young association struggling to survive. 
Early Activism: Free Speech 
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The CCLA accomplished very little in its initial years but remained true to its 
concern with civil and political rights As its first act in January 1965, the group sent 
out letters and press releases protesting a bylaw passed by the Police Commission 
empowering police officers to censor signs used in parades and processions. 689 In 
April1965, Porter and Mackay presented a brief to the McRuer Royal Commission 
on Civil Rights, calling for the end of religious practices in public schools, stricter 
regulation of electronic eavesdropping, an end to any form of government censorship, 
reforming the bail system which discriminated against the poor and compensation for 
victims of police abuse.690 A few months later the CCLA came to the defence of 
Dorothy Cameron, a local gallery owner who had paintings seized by police during an 
exhibit entitled Eros '65. The paintings were seized under the vague obscenity 
provisions of the Criminal Code which the CCLA considered too broad and sought to 
challenge all the way to the country's highest court only to be denied the right to 
appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada.691 This was the first major case the CCLA 
took to court (reaching the Ontario Appeals Court which ruled against Cameron) and 
would represent the first of many cases the organization would pursue with the help 
of volunteer lawyers in Toronto. 
Free speech issues dominated the organization in its early years. When 
violence erupted at Allan Gardens in response to a speech by a self-styled Nazi, John 
Beattie, City Council chose to enact a bylaw allowing it to ban public speaking 
permits if there was the potential for violence. Although opposed to the content of 
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Beattie's speech, the CCLA supported his right to speak and fruitlessly lobbied City 
Council to remove the bylaw. 692 Two years later the Police Commission passed a 
bylaw empowering police officers to remove people or groups from Nathan Phillips 
square if they did not have permission from city council.693 Once again, the CCLA 
unsuccessfully lobbied against this limitation on free speech.694 Finally, in the same 
year, the CCLA challenged a decision by the Police Commission to re-route an anti-
Vietnam parade from Yonge street to Bay street.695 
In its early years the CCLA had established itself not only as a defender of free 
speech, but a dedicated observer of police activities and attempts to expand police 
powers. But it was a slow start. It was still a young organization with minimal staff 
and exposure in the community. Without the Atkinson grant in 1966 and the estate 
grant in 1967 the CCLA could very well have folded early on. It was unusual for such 
a young organization, barely a few years old, to receive such generous donations, and 
the success of the CCLA in gaining private funding was no doubt facilitated by being 
located in Ontario (the Atkinson foundation was only for organizations in Ontario) 
and its elitist leadership, with several well known Canadians such as Pierre Berton 
and Keiller MacKay vouching for the group. It was also in these initial years when 
the group established the key priorities to guide the organization for the next 15 years: 
free speech and police practices. 
Entrenchment Years: 1968-1977 
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Alan Borovoy 
Few rights organizations, as is the case for many social movement 
organizations, manage to survive without the services of one particularly dedicated 
individual. Reg Robson in Vancouver, Maurice Champagne in Montreal and, as will 
be seen in the following chapter, Biswarup Bhattahcharya in St. John's, were 
absolutely critical in making their respective rights association viable and effective. 
This was no less the case with the CCLA. Until 1968 the group struggled to survive, 
both financially and organizationally, but the hiring of Alan Borovoy in 1968 with 
funds from the Atkinson foundation and the Clement Wells estate was the single most 
important development in the history of the CCLA. 
Borovoy had earned a Bachelor's degree and LLB by 1956. By the time the 
CCLA recruited Borovoy in 1968 to be its General Counsel, he had already 
distinguished himself with the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights. In 1961 
he had organized activists in Halifax and attracted a great deal of attention in taking 
up the cause of the residents of Africville, which led to the formation of the Halifax 
Advisory Committee on Human Rights. A year later he was at the centre of a 
successful lobby to introduce legislation against racial discrimination in Ontario. 
When natives from Kenora approached Borovoy about discrimination and limited 
government services, it was Borovoy who organized a large protest march to City 
Hall with hundreds of natives from neighbouring reserves to demand everything from 
telephones to an alcohol treatment centre (which were eventually provided). 
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Borovoy encapsulated many of the qualities of the CCLA as an organization. 
He had an undying faith in the law and its ability to promote tolerance and liberty, 
focussing most of his energies on briefs to government to change legislation or 
seeking redress in the courts. Borovoy was a Jewish lawyer (as was Himel) with an 
appreciation for the plight of minorities, having himself experienced discrimination. 
He had lived and worked all his life in Toronto and, although he travelled extensively, 
most of the issues taken on by the CCLA during this period were Toronto-centred. 
Finally, he was a middle class, white male in an organization which claimed to speak 
on behalf of all equally, yet failed, for instance, to attract many women to its ranks. In 
1971, out of 42 Board members and executives, there were only four women. The 
leadership of the organization consisted primarily of lawyers, academics, journalists, 
unionists and church ministers. 696 The demographics of the organization would 
remain the same until at least the early 1980s. 
State Funding? 
Through its full time staff the CCLA was able to attract more funding and 
membership. In 1968 the CCLA had barely 300 members; by 1977 the association 
could boast more than 3000 members, by far the largest rights association in the 
country (it would have more than 5000 by the early 1980s). While most groups in 
Canada sought government funding, the CCLA was particularly proficient at gaining 
private grants from various foundations. In 1968 the group successfully applied to the 
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Ford Foundation for an $85 000 grant to study due process across Canada.697 In 1973 
the Atkinson Foundation provided another grant of$53 000 to study aboriginals' 
access to legal services in the northern Ontario, while the Laidlaw Foundation 
provided grants of $30 000 in 1971 and $45 900 in 1973 to study the rights of welfare 
recipients across the country. Meanwhile, the United Church of Canada gave the 
CCLA $15 000 in 1973 to help natives in the Kenora region. These grants were 
continually supplemented by various other smaller donations, anywhere from a few 
hundred dollars to a $1000. While membership fees generally covered 90 percent of 
the organization's expenses, these grants allowed the association to conduct extensive 
programs throughout Ontario and, in the case ofthe Ford and Laidlaw grants, across 
Canada. 
'The Insane Are Devil Possessed!': Denominational Education 
Soon after arriving in the CCLA, Borovoy was pleased to see the publication 
of a report which would bolster the CCLA's advocacy in the realm of education. 
Since 1944 Ontario had allowed the exercise of religious practices in public schools 
as well as the teaching of religion by clergy. At the time, roughly half the population 
in Ontario supported the practice.698 But by the sixties, criticism against the use of 
religious exercises and teachings in schools mounted. A combination of increasing 
urbanization and secularism with rising prosperity and declining Sunday school 
attendance, as well as heavy immigration introducing new faiths into the community, 
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all combined with the rising rebelliousness of youth against parental mores to 
undermine support for religious practices in public schools. There were also several 
practical reasons why people objected to the practice. Jewish organizations, for 
obvious reasons, objected to a system of religious instruction based on Christian 
theology. Teachers, many of whom felt unqualified to be teaching scripture, who 
requested an exemption feared retaliation from employers while students allowed to 
stand outside the classroom during the exercises were placed in the same position as 
students being punished. There was also a degree of ostracism for students exempted 
from religious exercises. 
All ofthese concerns were raised by Borovoy in 1966 when he was invited by 
a group of universalists in the small town of Gosfield, 30 miles out of Windsor, to call 
on the school board to remove religious instruction in the school. Several parents in 
the region had been concerned about some ofthe content of the instruction, with 
clergy going so far as to suggest the insane were 'devil possessed' and people with 
strong enough faith could defy gravity.699 It was a failed endeavour, with the school 
board deciding to maintain the practice, but it did engender much publicity in the 
province. Later, in 1967, Borovoy made similar presentations before the Mackay 
committee on behalf of the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights as did the 
CCLA. Mackay, honorary president ofthe CCLA since 1965, had been appointed in 
1966 by the Ontario government to lead an investigation into the implications of 
religious practices in Ontario schools. The report was released soon after Borovoy 
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joined the CCLA. Although the committee concluded in favour of maintaining the 
Lord's Prayer, it otherwise vindicated the position ofBorovoy and the CCLA by 
calling for the removal of all religious practices from public schools.700 
When Borovoy moved from the OCLHR to the CCLA, his crusade against 
religious exercises in public schools in Ontario resumed. He continued to push the 
government of Ontario to implement the recommendations of the Mackay report, 
organizing a delegation to the Minister of Education in 1971 with 60 people 
representing various organizations calling on the minister to implement the report's 
key recommendations.701 Petitions were organized and letters sent to members of the 
government. Yet, the government remained recalcitrant, refusing to change the 
system, claiming it was waiting for an alternative to present itself for teaching 
morality to youths in public schools. One can only speculate as to the reasons why 
the Progressive Conservatives refused to eliminate religious practices in the public 
school system. Many MLAs were undoubtedly concerned about the need to teach 
morality to children and were devout Christians themselves. At the same time, 
Catholics throughout the province had mobilized a large campaign in the 1960s to 
convince the province's three political parties to support full funding for the Catholic 
separate school system. Both the Liberals and NDP supported the measure but the 
Progressive Conservatives, fearing the potential costs to the system, refused. 
Conscious of the strong support the Liberals already enjoyed among Catholics, it is 
probable the Progressive Conservatives feared alienating Catholic voters even more if 
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they eliminated religious practices in public schools.702 For a political party, an issue 
like prayers in schools was also often best left to the status quo lest they court a 
negative public backlash. After all, those who interests feel threatened (those who 
support prayers in schools) were more likely to be vocal critics compared to those 
who have been living with the practice for years. In any event, a large number of 
school boards had discontinued the practice in the 1970s and 1980s, making it a non-
issue for many voters.703 It was not until 1990, following one of the CCLA's most 
successful Charter cases, that religious preachings in schools in Ontario were finally 
discontinued. 704 
The October Crisis 
On the heels of the Mackay committee report in 1969 came the FLQ crisis a 
year later. The CCLA soon found itself embroiled in a national crisis and for the first 
time in its history directed its efforts towards Parliament Hill instead of Queen's Park. 
Whereas the LDH had failed to distinguish itself during the crisis, Le Devoir credited 
the CCLA with being one of the few groups outside Quebec to take a clear stand on 
the crisis.705 As one editorial noted on the extensive support Trudeau enjoyed outside 
Quebec, at the 
height of the crisis brought on by the abduction of Mr. Cross and Mr. 
Laporte, one had the impression that, but for a few voices crying in the 
wilderness, all critical reflection had practically ceased in English-
Canada. The solid, almost dogmatic support which English Canadians 
gave to the governments' decisions (including those which 
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contradicted their strongest traditions) was such that certain dissident 
voices seemed themselves frightened at times of their own isolation.706 
Closer to home the CCLA was powerfully reminded about the support in English 
Canada for the use of emergency powers following a rally of 5000 people on the 
campus of York University in support of Trudeau's actions. One of the few critics at 
the rally to speak out against the government noted the extent to which the crowd was 
in support of the measures: "I have never before or since been afraid of a crowd, never 
feared being tom form limb to limb, but that day I was frightened. The shouts from 
the students that interrupted my speech were frequent and hostile; the visceral hatred 
of the FLQ kidnappers and murderers, and, as I interpreted it, of all Quebecois, was 
palpable. "707 
The most notable aspect of the LDH's inaction, which damned them in the 
eyes of many, was the group's unwillingness to take a definitive stand against the War 
Measures Act and to take the government to task. This was clearly not the case with 
the CCLA. Three days after the War Measures Act was declared, the CCLA 
submitted a brief to the federal cabinet calling for the Act's revocation, arguing that 
the powers had not been justified: "Only the doctrinaire could claim that such harsh 
measures are never justified; but reasonable democrats must insist that the proponents 
of such measures produce the justification."708 Ten days later, the CCLA appeared 
before the Toronto Board of Education to challenge a proposed resolution, similar to 
the one passed by the provincial government in British Columbia, in which teachers 
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would be dismissed for advocating FLQ policies.709 When the Public Order Act was 
passed to ban the FLQ and suspend civil liberties, the CCLA returned to Ottawa with 
another brief with the same position: the government had yet to justify the need to use 
extraordinary powers because the Criminal Code possessed sufficient powers of arrest 
and detention to deal with the kidnappings.710 Letters were sent out to Members of 
Parliament and other organizations to garner their support.711 At a time when the 
LDH was doing little to discourage the federal government from its course of action, 
Borovoy met informally with Justice Minister John Turner in Ottawa in November 
1970 to discuss the situation and consider alternatives.712 
It is difficult to gauge how much influence the CCLA had on the decision 
makers in Ottawa, but it is clear that the organization had access to high level officials 
and was one of the few highly vocal organizations outside Quebec attacking the 
government. A public forum was organized in November 1970 featuring Jean Paul 
Goyer (future Solicitor General). A meeting of rights activists and scholars was 
convened on International Human Rights Day (1 0 December 1970) to discuss the 
implications of emergency powers, and Borovoy appeared on various television and 
radio shows. 713 The October crisis was one of the greatest threats to civil liberties in a 
generation, and the CCLA was swift to act.714 When the federal government 
announced it was considering permanent peacetime emergency legislation, the CCLA 
organized a delegation to meet Turner in March 1971. Perhaps the most compelling 
argument presented in the brief was that it was essentially normal detective work, not 
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emergency powers, which led police to capture Laporte's kidnappers and rescue 
James Cross.715 Whether it was the CCLA or other forces at work, after meeting with 
the CCLA Turner announced to the press that the government was no longer 
committed to peace time emergency legislation. 
The Man in the House Rule: Human Rights and the Welfare State 
The October crisis was assuredly one of the most dramatic episodes in the 
CCLA's history, and the first time since its inception that the group had demonstrated 
its effectiveness at the national level. Soon after the crisis, the association entered a 
new realm of advocacy: the rights of welfare recipients. The creation of the welfare 
state expanded exponentially the ways in which the state interfered in the private lives 
of its citizens. And yet, whereas human rights associations such as the LDH 
embraced the idea of economic and social rights, the CCLA shared the same 
ideological bent as the BCCLA with their mutual concern for negative freedom. In 
other words, the CCLA dealt solely with the administration of welfare and the 
equitable treatment of recipients as opposed to the amount and the nature of welfare 
support. 
Jennifer Smith was a 30 year old woman trying to raise four children in 
Toronto by herself after having been deserted by her husband?16 She was taking 
courses to complete her high school degree and had been on welfare since the mid-
1960s. In 1970 Smith received a letter in the mail with no warning informing her that 
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her welfare was being cut off because she was no longer living as a single person.717 
Denied any right to challenge the decision and having to wait until a Board of Review 
was called, Smith was typical of single mothers who were victims of a welfare system 
eager to cut costs. Single women suspected of having a male in the house, the 
infamous 'man in the house' rule, were denied access to welfare as it was assumed 
males, as breadwinners, would provide for women. The man in the house rule clearly 
discriminated against women, assuming a sexual relationship implied a financial one, 
and the abruptness with which recipients could be denied welfare raised the potential 
for numerous procedural abuses. There were also serious concerns about the tactics 
employed by the welfare office in determining whether women were living as single 
persons. During some surprise visits (all welfare recipients in the 1970s were 
required to sign forms permitting surprise inspections) inspectors would demand to 
know about the most intimate aspects of a recipient's relationships and in some cases 
draw conclusions based on such weak evidence as the presence of open beer cans or a 
raised toilet seat.718 
The man in the house rule and the procedural regulations of the Department of 
Welfare in Toronto were two of many issues raised by the CCLA in briefs and 
correspondence to various Ministers of Family and Social Services in the late 1960s 
and throughout the 1970s. Its work in this field was supported by two generous grants 
from the Laidlaw foundation in 1971 and 1973. A report produced by the CCLA 
based on interviews with 1002 welfare recipients across Canada revealed a host of 
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abuses of the natural rights of welfare recipients and became the basis of much of the 
organization's lobbying work throughout the 1970s.719 The amount of control 
exercised by the welfare department was extensive. Through welfare, the state 
determined how people could eat, where they could live, and what they bought and 
from whom. Welfare procedures at local offices departed significantly from common 
law requirements of due process, requiring recipients to wait for long periods for 
responses. Decision makers were difficult to contact and official conduct was often 
characterized as demeaning. Women with illegitimate children were forced to reveal 
the names of the fathers so the department could seek them out and recover costs.720 
Recipients lived well below the poverty line, receiving an estimated 60 percent of the 
basic amount required to lead a healthy and functionallifestyle. 721 These regulations 
emerged from a system struggling with the inherent contradiction of providing 
welfare while seeking to minimize costs. As the report itself suggested, a "person 
accused of the most heinous crimes enjoys more discernible protection of his 
domestic privacy than does an innocent recipient of public welfare."722 
Through the efforts of the CCLA and anti-poverty groups in Ontario, welfare 
regulations were eventually narrowed through court action and lobbying. One of the 
few requirements attached to the Canada Assistance Plan was that provinces should 
provide appeal boards. Ontario initially resisted, and only through pressure from 
various activist groups did the province finally establish a Board of Review in 1969. 
Although the CCLA's attempt to challenge the provincial regulations dealing with the 
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discretion of the Director of Welfare and the man in the house rule failed in the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, Jennifer Smith eventually had her benefits restored after 
negotiations between the CCLA and the minister.723 In the same year the Smith case 
was decided, the Ontario government passed the Civil Rights Law Amendment Act 
requiring notice in advance of any loss of benefits and allowing recipients to reply in 
writing to defend themselves. A few years later, an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in 
197 5 required welfare officials to demonstrate the existence of a financial relationship 
between a man and a women before cutting off benefits to single women.724 The man 
in the house rule was more resilient despite several attempts by the CCLA in the 
1970s to defeat the regulation in court, lasting until 1986 when threatened court action 
by women's groups to challenge the rule as a violation of the Charter led the Ontario 
government to eliminate the regulation.725 Realizing how few welfare recipients were 
aware of their rights, the CCLA organized a volunteer duty counsel service in 1971 in 
Metropolitan Toronto welfare offices where a volunteer would provide free legal 
advice to welfare recipients visiting the office.726 But it was an uphill battle against a 
government terrified about the soaring costs of welfare in the 1960s and 1970s and 
comfortably entrenched in power. 727 The Progressive Conservatives ruled Ontario 
from 1943 to 1985. 
Police Violence in Ontario 
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Religious education and welfare rights are two examples of the CCLA's 
advocacy program during these years; other issues included native rights, the rights of 
demonstrators, abortion and capital punishment. But no issue captured the 
imagination of the organization more than police abuse of powers and a new civilian 
complaints system. Throughout the 1970s, there was no issue the CCLA remained 
more single-mindedly focussed on than the question of a civilian review board. As 
early as 1967, Harry Arthurs began research for the CCLA on a proposal for a new 
system of investigating civilian complaints against police officers in Toronto, notably 
a system independent of the actual police force. 728 Metropolitan Toronto's police 
force was a recent creation, formed in 1957 with the amalgamation of thirteen 
municipalities. The police force employed a fairly crude complaints system where 
citizens could raise concerns at a complaints bureau located in the force's 
headquarters and regular duty officers would conduct informal investigations of their 
colleagues. The idea of a civilian review board for complaints against police was 
rejected early on in 1968 by Attorney General and Minister of Justice A.A. Wishart 
because of the functional difficulties of such a system. If separate agencies existed for 
the enforcement of the law and the disciplining of law officers, Wishart claimed, it 
would inevitably lead to conflict between the two agencies and undermine the 
effectiveness of the system. 
A year later the CCLA presented a brief to Wishart calling for a civilian 
complaints system followed up by another brief in 1973 to the Task Force on Policing 
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which was created by the province in 1972 to study the organization and effectiveness 
of policing in Ontario. According to the CCLA's research, of 161 individuals 
interviewed in 7 Ontario cities, 41 claimed they were abused by police. Yet, only 12 
percent sought redress and most assumed it would do no good. The simple problem 
was that, in a system where police investigated police, there was a perception of 
rampant cover ups and bias against the complainant. 729 A police commission 
concerned about the public image, efficiency and morale and legal liability of the 
force could hardly conduct an impartial investigation. In fact, in 1972 when the 
Ukranian Canadian Committee publicly accused the police of abusive tactics against 
their demonstrators during the visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin, the Toronto police 
commission asked the Attorney General to establish an independent inquiry to 
eliminate the perception of bias on their part. Clearly, this was a recognition on the 
part of the police commission of the faults in the system. In its many briefs 
throughout the 1970s, the CCLA called for an independent citizens advisory 
committee made up of members from the community and located outside the police 
headquarters to investigate complaints. Once a complaint had been received, it would 
be investigated fully and could not be withdrawn, a weakness in the established 
system as it made complainants potential targets for police intimidation. If some fault 
were found, the committee would be empowered to conciliate and force the police 
department to pay damages or call a hearing into the issue. The key was to ensure a 
fair and open investigation and the perception of independence. This was the 
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CCLA's enduring vision of how the relationship between citizens and police should 
be regulated. 730 
The vision would only be partially realized in the early 1980s but in the 1970s 
there were many opportunities for the CCLA to air its grievances against the current 
system of processing complaints. There were three major inquiries in the 1970s alone 
highlighting the problems with the current system of handling complaints against the 
police. The Toronto police commission appointed Toronto lawyer Arthur Maloney to 
a one-man inquiry in 1974 to study complaints procedures.731 Maloney found 
evidence of cover ups when fellow officers were being investigated and 
recommended the appointment of a Commissioner of Citizen Complaints to be 
appointed by Metropolitan Toronto Council, either a lawyer or a judge. He refused to 
go so far as to create a fully independent civilian system, instead preferring an outside 
arbitrator to review police activities; the investigation would remain with the police 
themselves.732 A civilian system was rejected as it would lower police moral and be 
counterproductive, increasing tensions between police and citizens.733 
The Maloney report helps explain why the subject of complaints procedures 
was an issue of public concern by the 1970s. Maloney notes how the seventies was a 
period in which Ontarians, as an increasingly well educated population, possessed a 
heightened awareness of individual rights and were willing to seek redress when those 
rights were abused. Secondly, the widespread enforcement of criminal laws 
respecting drugs involved a new criminal element, mainly young, middle class and 
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often vocal individuals who were increasingly brought into contact with police. 
Thirdly, complaints usually arose when the police were required to enforce unpopular 
laws or those about which most of society was ambivalent, notably drinking, 
gambling, prostitution and drugs. Since these crimes had no discernible victims who 
would push for an investigation, they could often lead to illegal searches, arrests and 
activity by undercover agents sometimes leading to outright entrapment, thus 
increasing the number of potential complaints against police.734 
In the same year Maloney reviewed Toronto's police complaint system (the 
year of the Fort Erie raid), the media was pressuring the province to take action. A 
series often hard-hitting front page stories appeared in the Globe and Mail in October 
1974 documenting 17 cases of police brutality. In one case, a drug dealer claimed his 
police interrogators applied a stapler and mechanical claw to his genitals to extract a 
confession, while another man was kicked in the stomach so severely he nearly died 
in hospital. As a result, the province appointed Justice Donald Morand, who later 
became the province's second ombudsman (Maloney was the first), to head a Royal 
Commission into Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices. Morand's commission 
investigated a total of 114 complaints against Toronto police. The report, presented 
in 1976, documents a variety of illegal activities by police, from lying under oath to 
hiding evidence, changing duty books and lying to superior officers. Morand called 
for criminal charges to be laid in relation to 11 incidents and for a new system of 
processing complaints against police. Once again, the CCLA's conception of an 
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independent civilian complaints system was rejected. Morand recommended the 
implementation of Maloney's idea of a Public Complaints Commission, a system 
which would retain the Chief of Police's responsibility for imposing discipline and 
require police to investigate the initial complaint.735 
By 1977 the province had yet to act on the major recommendation of both the 
Maloney and Morand reports. The Toronto police commission had called on the 
provincial government to implement Maloney's recommendations to no effect. A 
civilian review agency, long sought after by the CCLA, remained beyond its grasp 
despite having made presentations before the Maloney commission and the Solicitor 
General following the Morand report. Nonetheless, between 1968 and 1977 the 
CCLA established itself as the leading rights association in Ontario and one of the 
major activist groups in the country. It was invited to meet with government 
ministers, to present briefs and, through several generous grants from large 
foundations, conduct important research projects which led to significant legislative 
reforms. Within the organization, former Supreme Court Justice Emmet Hall was 
appointed honorary president of the association in 1973 following the death of Keiller 
Mackay three years earlier. These were the formative years as the CCLA worked to 
place itself in a position to influence key national and provincial policy issues. 
From Local to National: 1977 to 1982 
325 
Protecting People from the Police: A Civilian Review Systemfor Complaints Against 
the Police 
Police scandals and investigations into the need for a new process of 
investigating complaints did not end with the Morand report in 1976. Within a year 
the public was once again clamouring for reform in the face of police violence. This 
time it involved cases of physical abuse against members of minority groups by 
Toronto police, notably a series of subway beatings with racial overtones on New 
Year's Eve in 1976. Walter Pitman, president of Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, was 
appointed by the Toronto police commission in 1977 to head a Task Force on Human 
Relations. His report called for basic reforms to the structure of the police force and 
recommended the implementation of a new system for processing citizen complaints 
against police along the lines of the Maloney report.736 All of his recommendations 
were eventually adopted and the police commission recommended to the provincial 
government it legislate for a new system of processing citizen complaints.737 
After three major reports investigating police abuse in Toronto, it was an 
understatement when the Chairman of the police commission suggested that "no other 
police force or public agency for that matter has undergone such intensive and wide-
ranging scrutiny in recent years as the Metropolitan Toronto Police."738 And it was 
not to end there. Two years after the Pitman report, the Toronto police force found 
itself mired in another scandal following complaints by the homosexual community. 
Homosexuals became incensed following revelations that police were notifying 
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school boards about public school teachers who had appeared in court on morals 
charges. Tensions peaked when a black man, Albert Johnson, was shot and killed on 
26 August 1979. It was the culmination of a series of police shootings over a ten 
month period involving mostly members of minority groups, at least one shooting a 
month, and 2000 people demonstrated in downtown Toronto in wake of Johnson's 
death. The issue was serious enough to lead Toronto City Council to pass a motion of 
non-confidence in the Toronto police commission.739 Gerald Emmet Cardinal Carter 
of the Roman Catholic Church was appointed to mediate between police and minority 
groups. His report ( 1979) called for a series of revisions to police practices including 
more street patrols and regulations against verbal abuse, including a better procedure 
for handling complaints.740 
Throughout all this the CCLA consistently called for a civilian agency to 
review complaints against police. The association was present before the Maloney 
commission, made representations before the Toronto police commission, and lobbied 
several provincial Solicitor Generals. Remarkably, the CCLA was even able to make 
common cause with the Ontario Police Association which supported the CCLA's call 
for a fully independent civilian complaints system.741 Throughout the 1970s a series 
of events continually revitalized the CCLA's dogged campaign for a civilian review 
system. In 1973 Vicky Trerise, a striker on a picket line during the Artistic 
Woodwork labour dispute in Toronto, was dragged by her hair and beaten by police 
without provocation.742 A year later the CCLA made presentations before the Pringle 
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commission on the Fort Erie raid. Throughout 1978-1979, the CCLA entered into 
extended correspondence with two succeeding Solicitors General over questions of 
police abuse of native people in Kenora following a series of investigations in which 
20 people claimed abuse. The issue was serious enough to lead to an inquiry by the 
Ontario Provincial Police and a debate before the Standing Committee on the 
Administration of Justice.743 Following accusations of police abuse of strikers during 
the Boise Cascade strike in Kenora in 1979, the CCLA repeated its demands on the 
Solicitor General to implement a new system.744 For over a decade the CCLA had 
been constantly calling for reform. 
Attempting to transform the citizens complaints system proved to be a 
torturous process with the issue constantly stalling in the legislature. As early as 
October 1976 John MacBeth, Ontario's Solicitor General, promised legislation to 
improve complaints procedures.745 A year later MacBeth introduced Bill113, An Act 
to Amend the Police Act, to implement Maloney's recommendation for a civilian 
complaints commissioner.746 His bill died on the order paper and another bill was not 
introduced until 1979 when a new Solicitor General, Roy McMurtry, introduced Bill 
201 to create a Commissioner of Citizen Complaints for a three year test period.747 
This bill also died on the order paper and McMurtry attempted again in May 1980 to 
push through similar legislation. At the time the Progressive Conservatives under 
William Davis were operating as a minority government, and there was intense 
opposition, particularly from the NDP, to the government's proposed legislation. 
328 
Each piece of legislation introduced thus far by the government simply proposed 
civilian oversight of the initial police investigation; a Citizens Complaints 
Commissioner would review a report produced following a police investigation of the 
initial complaint and had the power to call a tribunal or impose penalties if the 
commissioner felt the investigation had been improperly handled. While this was 
consistent with Maloney's vision of a civilian complaints system (and supported by 
subsequent commissions), it contrasted with the CCLA and the opposition NDP's 
idea of a fully independent civilian investigatory body. From McMurtry's 
perspective, since 90 percent of complaints were solved in the initial interview (either 
through clarifying an issue or an apology from the officer) a fully civilian system 
would create unnecessary burdens. Undoubtedly McMurty was also concerned about 
a possible confrontation with the police who, with few exceptions, were adamantly 
opposed to a fully independent review system.748 
While an attempt by the NPD to introduce a private members bill to create a 
civilian review agency failed, McMurtry's legislation was defeated by combined 
opposition from the Liberals and the NDP.749 Four attempts by the government and 
private members to introduce legislation to deal with civilian complaints had thus 
failed. Finally, on 5 May 1981, McMurtry introduced Bill68 to create an office ofthe 
Public Complaints Commissioner. Two key factors paved the way for passing the 
legislation. First, in March 1981 the Progressive Conservatives had won a resounding 
victory over the Liberals and NDP and now enjoyed a majority government. Second, 
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in February 1981, in what was characterized as the largest police action since the FLQ 
crisis, 150 Toronto police officers raided four gay bathhouses and arrested hundreds 
of gay men for being found-ins. The incident sparked an outcry from the gay 
community and local papers for the police's singling out of homosexuals. The Globe 
and Mail characterized the raids as an 'ugly action' and a clear case of discrimination 
against homosexuals, suggesting that "this flinging of an army against the 
homosexuals is more like the bully-boy tactics of a Latin American republic attacking 
church and lay reformers than of anything that has a place in Canada."750 At least two 
papers, the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, suggested the provincial 
government should implement an independent civilian system for handling 
complaints soon after the election in light of the bathhouse raids.751 All of this 
pressure undoubtedly encouraged McMurtry to reintroduce his police review bill in 
the form ofBill68 within days ofthe legislature being recalled in May 1981 (the bill 
was passed in December 1981). 
Once again, the CCLA had used a highly public issue to call for a new system 
of transmitting police complaints.752 After nearly 15 years of pressure, the CCLA 
finally had its wish in the form of Bill 68. Despite the failure to achieve a fully 
independent civilian system for handling police complaints, the CCLA could claim a 
partial success in the creation of the Public Complaints Commissioner after more than 
a decade of advocacy. The entire question of police powers had been the central 
preoccupation of the CCLA since its founding, from its advocacy in the realm of 
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demonstrations and police censorship in the mid-1960s to the complaints system. 
Appropriately enough, the first Public Complaints Commissioner appointed by the 
province for a three year trial period beginning in 1981 was none other than Sidney 
Linden, former General Counsel and one of the founders of the CCLA.753 As the 
CCLA moved from focussing predominantly on local issues to tackling more national 
concerns, it would retain its interest in regulating police powers. 
From Barn Burning to Opening Your Mail: RCMP Illegal Activities 
While 1977 to 1982 represented a culmination ofthe CCLA's activities in the 
field of police abuse, it was also a period in which the CCLA vigorously asserted 
itself on the national stage. Whereas in the 13 years previous the association had 
focussed its efforts predominantly on provincial and municipal issues, with the 
exception of research under the Ford and Laidlaw grants and the FLQ crisis, by 1982 
the CCLA had truly made a name for itself nationally. This was done through two 
key events. The first began with Canada's own version of Watergate. 
In 1976 there were revelations of extensive illegal activities conducted by the 
RCMP. Among other things, police were illegally opening mail and in 1972 had 
conducted an illegal raid on the office of the Agence de Pre sse Libre du Quebec, a left 
wing news agency. RCMP officers, in conjunction with the Quebec Provincial Police 
and the Montreal Urban Community Police force, were further responsible for 
secretly raiding the offices of the Parti Quebecois and copying membership lists. 
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Other incidents included stealing explosives and burning down a bam to prevent a 
meeting of the Black Panthers and suspected members of the FLQ. It was clear the 
RCMP had overstepped its bounds, although its actions were entirely consistent with 
the force's focus on separatists and socialists as a threat to national security. Within a 
year, Solicitor General Francis Fox appointed a Commission oflnquiry Concerning 
Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police chaired by Alberta judge 
David C. McDonald.754 The commission's final report appeared in 1981. 
The history of the McDonald Commission is presented elsewhere and does not 
need be recounted in full here.755 Sitting from 1977 to 1981, the commission's 
inquiry involved extensive research into the role ofthe RCMP, hundreds of briefs and 
individual investigations, massive media coverage, and conflicts with the Quebec 
provincial government after the newly elected Parti Quebecois government enacted its 
own inquiry (Keable Commission) in 1977. Two other provincial inquiries emerged 
from these developments, including royal commissions in Alberta under Justice 
James Laycroft and in Ontario under Justice Horace Krever. The McDonald 
commission took 49 months to produce more than 2000 pages in three separate 
reports costing $8 million, and $2 million for RCMP lawyers.756 At the heart of the 
commission's findings was the idea of an inherent contradiction facing the RCMP: a 
belief that in order to enforce the law they felt the need to break it. To protect the 
nation from security threats, the police believed they had to circumvent the law by 
opening mail and committing other abuses. Among the commission's 
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recommendations was the creation of a civilian agency without police powers to take 
control of the RCMP's security service. It further recommended making access to 
information reviewable by the Federal Court, clarifying the mandate of the RCMP, 
banning the infiltration of unions and political parties, establishing external 
investigations of RCMP activities, and greater ministerial responsibility for the force. 
However, it did not recommend any specific criminal proceedings be taken against 
the accused police officers (although the Keable Commission did recommend 
prosecutions and several were undertaken in the Quebec).757 The entire episode 
served to highlight the weak oversight of the RCMP by political leaders and, as 
journalist Jeff Sallot suggested in 1979, the "true test of a national security agency ... 
is its ability to quickly identify the real threats and not to waste its time on legitimate 
dissenters. This the Security Service failed to do."758 In the end, the commission not 
only mobilized rights activists across the country but also stimulated a widespread 
public debate on the extent of police powers in Canada.759 
The CCLA embraced the scandal surrounding RCMP illegal activities with a 
passion. This response was entirely consistent with the association's longstanding 
efforts to establish civilian checks on the operation ofpolice forces. One of its first 
acts was to petition the commission for standing to allow its own lawyers to cross-
examine witnesses, a request McDonald denied.760 Not to be discouraged, the CCLA 
had a representative at the commission's public hearings who produced reports on the 
commission's activities. Borovoy organized a team of researchers across the country 
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to prepare a massive brief. After all, no issue fit more perfectly into the CCLA' s 
mandate and there would be no better forum for promoting reform in the relationship 
between the police and citizens throughout the country than the McDonald 
commission given its mandate and all the media attention. Lawyers and other 
volunteers were recruited from as far away as Nova Scotia and British Columbia to do 
research on everything from due process jurisprudence in the United States to 
unresolved citizen complaints against the RCMP.761 It was a testament to the CCLA's 
effectiveness that it was able to recruit people from diverse backgrounds and outside 
of Ontario to do volunteer work for the association. 
There is little doubt the CCLA exploited the McDonald commission in an 
attempt to establish itself as Canada's true national civil liberties association. On 16 
November 1977 the CCLA sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau and three days 
later had it published in the Globe and Mail. This full page advertisement cost the 
organization a painful $10 000, straining its budget, but ensuring the CCLA did more 
than any other rights association in publicly challenging the government's position on 
RCMP wrongdoings. Signed by such luminaries as Walter Tamopolsky and Emmet 
Hall, the letter went to the heart of the issue as the CCLA perceived it: ministerial 
responsibility. Quoting Trudeau's own words, the letter questioned the Prime 
Minister's defence of RCMP illegal activities when he noted how in some situations 
the police must break the law, as in the case of entering a private residence to diffuse 
a bomb or speeding to catch a bank robber. According to the CCLA, none of these 
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acts could justify the need to break into the office of a legitimate political party and 
copy its membership lists. The letter went on to question why the Prime Minister and 
his cabinet failed to inform themselves on the activities of the RCMP and the 
association accused the government of using the commission as a delaying tactic. The 
CCLA called on Trudeau to prosecute all known police offenders, inform the 
provincial attorneys general of all the evidence the commission had gathered, and 
launch a Parliamentary committee to investigate the responsibility of a Minister of the 
Crown in supervising the RCMP.762 
Trudeau responded with his own public letter effectively criticizing the CCLA 
for quoting him selectively and justifying the need for ministers to remain aloof from 
the administration of the police: 
I do not believe it appropriate, for example, for the government to be 
aware of, or involved in, either police or security investigations. The 
independence of these investigations, and the confidence of the public 
in their honesty, must not be impaired by even the suggestion of 
political interference .... It is necessary, I suggest, for those asking 
these questions to bear in mind the extraordinary techniques employed 
by those engaged in espionage, subversion or terrorism, as it is 
necessary for those answering the questions to focus on the precarious 
and sometimes fragile nature of our democratic process.763 
Trudeau rejected all the association's recommendations. He refused to pass on 
information to individual Attorneys General preferring a single investigation run by 
the federal government and did not want to discipline individual RCMP members as 
discipline was best left to the internal processes of the force. A Parliamentary 
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committee on ministerial responsibility was also dismissed as the idea had already 
been rejected by the Marin commission on security. 
The issue of ministerial responsibility was at the heart of the divide between 
the CCLA and the federal government. For years the CCLA had been calling for 
civilian review of local police forces and in calling for greater ministerial 
responsibility the group hoped to achieve a form of civilian review of the RCMP. In 
contrast, Trudeau and his ministers seemed loath to take direct responsibility for 
RCMP law breaking. As suggested in one Globe and Mail editorial, the "Prime 
Minister and his colleagues either don't know or won't admit what Cabinet 
responsibility means. This has been growing more and more apparent as incidents 
involving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been revealed."764 In 1977 
Solicitor General Francis Fox was admitting to the mail opening but claimed to have 
known nothing about it; Justice Minister Ron Basford said there was nothing he could 
do but refer the issue to the McDonald commission since the RCMP's own 
investigatory unit would be inappropriate; and, Postmaster Jean Jacques Blais claimed 
to know nothing ofthe practice.765 Not only would the Liberals introduce a bill to 
legalize mail opening a couple of years later in 1979 (and, in doing so, inflaming 
rights activists who felt this legitimized illegal activities by the police), but after the 
report was released in 1981 the new Solicitor General, Robert Kaplan, would continue 
to maintain that the RCMP's activities were justified except for the more egregious 
offences such as bam buming.766 Given the consistent refusal of senior political 
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leaders to accept responsibility and the four year delay in the McDonald 
commission's investigation, cynicism surrounding the inquiry and the belief it was a 
delay tactic were understandable. 
The CCLA's campaign, mixed with several public forums and no less than 
five briefs before the McDonald commission (including a massive 100 page brief), 
substantially increased the group's public profile.767 It garnered 400 new members in 
the first two weeks alone following the advertisement placed in the Globe and 
Mail.768 By the end of the year the advertisement and the CCLA's promotional work 
had earned them at least 1000 new members. It also engendered some negative 
feedback from those who came to the defence of the RCMP. The association's 
correspondence files are littered with letters stating things such as 'Bullshit!! Thank 
God for the RCMP', 'You bloody communists ... Canadians aren't with you', 'You 
middle class humbugs', 'Drop dead you bastards', 'The country's biggest collection 
of assholes, especially your legal counsel.' 
In a creative campaign to solicit public interest and pressure the government to 
act, the CCLA organized a petition calling on the government to initiate proceedings 
against offenders. Unlike traditional petitions, this one required all signatories to pay 
$1 to emphasize their support for the cause. Well known public figures such as 
Margaret Atwood, Pierre Berton, Daniel G. Hill (first Chair of the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission), T. C. Douglas, David Lewis, and Walter Tarnopolsky sat on a 
sidewalk booth on Y onge Street soliciting donations. The CCLA was also able to use 
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its connections with the NDP and organized labour to solicit support by way of large 
mailing campaigns through various mailing lists, as well as working with its chapters 
in Nova Scotia and Manitoba.769 It netted more than $15 000 and the petition was 
presented to Kaplan as Solicitor General in May 1980, with media coverage across the 
country.770 By this time the CCLA had 5000 paid members and 30 organizational 
members (mainly church, labour and ethnic groups). In the end the entire episode 
elevated the CCLA to one ofthe government's leading critics. 
While an initial report had been released in 1980 dealing with such issues as 
revisions to the Official Secrets Act and access to information, the major reports were 
not released until 19 81.771 After four years of tireless work and activism (the 
McDonald Commission was the group's largest expense for several years), the CCLA 
leadership must have been disappointed with the results. While many of the CCLA's 
minor recommendations, such as requiring that any proclamation of the War 
Measures Act be approved by Parliament within a specific time limit, were included 
in the commission's recommendations, the inquiry's two key recommendations were 
opposed by the CCLA. 772 First, the commission did not directly recommend the 
prosecution of RCMP wrongdoers because in some cases (such as illegal mail 
opening) it refused to investigate allegations on a case by case basis and it considered 
recommendations for specific prosecutions beyond its jurisdiction. 773 As of 1977, the 
CCLA had been outspoken in demanding illegal acts be prosecuted. This was not so 
much a disagreement with a specific recommendation as much as frustration with the 
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commission for not being more strident in demanding prosecutions. Second, the 
McDonald Commission recommended the creation of a civilian security agency with 
no police powers, which soon led the federal government to create the Canadian 
Security and Intelligence Service. In a lengthy column published in the Globe and 
Mail, Borovoy criticized the commission's central recommendation as it would 
divorce criminal investigations from security work.774 Law enforcement was reactive 
whereas security service was preventative. Security services gather a great deal of 
information on broad and vague mandates in contrast to law enforcement agencies 
which focus on specific crimes and gather evidence for easily identifiable crimes. 
Borovoy was concerned about a security service separated from criminal 
investigations blurring the lines between subversion and legitimate dissent. This was 
entirely possible if the new security service was not reacting to crimes but seeking to 
prevent subversion and attempting to predict the future. For those who criticized the 
RCMP system, Borovoy noted how the problem with the RCMP's structure was the 
total removal of the criminal investigation branch from security investigations. The 
solution was, therefore, to reintegrate the criminal with the security services within 
the RCMP.775 
The final domino fell in July 1982 when Minister of Justice Jean Chretien 
decided not to initiate prosecutions against any RCMP officers. Nothing could have 
infuriated the CCLA, and other rights activists, more than the decision not to 
prosecute. In a letter to Solicitor General Kaplan, Chretien explained that his refusal 
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to prosecute was primarily based on the fact that the commission did not provide 
evidence for specific illegalities and instead recommended the government investigate 
hundreds of allegations. Given the massive scope of hundreds of potential 
investigations, Chretien chose not to act. In the case of illegal mail openings, the 
Minister of Justice noted how for some individuals the statute of limitations made 
some prosecutions impossible, so only those who had committed the crime more 
recently would be prosected, which the Minister considered an unfair form of 
discrimination. He was also cognisant of the fact that for many RCMP officers the 
practice had an air of legitimacy and many were unaware they were committing illegal 
acts; in addition, he did not believe the offenders acted out of personal gain. 
Ironically, given how many observers considered the commission a government 
delaying tactic, Chretien concluded his letter by noting that "it should be borne in 
mind that time applicable to limitation periods was running during the nearly four 
years of the existence of the Commission oflnquiry."776 
Borovoy and the leadership of the CCLA were incensed. Chretien's letter was 
a collection of excuses for not prosecuting RCMP officers even though, had it been 
civilians who had been accused of similar crimes, the state would surely have acted. 
In an article published in the Toronto Star, Borovoy called on Chretien's successor 
(Mark MacGuigan, a former CCLA executive) to act on the commission's 
recommendations. Borovoy argued that there was no reason to refuse to prosecute 
simply because the statute of limitations had expired in a few cases. While it was true 
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that the officers in question did not gain materially from their activities, it was also 
highly likely some committed these acts to curry favour with their supervisors. In 
addition, the commission's hearings clearly revealed how high echelon officers knew 
the practice was illegal. The CCLA had been calling for prosecutions since 1977 and 
the government had yet to explain why it chose not to act earlier.777 
To be sure, the McDonald commission stands out as one of the CCLA's most 
important efforts in its history. In many ways, it was a spectacular failure. Despite 
practically dominating the organization's efforts for several years, neither the reforms 
to the RCMP security service nor the anticipated prosecutions were realized. As well, 
changes to the War Measures Act and Official Secrets Act recommended by the 
commission were never implemented. Yet, for the first time in its history, the CCLA 
had justified calling itself a national organization. It continued to lack 
representativeness across the country, with most of its membership in Ontario and a 
few chapters scattered across the country, but it asserted itself aggressively on a 
national issue. Its briefs provided some of the most extensive analyses of the 
problems facing policing in Canada available to the commission, and its 
advertisement in the Globe and Mail and petition campaign brought attention to the 
organization and its cause at a national level. No other rights association came close 
to doing the same in relation to the McDonald commission, including the Federation. 
Borovoy' s criticism of the McDonald Commission's recommendations and of the 
government's refusal to prosecute were well covered in the press and the CCLA had 
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established a strong enough profile that the Prime Minister himself felt the need to 
respond to the group's criticism in a detailed letter.778 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
By 1981 the group was not only the largest rights association in the country 
but it was by far the most active. While the LDH struggled with internal disputes, the 
BCCLA with declining government grants and the Federation with virtual invisibility, 
the CCLA thrived. It enjoyed a budget fluctuating between $125 000 to $150 000 
although the organization did not receive any major research grants during this time, 
so membership fees accounted for approximately 80 percent to 90 percent of the 
group's funding. 779 Funds accrued from the campaign on RCMP wrongdoings netted 
an impressive $54 000 by 1980 (the CCLA executive had estimated they would only 
be able to raise around $21 000).780 
While the CCLA continued to promote legislative change in Ontario, it geared 
up in the early 1980s for one of the most important developments in Canadian history: 
the patriation of the constitution.781 Aspect's ofthe CCLA's role in the Charter 
debates are already documented in a book published by Borovoy in 1991 entitled 
Uncivil Disobedience; but the issue deserves some attention here given the 
recognition accorded the CCLA during the Charter debates and the Charter's 
contribution to helping establish the organization as a national rights association. 
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The CCLA had a greater impact on the Charter than any other rights 
association in the country. In its briefbefore the Special Joint Committee on the 
Constitution, the organization went so far as to actually oppose the passing of the 
Charter, suggesting the status quo would be better than the proposed Charter unless 
significant improvements were made. Among the changes suggested were removal of 
section 1, the limitation clause, because it would allow judges to reassert the 
philosophy of parliamentary supremacy which had been the bane of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 8 on searches would allow any search as proscribed by law, an insufficient 
protection since anything passed by a legislature was 'proscribed by law' and the 
CCLA hoped to have broader restrictions on searches. In regard to section 10 on right 
to counsel, the CCLA called for a clause requiring, as was the case in the United 
States, individuals to be informed of their right to counsel. The CCLA also wanted a 
section ensuring evidence illegally obtained would not be admissible in court.782 
The final draft of the Charter drew inspiration from the CCLA's brief. 
Although section 1 remained, it was reworded based on submissions by the CCLA 
and the federal Human Rights Commission to require any limits on constitutional 
rights be 'demonstrably justified;' the CCLA had recommended 'necessary' but the 
effect was the same in that the burden was now on the state to prove the need to limit 
a certain right.783 Section 8 was amended to ban unreasonable searches and seizures 
(in contrast to illegal searches which could be permitted by law thus placing a greater 
burden on the state in justifying the search), section 10 was changed to add the right 
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to be informed of one's right to legal counsel upon arrest (although the actual wording 
was drawn from the Federation's brief), a section on remedies for Charter violations 
was added and trial by jury was entrenched. 
In the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution's draft report to Parliament 
the CCLA was the only rights groups mentioned (in the final draft references to 
specific groups were removed). In fact, the CCLA and only four other groups are 
referred to in the report out of 95 groups who made presentations before the 
committee and 914 which sent in briefs.784 When Jean Chretien introduced his 
recommendations in January 1981 for changing the draft resolution patriating the 
constitution, the CCLA was among only nine organizations referred to as having 
directly influenced the revised version of the resolution. With the exception of one 
short reference to the BCCLA, the CCLA is the only rights association referred to by 
the Minister of Justice. Despite the apparent influence of the Federation's 
recommendations on the final draft (notably section 1 0), Chretien only credited the 
CCLA. Whatever his motivations, Chretien recognized the CCLA in reference to 
changes on the limitation clause ( s.1 ), search and seizure ( s. 8), being detained by 
police (s.9), to be informed of the right to counsel (s.10), admissibility of evidence 
(s.26) and remedies (new section).785 Although not all of Chretien's 
recommendations were accepted in the end (such as dropping the section allowing 
illegally obtained evidence at trial which was amended, not dropped, in Parliament), it 
is clear the CCLA had a critical impact on the development of the Charter. Only the 
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brief presented by the Canadian Bar Association received more attention by the 
government. Undoubtedly Walter Tarnopolsky's presence as arguably the country's 
leading expert on individual rights and president of the CCLA, greatly enhanced the 
briefs reception. 
If the history of the Charter demonstrates anything, it is that the CCLA was at 
least nominally recognized by many policy makers as the leading rights association in 
the country. As will be discussed, this did not mean the association was a truly 
national rights association, only that it had greater visibility and name recognition 
than any other association in Canada. The years 1977 to 1982 were therefore the peak 
years in the organization's early history wherein it established itself on the national 
stage while it continued to promote reform in Ontario. With section 1 entrenched in 
the constitution, the Charter would no doubt prove a bitter pill for many of the 
organization's members, but for those such as Tarnopolsky who in principle 
supported constitutional rights, it was the ultimate victory for a civil libertarian. By 
1982, with a membership of 5000, nearly double the next largest association, the 
CCLA could truly claim to have come into its own 18 years after its birth. 
Conclusion: The CCLA as a Social Movement Organization 
The Courts 
No other rights associations had such a proclivity towards litigation than the 
CCLA. Granted, the BCCLA also looked to the courts for redress. But the BCCLA 
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was only able to take on a few cases in its first 20 years of operation, and only one of 
them reached the Supreme Court of Canada. No rights association had a stronger 
presence in the provincial appellate court and Supreme Court in the pre-Charter era 
than the CCLA. As Robert J. Sharpe and Kent Roach note, under "Laskin's liberal 
regime, the CCLA became a familiar presence before the [Supreme] Court."786 
Between 1964 and 1982, the CCLA provided legal counsel for 23 separate cases in 
either the County Court, provincial superior/supreme courts, appellate courts or the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Of these cases, five reached the highest court in the 
country, six were argued before a provincial appellate division, two went before the 
Federal Court (one of them reached the Federal Court of Appeal) and the rest resided 
in various inferior courts. Most of the litigation occurred in Ontario, although four of 
the CCLA's cases during this period were outside of the province, two in Nova 
Scotia, one in New Brunswick and one in British Columbia.787 
One of the significant advantages of being located in Toronto was having 
access to a fairly large pool of volunteer lawyers and two major law schools.788 The 
CCLA rarely had difficulty in securing free legal counsel at a time when most rights 
associations in the 1970s could barely afford to hire a secretary or find lawyers willing 
to work for free.789 To be sure, the organization's faith in the legal system was driven 
by a belief in the potential for the law to promote equal (legal) opportunity and the 
association's focus on civil and political rights (courts have always been poor forums 
for promoting social, economic and cultural rights). As was the case with the 
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BCCLA, the CCLA sought in most cases to convince the courts to expand their 
understanding ofthe Bill of Rights. In other cases, the CCLA simply hoped to 
encourage the courts to accept the practice ofinterveners.790 
An analysis of the CCLA's track record suggests its faith in the legal system, 
in the pre-Charter era, was misplaced. Of 23 challenges, the association was 
successful in only one case. In 1981 the CCLA pursued a case involving a researcher 
at CBC in Halifax, Linden Mcintyre, who sought public access to material behind the 
issuance of a search warrant. When the Nova Scotia Attorney General challenged the 
case and argued that only property owners had a right of access, the case eventually 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada and the CCLA was successful in establishing a 
precedent for access to such information.791 Otherwise the CCLA failed in each court 
battle, although in some cases the association won in the appellate court only to be 
defeated in the Supreme Court. Attempts by rights activists to seek redress in the 
courts were therefore continuously thwarted, bringing into question the ability of the 
courts in the pre-Charter era to act as an effective forum for the defence of individual 
rights. 
Of course, the success of litigation should not only be measured in the 
decision handed down by the court. Several leading members of the CCLA, such as 
Borovoy and Harry Arthurs (who served as president of the CCLA from 1976-8), 
were in actuality cautious in their enthusiasm about the court's potential to promote 
social change. 792 Instead, a social movement organization could benefit from the 
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publicity and mobilization which accompanied a major court case. As Miriam Smith 
has argued in relation to the gay rights movement, rights discourse legitimized 
demands for sexual equality for gays and helped mobilize members within the 
movement despite several failed attempts to have the courts recognize their claims.793 
Both the BCCLA and the CCLA could use the legal system to politicize and claim 
legitimacy for their demands for free speech, including contentious hate speech. A 
loss in the courts could also help to soften public opinion and pave the way for a 
political assault which was most often more important than an actual win in court. As 
Borovoy once quipped to a lawyer representing the CCLA, the "key thing is to lose 
with flair and, for heaven's sake, don't win because I'll have to rewrite my 
speeches. "794 
The passing of the Charter represented a significant victory for the CCLA, an 
organization dedicated to using the courts to protect individual rights. By 2000 the 
CCLA had intervened in more Charter cases than any other organization in Canada 
with the exception ofthe Legal Education and Action Fund, a women's rights 
organization.795 Between 1982 and 1997 alone, the CCLA had intervened in 32 
Charter cases to the Supreme Court and was the primary litigant in two other cases. 
With a 63 percent success rate in the Supreme Court, the post-Charter era represented 
a significant transformation in the association's fortunes in court and encouraged 
increasing litigation as a core tactic.796 
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Ideology 
As civil liberties associations, the CCLA and BCCLA understood human 
rights in terms of civil and political rights, or negative freedom. In the field of 
administrative decision-making, the BCCLA distinguished between the 
administration of social services and the content of such services, avoiding any 
discussion of the latter as a right. This was clearly the case with the CCLA's 
extensive work in the field of welfare. According to the federal government and the 
Toronto Social Planning Council, Ontario welfare recipients received barely 60 
percent of the minimum funding they required to survive in the early 1970s. Yet, 
when the CCLA took on the case of Jennifer Smith and provided a duty counsel in 
welfare offices, its goal was to improve the administration of welfare and ensure due 
process, and the association never questioned the amount of welfare doled out by the 
state. In the association's voluminous report on welfare practices across Canada, 
there was no mention of rampant under-funding.797 
Civil liberties activists mobilized to deal with the new threats posed by the 
welfare state, but there remained important ideological distinctions between civil 
liberties and human rights activists. A human right, for equality-seekers, was more 
than simply protecting individuals from lack of unfair restraints. The LDH defended 
the handicapped, elderly, youth and prisoners, areas the CCLA generally avoided. 
Not only did the LDH's subcommittee (ODD) focus on prisoner's due process rights, 
the LDH also advocated for better food, wages and, ultimately, the abolition of 
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prisons altogether. For the elderly, the LDH argued that they had a right to their own 
lodgings, obtaining services at home including medical help and transportation, and 
achieving a minimum standard of living and participating in the social and cultural 
life of the community. 798 
But it was more than simply a question of prioritizing rights. The BCCLA and 
the CCLA have been ardent defenders of free speech, and have opposed criminalizing 
hate speech and censoring pornography.799 To this day, the NLHRA supports the 
censorship of pornography (and in the late 1980s adopted a position supporting hate 
legislation), as have many human rights associations.800 Surprisingly, the LDH did 
not take a stance on pornography, despite the creation of an office for women in the 
mid-1970s with an express mandate to promote women's equality. Nonetheless, 
LDH's equality-seeking agenda is evident in its campaign in 1980 to, among other 
things, have the criminal code amended to prohibit accused rapists from introducing 
their accusers sexual history at trial. 801 Eleven years later, the CCLA earned the ire of 
many equality-seekers when it successfully intervened in a case to strike down the 
criminal code's rape-shield law. Free speech was not the only issue dividing rights 
associations. Since 1972 the LDH distinguished itself as an ardent defender of the 
collective rights of French Canadians, including the extension oftheir language rights 
in such a way as to make the public education system unilingually French. It was not 
only an assertion of the socio-cultural rights of French Canadians, but a positive 
understanding of human rights based on a belief that the state should actively promote 
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equality and not just protect liberty. Few civil libertarians with a penchant for 
conceiving of human rights as negative freedoms would have seen Quebec's language 
laws in the 1970s in a favorable light. Borovoy, for instance, severely criticized the 
application of Quebec's language laws in the workplace and on public signs, 
characterizing them as 'morally dubious', an unwarranted encroachment on freedom 
of expression, and "an affirmative action program in favour of the majority," which 
"contributed nothing to the legitimate protection of the French majority."802 
Organized Labour and the CCLA 
In its crusade to protect free speech, the CCLA found itself at odds with many 
other social movement organizations, mostly notably Jewish activists and feminists. 
Generally, however, the CCLA had a positive working relationship with other social 
movement organizations. Several of its mail solicitation campaigns, sometimes 
numbering as many as 80 000 letters, used the mailing lists of other groups.803 It 
organized occasional coalitions to present briefs to the provincial or federal 
government on such issues as religious education and capital punishment. Borovoy 
even sat on a committee of the CJC, although the two groups did not cooperate on 
joint ventures. The CCLA's group members were almost exclusively unions and 
ethnic and church groups. There was no propensity to organize coalitions; the LDH 
was far more successful in organizing coalitions than the CCLA, particularly when 
presenting briefs to government. It is likely the CCLA's narrow rights philosophy 
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limited its ability to find common ground with other social movement organizations 
whereas the LDH, willing to consider issues such as the conditions of imprisonment 
and the financial needs of the elderly as human rights, found it easier to establish 
similar positions with others. 
There is no question the CCLA's most important relationship with social 
movement organizations outside other rights associations was organized labour. 
Several of the leading members of the CCLA's Board of Directors were important 
figures in the labour movement, notably Terry Meagher (Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Ontario Federation of Labour) and Dennis McDermott (president of the CLC). 
Borovoy himself was the main link between labour and the CCLA. Borovoy had been 
one of the most important figures in the JLC and in organized labour's human rights 
program, and he maintained these ties when he moved to the CCLA. He continuously 
gave speeches and represented the CCLA at meetings with the CLC, the Ontario 
Federation of Labour and various labour councils. It was Borovoy who convinced the 
CLC to hire Patrick Kerwin to work in Kenora to organize natives as part of its 
program for International Year for Human Rights, and for the next two years Borovoy 
and the CCLA supervised Kerwin's work.804 Labour could also count on the CCLA 
to come to its aid when the police abused strikers on the picket line. In 1972 the 
CCLA supported striking workers from the United Steelworkers of America by 
sending letters of complaint to the provincial government when the courts repeatedly 
forced strikers to stay away from the picket line. Similarly, in 1973, the CCLA 
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attacked the provincial government's proposed legislation to restrict the right of 
teachers to strike.805 When Vicky Trerise was grabbed by the hair and beaten by 
police during the Artistic Woodwork strike, the CCLA lobbied the police commission 
and Solicitor General for a public inquiry. 806 Six years later strikers accused local 
police of harassment and favouring strike breakers when arresting people over clashes 
on the picket line during the Boise Cascade Strike in Fort Francis-Kenora. In 
response the CCLA sent a staff member to investigate and lobbied the Solicitor 
General for sanctions against police. 807 
These were just a few examples of how the CCLA cooperated with organized 
labour generally, and the CLC specifically. When the CLC decided in 1972 to write a 
primer on civil liberties to distribute to its members, it asked the CCLA to write it 
instead of the JLC .808 To support the CCLA's petition in 1978 on RCMP 
wrongdoings, the CLC endorsed the petition and distributed it to its members 
encouraging them to sign up. 809 Not only the CLC but several NDP clubs endorsed 
the CCLA campaign as well and provided it with access to their mailing lists for the 
petition while the United Auto Workers and the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
donated $1000 each to defray the costs of the advertisement in the Globe and Mai/. 810 
In the days of the JLC organized labour was a key player in the human rights 
movement, but by the 1970s it was clear it had surrendered its position to rights 
associations. The decision to have the CCLA and not the JLC produce the primer was 
in itself an acknowledgement of the rise of the CCLA as a leader in the human rights 
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movement. Most importantly, the CLC's interest in human rights activism was on the 
decline. Although the CLC's human rights committee continued to operate, the 
committee was increasingly eclipsed by the activities of the Women's Bureau and 
stopped publishing its newsletter.811 With the NCHR falling by the wayside the only 
independent and active aspect of labour's human rights program was the JLC, and it 
was in effect defunct by the mid-1970s. In retrospect, the last major human rights 
initiative by the CLC was in 1968 when it sent Kerwin to Kenora and organized a 
national conference in Ottawa. Since then the CLC effectively shied away from 
human rights advocacy. Without a doubt the CLC took an active interest in specific 
human rights issues such as privacy legislation, abortion and capital punishment, 
presenting briefs to various parliamentary commissions. But this was a far cry from 
the financial commitment it had accepted with the JLC and the educational programs 
it had sponsored through the local labour committees in the sixties, not to mention 
taking on specific cases of discrimination. Nothing exemplifies this reality more 
clearly than the fact that with nearly a thousand submissions presented to the Special 
Joint Committee on the Constitution in 1980-1, organized labour was virtually absent 
from the proceedings.812 This was a significant omission from a movement which had 
been visibly active in the committees studying a bill of rights in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Despite the proliferation of rights associations across the country in the 
seventies, the CLC and its provincial federations had little or no contact with them. 
In fact, except for the LDH (which had some links with Quebec unions) and the 
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CCLA (which had only a limited working relationship with the CLC alone), rights 
associations had few links with the labour movement. This was an important change 
from the 1940s when prominent unionists, including C.S. Jackson and Charles 
Millard, were highly active within right associations and the labour movement 
worked alongside rights associations in several human rights campaigns. Organized 
labour's diminished participation in the human rights movement was intimately tied 
with the decline of the JLC. Although discrimination, the heart and soul oflabour's 
human rights program, was hardly eliminated, human rights commissions took over 
most the labour movement's human rights work. In addition, there were more social 
movement organizations in the seventies than at any other point in Canadian history. 
The number of feminist and aboriginal groups had grown exponentially, and 
traditionally voiceless constituencies, from gays to the disabled, were organizing 
themselves. These new social movements increasingly eclipsed organized labour, 
either in attracting more adherents or in dominating the public agenda. Finally, the 
early seventies was the pinnacle of the fordist period in Canadian history, with the 
welfare state fully entrenched and labour focussed primarily on job security and 
wages for its workers. As Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz have pointed out, the post 
war settlement "directed the efforts of union leaders away from mobilizing and 
organizing and toward the juridicial arena oflabour boards .... These activities tended 
to foster a legalistic practice and consciousness in which union rights appeared as 
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privileges bestowed by the state, rather than democratic freedoms won, and to be 
defended by, collective struggle." 813 
Tactics 
In 1991 Alan Borovoy published Uncivil Obedience: The Tactics and Tales of 
a Democratic Agitator.814 At the heart of book is a faith in human nature and a belief 
that public opinion will set most wrongs right again. His book emphasizes the 
CCLA's core tactic: convincing the media to cover a story and bringing public 
pressure to bear on the state or private individuals. In the 1960s and 1970s, for 
instance, the CCLA organized several surveys of employment agencies and held press 
conferences to highlight instances when agencies agreed to post racially 
discriminatory job advertisements. When Borovoy visited the small town of Gosfield, 
Ontario to petition the school board to end religious practices in public schools, he 
had little hope the board would ever change its policy. Instead, Borovoy wanted the 
media to cover his visit. In Gosfield the media was exposed to extremists who sought 
to use public schools for religious indoctrination, and the resulting headlines and 
editorials strengthened the CCLA's campaign to remove religious practices from 
public schools. 
The CCLA engaged in a variety of strategies to attract the media. Although 
Borovoy has often recommended that social activists employ 'disruptive' tactics to 
get their message across (e.g., sit-ins), the CCLA itself has always depended on the 
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expertise of its leadership and rarely employed grass roots mobilization and has 
scrupulously avoided disruptive tactics. The only exception to this rule was a set of 
rallies organized in conjunction with other social movement organizations (which had 
closer ties to a grass roots following). However, by the late 1990s, the CCLA had 
only participated in three such actions throughout its long history. 
Appealing to the press therefore became the CCLA's core strategy. Public 
letters, press conferences, surveys and, to a lesser extent, litigation were all designed 
to attract the media. The CCLA was also prolific in preparing and presenting briefs to 
various municipal councils, government officials or regulatory bodies. It presented no 
less than 54 briefs between 1964 and 1982. The RCMP petition, albeit the only time 
the CCLA organized a petition, was successful in bringing attention to RCMP illegal 
activities. Coalitions were another tactic, although the CCLA avoided long term 
coalitions. 815 Extensive correspondence was an additional means of convincing an 
organization to change its policies. Throughout the 1970s the CCLA exchanged 
dozens of letters with the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association in an attempt to 
persuade the association to stop discriminating against Asians in the provision of 
licenses. 
These tactics were appropriate for an organization which sought respectability 
and a legitimate voice in the community. The CCLA, and the other rights 
associations in this study, did not embrace civil disobedience or mass mobilization as 
effective strategies to promote social change. Instead, the CCLA recruited 
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'respectable' members of the community to facilitate its activism, as was the case in 
1970 when the CCLA was granted a meeting with the Ontario minister responsible for 
the administration of welfare thanks to the participation of the CCLA president, 
former lieutenant-governor J. Keiller MacKay. The elitist nature of rights 
associations led them to speak on behalf of people in their community who were 
poorly represented within the organization. In addition, rights associations clearly 
differed from many other social movement organizations in their unwillingness to 
employ dual strategies. None of the tactics associated with the American civil rights 
movement, including sit-ins, freedom rides, boycotts, occupying public buildings, 
shouting obscenities at public meetings and dozens of other disruptive tactics were 
ever employed by Canadian rights associations. In an article written for the Canadian 
Bar Review in 1973, Borovoy condemned civil disobedience, and suggested that 
violence would simply beget a similar reaction from the state. 816 However, rational 
public debate, the cornerstone of the CCLA's modus operandi since it was founded in 
1964, could only achieve so much. As Borovoy himself admitted, "the reliance on 
exclusively legal tactics in political disputes is likely to reduce the prospects of 
anything but incremental victories. The quick and radical transformation of society 
can rarely be achieved through the use of lawful strategies."817 
A National Rights Association? 
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Irving Himel's legacy to the CCLA, having himself founded its predecessor 
the Association for Civil Liberties as a failed national association, was a vision of a 
central body defending against rights violations across the nation. Since its founding 
in 1964 the CCLA has strived to be a national rights association, with a pan-Canadian 
membership and Board of Directors. There were two ways in which it sought to be a 
national organization: first, by forming chapters across Canada and, second, by taking 
on national issues. 
As early as 1967 the CCLA was formulating plans on how to create a 
framework for a national organization. Thanks to the Ford grant and the interest 
surrounding International Year for Human Rights, affiliates of the CCLA emerged in 
eight cities across Canada: Windsor, London, Hamilton, Regina, Ottawa, Fredericton, 
Winnipeg and Halifax.818 By 1971, when Whiteside and the BCCLA were making 
plans to form a federation of rights associations, the CCLA had lost three chapters to 
disaffiliation (Ottawa, Windsor and London). As noted earlier, the CCLA 
participated in the negotiations leading up to creation of the Federation. From the 
beginning of these negotiations in 1970, the proposed Federation threatened the 
CCLA's vision of forming a single national rights association comparable to the 
ACLU in the United States. Not only was the Federation going to accept state 
funding, to which the CCLA was adamantly opposed, but it would be a loosely 
connected federation of associations instead of a centralized agency capable of quick 
and coordinated action. Throughout the negotiations the CCLA attempted to offer a 
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counterproposal to the original federation concept. The 'Arthurs proposal' as it was 
dubbed would create a Co-ordinating Committee of Civil Liberties Associations 
where every member would be allowed one delegate to meetings for every 1 00 
members. In 1971 this would have translated into 20 delegates for the CCLA and one 
for the NLHRA or five for the BCCLA as the next largest association. It would be 
funded through a $1 fee per member of each association and the office would be 
located in Toronto with the CCLA's general counsel as the committee's executive 
director. Among the committee's responsibilities would be to coordinate the 
activities of various groups, promote national rights campaigns, work towards 
establishing a permanent structure and hold an annual conference. 819 
The result was a clash of visions between the CCLA and most ofthe other 
rights associations. From the perspective of the CCLA, if the proposed national group 
was to succeed without government funds it would need a head office and a national 
director. Since the CCLA was the only rights association in 1971 with a full time 
director and staff, and was centrally located, the Toronto group was the logical choice. 
At the same time, with more than 2000 members, it was deemed illogical to have a 
federation where a group as small as the Prince Edward Island Civil Liberties 
Association with barely a dozen members would have an equal vote to that of the 
CCLA. In the end though, according to the CCLA, it was the question of state 
funding which damned the attempt to form an inclusive national association; the 
Arthurs proposal, which compromised in many areas, was founded on opposition to 
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receiving government funds. It was evident that the BCCLA and the other future 
members of the Federation were unwilling to compromise on this issue. The CCLA 
was helpless to act. 
Why did state funding lead the CCLA to reject the Federation? Borovoy, 
Arthurs and Park were adamantly against forming a national organization dependent 
on government funding, yet several of the CCLA affiliates, including the Nova Scotia 
Civil Liberties Association and the Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties, 
received funding from the Secretary of State. 82° Clearly, the CCLA had no problem 
working alongside state-funded organizations, but it drew the line at joining a 
federation dependent on government grants. None of the affiliates could claim to 
speak on behalf of the CCLA. However, if the CCLAjoined the Federation, the latter 
could conceivably have deferred to the government out of fear of losing support while 
claiming to speak on behalf of the CCLA. This new state-funded federation 
challenged the CCLA's vision of what defined an effective national social movement 
organization. 
Between 1964 and 1982, CCLA had managed, at one point in time, to create 
chapters in 12 different cities across Canada. Many times Borovoy was himself 
directly responsible for the creation of a chapter, taking the opportunity after being 
paid to speak at a law school or before a particular association to mobilize locals 
(often law students or lawyers) to form an association. Such a process led to the 
creation of highly unstable and ad hoc groups, and the leadership of the CCLA 
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remained based in Toronto. When the CCLA attempted to recruit Mark MacGuigan, 
one of the association's founding members and future Minister of Justice and of 
External Affairs, back into the fold in 1970, MacGuigan informed the association that 
he "would like to belong to a national civil liberties association, but I am reluctant to 
join the Toronto one."821 MacGuigan refused to join the CCLA because the 
association's Board of Directors was predominantly from Toronto. Although the 
CCLA claimed to have eight chapters in 1982 (Saint John, Timmins, Fredericton, 
Halifax, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Regina and Calgary), most of them were inactive.822 
The only affiliate on the rise by the 1980s was the Manitoba Association for Rights 
and Liberties (MARL), which had emerged in 1978. MARL was the sole affiliate 
with a full time staff member, and thus the only group with any kind of stability. 823 
By the 1980s the CCLA had failed to create a network of rights associations 
across Canada, and thus to be a truly national rights association. The CCLA had done 
little more than stimulate discussion among rights associations, as a result of which 
they occasionally established common positions on certain national issues.824 The 
vision of a centrally organized national association with membership dues being 
funnelled from the chapters to the Toronto headquarters without the need for state 
funding and organizing national campaigns never materialized. 825 
With the failure to create a viable national association through 
chapters/affiliates, the only other claim to national status for the CCLA was its 
advocacy. It was not until after 1977 that the CCLA established a strong presence at 
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the national level, but it did so effectively with its work surrounding the McDonald 
Commission and the Charter. However, except for a few campaigns, the CCLA's 
advocacy was limited primarily to Ontario. In theory the affiliates would do the 
advocacy work for the CCLA as part of a national campaign, but in practice they 
tended to act independently and rarely coordinated at the national level. For instance, 
the research surrounding a report published by the CCLA in 1975 based on interviews 
with welfare recipients across Canada was the basis for the association's advocacy on 
welfare rights for most of the 1970s. Yet, its work was largely confined to Ontario 
despite having discovered various administrative abuses of due process in other 
provinces. Its major research grants dealing with native advocacy and living 
conditions were limited to Ontario; the only other national research projects was the 
Ford foundation grant in 1968. 
The main exception to the CCLA's provincial focus was six briefs presented 
before federal Parliamentary committees. Combined with its work surrounding the 
McDonald commission and the Charter, the CCLA could legitimately claim to be 
doing more work at the national level than any other rights association. This was 
often simply a question of resources, with groups in Vancouver and St. John's unable 
to cover the expenses to fly to Ottawa. Located in Montreal, the LDH was partially 
active in presenting briefs to the federal government on such issues as capital 
punishment and immigration. In general, however, the CCLA was far more active 
federally with briefs on immigration, capital punishment, privacy, mail opening, 
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prisons, the Human Rights Act and freedom of information. Often the CCLA could 
claim some success, as when the federal government, in reaction to opposition from a 
variety of sectors including the CCLA, chose to abandon its legislation to legalize 
mail opening by the RCMP. In other cases the association was less effective, notably 
in its opposition to hate propaganda provisions in the federal human rights 
legislation. Nonetheless, as was the case with the Charter, by 1982 the CCLA was a 
well recognized national association with members from across Canada and a strong 
voice in Ottawa despite being a primarily Toronto-based association. 
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Chapter Eleven: 
Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Association 
Religion and religious institutions have historically played a more influential 
role in the public education system in Newfoundland than any other province in 
Canada, with the possible exception of Quebec. In 1972, when 25-year-old Judy 
Norman refused to state her denominational affiliation on the application form, she 
was denied a teaching certificate. With the aid of friends and colleagues, student 
committees were formed at Memorial University to debate the value of a church-
based education system, and supporters marched through shopping malls in St. 
John's, Gander, Grand Falls and Harbour Grace with petitions demanding that 
Norman be granted her certificate. In the House of Assembly, the Liberal opposition's 
education critic, F.W. Rowe, echoed the demands of the petitioners that "academic or 
professional qualification be the basis for recommendation [for a teaching 
certificate]."826 Progressive Conservative Premier Frank Moores responded by 
announcing an immediate investigation into the matter by a committee of the House. 
Newspaper articles discussing the activities of Judy Norman and her colleagues were 
carried in at least 11 papers across the country. In dismissing accusations of 
discrimination, Rev. Geoffrey Shaw, head of the Pentecostal examining board, argued 
that the existing system was ideal for a province where 98 percent of the population 
was Christian. He also stressed the need for children not to "be subjected to a militant 
atheistic Communist who might unteach Christian principles," though he had no 
evidence about Norman's political views. 827 A potentially divisive social issue 
quickly died away. Moores's investigation never materialized, the media soon tired of 
the case, and Norman began teaching for the Integrated School Board a few months 
later, having never declared her affiliation.828 
A significant sidebar to this event, ignored by the media and Norman herself, 
was an exchange of letters between John Carter, Minister of Education, and Dr. 
Biswarup Bhattacharya, a psychiatrist at the Waterford Hospital and president of the 
Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Association (NLHRA). In response to 
Bhattacharya's concerns about religious discrimination in the education system, 
Carter countered with the contradictory response that "never has a teacher been 
denied a Teaching Certificate in Newfoundland on the basis of Religion .... [I]f a 
teacher will agree to uphold the Christian tradition within the school system of her 
choice ... but the candidate for certification ought to indicate the denomination he or 
she wishes to teach under. ... [Judy Norman] failed to assure the certifying authorities 
that she would not seek to undermine the religion of others. "829 In reply, Bhattacharya 
challenged Carter's assumptions about the value of a "Christian" education system in 
a multicultural society, and dismissed the idea that non-Christians would undermine 
the religion of others. He claimed to have contacted civil liberties and human rights 
associations across the country, and all agreed that this was a case of religious 
discrimination: "Our [concern] lies ... with the process within which there remains a 
loophole which allows discrimination on religious grounds, and not accepted merit 
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only."830 Bhattacharya then offered the services of the NLHRA to Norman in her 
fight to gain a teaching position. She did not respond, and the NLHRA moved on. 
The Norman episode was a brief interlude in the history of the NLHRA. 
Unlike the LDH, the NLHRA was founded in the wake of International Year for 
Human Rights and began as a human rights organization. It was representative of the 
many organizations born in 1968 out of a government-based initiative, and thus offers 
a fundamental contrast to the other three groups in this study. The NLHRA also 
offers a useful comparison with other rights associations because it was located in a 
small, geographically isolated region of the country and its location would have an 
important impact on the nature of its advocacy. As one ofthe few surviving human 
rights associations in the country, an analysis of the NLHRA helps to explain the 
historical divisions among civil liberties and human rights organizations. Through its 
interaction with other rights associations, the NLHRA had an impact on national 
debates, and at home. But it remained unsuccessful in confronting one of the most 
important human rights issue in Newfoundland history: denominational education. 
International Year for Human Rights and the Newfoundland Human Rights 
Code 
The impetus to form the NLHRA began in Ottawa with plans to celebrate 
International Year for Human Rights in 1968. John Humphrey, Dean of Law at 
McGill and the original drafter of the UDHR, and Kalmen Kaplansky, an executive of 
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the International Labour Organization, headed the Canadian Commission for the 
anniversary. Formed in 1967 and funded through the federal government's Secretary 
of State citizenship program, one of the Commission's first tasks was to stimulate the 
creation of provincial human rights committees to organize conferences and 
educational activities to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the UDHR. Humphrey 
sent letters to provincial premiers requesting their support. In some provinces, the 
1968 celebrations were organized by volunteer groups formed through the initiative of 
local community leaders. Others worked through the local human rights commission, 
but in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, the provincial governments set up 
their own human rights committees. 
The Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights Committee was formed on 31 
January 1968 at a public meeting initiated by the provincial government. It was 
attended by 23 volunteer groups, Peter Truman of the United Nations Association of 
Canada, and 70 high school and university students. The meeting elected an executive 
composed ofR.J. Greene and W.J. Noseworthy (co-chairs), Felix Murphy (secretary), 
and J.E. Butler and Shannon O'Keefe (directors).A cabinet committee was formed to 
consult with the executive and discuss recommendations for legislative action. It 
consisted of G.A. Frecker, F.W. Rowe, John Crosbie, Alex Hickman, W.J. Keough, 
Edward Roberts and J.G. Channing. A provincial grant of $7,500 and the composition 
of the committee reflected the importance the government placed on the event. Rowe 
was the influential Minister of Education (later appointed to the Senate); Crosbie was 
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Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing; and Keough, the Minister ofLabour, was 
a close friend of Smallwood and later drafted the provincial human rights code. 
Members of the Human Rights Committee spent the year speaking at school 
assemblies, encouraging clergy to discuss human rights in sermons, organizing a 
conference at Memorial University, corresponding with community groups, and 
planning for a national conference in December. 831 
The efforts of the human rights committee throughout 1968 resulted in a series 
of recommendations to the provincial government. In summary, these 
recommendations included: 
1. establish a permanent human rights association with a $7,500 grant 
until it becomes independently funded 
2. establish a human rights commission to conduct research, education 
and conciliation activities 
3. introduce a human rights code and amend the Minimum Wage Act to 
eliminate differential pay between men and women 
4. establish an ombudsman's office with broad powers to include 
schools, universities, municipal councils and boards 
5. the government should take the initiative to have the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UDHR entrenched in 
the Canadian constitution 
6. the government should undertake research to reassess the rights of 
minorities in Newfoundland, particularly in the case of Inuit and 
Indians 
7. review the prison system based on recommendations of the John 
Howard Society and expand the scope of the legal aid system 
8. reassess the viability of the denominational school system which 
currently discriminates against non-Christians832 
These recommendations were based on input from community groups, and 
offer a glimpse into the human rights issues facing Newfoundland in the late 1960s. 833 
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It was one of only three provinces (alongside Quebec and Prince Edward Island) 
lacking comprehensive human rights legislation; every other province had enacted 
either a human rights code, or laws dealing with discrimination in employment and 
accommodation. There was a clear appreciation for national and international issues, 
not only in the references to United Nations resolutions, but also in the decision to 
focus on an issue, prison reform, which was gaining increasing attention across the 
country.834 The Minimum Wage Act was of particular concern, and the question of 
equal pay was to develop into the central human rights issue for the provincial 
government in the next decade. The recognition of discrimination against aboriginals 
was significant, coming as it did from a committee sponsored by a government whose 
leaders dismissed the existence of racial discrimination. A year later, for example, 
Keough stated that he "knew of no case of racial and ethnic discrimination having 
taken place in this province."835 The most controversial recommendation referred to 
the denominational school system. When Judy Norman created a minor stir in 1972, 
her complaint was directed towards discrimination in the hiring of teachers. The 
committee's recommendation was more far-reaching, attacking the legitimacy of a 
denominational education system which discriminated against non-Christians. It was 
a daring move, and from its inception a year later the NLHRA openly opposed the 
denominational school system. The provincial government, however, had no wish to 
deal with that issue. 
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The government was prepared to pass human rights legislation though, and in 
May 1969, a Human Rights Code became law. Speaking to the bill, Smallwood saw 
the legislation as 
not a Bill to establish human rights, to create them or to establish or 
protect them. This has been handsomely done by our forefathers .... 
This legislation does not create the right to free speech, because the 
right is already there, it does not need to do it. This does not create the 
right of free press .... [l]t is already established. 836 
The bill was meant to bring together existing laws under one statute enforceable by a 
human rights commission. In the debate, Clyde Wells was the only member to grasp 
the essence of the new Human Rights Code: it was more akin to fair employment and 
fair accommodation practices acts, than to the more sweeping human rights codes 
which existed in such provinces as Ontario and New Brunswick.837 
The Newfoundland Human Rights Code was indeed a weak piece of 
legislation. The bill was divided into three key sections, the first dealing with 
discrimination in accommodation, the second employment, and the third with 
enforcement and the human rights commission. It forbade discrimination in 
accommodation or employment for reasons of race, religion, political opinion, colour 
or ethnicity, and national or social origin, with the caveat of a 'bona fide occupational 
requirement' for employment. 838 No provisions were made for the administration of 
justice, such as guaranteeing humane treatment while under arrest, or an individual's 
right to be promptly informed of the substance of charges laid against him or her. 839 
The commission was a temporary body with no permanent staff, to be called upon 
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when needed, and beholden to the Minister of Labour. Regulations were included to 
ensure equal pay for women, but only for work done in the same establishment; a 
corporation or the government could continue with discriminatory wage scales, so 
long as men and women did not work in the same place. Only the inclusion of 
political opinion as a prohibited ground of discrimination could be considered 
progressive. Indeed, Newfoundland was the first Canadian jurisdiction to protect 
political opinion in its human rights jurisdiction. 840 The key weakness of the 
legislation, also noted by Clyde Wells, was the exemption under section 9 for all 
educational institutions.841 This exemption was a clear sign of the government's 
unwillingness to use the Code to implement substantial change. 842 
The first Human Rights Commissioner was not appointed until March 1971. 
This was Gertrude Keough, wife of the recently-deceased Minister of Labour and a 
former school teacher who, in an Evening Telegram interview, admitted to knowing 
little about the issues, the Human Rights Committee, the Code, or even her own 
salary.843 This appointment further weakened the legitimacy of the Commission and 
its ability to push the government to expand the scope of the Code (Mrs. Keough 
served until1981). It was not Keough but Fred Coates, the Commission's full time 
Director, who was successful in pressuring the Treasury Board and private employers 
to end discriminatory wage practices.844 Under Keough the Commission did not 
make a single proposal for amending the Human Rights Code even though Coates 
was publicly critical of such provisions as the exemption for educational institutions. 
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In 1974 the Progressive Conservative government under Frank Moores removed the 
'same establishment' clause to guarantee equal pay for equal work across the board 
(the implementation of equal pay for work of equal value would take another 
generation). 845 But in the House of Commons debates it was the NLHRA, not the 
Commission, which was credited for lobbying and informing the amendment. In 
contrast, the chairs of human rights commissions in Ontario (Dan Hill) and British 
Columbia (Kathleen Ruff) were active in the 1970s in promoting substantive changes 
to their respective provincial human rights codes, particularly in expanding the 
definition of accommodation and the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited 
basis of discrimination. 
Despite its weaknesses, the passing of a Human Rights Code and the creation 
of a Human Rights Commission was an important step in a province lagging behind 
the rest of the country in anti-discrimination legislation. It created a potential forum 
for handling complaints and promoting awareness of human rights, and helped 
eliminate gender differentials in minimum wage laws. The remaining 
recommendations of the Human Rights Committee were generally ignored. Grants to 
the legal aid fund were increased but remained small, the decision to create an 
ombudsman's office was rejected, and no advances were made in prison reform or in 
the further reform of the denominational education system. 
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From Humble Beginnings: The Newfoundland-Labrador Human Rights 
Association 
Interest in establishing a human rights association had waned by early 1969. 
At some point between December 1968 and July 1969, W.J. Noseworthy stepped 
down as president of the Human Rights Committee and Dr. Biswarup Bhattacharya 
took control of the organization which was now called the Newfoundland-Labrador 
Human Rights Association. Keough's death in 1969, and the dissolution ofthe 
cabinet liaison committee due to lack of interest, effectively severed the NLHRA's 
ties with the provincial government. However, an increasingly frustrated Bhattacharya 
lobbied Smallwood for continued funding, asserting that it was the "duty of the 
provincial government to start us off."846 In his last recorded attempt to convince 
Smallwood to support the fledgling human rights group, the president of the NLHRA 
argued that 
the very survival of the organization depends on your generosity. 
Perhaps it is true that we could receive money from different sources 
in this Province, but we feel this possibly would bind us in subtle ways 
to groups which may prevent us from working without bias and 
independently. It is our understanding that the responsibility of 
maintaining a Human Rights Association in the province is the joint 
responsibility of the government of the province and the Federal 
Government. 847 
There were small grants of$250 and $500 in 1969 and 1970, but these ended 
government financial support, and the NLHRA might well have become defunct, like 
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similar committees in Quebec, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Alberta and Prince Edward 
Island, had it not been for Bhattacharya and his small executive. 
There are few NLHRA records before 1972, but it appears that in its early 
years the organization concentrated on attempting to secure government funding, and 
on lobbying for the full implementation of the Code (provisions on equal pay were 
not to come into effect until 1972 in order to allow private enterprise to adjust their 
wage base).848 With little financial support, the original members (Bhattacharya, 
Lilianne Bouzane, James Morgan and Rae Perlin) were forced to meet in private 
homes, and there is no evidence of additional members beyond this small group of 
individuals. But much as Robson in Vancouver, Borovoy in Toronto and Champagne 
in Montreal helped keep their respective associations alive, so Bhattacharya proved to 
be the leading force within the NLHRA. 
With no support from the provincial government, the NLHRA turned to the 
federal government. As early as 1971 the NLHRA began tapping into a large federal 
government grants system through the Opportunities for Youth and Local Initiatives 
programs. These were project-specific grants aimed at providing youth with 
community-oriented work experience, with most of the money going to workers' 
salaries. In 1976 the NLHRA began to receive core funding from the federal 
Secretary of State to establish an office and hire secretarial staff, with additional 
grants for summer student research projects. 849 These projects involved the 
investigation of particular human rights issues and the production of flyers and 
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booklets for distribution to schools and members. Various federal government grants 
would remain a central source of funding for the organization until the present-day. 850 
At no point did membership fees ever provide more than three percent of the budget, 
and the organization would forever be dependant on federal grants. 851 
The NLHRA, with a small membership base and dependant on the Board of 
Directors for research and action, drew members for its Board from the educated, 
middle class, professional and (except for Bhattacharya) caucasian population of St. 
John's. Few women were active in the organization in the 1970s. Bouzane and 
Morgan, one a civil servant the other a politician, would remain on the Board until the 
mid-1970s, but fewer directors were now linked with the provincial government.852 
Bhattacharya would be replaced as president by John Peddle, former general manager 
of the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (currently head of the Hospital 
Association), until Norman Whalen, a young Liberal lawyer from St. John's, became 
president in 1977 and remained until 1981. Other directors included Karl Beck 
(college professor), James Boyles (social worker) and David Kirby (professor of 
education at Memorial University). They were members of a newly emerged and 
matured middle class that had grown out of the economic boom of the post-
Confederation period under Smallwood with the expansion of public works program, 
the bureaucracy and education system. 853 The NLHRA was able to recruit from a pool 
of social activists with a shared concern in human rights issues while the leadership of 
the NLHRA was active in maintaining its own continuity. Bhattacharya recruited 
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Peddle and then Whalen to take over the presidency, and Whalen recruited William 
Collins, a lawyer practising in St. John's, to replace him in 1981.854 
The group used its meagre funds in the first few years to set up a telephone 
line to provide legal advice and direct complaints to the appropriate agency or 
organization. By the mid-1970s the NLHRA was able to establish an office with a 
part-time secretary who could direct complaints to members of the Board. They 
would review individual cases, discuss cases at monthly Board meetings, and decide 
whether or not to redirect the case to another agency or take it on themselves. Lacking 
the funds for litigation, the best the NLHRA could do in most situations was to send a 
letter to the individual or organization the complaint had been lodged against, 
warning them that their actions could lead to legal sanctions or a Human Rights 
Commission tribunal. The complaints phoned in to the NLHRA office during this 
period (1968-1982) were predominantly in the area of employment discrimination, 
although there were also calls dealing with housing discrimination, refusal to offer a 
service, and accusations of police abuse. In 1974 there was an average of30 to 40 
calls per month. By 1980 there were over 1,500 calls annually. 
There were also attempts to form chapters. As was the case with the other 
rights associations under study the NLHRA hoped to expand the movement into 
smaller urban areas across the province but it was singularly unsuccessful. Chapters 
in Corner Brook, Labrador and Gander all died within a few years due to their 
inability to organize local interest. 855 
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The organization was able to take an active stance on local issues and 
implement change. The NLHRA was successful in pressuring the Minister of Justice 
in 1973 to destroy police photographs of protestors taken the year before in front of 
Confederation building, and eliciting a statement confirming that the RCMP was not 
keeping photo files on protestors. 856 When amendments to the Human Rights Code 
were introduced in 197 4, the government credited the NLHRA with having informed 
most of the changes. 857 Not only did it secure an amendment to the equal pay 
provisions of the Code noted earlier, but in the same year sex and marital status was 
added to the Code as prohibited ground of discrimination. 858 In 1978-9, the NLHRA 
made representations to the Minister of Justice in a successful bid to improve 
conditions at the St. John's courtroom jail, and convinced the Mutual Life Insurance 
Company to remove a question regarding illegal drug use on insurance applications. 
During the same period the association teamed up with residents in rural Labrador to 
push the provincial government to stop uranium mining because of health and 
environmental dangers. 859 In conjunction with its educational and referral activities, 
the NLHRA had demonstrated an ability to deal effectively with issues of local 
concern. In 14 years it had become a stable and legitimate voice for social 
commentary inN ewfoundland. 
A great deal of the Association's work involved individual complaints rather 
than legislative reform. For instance, on 26 October 1973, the Medical Records 
Librarian at the Waterford Hospital in St. John's received a subpoena to appear in 
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Supreme Court three days later to discuss the medical records of a specific patient. 
This was not a criminal matter but a divorce case, and neither the patient nor the 
psychiatrist were informed of the subpoena. Unsure about whether or not to accede to 
the request and divulge private patient information, the librarian contacted 
Bhattacharya, who immediately took possession of the documents and refused to hand 
them over to the court, arguing that the records were the property of the hospital and it 
was an unnecessary violation of a patient's privacy. When the Justice Department 
realized it would have to take the president of the NLHRA to court, the matter was 
quietly dropped and the subpoena retracted. It was just one example of the type of 
service the NLHRA could provide on an individual basis for people unsure about 
their rights, or the rights of others. 860 
The NLHRA could also claim some credit for the appointment of an 
ombudsman in 1975, although the process had been a long one. In 1969 a 
government committee recommended the creation of an ombudsman's office.861 
Although legislation was passed in 1970 creating the position, the legislation was not 
proclaimed and an ombudsman appointed until1975. At that time Moores awarded 
the position to a recently-defeated Progressive Conservative M.P., Ambrose Peddle. 
The Leader of the Opposition called the appointment a "filthy act of political 
patronage," and the NLHRA expressed concern that the appointee would not develop 
the position's full potential. 862 Indeed, Peddle proved to be a weak advocate, and the 
NLHRA's hope that the office's scope would be expanded beyond government 
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agencies to Crown corporations and other government businesses never 
materialised. 863 
Despite all its work over the past decade and the concerns the organization 
had raised, no human rights issue marshalled the local populace around the NLHRA 
and there is no evidence that the association attempted to develop a grass roots 
following or mobilize people around a particular campaign. Outside the province, 
rights associations were able to mobilize around highly publicized events in which 
they could step in and make a unique contribution. Members of the BCCLA 
assembled their forces to deal with the impact of the Gastown riot, while the CCLA 
had the Fort Erie raid and the LDH came to the defence of prisoners during the FLQ 
crisis. Many ofthe core developments mobilizing other rights associations were 
simply not an issue in Newfoundland. While the BCCLA's most important case in 
the 1970s was undoubtedly compulsory treatment of drug addicts, Newfoundland's 
drug problem paled in comparison. According to the LeDain Commission, in 1972 
B.C. had 4 029 illicit habitual narcotic drug users; Newfoundland had two. 864 From 
its founding until1975 the LDH wanted nothing more than a provincial bill of rights, 
something the NLHRA achieved within two years of its founding. Meanwhile, the 
CCLA had dedicated much of its early history towards establishing checks on police 
abuses in Toronto (and to a lesser degree around Ontario) and the RCMP. Certainly 
Newfoundland had comparable figures for alcohol abuse and theft, but with regard to 
serious crime the island was a haven of peace. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s there 
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were no more than one or two murders a year (often none) and a violent crime rate 
which most often ranked the lowest or second lowest in Canada; Newfoundland's first 
ever bank holdup occurred in 1967, committed appropriately enough by a 
mainlander.865 The type of issues Maloney suggested brought police in contact with 
elements in society more likely to register complaints and assert their rights were 
simply not occurring in large numbers in the province and remained well below the 
national average.866 Combined with a comparatively (to Toronto) homogenous 
population and limited urban congestion, police in Newfoundland were not faced with 
the racial and other minority complaints which led to so many investigations into 
police complaints procedures in Toronto (although the Status ofWomen's Council 
did criticize the police for their failure to help battered women when responding to 
domestic disputes). The NLHRA was simply not confronted with the same human 
rights violations facing activists in Canada's major urban areas. There was thus a 
marked absence of issues in Newfoundland which had mobilized mainland rights 
associations and pushed them to concentrate their efforts on constructive campaigns 
while motivating them to marshal public opinion and take an active stance on a 
controversial case. 
The NLHRA and the Federation 
The NLHRA helped to organize the first coordinated action among rights 
associations during the FLQ crisis and Bhattacharya, representing the NLHRA, was 
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one ofthe founding members of the Federation.867 Through the Federation, the 
NLHRA was active in national rights debates. Both Bhattacharya and Whalen served 
on the Federation executive throughout the 1970s and 1980s and it was Whalen who 
led the Federation's delegation before the Special Joint Committee on the 
Constitution in 1981. The success enjoyed by the Federation before the joint 
committee remains a small but lasting contribution of the NLHRA and its former 
leaders to the human rights movement. 
The Federation was a logical association for the NLHRA, but the effect was to 
divert interest in national issues with important local consequences, such as abortion 
or capital punishment, to another organization. During the October crisis, for 
instance, groups in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver all sent their own separate 
letters and briefs to the federal government expressing their opposition to the War 
Measures Act, yet the NLHRA's only action during the crisis was to support a 
declaration written by the BCCLA. In Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto rights 
activists used the media to publicize their opposition to Trudeau's actions in an 
attempt to turn local opinion against the federal government. The NLHRA made no 
comparable attempt to influence Newfoundlanders. 
A similar silence greeted the McDonald commission. Instead of taking a stand 
on RCMP illegal activities, the NLHRA did nothing to raise concerns in 
Newfoundland about RCMP wrongdoings, preferring to allow the Federation to take 
the lead in Ottawa. In this and many other situations the NLHRA deferred to the 
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Federation. As a small organization with limited resources with a mandate to 
concentrate on local issues, the NLHRA simply did not see national issues as a 
priority. The lack of aboriginal or gay rights organizations on the island in the 
seventies contributed to the lack of public debate over national human rights 
concerns, although the women's movement raised the abortion issue within the 
context ofwomen's rights in Newfoundland as early as 1975.868 Local issues 
dominated the agenda of the NLHRA, but it nonetheless maintained important links 
to rights associations of this era and made its own unique contribution. 
Human Rights, Not Civil Liberties 
The LDH was not unique in propagating an expansive approach to human 
rights inclusive of economic, social and cultural (positive) rights; human rights 
associations emerging from International Year for Human Rights shared this 
philosophy. As a group born amidst celebrations over the anniversary of the UDHR, 
the NLHRA's conception of individual rights was distinct from the approach taken by 
civil liberties groups. Activists within the NLHRA called on the government to 
accept a more active role in promoting equality through programs promoting 
economic and social rights. While the NLHRA's contribution to the Charter debates 
through the Federation reflected a shared concern with due process, in Newfoundland 
it was active in pushing for low-income housing and improving the conditions of 
foster care. Many of the leaders in the BCCLA and CCLA would have characterized 
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the human rights issues identified by the NLHRA, not as human rights, but questions 
of public policy. In a brief before the Mayor of St. John's at a conference on housing 
issues, the NLHRA was "concerned with two issues. The first being that monies be 
made available for housing to people with low incomes; the second, that housing be 
so built and allocated that it becomes a part of, and integrates with, the environment 
in which we live."869 Throughout the 1980s the issue of low income housing was a 
priority for the association and, drawing on the edicts of the UDHR which called for a 
minimum standard of housing, the NLHRA advocated for more and better public 
housing in Newfoundland, often acting as a liaison between individuals seeking 
housing and government departments. 870 It also made several representations to 
government to improve the resources provided to foster homes. In perceiving 
individual rights within the context of subsidies to alleviate poverty or better 
conditions for foster children, the NLHRA deviated from civil libertarians' approach 
to economic and social rights which focussed on equal treatment by the state. 871 
Human Rights Activism: The Case of Denominational Education 
Despite the expansive approach to human rights adopted by the NLHRA, as 
with the LDH the Newfoundland association employed relatively conservative 
strategies in dealing with human rights violations. The limits of this form of activism 
are no more evident than the association's unrelenting opposition to the 
denominational education system. From its inception, the NLHRA was a consistent 
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critic of the denominational education system. In truth, concerns over the economic 
efficiency of maintaining multiple school systems organized around religious lines 
was perhaps the key motivation and justification for the elimination of the 
denominational system in the late 1990s. However, the history ofthe NLHRA offers 
a unique, rights-based perspective on one of the most important public debates 
throughout Newfoundland history. 
Newfoundland's state-funded denominational education system was rooted in 
the nineteenth century. There had been sporadic criticism of the system from time to 
time- both Wilfred Grenfell and the Fisherman's Protective Union voiced serious 
concerns, for example. The Commission of Government tried to implement reform, 
but was rebuffed by the churches. It was to appease the churches, and Roman 
Catholics in particular, that the Newfoundland delegation negotiating the Terms of 
Union with Canada insisted on the insertion of Term 17 to protect denominational 
education. There were some amalgamated schools by 1956, composed primarily of 
Protestant denominations, which formed the closest thing to the type of public 
education system available on the mainland. But they were few in number- 24 in 
1956, out of a total of 1,193 schools - and served only 8 percent of the school 
population. 872 Nowhere else in Canada, with the possible exception of the province of 
Quebec, did the churches enjoy such expansive control over education. 
In 1967, the Royal Commission on Education (Warren Commission) 
recommended a switch to a secular education system, which Phillip McCann 
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attributes to the influence of"United Nations policy on Human Rights and Children's 
Rights, and North American thinking on development of human resources in a 
technological age."873 A minority report accused the majority of violating its terms of 
reference by considering the denominational issue, and pointed to the Terms of Union 
as a constitutional protection for religious education. The government implemented 
some of the commission's recommendations, but the denominational system remained 
entrenched. 
Only four years after the Warren Commission report, the birth-mother of the 
NLHRA, the government-sponsored Human Rights Committee, recommended 
abolishing the denominational education system. From its inception, and later 
reaffirmed in 1972 when Judy Norman was refused her teaching certificate, the 
NLHRA had opposed the churches' monopoly over education as a violation of 
religious freedom. In 1984 the NLHRA prepared a brief on the Human Rights Code 
to the Minister of Justice arguing that 
The greatest single threat to equality of religion and freedom of 
worship [in Newfoundland] is the restrictive nature of the 
denominational education system. It is recommended that a second 
alternative be available for students who are not of faiths which benefit 
from a special constitutional privilege, or that denominational schools 
be prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religion. The best 
resolution of this issue would be an immediate court reference to seek 
a declaratory judgement concerning the scope of Term 17 of the Terms 
ofUnion.874 
The then-current system allowed public school teachers to be fired for not 
following the tenets ofthe faith, such as marrying outside the church. 875 To vote or be 
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a candidate in consolidated school board elections individuals were required to belong 
to either the Salvation Army, Anglican, Presbyterian or United churches. In a 
gathering of 120 people at Memorial University in 1987 to debate the merits of 
denominational education, Lynn Byrnes, who served as president of the NLHRA after 
1982, stated that the system was "based on some very blatantly discriminatory 
policies which we feel must be changed .... If these legal rights allow such cut and 
dried examples of religious discrimination then the legal rights are wrong."876 For 
two decades, the NLHRA believed that the solution to the denominational education 
system was to pressure the government to act, either through the courts or through 
legislative change such as amendments to the Human Rights Code. 
Yet, for over a century, attempts by various advocates for legal reform had 
failed to transform government policy. The reality ofNewfoundland politics made it 
unpalatable to challenge a system which, according to the commissioner of the 
Human Rights Commission in 1985, was "a fact of life in Newfoundland and is such 
because it is in accord with the wishes and desire of a large majority of the Province's 
population."877 The NLHRA was no different than any other civil liberties or human 
rights association in Canada in its focus on legal rights and state protection for 
religious freedom. The CCLA and the BCCLA both opposed any form of state 
funding for denominational education. As we have seen, a committee formed by the 
BCCLA in 1963 to lobby for changes to the legislation achieved little success.878 In 
each case, rights associations focussed on political lobbying or legal challenges under 
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their respective human rights legislation to challenge religious instruction in public 
schools; it was, in fact, a court challenge under the Charter in 1990, led by the CCLA, 
which resulted in the removal of religious practices from public schools in Ontario.879 
The saga surrounding denominational education in Newfoundland did not end 
in 1982 with the introduction of the Charter. Whereas the CCLA had successfully 
eliminated religious practices in Ontario's public education system with its Charter 
challenge in 1990, the system in Newfoundland was constitutionally protected by 
Term 17. Throughout the 1980s the boundaries of denominational education actually 
expanded. In 1987 Pentecostals were added to the list of religious affiliations under 
Term 17 and were thus assured state funding for their schools and a voice in the 
administration of the education system. Within a few years, however, there was a 
clear movement to challenge the dominance of the major religions in education. 
Significantly, this movement was led not by the NLHRA, but from the provincial 
government. In 1990 Premier Clyde Wells appointed a royal commission to study the 
efficiency and operation of the school system. In its report, Our Children, Our 
Future, the commission recommended a reduction of the churches role in education 
while at the same time suggesting the system continue to promote Judea-Christian 
values. 880 After negotiations between the government and churches to reform the 
education system broke down, Wells chose to hold a referendum to revise Term 17 
and introduce a public school system. With 54 percent voting Yes the government 
was able to go ahead and amend Term 17, only to find themselves blocked by the 
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courts who ruled that the revised Term 17 allowed the province to take over the 
administration of the school system but not close down the schools themselves. 881 
Frustrated at their inability to established a unified and secular public school system, a 
second referendum was held under the direction of Wells' successor, Brian Tobin, to 
fully revise Term 17 to ensure the churches had no say in the running of the education 
system. With 73 percent voting Yes, Newfoundlanders finally achieved a fully secular 
public school system in 1997.882 
The NLHRA was always at the forefront in the debate over denominational 
education. Children who were 'bumped' from an over-registered enrichment program 
in 1982 due to their religion were rescued by members of the NLHRA who lobbied to 
have increased federal funding provided to allow students entry into the program. 
Press releases were sent out and press conferences held throughout the 1980s calling 
on the government to end discriminatory practices inherent in the education system. 
A fiery television debate between Lynn Byrnes of the NLHRA and Archbishop 
Penney on CBC in 1985 helped keep the controversy alive and promote the NLHRA's 
cause to a wide public audience.883 In the same year a group of French Canadian 
parents approached the NLHRA when their children were denied entry into a French 
immersion program because they were of no professed religion or were non-Christian. 
Thanks to the intervention of the NLHRA, the federal government once again 
provided additional monies to hire teachers so students could join the program. Other 
activities included submitting a detailed review of the provincial human rights 
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legislation with a section on denominational education in 1985 and polling provincial 
election candidates in the same year and publishing their views on religious 
education. 884 By 1987 the NLHRA had also changed its position on denominational 
education: it now called for replacing the entire system with a secular public 
education system. 
One tactic the NLHRA hoped to use to undermine the system was to apply to 
the federal government's Court Challenges Program, a fund set up to support Charter 
cases, which the NLHRA sought unsuccessfully in the mid-1980s. 885 Another tactic 
was education, leading to a large conference attended by 120 people at Memorial 
University which was held in 1987. Lynn Byrnes, a past-president of the association, 
even sought election to the local School Board only to be denied because of her 
religious affiliation in an attempt to demonstrate the discrimination inherent in the 
system. When Premier Clyde Wells appointed a Royal Commission in 1990 to study 
the education system, the NLHRA presented a well researched and sophisticated brief 
calling for the removal of denominational education. Basing its arguments on the 
need to end discrimination in education, the NLHRA claimed the system unfairly 
discriminated against students by not allowing them to attend neighbourhood schools 
if they were not of the proper affiliation; it also discriminated against teachers by not 
hiring those of the proper denomination and discriminated against citizens seeking 
election to school boards. 886 Although lacking a strong presence during the 1995 
referendum, the NLHRAjoined a coalition called Education First in 1997 to fight for 
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the Yes side during the second referendum. It received favourable press coverage and 
Tobin worked primarily with the teachers' union and NLHRA to rally support for his 
initiative. 887 It is unclear how effective the NLHRA was in mobilizing public support 
in gaining a 73 percent Yes vote, but it was active in leading a coalition of 
associations in Newfoundland to support the Yes campaign (e.g., distributing 
literature and organizing a public forum) and working with the press. 
Conclusion 
The NLHRA was not the only social movement organization in the seventies 
expressing concern with the denominational education system. A potential challenge 
to the education system had always existed through the Newfoundland Teachers 
Association, with its concern over the ability of religious school boards to dismiss 
teachers. In 1975 Gregory Stack was fired by a Roman Catholic school board for 
marrying a non-Catholic. The teachers' association argued that this constituted 
dismissal without cause, and was therefore a violation of the collective agreement. A 
board of arbitration supported the school board's argument that the Terms of Union 
protected the rights of the school boards to dismiss at will, and that the collective 
agreement was ultra vires. 888 The Newfoundland Supreme Court overturned the 
decision, but the ruling did not challenge the right of the Catholic school board to fire 
Stack (and others) if sufficient notice and cause was given. In fact, courts in 
Newfoundland, British Columbia and Ontario upheld the power of religious schools 
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to dismiss teachers for violating tenets of the faith, because religious observance was 
a "bona fide occupational requirement" under provincial human rights codes.889 
The inability (or disinterest) of the labour movement in Newfoundland to 
mount an effective challenge to the education system was to be expected in an era 
when the labour movement was increasingly institutionalized. In addition to having 
no relationship with the local human rights group (even though Peddle, a union 
leader, served on the NLHRA Board), the labour movement did little more than 
organize legal challenges to violations of collective bargaining agreements. As noted 
in chapter two, contemporary critics of organized labour in the seventies have 
lamented the shift away from mass mobilisation and working class militancy to 
focussing on wages and job security. The latter places the emphasis on collective 
bargaining and the increasing influence of lawyers and entrenched union leaders in 
the structure of organized labour. Bryan Palmer's critique of contemporary trends in 
the labour movement in the form of 'social unionism' rhetoric highlights the core 
weakness of organized labour's ability to promote social change in the context of new 
social movements: 
Social unionism, for instance, might be seen as simply a progressive 
facade behind which a wing of the labour hierarchy adroitly masks its 
traditional business unionism refusal to use and extend the class power 
of the unions to launch a struggle for social change. It actually 
understates working-class power by accepting the current conventional 
wisdom that class as the central agent of socio-economic 
transformation has been undermined, and new social movements of 
women, ecologists, and peace advocates are more potent than class 
because they can more easily mobilize masses of supporters ... A real 
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social unionism would indeed link up with these sectors, but it would 
rightly stress the extent to which only mobilizations led by the working 
class and backed by the working-class capacity to stop the productive 
forces of advanced capitalist society in their tracks have the actual 
power to transform social relations. 890 
Without entering into the complex debate over whether or not the working class 
versus new social movements are the most effective agents for promoting social 
change, Palmer's analysis emphasizes the consequences of any social movement 
organization rigidly tied to institutional forms of activism. By rejecting grass roots 
organizing in favour of litigation, organized labour's self-imposed boundaries limited 
its ability to achieve systemic social change. 
The situation is comparable to the obstacles facing rights associations, with 
the predominance of lawyers among the leadership of human rights and civil liberties 
groups, and their focus on working through state institutions to achieve their goals. 
The only challenges presented by organized labour in Newfoundland to the school 
boards' discretion to dismiss teachers based on religious dogma was to bring each 
case to court, which the union subsequently lost.891 Similarly, the NLHRA 
consistently sought to work through state institutions to secularize the education 
system and, as with the teachers association, at no time sought to develop a grass 
roots following or organize a campaign to mobilize large numbers of people. In fact, 
all ofthe NLHRA's campaigns were based on the same strategies. Its early years 
were spent seeking amendments and implementation of the Human Rights Code, 
forwarding complaints to state agencies, having an ombudsman appointed, and acting 
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as a watchdog against potential abuses of human rights by the state. True, there are 
some exceptions in the historical record of rights associations. The BCCLA 
organized one demonstration in the seventies to challenge a policy of the Pacific 
National Exhibition; the League participated in (but rarely organized) demonstrations 
and days of protest for prisoners; the CCLA organized three rallies in its forty year 
history; and the NLHRA successfully pressured an insurance company to change its 
policies without having to submit a complaint through the human rights commission. 
Such instances were few and far between, however, and the history of rights 
associations in Canada is characterized by a focus on working through state 
institutions to achieve social change. Compared to the dual strategies employed by 
many social movement organizations during this period, the repertoire of strategies 
employed by rights associations were almost exclusively state-oriented and 
conservative. As with other rights associations, the NLHRA encountered immense 
obstacles in dealing with what it believed to be one of the most important human 
rights issues of the period. 
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Conclusion 
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of energetic social movement activism, 
from the gay liberation movement to the formation of women's centres to thousands 
of new social movement organizations representing a myriad of constituencies. 
During this period the rights revolution came to fruition as manifested, in part, by the 
explosion of civil liberties and human rights associations across the country. These 
social movement organizations (SMO) were a product of an evolving rights culture in 
Canada and were supported by the rising affluence of the middle class. Fuelled by an 
economic boom lasting into the mid-seventies and the rise of the service sector and 
bureaucracies, the middle class played an increasingly prominent role funding and 
leading SMOs. Linked with the rise of university enrollments in the wake of the post-
war boom, rights associations drew their members and leaders from rising numbers of 
middle class professionals, including journalists, lawyers, academics, social workers 
and ministers. The focus on quality of life issues characteristic of many social 
movements of the period, such as the environment or individual rights, was distinct 
from working class activism rooted in attacks against capitalism and excessive 
individualism. 
The mounting influence of Canada's middle class coincided with the 
expansion of the welfare state which, in turn, motivated rights associations to act. 
Rights activists traditionally concerned with state suppression of rights believed that 
the welfare state represented a potential threat to individual liberties. Prime Minister 
Lester B. Pearson's declaration of a War on Poverty in the sixties symbolized not only 
the expanding role of the state through welfare measures, but also symbolized 
Canadian society's expectation that the state would take an active role in dealing with 
poverty and other social welfare issues. While the CCLA and BCCLA spent years 
defending welfare recipients' due process rights, members of the LDH and NLHRA 
saw in the welfare state an acknowledgement of the right of citizens to certain basic 
social and economic resources, from low income housing to subsidies for the 
disabled. 
More than ever the state was intruding upon people's private lives and 
regulating the behaviour of its citizens. With urbanization came greater population 
density, more crime and larger police forces. In 1957 the Metropolitan Toronto 
Police Force was created and by 1977 it had more than 5000 members (about 1000 of 
them civilians); the cost of policing Toronto alone had risen from $58 129 000 in 
1971 to $140 520 000 by 1977.892 State repression of illicit drug use was at an all 
time high. Not only did this translate into greater conflict between police and citizens 
for an activity many felt should be legalized, but it forced a clash between police and 
middle class youth who were vocal and articulate in defending their rights. Perhaps 
the most visible manifestations of this conflict was the Gastown Riot of 1971 and 
demands for a civilian review system for complaints against the police in Toronto. 
Rights associations were active in their early years in defending youth against charges 
of vagrancy, drug use or protests. At the same time, the growing consensus around 
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the inviolability of human rights internationally, as manifested in the UDHR and 
subsequent covenants, as well as the eruption of the civil rights movement in the 
United States, undoubtedly played some role in inspiring and motivating human rights 
activists at home. An increasingly well educated population, rising affluence, greater 
state activity, new social movement activism, the peripheralization of the labour 
movement, urbanization, international developments and conflicts between police and 
youth all contributed to the proliferation of rights associations in unprecedented 
numbers during this period. 
The New Anti-Liberals? Comparing Generations 
A new generation of activists was at the forefront of organizing and leading 
rights associations in the sixties and seventies. The idea of distinctive generations is 
an elusive and vague concept, but if one accepts the notion that generations are an age 
group shaped by history, there "is no doubt that the social moment for the baby-boom 
generation was the sixties. "893 The history of rights associations is not a history about 
'evolving' ideas about rights. At the dawn ofthe twenty-first century, civil liberties 
activists continue to fight many of the same battles as their forerunners as evidenced 
by the disturbing parallels between the current war on terror and the suppression of 
communism in the forties. Instead, the history of rights associations is about how a 
particular historical context shaped social activism. Second generation rights activists 
built upon the achievements of their predecessors and reacted to the issues and events 
397 
confronting them, from the nationalism of the Quiet Revolution to the rising conflict 
between police and youth in the cities. 
The generational divide among rights activists was best symbolized by the 
differing priorities oflrving Himel, who left the CCLA in the mid-1960s, and Alan 
Borovoy, who replaced Himel as the leader of the CCLA. Both were lawyers with an 
interest in civil liberties, both were Jewish with strong ties to organized labour and 
Jewish organizations, and both were dedicated to combatting discrimination in all its 
forms. Yet whereas one of Himel's key objectives was to secure anti-discrimination 
legislation in Ontario, Borovoy spent most of his time dealing with police powers and 
due process violations. Unlike his predecessor, Borovoy not only led a rights 
association at a time when discrimination was increasingly unacceptable, he had the 
support of an emerging state human rights program in the form of a provincial human 
rights commission. Borovoy was in his early teens when the espionage commission 
was formed and had only recently graduated from law school in the late 1950s when 
the Padlock Act was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada. He never had to 
deal with the infighting between communists and social democrats which had divided 
the Toronto associations in the 1940s, but instead had to contend with egalitarians 
who were hostile to his own ideology of rights, to the point that he wrote a book 
denouncing egalitarians as 'anti-liberals.' 
Still, there were several important similarities between the two generations. 
Since the 1930s rights associations have failed to organize a grass roots following and 
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have drawn their members primarily from among educated middle class intellectuals. 
Journalists, academics, ministers and other professionals have consistently formed the 
leadership structure in these organizations. With the increasing accessibility of 
university education by the sixties this core constituency expanded dramatically, 
allowing the rights associations to be larger and mobilize more members. Essentially, 
however, the basic qualities of their members remained the same. Women continued 
to participate in small numbers, and there were few racial or religious minorities on 
the Boards of rights associations. Jews have always been prominent in Toronto rights 
associations, yet outside Toronto few have participated in these groups. 
Despite these similarities, there was one significant distinction between the 
demographics of each generation: the presence of French Canadians. Virtually absent 
from the first generation, by the seventies French Canadians led one of the most 
dynamic rights associations in the country. They dominated the LDH, an association 
which began as a bilingual organization only to become unilingually French by 1972. 
The LDH was one ofthe founders ofthe Federation and, although not to the same 
degree as the CCLA, it did participate in national debates on such issues as national 
security regulations and privacy legislation by presenting briefs to parliamentary 
committees. 
The second generation also had the benefit ofthe UDHR (1948) and the Bill 
of Rights (1960). Although neither document had much of an impact on Canadian 
law and the latter proved to be a lame duck, they had a strong educational value and 
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were exploited by rights associations. Certainly the Bill of Rights, if it had any kind 
of an impact at all, was to begin chipping away at the idea of parliamentary 
supremacy. As noted in chapter four, by 1970 with the inquiry ofthe first Special 
Joint Committee on the Constitution, parliamentary supremacy was no longer seen as 
a viable obstacle to entrenching human rights in the constitution. The Bill of Rights 
was also often the inspiration for litigation on behalf of the second generation of 
rights activists. When the BCCLA challenged the validity of the Heroin Treatment 
Act it claimed that the Act violated the equality under the law clause of the Bill of 
Rights, and the CCLA often intervened in court cases to argue a violation of the Bill 
of Rights. At the same time, human rights activists pointed to the UDHR as a symbol 
of how human rights should be interpreted and applied. Instead of negative rights 
requiring little action by the state, human rights activists demanded more positive 
state action in the field of welfare, housing and providing for the poor. Both 
documents were powerful tools to be employed by rights activists who could claim 
that the state was violating its obligations under the UDHR and the Bill of Rights. 
Without a doubt the single most important distinction between the two 
generations was the question of ideology. Both generations were characterized by 
ideological divisions, although only in the first generation did these divisions 
degenerate into bitter conflicts between activists. The division between communists 
and social democrats/liberals in the thirties and forties was part of the broader 
divisions within the Left. By the seventies rights associations were divided between 
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negative and positive conceptions of rights. More than any other organization the 
LDH symbolized the ideological divide between human rights and civil liberties 
associations. League activists did not focus exclusively on civil and political rights 
but instead saw human rights as a pathway to promoting a program of social justice as 
manifested in its call for the abolition of prisons, economic rights for youth, 
handicapped and the elderly while placing the debate over national security within the 
context of class repression. This ideological transformation was intimately linked 
with the Quiet Revolution and the increasingly militant Left in Quebec. But it is too 
reductionist an interpretation to account this transformation solely to the Quiet 
Revolution and French Canadian nationalism. It should not be forgotten that the LDH 
emerged within the context of an expanding human rights movement in Canada, a 
movement with organizations in every province with thousands (if not millions) of 
adherents. Rights associations such as the NLHRA, and many of the participants in 
the celebrations surrounding International Year for Human Rights, embraced a 
positive approach to human rights. It was thus part of a movement concerned with 
the limits of traditional notions of rights articulated by civil liberties organizations 
which shared their space within the human rights movement. 
Divided We Stand: A National Rights Association 
Bitter divisions between communists and social democrats/liberals in the 
193 Os and 1940s were sufficient to prevent the formation of a national rights 
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association. The second generation of rights activists found themselves equally 
helpless to form a truly national rights organization, although for more complex 
reasons. 
The Federation had always been a weak organization. Dependent on 
government funding, when the state pulled the plug in the late 1980s the Federation 
soon collapsed, unable to pay for its newsletter and annual meeting. For nearly 
twenty years it had proven to be the best forum for bringing together rights 
associations but it never developed a strong agenda or lobbying program, and it 
focussed more on networking than advocacy. The Federation was a pale image of the 
type of national rights association envisioned by its founders. 
Only the CCLA challenged the Federation for the status as Canada's national 
rights association. By the 1970s, with chapters spanning the country and confronting 
important human rights violations such as the implementation of the War Measures 
Act and RCMP illegal activities, the CCLA was far closer to being a national rights 
association than the Federation. Yet the strength of the CCLA was also its weakness. 
What made the Federation so weak was its decentralized model, its inability to 
consult with other associations quickly and its failure to raise funds to act on national 
issues. Most of the work was left up to individual associations. In contrast, the 
CCLA, as a highly centralized association, was able to act more quickly and 
efficiently, but in doing so it could rarely be said to represent the interests of its 
chapters. Most chapters could not afford to send their leaders to CCLA Board 
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meetings and by the 1980s it was clear that most of the chapters were themselves in 
decline. Whereas the Federation could honestly claim to be a national association with 
representation from across the country, the CCLA had a weak claim through its 
chapters and could only point to having some members from outside Ontario on its 
membership lists. In addition, national campaigns rarely materialized. The reality of 
the situation was that the Toronto group spent most of its time dealing with problems 
in Ontario. This was continually acknowledged by other rights associations who 
refused to recognize the CCLA as a national association and by individuals who 
refused to join the association because it was Toronto-centred. 
As a result, by the 1980s there were two weak national organizations, and 
neither was able to develop a viable program of action at the national level. In an era 
with no electronic mail and costly long-distance telephone service in a geographically 
vast country, it was extremely challenging to maintain a national organization. The 
inability to form a national human rights and civil liberties organization is a core 
theme in the history of rights associations in Canada throughout the twentieth century. 
The Debate Over State Funding 
When Don Whiteside sought to mobilize rights activists across Canada to 
form a national rights association in 1970-1, he was entreated by Eamon Park, the 
current Chair of the Board of Directors of the CCLA, not to solicit government 
funding for the meeting. The two men found themselves at an impossible impasse 
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which would eventually cause a fundamental rift between the two national rights 
associations, one heavily state funded and the other autonomous of government. In 
exhorting Whiteside to refuse state funding, Park warned him that it would forever 
tarnish the reputation of the proposed Federation and undermine its public credibility. 
Imagine, Park suggested, an organization supported by state funding refusing for 
legitimate reasons to take on a particular issue involving the government. No matter 
how justified its motivation, the group would be perceived as having backed off 
because of its dependence on state funding. 894 
It is clear that the CCLA was able to survive and thrive without state funding 
while other associations faced dissolution unless outside support could be secured. 
No issue caused more acrimony between the CCLA and other associations than the 
question of state funding. For the CCLA, state funding was proof of cooption by the 
state and an inability to effectively challenge governments when the state itself 
represented the greatest potential threat to civil liberties as evinced by the FLQ crisis, 
McDonald commission, police abuses and welfare issues. 
From the perspective of government officials, funding private voluntary 
agencies had a specific policy objective. Funding became a means, among other 
things, by which the federal government could support organizations to mobilize the 
public and direct public attention to national issues in order to develop a sense of a 
national community, fostering a "greater allegiance to national institutions through a 
feeling that these institutions were open to popular forces."895 This was clearly the 
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case with rights associations. The human rights program was entirely consistent with 
Trudeau's vision of combating Quebec separatism with rights discourse (epitomized 
in the Charter), such as promoting language and education rights outside Quebec. It 
was immediately following the FLQ crisis that the LDH received its first major grant 
from the Secretary of State and just prior to Trudeau's introduction of a draft Charter 
that the budget for the human rights program doubled from the previous year (as did 
the program supporting women's associations, which were highly active in the 
Charter debates). 
From the perspective of most rights associations, state funding often meant the 
difference between survival and defeat. CCLA opponents of state funding focussed 
their criticism on three key points. First, they believed that organizations dependent 
on state funding would hesitate to take their paymasters to task on controversial 
issues. Yet, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, there is no evidence either 
the BCCLA, LDH or NLHRA ever found themselves constrained by state funds. All 
three organizations expanded their membership, activities and scope exponentially 
over 20 years and rarely hesitated to challenge the government on controversial 
issues. While the NLHRA received most of its funding from the federal government 
and shied away from national issues for functional reasons, the other two associations 
did not hesitate to take on controversial issues involving the same governments 
(federal and provincial) who funded them, from compulsory treatment of addicts in 
British Columbia to self-determination and a bill of rights in Quebec. In fact, the one 
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time the federal government threatened to cut off funds as a result of the LDH's 
language policy, a hastily convened press conference denouncing the government's 
tactics soon led to a renewal of the grant. While it is true all three organizations were 
often constrained by project-specific grants and unable to conduct the type of 
initiatives they may have desired, this was no less the case with the CCLA. The 
latter's focus on welfare and Indian issues, while predating the 1970s, were no doubt 
intensified as a result of various project-specific grants from private foundations. 
At most, one could accuse the three state-funded rights associations in this 
study of making little effort to attract membership to their ranks whereas the CCLA 
continually focussed on attracting new members to the fold. The CCLA was far more 
active in encouraging individuals to become active in a rights association whereas the 
LDH only attracted large numbers of members when its government grants were 
temporarily cut off, and soon afterwards its membership declined. The LDH and 
NLHRA did not even bother to publish a newsletter, whereas the CCLA published 
both Civil Liberties and a bi-monthly 'News Notes.' At any rate, in an age of 
professional social movement organizations where most middle class adherents 
contented themselves with placing a cheque in the mail as the sum of their entire 
participation in a movement, there is no evidence the CCLA was able to mobilize the 
public in its activities more intimately than the other associations. Except for the 
petition campaign, several public forums and the Fort Erie demonstration, the CCLA 
did little to mobilize the public to participate in its activities. 
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The CCLA also enjoyed several core advantages any Toronto organization 
invariably has over any other association. First, located in the country's largest and 
richest city, the association had access to a wide base of support. Most of its 
membership campaigns were large mail solicitation campaigns through lists acquired 
from unions, church groups, the NDP and others, many of whom were located in 
Toronto or throughout Ontario. Even by 1982 the vast majority of the association's 
membership were located in Toronto as was its Board of Directors and Board of 
Advisors who contributed financially to the organization. The availability of a large 
base of support allowed the group to hire full time employees whose job was to enlist 
new members, creating a circle of reproduction that groups in isolated and small cities 
could never match. In building a stable membership base the CCLA was a much 
more attractive recipient for a grant from various private foundations interested in 
investigating specific issues than rights associations who might use the funds to 
secure staff to help build up the association. Secondly, the CCLA had access to the 
Atkinson foundation to stave off financial problems, in both 1967 and 1973. Third, 
much of the association's success in acquiring funding was attributable to its elite 
leadership with notable figures such as Keiller Mackay, Pierre Berton and June 
Callwood. Organizations located in St. John's or Saskatoon could not hope to match 
these advantages. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, Eamon Park believed that any group receiving state 
funding would be perceived as being biassed in favour of the state if it failed to take 
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on a key rights issue, even if it had legitimate reasons for doing so. Of course, it is 
impossible to answer a question involving a lack of action. However, there is no 
evidence any of the three state funded associations were openly criticized for inaction 
on a major issue or lost members for inaction. Only the LDH was publicly lynched by 
letters to the editors and in some editorials for not doing enough during the October 
crisis; however, this incident occurred before the association received its federal 
grant. Compared to the CCLA, all three associations, either individually or through 
the Federation, were vocal critics on key national issues, from the October crisis to 
RCMP wrongdoings. Although the CCLA was certainly far more active and 
dedicated to the RCMP scandal, this reflected more the regionalisation of rights 
associations and their preference for working through the Federation on national 
issues. 
Thirdly, Donald Smiley (a Director for the CCLA) once asked how one can 
ever expect bold and imaginative leadership leading to significant social change from 
state-funded associations? There is undoubtedly some validity to Smiley's criticism. 
As noted above, organizations dependent on state funding do not seek to mobilize 
larger numbers of adherents and only the CCLA had a large membership base. All 
three state funded associations employed the same tactics, mainly litigation, 
education, press releases, letter writing campaigns and briefs to parliamentary 
committees to pursue their agenda. Yet was this any different from the CCLA? In 
Fort Erie the CCLA organized a demonstration to demand an inquiry into the 1974 
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drug raid. Such was the same tactic employed by the LDH on the anniversary of the 
War Measures Act and on several protests against prison conditions, and with the 
BCCLA in protesting censorship at the Pacific National Exhibition. Perhaps the only 
truly imaginative campaign pursued by the CCLA in its early history was the petition 
on RCMP wrongdoings. Otherwise, there is no evidence a group not funded by the 
state provided more imaginative leadership. In fact, as a civil liberties association, the 
CCLA presented a more traditional approach to rights advocacy than the broader 
philosophy adopted by the LDH and the NLHRA. When the LDH revolutionized its 
operations in 1972 after it began receiving government grants, it became more 
militant, adopting positions on language rights and self-determination and taking on 
new issues such as the rights of the elderly and children. In its case, state funding did 
not dampen its activism but enhanced it. Granted, the most radical wing of the LDH 
was the only privately-funded sub-committee of the association, the prisoners 
committee. Nevertheless, when the prisoners committee suggested in its Charter of 
Prisoners' Rights that prisoners were justified in trying to escape because of the harsh 
conditions of jails, the prisoners committee had its funding pulled by the United Way. 
Even private funding, which the CCLA considered more legitimate than public 
funding, could threaten to inhibit a group's ideals. State funding did not seriously 
hamper the activities of rights activists in Canada and there is no evidence private 
funding provided the CCLA with significant advantages over its rival rights 
associations. 
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Human Rights Activism in the Age of Protest 
Rights associations in Canada are typical of the professional social movement 
organizations identified by social movement theorists in the United States. 
Government and private funding expanded considerably in the seventies and played a 
key role in allowing rights associations to thrive. They were also supported by a 
membership base they had little contact with except through membership dues and 
donations. Middle class professionals dominated these organizations and the media 
was a key tool for expanding their membership base as well as promoting their cause 
to a wider audience. Rights associations also depended a great deal on experts in their 
advocacy, whether it was placing BCCLA Board members on the stand to testify on 
the literary merits of the Georgia Straight or using the LDH's academic experts to 
study the conditions of prisons across Quebec. Finally, while rights associations did 
not constitute the human rights movement, these SMOs formed an important dynamic 
within the overall movement. Campaigns such as the CCLA's petition on RCMP 
illegal activities, the LDH's bill of rights crusade, the NLHRA's public debates on 
denominational education, and the BCCLA's educational campaigns were designed, 
in part, to reach out to adherents of the human rights movement and encourage them 
to join the association or support their cause. As discussed briefly in the appendix, 
many of these qualities are attributable to most, if not all, of the other rights 
associations which emerged during this period. 
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Social movement scholars who have studied SMOs have identified a myriad 
of strategies employed by SMOs. An important feature of social movement activism 
since the sixties is the use of dual strategies, including alternative tactics to working 
through state institutions. In the age of protest, social movement activists raised the 
spectre of mass mobilization, from rallies to sit-ins, as well as alternative forms of 
protest including civil disobedience or forming sub-cultures, to promote social 
change. Yet it is a distinguishing feature of rights associations that, with the 
exception of a few rare instances, they did not favour such strategies. All of the 
associations identified in this study, whose sole criteria were to be a self-identified 
civil liberties or human rights organization (with no partisan or constituency 
affiliation), depended largely on what Zald and Ash have characterized as 
'conservative' tactics. Rights associations shied away from grass roots mobilization 
in the way tenants unions employed mass rent strikes or civil rights activists used sit-
ins.896 The repertoire of tactics available to SMOs was extensive, but rights 
associations limited themselves primarily to briefs, publications, litigation, 
developing position papers and sending observers to protest marches. No single 
element can explain this development; a confluence of factors affecting all rights 
associations have informed these strategies. Rights associations have rarely been led 
by the same oppressed peoples whom they were defending; SMOs in general tend to 
focus their activities on state institutions by virtue of their own hierarchically 
organized structure; professional SMOs have little direct interaction with their 
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members; and state funding allows SMOs to forgo the mobilization of large numbers 
of constituents. Finally, it is essential to appreciate the impact of rights discourse in 
conjunction with these other forces. Human rights encourage the perception of social 
change as legal change, and when combined with these other factors, further 
motivated rights associations to focus their efforts on state institutions. Human rights, 
after all, are primarily realized through the state. 
As Michael Ignatieffhas suggested, human rights "is universal not as 
vernacular of cultural prescription but as a language of moral empowerment. Its role 
is not in defining the content of culture but in trying to enfranchise all agents so that 
they can freely shape that content."897 The history of rights associations in Canada 
demonstrates the ability of activists to employ rights discourse to advance the 
interests of the vulnerable and powerless. In Vancouver, the BCCLA articulated a 
forceful defence of free speech for an unpopular newspaper and hippies; in Quebec, 
the unique needs of the handicapped, youth and the elderly were explicitly recognized 
in the provincial Bill of Rights while individuals associated with a brutal act of 
terrorism discovered that, even in the midst of a crisis, they would not be left 
completely to the mercy of the state; in Toronto, poor single mothers dependent on 
welfare ascertained that they could question the government's arbitrary policies and 
seek redress; and, in St. John's, the NLHRA played a key role in getting equal pay for 
women through amendments to the human rights code and protecting protestors from 
the police. 
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But seeking social change through state institutions can often be a bitter and 
frustrating enterprise. The history of rights associations abound with examples of 
failed attempts to use mainstream tactics to protect individual rights. They often 
found themselves unable to deal with the core controversies they themselves 
identified, including abusive drug laws and enforcement, police violence, and 
denominational education. Perhaps the most successful association was the LDH, 
which succeeded in its objective of pushing the government to implement expansive 
human rights legislation (albeit, the last province to do so). But even the LDH faced 
severe obstacles, including national security regulations which prevented individuals 
from seeking redress from state abuse of fundamental freedoms. Institutional barriers 
simply proved too difficult to overcome for many human rights activists. 
According to some critics, the problems facing human rights organizations are 
of their own making: a minimalist approach to human rights. Irwin Cotler, a future 
Minister of Justice in the federal government, suggested in the early 1990s that at the 
time "a disproportionate number ofNGOs deal with matters pertaining to political 
and civil rights, while the cause of economic, social and cultural rights appears to be 
under-represented among the NG0s."898 Around the same time, Laurie Wiseberg 
advanced a similar criticism about the limited scope of human rights activism in 
Canada: "Yet [human rights associations] have, by and large, not delved into the 
structural causes of [human rights] violations, and they have, by and large, not 
devoted the same degree of attention to economic and social rights .... What they have 
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not done has been to call for the radical restructuring of societies."899 Ignatieff goes 
so far as to locate Canadian's minimalist approach to human rights activism in our 
culture of rights: "I am astonished that social and economic inequality, the focus of so 
much socialist passion when I was a student, has simply disappeared from the 
political agenda in Canada and most other capitalist societies. This disappearance has 
something to do with rights talk. It can capture civil and political inequalities, but it 
can't capture more basic economic inequalities, such as the ways in which the 
economy rewards owners and investors at the expense ofworkers."900 
Not all rights associations proffered such a limited conception of rights. Civil 
liberties associations refused to embrace positive notions of human rights, and any 
engagement with economic or social rights was conceived within the context of 
negative freedom. It is clear, however, that human rights associations such as the 
LDH and NLHRA did not fit this mould. As organizations dedicated solely to the 
promotion of human rights, it is significant that these two associations considered 
low-income housing and the economic needs of the elderly as rights and not simply 
privileges of the welfare state. It is a testament to the historical period in which they 
battled that human rights activists of the sixties and seventies, building upon the 
successes of their predecessors, no longer fought simply for the recognition of basic 
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civil and political rights but ambitiously proffered an expansive conception of human 
rights. 
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Appendix A: 
The Proliferation of Rights Associations in the 1960s and 1970s 
Between 1960 and 1982, 41 separate rights associations, including the 
Federation and the CCLA, were born in Canada.' Some groups barely lasted a year 
whereas others survived for more than forty years. The following section provides an 
overview of the emergence of rights associations in each province across Canada in 
the 1960s and1970s. 
The origins of individual rights associations varied considerably. Civil 
liberties organizations were most often created in reaction to specific rights abuses by 
the state whereas the bulk of Canada's human rights groups emerged out of 
International Year for Human Rights. Several rights associations, including the four 
case studies in this work, sought to create chapters in their respective provinces. In a 
few cases they were successful in creating associations which would stand the test of 
time and would eventually become independent from their parent organizations. By 
and large, however, such efforts proved ineffective. Only four of the ten chapters 
formed by the BCCLA lasted for more than a handful of years and chapters formed by 
the NLHRA and the LDH all became defunct soon after their creation. No group was 
more prolific in the formation of chapters or in encouraging other associations to 
become affiliates than the CCLA. By 1972, however, only five chapters remained 
active and most of these were affiliated organizations which had only minimal contact 
with the Toronto association. According to the 1972 Secretary of State report on 
rights associations in Canada, the failure of the CCLA to effectively operate chapters 
outside Toronto was attributable to its use of chapters simply as free labour and as 
part of its attempt to be perceived as a national organization. Most telling was the 
CCLA's unwillingness to provide affiliates or chapters with a strong voice within the 
organization's executive or with sufficient financial resources.2 In most cases, 
however, it was simply a question of insufficient resources or lack of leadership and 
volunteers. As a result of the failure of most rights associations to expand through 
chapters across the province, the history of rights associations is largely dominated by 
groups scattered across major urban areas. 
British Columbia's first rights association was the Vancouver branch of the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Union in the 1930s under the leadership of a well known 
academic and social democrat, George G. Sedgewick. By the late 1950s, both the 
Association for Civil Liberties (ACL) and the League for Democratic Rights (LDR) 
had become inactive and there were no remaining rights associations in Canada. 
Nonetheless, there were anti-discrimination associations in Vancouver throughout the 
1950s including a JLC committee and the Vancouver Civic Unity Association, an 
organization with a mandate to "improve intergroup relations and to strive for the 
elimination of prejudice. "3 But neither group had inherited the mantle of a 'rights 
association' in the wake ofthe Vancouver CCLU's demise. The first group to emerge 
from this vacuum was the BCCLA in 1962. 
Following the formation of the BCCLA, a host of other rights associations 
appeared throughout the province. In addition to the provincial and municipal human 
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rights labour committees, a British Columbia Human Rights Council materialized in 
the wake of International Year for Human Rights.4 Its Chair was a well known 
academic from the Faculty of Education in the University of British Columbia, Joseph 
Katz, who chaired the B.C. Human Rights Committee, the temporary body organizing 
the province's activities for 1968.5 Katz was acknowledged nationally for his human 
rights work in British Columbia; his organization was one ofthe few to receive a 
large grant from the Secretary of State in 1970 and, in the following year, was invited 
to Ottawa to advise the Secretary of State on its human rights program with a group of 
rights activists across Canada. Unlike the BCCLA, the Council was a collection of 
associations, not individuals, and acted in a complementary role to the provincial 
human rights commission; the Council conducted educational work and brought 
human rights violations to the attention of the commission. While the Council was 
involved in a variety of activities, its main focus was promoting non-discrimination 
and tolerance. As a result, it sometimes carne into conflict with the BCCLA whose 
civil libertarian positions would favour free speech, even when such speech was 
hateful.6 It was this incompatibility which led the Council to hesitate joining the 
Federation fearing civil liberties and human rights groups could never cooperate. In 
the end the Council chose to join the Federation and became an enduring member 
until the Council's demise in the early 1980s.7 
While the BCCLA and the B.C. Human Rights Council were centred in 
Vancouver, a large number of rights associations emerged around the province 
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throughout the late 1970s. An attempt to form a rights association in Victoria in 1969 
was unsuccessful but another group finally emerged in the 1979 and continues to 
operate today as a discussion group. 8 At one point in time there were groups in 
Powell River, Kamloops, Penticton, Quesnel, Prince George, Comox-Strathcona 
Courtnay, Kelowna, Williams Lake and in the North-Central and South Okanagan 
regions. Some of the groups were organized by the B.C. Human Rights Council but 
most of them were created by field workers sent out by the BCCLA. Through a grant 
provided by the province in 1973 (later funded by an Local Initiatives Program grant 
from the federal government), the BCCLA's Community Information Project was 
designed to send field workers around the province to provide legal counseling 
services, promote good relations between the police and citizens, and encourage the 
formation of independent rights associations.9 Although the BCCLA had been 
instrumental in the formation of these groups, there was no official linkages between 
them outside the Community Information Project; none of these groups had 
representation on the BCCLA Board of Directors and the only financial relationship 
was the salaries provided to the field workers through the BCCLA's government 
grants. Unfortunately, the core weakness of each group was a dependance on the field 
worker and many of them became defunct once the field workers departed. Only the 
South Okanagan and Quesnel groups remain active today. 
Alberta lacked a strong presence among first generation of rights associations 
with the exception of five small chapters of the LDR, and the province did not 
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become active in the second generation until International Year for Human Rights. A 
year earlier the government had set up a provisional human rights committee with the 
goal of establishing a provincial group to work with voluntary organizations on 
human rights programs. It was part of the nation-wide effort to promote awareness of 
human rights in anticipation of the anniversary in 1968. In the same year the 
provincial government hired a full time human rights officer to bring provincial 
human rights legislation to the attention of the public. 10 The provisional committee 
eventually evolved into the Alberta Human Rights Association which was 
incorporated in 1968 under the leadership ofF.C. Brodie, secretary of the Alberta 
Federation of Labour, and was centered in Edmonton. The group struggled in its 
early years, kept alive predominantly by the efforts of government officials. 11 Within 
a few years the group was forced to release its secretary due to lack of funding, but in 
1971 it was able to secure funds from both the Secretary of State and the provincial 
government to stay afloat. By 1972 the group enjoyed greater stability with about 200 
members and a new president who took an active interest in cases of discrimination 
and the need for an independent review board for police complaints. 12 It was soon 
renamed the Alberta Human Rights and Civil Liberties Association to broaden the 
group's appeal. 13 
In 1973 the Alberta Human Rights and Civil Liberties Association established 
its first successful chapter (a previous attempt in Calgary had failed) with the 
Lethbridge Civil Liberties Association in reaction to local concerns about the use of 
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corporal punishment in public schools. This led to a successfully lobbying campaign 
by the Lethbridge association against the school board to have the regulations for 
corporal punishment removed. 14 A group of academics, including Ed Webking, a 
political science professor at the University of Lethbridge, founded the organization 
and kept it active until the group folded in 1983 Y Within a year of its founding, 
however, the Lethbridge group became independent and changed its name to the 
Lethbridge Citizens Human Rights Council in order to qualify for Secretary of State 
grants under the program for new groups. 16 Through state funding it was able to 
operate a downtown office for screening and referral services and spent most of the 
1970s organizing education programs funded by provincial and federal grants. It 
remained active until1982 when Ed Webking left the group for Ottawa and the 
driving force behind the organization was lost. 17 Additional rights associations were 
formed in Fort McMurray and Grand Prairie in 1977, but they only managed to stay 
alive for a handful of years and never numbered more than a couple of dozen people. 
The most enduring rights association to emerge from Alberta appeared in 1973 
as the Calgary Civil Liberties Association. Its founder was Sheldon Chumir, a tax 
lawyer and former Rhodes scholar from Calgary who was independently wealthy 
thanks to a small oil and gas company. Chumir established a private practice in 1975 
and became noted for his civil liberties work in Alberta and chaired the civil liberties 
section of the provincial wing of the Canadian Bar Association. 18 The fledgling rights 
association began meeting informally at a Chinese restaurant every second Friday to 
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discuss issues of interest until it members decided to incorporate themselves into a 
formal organization in 1977 under the Societies Act. 19 Among its founders was Gary 
Dickson (lawyer), David Cruickshank (law professor, University of Calgary), Ed 
Wolfe (Calgary oil patch worker) and Joan Ryan (anthropology professor, University 
of Calgary). Most oftheir early work involved drawing attention oflocal human 
rights abuses to the media and writing letters to the provincial government. In fact, 
despite the presence of a few non-lawyers, by 1982 the Calgary Civil Liberties 
Association was in effect little more than a small group of lawyers lobbying and 
litigating cases. Once they were incorporated, the association developed a working 
relationship with the CCLA although never formally affiliated. Among the issues the 
group concerned themselves with were free speech and municipal bylaws dealing 
with parade permits and public signs, discrimination against aboriginals by Calgary 
landlords, various breaches of privacy access regulations and prayers in public 
schools?0 Once the Alberta Human Rights and Civil Liberties Association had 
became defunct in the mid-1980s the group changed its name to the Alberta Civil 
Liberties Association. It had also recently founded the Alberta Civil Liberties 
Research Centre in 1982 (with the help of a grant from the Alberta Law Foundation) 
to receive donations and conduct civil liberties educational programs and research. 
Both the Alberta Civil Liberties Association and the research centre continue to be 
active today. 
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Saskatchewan also had virtually no presence among rights associations before 
the 1960s except for branches of the LDR in Regina, Saskatoon and Moose Jaw. As 
was the case in Alberta, the Saskatchewan Association for Human Rights (SAHR) 
was a direct result of celebrations surrounding International Year for Human Rights in 
Saskatoon.21 Its founding president was Reverend G.E. Hobson, with executive 
secretary John D. Statychuk, a leading figure in the Saskatchewan Ukrainian 
community working for the provincial wheat pool.22 Statychuk was also one of the 
key founders ofthe Federation and helped recruit D.A. Schmeiser, a well known 
Canadian legal scholar, to the SAHR's Board ofDirectors. By 1972 the group had 72 
members. As was the case with many of the associations formed in 1967-8, one ofthe 
first priorities of SAHR was securing a provincial human rights commission with a 
human rights act.23 The group worked closely with the government in preparing the 
legislation and successfully lobbied for significant amendments. According to the 
Regina Leader Post, the "government has bowed to pressure from the Saskatchewan 
Association of Human Rights and will change its proposed human rights commission 
legislation to allow the commission to enforce its own decisions and to allow persons 
affected the right of appeal."24 
Three chapters ofthe SAHR were formed in the 1970s in Regina, Moose Jaw 
and Esterhazy, none of which lasted for very long. The only other rights organization 
to emerge during this period in Saskatchewan was the Regina Civil Liberties 
Association, a branch of the CCLA. It was created in 1970 and was predominantly a 
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collection of university professors, unionists and lawyers led by John Beke. Several 
committees were initially set up to study various issues in the province including the 
status of inmates of public health institutions and prisons, the rights of juveniles and 
in the administration of justice. 25 The Regina branch remained active until 1980. 
Unlike Saskatchewan and Alberta, there was an active rights association in 
Manitoba before the 1960s called the Civil Liberties Association of Winnipeg. The 
LDR had established branches in Brandon and Winnipeg, and Winnipeg was also 
home to one of the JLC's human rights committees. Surprisingly, there was little 
activity in Winnipeg during the 1960s and 1970s. The Winnipeg branch of the Jewish 
Labour Committee was only marginally active, doing some educational work and 
taking on a few specific cases of discrimination. In 1967 a Manitoba Human Rights 
Association was formed and changed its name to the Manitoba branch, CCLA, when 
it affiliated with the CCLA in 1969. The affiliation allowed the organization to 
receive $20 000 ofthe CCLA's Ford grant, and it managed to raise an average of$12 
000 to $14 000 each year afterwards to stay active.26 More than 400 people attended 
the chapter's founding in 1969 when Pierre Burton, who sat on the Board of Directors 
for the CCLA, gave a talk. Jerry Fast, a graduate student in economics, was 
appointed the group's first staff director.27 Within a year the newly christened 
association presented a brief to the provincial government demanding significant 
revisions to the human rights code asking for the commission to report directly to the 
legislature and not the minister, and called for the inclusion of sex, property status, 
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social origin, social status or other status as prohibited forms of discrimination.28 
Unfortunately the Manitoba CCLA did not enjoy the success of its Saskatchewan 
counterpart and the recommendations were not accepted. 
An attempt to form a chapter in Brandon was unsuccessful and the branch 
itself became defunct by 1975. It had already lost its director in 1971 due to lack of 
funding. By focusing on the CCLA's due process research the Manitoba group had 
neglected its own needs and eventually became inactive. It was quickly replaced, 
however, by a new Manitoba Civil Liberties and Human Rights Association which 
experienced a variety of name changes, from the Winnipeg Civil Liberties and Human 
Rights Association in 1976 to the Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties 
(MARL) in 1978. There was some fluidity between the fall of the original CCLA 
branch and MARL, which also affiliated itself with the CCLA; the cash balance held 
by the original group was passed on the MARL when it was incorporated. MARL's 
first president was Dr. Ralph E James, past president of the Carribean Canadian 
Association ofWinnipeg and an active member ofthe Canadian Council of Christian 
and Jews. Judge C. Rhodes Smith, former Chief Justice of Manitoba, served as 
honorary president. MARL's first public action was to brief the provincial Law 
Amendment's Committee to oppose amendments to the Human Rights Act (Bill65) 
which would have allowed discrimination in employment on grounds of race, 
religion, physical disability or colour where they were considered occupational 
requirements for work. Bill 65 further proposed to exempt the Manitoba Insurance 
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Company from the Human Rights Act. Eventually the government chose not to 
amend the legislation in regards to race, colour, religion and handicap.29 By 1981 
MARL had over 350 members, although it was experiencing financial difficulties and 
had to be bailed out by the CCLA with an annual grant of$5000.30 Nonetheless, the 
organization overcame its difficulties and continues to be active today. 
Ontario, as the largest province in Canada and home to the nation's capital and 
the largest urban area, has always played host to several rights associations. Several 
organizations operated from Ottawa and Toronto in the 1930s and 1940s, and the 
Association for Civil Liberties and the LDR (which also formed chapters in Ottawa, 
Toronto, Hamilton, Niagara Peninsula, London, Windsor, Sault St. Marie, Timmins, 
Port Arthur, and Fort William) operated out of Toronto. It was the CCLA, with its 
ties to the Association for Civil Liberties through Irving Himmel, which was the first 
group to emerge in the 1960s in Ontario. At the time, the Jewish Labour Committee 
had been active in both Toronto and Windsor with committees to combat racial 
intolerance. Between 1968 and 1982, chapters ofthe CCLA were formed in Windsor 
and London while other groups were formed in Ottawa, Hamilton, Owen Sound, 
Cornwall, and Ken ora. Although devoid of chapters, the CCLA remains one of the 
most active rights associations in the country today and is unquestionably the most 
recognizable. 
Another organization was founded in Ontario around 1968 in Ottawa as a 
chapter of the CCLA but it soon disaffiliated and became an independent 
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organization. Although it was formed during the International Year for Human 
Rights, the Civil Liberties Association National Capital Region (CLA NCR) was in 
actuality created in response to police harassment of youths selling the alternative 
newspaper, the Free Press. 31 Police had decided to harass and seize copies of a paper 
called 'Octopus' being distributed on the Sparks Street mall, a pedestrian walkway in 
downtown Ottawa. Although in theory no one could peddle or conduct business on 
the mall without a permit from the Pedestrian Mall Authority, in practice the 
mainstream newspapers never bothered to obtain one. Only Octopus was targeted by 
officials who harassed, seized and prosecuted distributors of the paper for illegal 
distribution on the mall. After 20 months of negotiations with the mall authority, the 
CLA NCR was finally able to get them to agree to allow Octopus to be distributed so 
long as the vendors did not harass people in the mall. 32 Among its founders was Don 
Whiteside, a member of the Secretary of State's Group Understanding and Human 
Rights Section, and most of its initial membership were local university professors. 
Its president was professor Hugh Martha and its general counsel was a lawyer, Len 
Shore. Whiteside became the key link between the CLA NCR and the Federation 
which he helped found and eventually became the leading force in the latter, using the 
resources and offices of the CLA NCR to help keep the Federation active. 
In Cornwall, a group was constituted in 1971 and soon became a member of 
the Federation. Thanks to funding from the Secretary of State, it was able to establish 
a permanent office and open a storefront office in the downtown to provide advice 
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and referral services to the local community.33 Its work by the mid-1970s included 
organizing seminars on discrimination, publishing a pamphlet on youth and the law, 
and helping people who were confused with the complicated process of claiming 
unemployment insurance and using income tax forms. 34 The Cornwall Civil Liberties 
Associations managed to stay active until1981. In the Kitchener-Waterloo region a 
Kitchener-Waterloo County Human Rights Association was organized in 1970 only to 
become inactive by 1972; it was quickly replaced, however, by the Kitchener 
Waterloo Human Rights Caucus in 1972 which remained active until 1981. In its first 
years of operation, the Human Rights Caucus complained to the Waterloo County 
Board of Education when it refused to hire a woman out of concern she might become 
pregnant, and supported a boycott by the Dare Foods workers in Kitchener who were 
on strike. The strike was initiated because of differential wages between men and 
women in the factory, and the difficult working conditions where seven women per 
week on average were fainting in a building which could reach up to 130 degrees.35 
In Hamilton, the local civil liberties association led by university professor 
Harry Penny began in 1970 with 85 members and would continue operating until 
sometime in the 1980s. It refused the join the Federation based on "irreconcilable 
differences in ideology" because the Federation accepted government funding which, 
as was the case with the CCLA, the Hamilton group adamantly opposed.36 For the 
next 12 years the association concerned itself with a wide range of civil liberties 
issues, from RCMP record keeping for people found innocent of crimes to the rights 
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of patients and immigrants. A London rights association originally began as a chapter 
ofthe CCLA but became an independent association in 1972 with Dr. Carl Grindstaff, 
a law professor at the University of Western Ontario, as its president. It was formed 
when police in London decided to arrest ten people for shoplifting near Christmas and 
keep them in jail over the holidays as an example to other potential shoplifters. 
Outraged at the decision to imprison people for stealing $40 in merchandise, 
Grindstaff called together a group of leading activists in the city to form a London 
branch ofthe CCLA which unsuccessfully sought a Writ of Prohibition to prevent 
further detentions for shoplifting.37 Other groups were also formed around Ontario in 
the 1960s and 1970s in Owen Sound, Sudbury, Windsor, Kingston and Kenora, most 
of which lasted for only a few years.38 
While rights association proliferated in Ontario, there were surprisingly few 
associations in Quebec. Montrealers have always been active among rights 
associations, beginning with a chapter ofthe CCLU in the 1930s and, years later, the 
Montreal Civil Liberties Association. There were also chapters of the LDR in 
Montreal and Quebec city, and the Jewish Labour Committee was headquartered in 
Montreal as was the United Council for Human Rights. Outside the labour 
committees, however, the only enduring rights association in Quebec was the LDH. 
For a brief period the LDH toyed with the possibility ofhaving chapters. 
There was some correspondence with people in Sherbrooke as early as 1965 thinking 
of setting up a branch of the LDH but nothing materializing from the initiative.39 For 
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the first time a branch was set up in 1973 in Quebec City which barely last a year. 
Little is known about the branch and why it failed except for difficulties it 
encountered in encouraging people to become active in the group.40 The most lasting 
branch of the LDH was a group in Sept-Ilses called the Comite Regionale du Cote 
Nord, which was active between 1976 and 1980. Inspired by the activities of the 
LDH, a group of residents fighting against exploitation by landlords decided to form 
the branch and spent most of its time sending letters to politicians on key issues, 
preparing teaching aids, distributing press releases and organizing petitions.41 
Another branch in Estrie formed in 1978 also became defunct within a handful of 
years. From the minutes of the LDH it is clear the failure of the branches was likely a 
result of simple disinterest on the part of most members ofthe LDH executive 
council. The branches were a product oflocal initiative and not the executive; the 
LDH offered the groups no financial support nor a place in its own council, and took 
little interest in the initiatives these groups were undertaking. The LDH itself remains 
one of the largest and most active rights associations in Canada today. 
New Brunswick, as with its fellow Atlantic provinces, had no presence among 
the first generation of rights associations, not even a branch ofthe LDR. A branch of 
the CCLA was formed in Fredericton in 1969 under president John Oliver with about 
60 members and continued to operate until1975. In its first year of operation the 
organization established a legal aid office and, in the same year, came to the defence 
ofT om Murphy, a writer for the student newspaper at the University of New 
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Brunswick. Murphy had written a column on the recent barring of a professor from 
the university, Norman Strax, accusing the courts of perpetrating a mockery of justice 
and being tools of the corporate elite. Borovoy was flown in from Toronto by the 
Fredericton CCLA to challenge the charge against Murphy of scandalizing the courts. 
Borovoy argued that the Crown had to prove actual interference in the administration 
of justice but he lost the case and Murphy spent ten days injail.42 
An additional group was formed in Bathurst (Comite des droits de 1 'homme 
du nord-est du Nouveau Brunswick) in 1971 with 300 members which was defunct by 
1980 although it had been effectively inactive since 1975.43 Jean-Marie Nadeau of the 
New Brunswick Federation of Labour was the group's first executive secretary and its 
founding president was Theo Gagnon, provincial director for welfare services in the 
north-east region (many of the group's early founders eventually became the leaders 
ofNew Brunswick's francophone labour movement). Within a year the group had 
applied for Secretary of State funding and established an office in Bathurst with 
seminars to discuss the role of the provincial ombudsman, legal aid and the human 
rights commission. Of all the New Brunswick rights associations, the Bathurst 
organization was the most active, offering a referral service and working with the 
ombudsman and human rights commission to establish offices in the region. This 
organization emerged as a result of the social and economic problems of the region, 
specifically high unemployment and lack of services for Acadians in French. The 
group's primary goals and accomplishments were lobbying the government to extend 
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unemployment benefits and services to this largely poor region of New Brunswick 
and improving access to French services in the north-east.44 
Another association called the Co mite pour les droits de 1 'homme du sud-est 
du Nouveau Brunswick, emerged in 1972. Little is know about the latter except that 
it joined the Federation in 1972 when it was formed and remained active in the 
Federation until1975 when the sud-est group dropped off the map. According to the 
Federation, the sud-est group fell from a remarkable 1500 members to 10 within a 
year and became inactive by 197 5. It most likely emerged as a result of a particular 
event which mobilized the local populace and soon became defunct after the issue 
was concluded. Finally, in 1975 (around the time the Fredericton chapter ofthe 
CCLA became defunct), a fourth rights group emerged in New Brunswick called the 
New Brunswick Human Rights and Civil Liberties Association. It was formed at the 
initiative ofNorville Getty, a former leader of the Prince Edward Island Civil 
Liberties Association, who was traveling to Fredericton in his capacity as President of 
the Federation. Getty encouraged a small group of local young professionals, mainly 
professors and civil servants, to form an association and join the Federation. The 
group (mostly anglophones from the south of the province) was led by Cynthia Davis, 
a civil servant with the provincial government, and most of their time was spent 
responding to phone calls from people unsure about their rights. It became defunct in 
1983.45 
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Sydney, Nova Scotia, was briefly home to a chapter of the LDR but the 
province had no active rights association until1962 with the creation ofthe Halifax 
Advisory Committee on Human Relations (although there was a human rights 
committee with the Halifax and District Labour Council and the Cape Breton Labour 
Council). In its fourteen year history it experienced more name changes than any 
other rights association, including the Halifax Advisor Committee on Human Rights 
(1963), Nova Scotia Human Rights Association (1966), Nova Scotia Civil Liberties 
and Human Rights Association (1969) and the Nova Scotia Civil Liberties 
Association (1972).46 
In its original form, the creation of the Human Rights Advisory Committee on 
Human Relations was a product of the JLC. Sid Blum, Director of the JLC, sent his 
most effective employee, Alan Borovoy, to Halifax in 1962 to work with the labour 
federation and other community groups to see if there was anything they could do to 
help the black population of Africville. The all-black suburb of Halifax had long 
been an issue of concern for both local and national minority rights activists.47 It was 
a dilapidated and run down part of the city with approximately 80 families (400 
people), many of whom lived in hovels with no running water and used outdoor 
toilets.48 
Working with Joe Gannon, a vice-president of the Canadian Labour Congress 
headquartered in Nova Scotia, Borovoy mobilized a group of activists to agitate for 
the rights of blacks in Africville who eventually took the name of the Halifax 
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Advisory Committee on Human Relations.49 Within a few years, the group had Chief 
Justice ofNova Scotia, Gordon S. Cowan, as its president and H.A.K. 'Gus' 
Wedderburn, president of the Nova Scotia Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People, as its Vice-Chairman. By 1972 it had approximately 230 members. 
Wedderburn was the real mover behind the organization. A tireless black activist 
born and raised in Nova Scotia who was employed as a high school principle (and 
became a lawyer in the 1970s), it was Wedderburn who became the JLC 
representative in Halifax. For the next ten years, the Halifax group would function in 
much the same capacity as the Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights and 
receive funding from the JLC; however, the group operated independently and never 
formally worked with the provincial labour federation as was the case in Ontario and 
British Columbia. An attempt to form chapters in Pictou County, Truro, Cape Breton 
and Yarmouth did not last for very long and these groups quickly became defunct. 
The Nova Scotia organization had only been linked to the JLC through 
Wedderburn and did not depend on them, as the Ontario group had, for all its funding. 
When the JLC became defunct in the mid-1970s, the group was able to continue 
functioning with little hindrance. But by this stage the organization was in decline. It 
had changed its name to the Nova Scotia Civil Liberties Association to reflect its new 
mandate. The group no longer dealt with cases of discrimination, which it felt best 
belonged to the human rights commission. At this stage Wedderburn had retired from 
the organization and it fell into the hands of a group of lawyers and academics mostly 
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from Dalhousie University.50 The name change also reflected the organization's 
decision to affiliate with the CCLA. For the next three years, before the organization 
became defunct in 1976, most of its energies were directed towards dealing with 
complaints against the police, reviewing legislation and offering legal advice. It 
began receiving grants from the federal government as well, including a $16 400 grant 
from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation to organize tenants 
associations across the province in 1971 and a $57 000 grant from the Secretary of 
State to study doctor-patient relations in 1973.51 The group also vigorously studied 
the McRuer report and attempted to apply the same recommendations to Nova Scotia 
by making presentations to the legislature's Law Amendments Committee in such 
areas as tenants rights and police practices. By 1976 the leadership of the group had 
turned to a local lawyer, Walter Thompson, and once he was unable to continue 
organizing the association's meetings, the Nova Scotia Civil Liberties Association 
ceased to be an active force in the province.52 
Prince Edward Islanders formed their first rights association in 1971. Before 
the Prince Edward Island Civil Liberties Association (PEl CLA) there had been no 
rights association in the province; a committee had been formed to celebrate the 
anniversary of the UDHR and did not develop into an independent association as had 
been the case in Saskatchewan, Alberta and Newfoundland. The new organization 
was founded in reaction to the use of the War Measures Act and helped found the 
Federation. One of its founders and future president was Norville Getty, a senior civil 
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servant in the Department of Development, and the remaining directors were 
predominantly professors from the University of Prince Edward Island. The group 
began with a small membership of 50 and had 100 by 1972.53 Among its earliest 
successes was a report on the poor state of the prison system which led to the building 
of a new provincial prison in Sleepy Hollow, just outside of Charlottetown. 54 Perhaps 
the most enduring success of the PEI CLA by 1982, however, was convincing the 
government to establish a permanent human rights commission in 1975.55 Although 
the province had enacted human rights legislation in 1968, it lacked a full time 
commission to enforce the legislation. Since its founding the PEI CLA had also been 
an active member of the Federation and remained so until both organizations became 
moribund in the 1990s. 
Newfoundland, which was not even a province of Canada when the first rights 
associations emerged, did not have its own rights association until the 1960s. As was 
the case with Saskatchewan and Alberta, the anniversary of the UDHR stimulated the 
creation of a rights association in Canada's easternmost province. It would later 
become one of the founding members ofthe Federation and a stalwart supporter of 
the organization until the Federation became defunct in 1990. Despite being a small 
group in an isolated region, the NLHRA continues to operate today after more than 
thirty years. 
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Endnotes for Appendix A 
1. This number does not include the large numbers of small chapters formed by 
various rights associations which only lasted for a few years. Don Whiteside's report 
which documented forty-six groups in 1972 referred to in chapter one included not 
only these small chapters in its analysis but several human rights committees set up by 
mayors in cities such as Kenora and Sudbury which are not discussed here. 
2. There is a clear bias against the CCLA in the report written by Don Whiteside 
for the Secretary of State. Interviews with rights activists across Canada confirmed 
that Whiteside had always been hostile to the CCLA; Whiteside was one of the key 
architects of the Federation, the only rival national rights association to the CCLA. In 
fact, the CCLA later wrote to Pelletier directly as Secretary of State criticising the 
inaccuracies in the report, noting that "in view of our past differences with him, it is 
perhaps understandable that he should wish to extend these polemics to the 
preparation and dissemination of such a document. What is disconcerting to us, 
however, is that the Government of Canada should officially sponsor the publication 
and dissemination of such inaccuracies." Sidney Midanik to Gerard Pelletier, n.d., 
NAC, CCLA, vol.l81, f.23; NAC, Kalmen Kaplansky Papers, MG30, A53, vol.7, 
f.3, A Brief Historical Analysis of the Development of Human Rights and Civil 
Liberties Associations in Canada, 6 June 1972. 
3. The Vancouver Civic Unity Association was created in 1950 with leaders 
from church, labour and ethnic groups in Vancouver. Despite the fact that it was not 
a self-identified civil liberties or human rights association, the Association did not 
represent any specific constituency but was truly representative of the community. 
However, it was clearly issue-specific, with a mandate to focus on anti-discrimination 
campaigns, and thus falls outside the rubric of a 'rights association.' NAC, Walter 
Tarnopolsky Papers, MG31, E55, v.8, f.l2, International Year for Human Rights, 
Reference Materials, n.d. 
4. According to William Giesbrecht, chair of the Vancouver Labour Committee 
for Human Rights, the B.C. Human Rights Council was "mainly an organization 
arising out of the individuals who were on the International Year for Human Rights, 
B.C. Commission, an organization primarily carrying out the same functions that the 
Vancouver Civic Unity Association had done for some years- or were supposed to do. 
"William Giesbrecht to R.C. Haynes, 15 April1970, vol.37, f.17, University of 
British Columbia, Rare Books and Special Collections, University of British 
Columbia, British Columbia Federation of Labour Papers. 
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5. Katz and the original members of the B.C. Human Rights Council were 
originally drawn from the Vancouver Unity Association. NAC, CCLA, vol.4, f.3, 
Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations- Report on Voluntary Organizations 
by Gilles Theriault and Michel Swinwood, 10 March 1972. 
6. As Katz noted in a meeting ofthe Undersecretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Human Rights, the "Council has some concern about the stance that 
civil liberties takes that strike the public, in many cases individuals as sort of a 
negative or regressive stance which tends to try to show the negative side in order to 
elicit the positive. On the other hand human rights is concerned with cultivating and 
developing a positive relationship." UQAM, SAGD, LDL, 24P2b/14, Under-
Secretary of State's Advisor Committee- Human Rights, 25 January 1971. 
7. Around the same time the British Columbia Human Rights Council was 
folding, a new organization was emerging in the province to take its place: the British 
Columbia Human Rights Coalition. As was the case with the Council, the Coalition 
was more an umbrella organization for rights associations than a membership of 
individuals. In addition, the Coalition favoured a broad human rights approach 
compared to the BCCLA's civil liberties viewpoint on issues such as pornography 
and hate propaganda. Ross Lambertson, interview by Dominique Clement, 26 August 
2003. 
8. The Victoria Civil Liberties Association was a product of the BCCLA field 
workers. For most of its history the Victoria group remained only marginally active, 
organizing public forums and supporting the BCCLA on specific issues. It remains 
active today, but only through the participation of a small group of individuals 
meeting irregularly in Victoria. Lambertson, interview. 
9. Robson to field workers, June 1974, LSBCA, BCCLA, vol.2, f.4. 
10. NAC, Franks Scott Papers, vol.103, list of events and plans undertaken by 
various organizations for International Year for Human Rights, 15 December 1967. 
11. NAC, Kalmen Kaplansky Papers, MG30, A53, vol.7, f.3, A Brief Historical 
Analysis of the Development of Human Rights and Civil Liberties Associations in 
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14. Ed Webking, interview by Dominique Clement, 26 August 2003. 
15. By the late-1970s Ed Web king had become the driving force behind the 
Lethbridge association. When he went on sabbatical in 1982 and moved to Ottawa to 
help Walter Tarnopolsky found the Human Rights Research Centre at the University 
of Ottawa, the group became defunct. Upon his return to Lethbridge W ebking 
decided not to revive the organization, but became active instead in the Calgary Civil 
Liberties Association. Webking, interview. 
16. National Bulletin, Vol.3, No.4, July 1974. 
17. Rights and Freedoms, No.25, March 1977; Rights and Freedoms, No.32, 
September-October 1979. 
18. Glenbow Archives, Sheldon Chumir Fonds, biographical summary. 
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21. NAC, Frank Scott Papers, v.52-3, provincial report from Saskatchewan for 
International Year for Human Rights, 1968. 
22. Another Ukranian who was among the key leaders of the SAHR was Zenon 
Pohorecky, a professor of archeology at the University of Saskatchewan. 
23. Canada. Report of the Proceedings, National Conference on Human Rights 
and Activities of the Canadian Commission, 1969 
24. Quoted in: National Bulletin, Vol.l, No. I. 
25. Civil Liberties, Vol.3, No.1, May 1971. 
26. UQAM, SAGD, LDL, 24P2b/ll, Canadian Civil Liberties Association-
Manitoba Branch, 1970. 
27. Civil Liberties, Vol.2, No.1, September 1969. 
28. Civil Liberties, Vol.2, No.1, August 1970. In 1968 it had been the Mantioba 
Civil Liberties Association which had taken charge of the provinces's activities 
during International Year for Human Rights. 
555 
29. In defence of human rights and civil liberties (MARL newsletter), 17 
December 1978, No.1. 
30. NAC, Walter Tarnopolsky Papers, vo1.3, f.5, minutes Board of Directors of 
the CCLA, 16 December 1981. 
31. NAC, Kalmen Kaplansky Papers, MG30, A53, vol.7, f.3, A BriefHistorical 
Analysis ofthe Development of Human Rights and Civil Liberties Associations in 
Canada, 6 June 1972. 
32. Civil Liberties, Vol.2, no.1, August 1970. 
33. National Bulletin, Vol.2, No.1, February 1973. 
34. National Bulletin, Vol.2, No.2, April1973. 
35. National Bulletin, Vol.2, No.2, April1973. 
36. National Bulletin, Vol.l, No.3, October 1972. 
37. Civil Liberties, Vol.2, No.1, September 1969. 
38. The Owen Sound group was an initiative of the local United Church and had 
about 20 members; it focussed its efforts on organizing seminars. In Windsor, 
professors Saul Nosanchuck and John Spellman formed the group and dealt with 
some minor issues such as getting a young man, who refused to cut his hair, back into 
the high school which had expelled him. Sudbury's Mayor's Committee on Human 
Rights was an initiative of the local 6500 of the Steelworker's Union with a union 
member, Bob Chartrand, as the committee's president. The union had decided to 
form the committee in the hope of attracting prominent members of the community, 
such as the mayor and police chief, to contribute to the union's human rights program. 
NAC, CCLA, vol.4, f.3, Civil Liberties and Human Rights Associations- Report on 
Voluntary Organizations by Gilles Theriault and Michel Swinwood, 10 March 1972. 
39. Jean Louis Beaudoin, to Pierre Paul Rioux, 10 December 1965, 24P3/1, 
UQAM, SAGD, LDL. 
40. Pierre Dupuis to Maurice Champagne, 27 August 1974, 24P3/3, UQAM, 
SAGD, LDL. 
41. UQAM, SAGD, LDL, 24P3, Les droits et libertes sur la Cote Nord- Recherche 
Action presentee par le Comite regional Cote Nord de Ligue des droits et libertes, 
1979. 
556 
42. Civil Liberties, Vol.2, No.1, September 1969. 
43. The first meeting of the Comite des droits de l'homme du nord est du 
Nouveau Brunswick was held on 16 May 1971 where a provisional committee was 
established to draft a constitution. On 17 December 1972 the constitution was 
approved and the organization formally created. It was organized along the regions 
established in the province for educational purposes (six in total), with 3 directors 
from each region being elected alongside 9 at-large members. The original impetus 
behind the organization was simply a group of friends who were active in other 
francophone community groups and who were inspired by the ideas of the UDHR and 
the Bill of Rights. Theo Gagnon, interview by Dominique Clement, 20 November 
2003. 
44. Gagnon, interview. 
45. Norville Getty, interview by Dominique Clement, 14 October 2003. 
46. The name change in 1969 reflected the leadership's desire to narrow the 
group's activism to civil liberties issues after the province appointed a full time 
director for the human rights commission. Human rights legislation had been passed 
inN ova Scotia in 1963 but the association at that time continued to play a key role in 
publicizing the legislation and bringing cases before the commission which had a 
small staff operating out of the Ministry of Labour. Public Archives ofNova Scotia, 
Nova Scotia Human Rights Association Papers, MG20, vol.421, summary of 
activities of the Nova Scotia Civil Liberties and Human Rights Association, no date. 
47. Walter Thompson, interview by Dominique Clement, 1 June 2003. 
48. NAC, Jewish Labour Committee Papers, MG28, V75, vo1.2, f.7, A Report of 
Recent Activities, 1965. 
49. NAC, Jewish Labour Committee Papers, MG28, V75, vo1.40, f.16, 
memorandum from Borovoy to the Joint Advisory Labour Committee, 31 January 
1967. 
50. According to an article covering the February 1972 meeting of the Nova 
Scotia Civil Liberties Association, much "of the energy of the organization in the past 
went into fighting for the rights of minority groups, especially black and Indians. But 
now that the Human Rights Commission and the Black United Front are operating 
many members feel the Civil Liberties Association can better serve the community by 
working to protect the civil liberties of all citizens." The 4th Estate, 3 February 1972. 
557 
51. Public Archives ofNova Scotia, Nova Scotia Human Rights Association 
Papers, MG20, vol.421, minutes of a meeting of the Nova Scotia Human Rights and 
Civil Liberties Association, 30 September 1971; Walter Thompson, interview by 
Dominique Clement, 1 June 2003. 
52. Thompson, interview. 
53. UQAM, SAGD, LDL, 24P2b/12, union of human rights and civil liberties 
newsletter, Vol.2, no.1, January 1972. 
54. Getty, interview. 
55. NAC, Canadian Labour Congress Papers, MG28, 1103, f.15, vol.662, report 
from the 1974 annual general meeting of the CLA NCR, 22 October 1974. 
558 




